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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the strategic decision-making practices (SDM) in 
music industry micro-enterprises in the United States.  Although a significant body 
of literature has examined the SDM processes in high-tech firms, manufacturers 
and other specialty industries, very little has been learned about strategic decision-
making within the music industry.  Eight cases were used to look at what influences 
the decision-making practice, and how.  Two decisions from each of four firms that 
are directly involved in the marketing and promotion of recorded music product 
were chosen.  The primary source data came from forty-three interviews by thirty-
six respondents from firms that were directly involved in the decision-making 
practice.  Direct observation and note taking on company culture and employee 
interaction, analysis of artefacts in the form of company emails, websites, social 
media sites and magazines, and other items referenced in the interviews were also 
used as data sources.  
Bourdieu’s theory of practice was used to conceptualise the decision-making 
as interplay between social, cultural, symbolic and economic capital, habitus, and 
field.  The principle argument developed in this thesis is consistent with Bourdieu’s 
concept of recognition, and explores the desire for actors in this field to make 
strategic decisions that will position themselves better to either acquire and/or use 
capital that will lead to further power and positioning within the field.  The 
primary practice was often dictated by the actor’s concern for reputation and how 
other individuals perceived them and their respective firms.  Instances of explicit 
and implicit exploitation of objectified symbolic capital were seen as a necessary 
practice to achieving firm objectives. This research also incorporates previous 
research on strategic decision-making in other micro-enterprises, including the use 
of past experiences, personal biases, heuristics and intuitive behaviours, as they are 
a product of the relationship between the habitus, capital and field.  A 
Bourdieusian lens allowed for the surfacing of the complex reflexive interplay 
among Bourdieu’s practice theory and the theoretical constructs of strategic 
decision-making, which led to a deep description of the influences on these 
practices in music industry micro-enterprises while further developing his ideas 
about the field of cultural production. By bringing both of these nuances to the 
forefront, my analysis leads to a contribution to the decision-making literature for 
micro-enterprises and music industry theorists while arguing for a repositioning of 
the popular music industry within the large-scale production of culture, as one 
characterised by high amounts of symbolic capital, not low amounts as Bourdieu 
(1996) contends.  In addition, I will argue that in order to transform one capital to 
another, for example, social or economic capital into symbolic capital, there is a 
need for a field-specific capital.  In this case, ‘music industry capital’ is used as a 
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 
 
A & R - Artist & Repertoire – The department within a record company 
responsible for finding new artists to record 
 
Actors - ‘Actors’ refer to the individual that ‘acts’ or makes their own free choices 
through ‘Agency’ 
 
 Agents – ‘Agents’ are normally those individuals or ‘actors’ that act on behalf of 
another and manage business, financial or contractual matters for a musician.  
 
Album – A recording containing usually eight or more individual songs totalling 
30 or more minutes of playing time. 
 
Billboard Charts – Report the weekly popularity of songs and albums in the 
United States recorded industry measured by radio airplay, streaming and sales 
 
Booking Agents - ‘Booking Agents’ refer to the agent that secures employment 
or performances for an artist 
 
Bundling – a sales and marketing strategy used in the music industry by 
combining of songs or other product under one single unit. Multiple songs on a 
given ‘EP’ or ‘Album’ would constitute a bundling of sound recordings. 
 
CHR – (Abbreviation for Christian Hit Radio) is a radio format that focuses on 
playing the Top 40 Christian songs as ranked by Billboard Charts.   
 
Christian AC - (Abbreviation for Christian Adult Contemporary) is a radio 
format similar to Adult Contemporary (AC) that targets 30-40 year old women. 
 
Christian INSPO (An Abbreviation for Christian Inspirational Music) – Is a style 
of music that often blends pop, contemporary and worship music and adult 
contemporary (AC).   Tracked by Billboard as a chart under the moniker of ‘Soft 
AC/Inspirational’ 
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DMA (Abbreviation for ‘Designated Marketing Area’) – A non-overlapping 
geographical area that is considered a standard in radio and television 
advertising 
 
Distribution (Abbreviation for Music Distribution) – the process and structures 
developed to get recorded music product into retail establishments.  This can be 
done with physical product or digital music product.  Distributors act as middle-
man between record labels and retail stores. 
 
DVD – Digital Versatile Disc, an optical disc storage format 
 
EP - (Abbreviation for ‘Extended Play’) – An album containing at least three and 
typically four to six songs 
 
Hot 100 – The Billboard Chart that tracks the top 100 most popular songs 
measured by airplay, digital and physical sales 
 
Hot Christian Songs – A Billboard Chart that ranks the most popular Christian 
songs measured by radio airplay impressions for any given week 
 
Independent Record Label or ‘Independents’ or ‘Indies’ – refers to those 
record labels that are not directly affiliated with the three main 
recording/entertainment companies 
 
MP3 (Abbreviation for MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3) - A file compression standard 
developed by the motion picture industry to make audio files smaller and 
therefore easier to transfer and store in computers and other devices 
 
MPAA – Motion Picture Association of America, a trade organisation that 
represents the six big Hollywood studios. 
 
‘Majors’ or Major Record Label – refers to the three main 
recording/entertainment companies 
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Promotion – the marketing and exploitation of master recordings by means of 
radio airplay 
 
Record – a general term used in the recording industry to mean an album, but 
could be considered an ‘album’ or ‘EP’ 
 
RIAA – Recording Industry Association of America, a trade organisation that 
supports and promotes the creative and financial vitality of the major music 
companies 
 
SDM – Strategic Decision-Making 
 
SoundScan – The company that collects point-of-sale information from the UPC 
bar code scanners at a variety of record retail outlets and sells sales pattern 
information to the labels or other parties; now actually Nielsen SoundScan, a 
division of Nielsen Retail Information 
 


















1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND AIMS 
 The research presented in this thesis is motivated by the desire to 
address a gap in our understanding of micro-enterprise decision-making in the 
popular recorded music industry.  Although a significant body of literature has 
examined strategic decision-making in high-tech firms, manufacturers and other 
industries, there is a paucity of research from within the recorded music 
industry that uses a Bourdieusian methodology.  The packaging and selling of a 
creative product, the high risk, low success rate of music, and the rapidly 
changing nature of the distribution system impacts the way in which decision 
makers examine the environment, analyse data and allocate resources.   These 
creative and cultural industry characteristics (Hirsch, 1972; Peterson, 1976; 
Negus, 1997; 1999; Caves, 2000) will help to form the foundation of this thesis. 
In an effort to understand this practice better, I sought to answer the 
following: 
1. How do owner managers within recorded music industry 
microenterprises in the United States of America make strategic 
decisions? 
 
2. What are the key influences on decision choices using a Bourdieusian 
conceptualisation of decision-making as interplay among social, 
cultural, economic and symbolic capital, habitus, and field? 
 
The recorded music industry is a dynamic and interconnected network of 
businesses that contribute to the overall end-product of music to which we 
listen. The previously accepted business model within the recorded music 
industry, before the recent internet-generated shift in its market structure, 
consisted of a rights-based model of distribution that relied heavily on ‘mega’ 
hits to generate revenue and sustain the major record labels’ dominance.  This 
model is now moving towards one that focuses more on the ways in which firms 
need to understand how to best monetise the relationship between content 
creator, the artist and consumer.  As the prominence of MP3 technology took 
hold in the 1990s and consumers began listening to their recordings through 
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digital means, the value chain shifted and became a much more ‘artist and 
consumer friendly’ model – one which enables easy access to music and satisfies 
consumer needs and wants.  These consumer-centric foci continue to shape the 
power and market structures in the industry today (Bockstedt, Kauffman & 
Riggins, 2006).  
Even though the means of consumption and distribution have been 
changing in the recorded music industry, the product has remained relatively 
constant for decades.  This consistency, coupled with the opportunities brought 
about by changes in technology, has prompted the investigation of the 
characteristics inherent in the commercialisation of cultural production and 
creative product like music (Caves, 2000).  This has led researchers as early as 
the 1960s and 1970s to begin investigating the dynamic relationship between 
the economic interest of the individual or firm and the creation of popular music 
for the public and private good.  As this research thread has grown, from social 
and cultural implications to the impacts upon the marketing, management and 
economics of the industry, it has presented researchers with more questions and 
opportunities for further investigation.   
One such area of interest and worthy of further study includes the way in 
which strategic decisions in this industry are actually made.  What motivates 
people to make decisions the way they do, and why?  As I will discuss throughout 
this thesis, much has been learned about strategic decision-making processes 
throughout the past half-century, but little has been investigated specifically 
within the realm of a creative and culture-producing industry like the popular 
recorded music industry - one that exhibits characteristics such as an 
uncertainty of demand and unpredictability of success, which I will discuss in 
further detail in section 2.4.4.  I will argue that, although similar influences on 
the decision-making practice may exist in other environments in which studies 
have been undertaken, the characteristic qualities of the recorded music 
industry impact strategic decision-makers in a way that has not yet been 
articulated empirically. 
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1.2 CONTEXT TO THE THESIS 
Much of my adult life has been involved in music, either as a performer, 
educator or business associate.  What I have learned in practical terms about the 
popular music industry has come from working and interacting with people 
while pursuing my career goals and helping others to achieve theirs.  
Considering the path I have chosen, now as a university instructor and 
researcher, I have also had the opportunity to learn from and teach others about 
my experiences. 
While pursuing my own goals and assisting others, I have also had the 
opportunity to begin learning more of the theoretical concepts that have guided 
the industry, understanding better why things are the way they are.   Whilst 
working in the music industry and expanding my opportunities to learn more 
about theoretical foundations, I always knew there was something different 
about how business was done in this industry.  I am aware of how it has evolved 
within the past half-century and the uncertainty and unreliability of what would 
or could lead to success.  This included the way I, and my colleagues, often 
approached problem solving and made the decisions that could either make or 
break our own or our artists’ careers.  This led me to look into how and what 
actually influenced, not only my own, but others' decision-making in this 
industry.   
In the winter of 2009, as I began my search to pursue a PhD I was coming 
from a career in the music industry.  I had begun teaching in higher education 
only a few years earlier, but was still actively consulting and managing artists in 
the music industry.  My career began as an independent musician and instructor 
before moving to a position as regional sales manager for a music products’ 
chain in the United States. I later became marketing and business development 
manager for a music and entertainment firm, and had the opportunity to work 
with prominent international artists.  I also held other positions in 
administration and licensing, during my twelve-year career in the music 
industry.  In 2006, an opportunity to teach in higher education was presented, 
with an offer from a small liberal arts college in central Pennsylvania.  I pursued 
this proposal with excitement and was soon enjoying an environment that 
actively encouraged the dissemination of new knowledge, debate and inquiry.   It 
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was not just about solving problems; it was also about asking questions.  
Bringing a blend of practical knowledge and my strong desire to learn allowed 
me to seek insight into some of these problems and questions I often 
encountered and inquired about while working.  I just needed the tools and 
guidance to do so adequately and professionally.  While I began the process of 
formally pursuing a research degree, I also became active in other academic 
organisations and pursuits including the Music and Entertainment Industry 
Educators Association (MEIEA), the Academy of Management (AOM) and the 
Strategic Management Society (SMS).  The culmination of these activities and my 
acceptance into a research programme enabled me to consider investigating 
what was really happening in companies as they were making the strategic 
decisions that impacted the future of their companies.  Was it formal planning, as 
I had learned in graduate school, or was it more akin to how I, in reality, was 
approaching it?  My procedure could have been described as somewhat chaotic, 
with no logical planning other than doing what I felt was correct at any given 
time.  I wanted to know more, and this was the opportunity for formal inquiry.  
Not only could I find insight for myself, but this information could also be helpful 
to those who continue to encounter these challenges in the industry today. 
Because of my experience in the industry and recognition of the need for 
a better understanding of this context, in this thesis I seek to engage not only 
theorists and academics, but also those who work in the industry.  I hope to 
enlighten my own future practice and understanding, as well as theirs.  Thus, I 
will inform the debate on micro-enterprises and, specifically, those within the 
music industry field. 
As I began my research, I approached it from a positivistic perspective 
typical of a management researcher from the United States.  I quickly realised 
that in order to understand the subtle nuances of the strategic decision-making 
practice, I needed to pursue an approach that would provide for a more 
descriptive, rather than a generalised finding.  This led to explorations into those 
methodologies best suited to answering my questions.  Ranging from Giddens’ 
structuration to symbolic interactionism, I found an interest in a growing 
perspective that has recently gained prominence in strategy research – strategy-
as-practice (S-as-P).  I chose this approach due to the practical nature of its 
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philosophy, and the growing interest amongst strategy researchers.  S-as-P 
research takes a different perspective from previous threads of inquiry – one 
often rooted in practice theories that look at how strategy is actually carried out 
in firms.  Of the multiple practice theories, I chose Bourdieu and his approach to 
social scientific inquiry for three reasons.   
First, his method of interpretation can account for the subtle nuances 
between structure and agency.  This enables an investigation into the influences 
that are occurring between the firms, the actors and the industry in which they 
are situated.  The researcher is capable of extending beyond the surface, and 
exploring how the phenomena being studied have evolved.   Meaning is 
determined by the interplay among the field, its actors and structures, the 
practices and interactions of people and the activities they carry out.  Choosing a 
practice theory as a methodology allows for that understanding.  It enables me to 
look at not just the decisions being made, but also what is motivating those 
decisions and influencing them. 
Second, it is Bourdieu’s use of an on-going reflexive approach to analysing 
empirical data that allows me to be mindful of how my biases may influence the 
interpretation of data.  This will be elaborated on in more detail in Chapter 9. 
The activities and practices being observed, documented and analysed are 
coloured by the prejudices, dispositions and biases that are the result of my 
working in the industry, and of which I have had to be mindful in writing this 
account.  This is an example of a reflexive sociology that Bourdieu called 
‘participant objectivation’.  A critical look at the analysis that I conduct can also 
lead to an understanding of how my view and experiences can distort, 
overemphasise ideals or even impact interpretation of the data.  Being mindful of 
this impact lies at the heart of what Bourdieu often found troubling in a detached 
world of ‘observation’ that is at the centre of an objective or positivistic 
epistemology.  
Third, his theory of practice, unlike others, can account for the subtle 
differences that motivate an actor beyond the superficial.  His use of habitus, 
field, doxa, capital and more specifically symbolic capital can account for 
behaviour and motivation in ways other theories cannot. The use of symbolic 
capital allows for the unspoken power relationships between the systems in the 
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field and the actors within them. I wanted to study why and how strategic 
decisions were being made and what motivates people to prioritise certain 
objectives over others and how this leveraging of power can influence that 
practice.   Through my own experience, it was the ‘unspoken’ leveraging of 
‘whom you know’ or ‘what someone can do for you’ mentality that permeates the 
daily decision-making.  The need to launch an artist by getting them ranked on 
industry sales and airplay charts, signed to a ‘certain label’ or working with a 
specific producer, and the great lengths people go to make that happen, can 
impact how decisions are perceived and made. 
As I was exploring the different practice theories, frameworks and 
methodologies available to me as a researcher, I stumbled upon Bourdieu and 
his praxeology while reading the Cambridge Handbook on Strategy as Practice, 
edited by Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl and Vaara (2010).  It quickly became clear to 
me that a Bourdieusian lens would aid in the explanation of, and accounting for, 
the subtleties of the practice that I wished to investigate.  I took it upon myself to 
conduct further ‘due diligence’ on his work and learn more about what Bourdieu 
and his theory had to offer, not only into why it would be an appropriate lens, but 
also its limitations.  After extensive investigation and considering the influences 
on strategic decision-making in micro-firms, I determined that Bourdieu enabled 
the answering of my research questions.   The last missing piece for me to make 
this decision was a work by Özbilgin and Tatli (2005) that enabled me to feel 
comfortable in taking a risk in using his work in an organisational setting.  
Becoming more fashionable now, it was less so when I decided to use a 
Bourdieusian praxeology as a lens when looking at practices within a firm.  This 
also led me to doing something different, while simultaneously knowing that it 
was an appropriate methodology to pursue for this research. However, I was at 
first cautious of the contribution it could make to understand the phenomena 
better, mostly because it reinforced my early bias towards a more positivist 
approach.  Nevertheless, as I continued the research and became more 
comfortable in using a Bourdieusian praxeology and a more interpretivist 
epistemology, a rich account of the decision-making practice began to surface.  A 
further reflection of how well Bourdieu worked, its limitations, and how the 
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challenges from an entrenched positivistic disposition affected my research, will 
be discussed in sections 9.6 and 9.7. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
As stated, the research questions have been operationalised using an 
interpretive epistemology so that the nature of ‘how’ and ‘what’ can be explored 
in-depth. Specifically, my intention is to follow the approach to 
phenomenological analysis as defined by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), a 
perspective concerned with ‘‘how social reality, everyday life, is constituted in 
conversation and interaction’ (p. 3) and how this contributes to the perceptions 
of decision-making in the popular recorded music industry. Using Bourdieu, and 
his theory of practice as a methodological lens to accomplish this, allows for the 
study of strategic decision-making in its ‘natural setting…by attempting to make 
sense of, or interpret,  [it] in terms of the meanings people bring’ (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 3). This perspective is suitable for the personal interviews, 
direct observation and analysis of key documents and communication that were 
used for this research.  
I decided that the best approach to answering the research question using 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice was to undertake a study of multiple decisions. 
Fieldwork was carried out in two distinct phases.  The first phase consisted of 
eleven interviews that allowed the fine-tuning of questions and adjustment of 
procedures when data collection ensued for the second stage.  Most interviews 
were conducted one-on-one, unless requested by the interviewee.  Each 
individual, however, was presented with the same topics for discussion, whether 
one or two colleagues were present in the room. The semi-structured interview 
allowed for an extraction of richer data enabling me to probe deeper into 
subtleties of activity.  The interview protocol was based on sixteen, pre-
determined topics, some of which were altered slightly in a second phase of the 
interview to reflect the position and responsibility of the individual that was 
involved in the decision practice.   
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1.4 KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
There are many assumptions that guide inquiry in strategic decision-
making.  The perspective taken in this research - a sociological practice driven 
approach - enables an account of the many influences that impact the decision-
making process.  The practice involved in generating activities, determining 
implications and the structures in which the decisions are made, is not a purely 
scientific or economic one.  You must also take into consideration their social 
reality and history when looking upon the intent and motivation behind why 
certain decisions are made in the manner they are.  Secondly, the power and 
positioning within the field must also be taken into consideration.  The capital, in 
all forms, social, economic, cultural and symbolic, determines the actor’s 
influence upon other actors in the field and the decisions that shape the 
accumulation of that capital.  Thirdly, this interplay among actors and other 
firms in which they operate is not done in isolation; it is played to the field doxa, 
the rules of which are often dictated by the dominant actors within the field. 
However, the actor plays the social reality of that game and must determine how 
he or she is able to leverage what they have in order to increase his or her 
positioning.  This leveraging of resources is conducted through decision-making, 
which may have a long-term impact on them or the firm in which they work.  
As the researcher, my dispositions will be highlighted, as their impact is 
meaningful in the interpretation of the data. Having a history of working in the 
industry for well over a decade and coming from a more positivistic research 
environment within the United States, I will certainly approach it with bias. 
Bringing my habitus to the research can lead to misunderstood intentions and 
nuances that other investigators, outside the field, may not bring to the analysis 
of the data. Because of my experience, I may see things as insignificant that could 
negatively affect the subtle gradations and richness of interpretation that could 
more easily be recognised by someone that sees it with fresh eyes.   
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1.5 OUTLINE OF THE REPORT 
 
This thesis contains nine chapters. The first following this introduction is 
the literature review; the next chapter focuses on the chosen methodology, 
followed by a chapter discussing the methods used.  The next four chapters 
feature the data collected and the analysis of it, with a final discussion chapter 
that speaks to findings, limitations and future research.  Beginning after this 
chapter, the recent research being undertaken within strategic decision-making 
will be discussed along with investigations related to the music industry.  
Understanding the differences in how managers that work in micro-enterprises 
approach decision-making along with the influences upon the practice is 
imperative in framing the context of the research questions.  This will be 
reviewed along with what has been learned about the practice from the 
beginnings of the conceptualisation until now.   It will then be followed by a 
review of the popular music industry that will outline the social and cultural 
impacts of the field including the implications of bringing music to the market 
place along with the characteristics that define it as a creative and cultural 
industry.  
Chapter 3 is a discussion on methodology, specifically the use of 
Bourdieu’s concepts within his practice theory – the underlying theoretical 
assumption that has guided this research.  Bourdieu’s practice theory is outlined 
and justified, as a lens most suited for answering the research questions over 
other known practice theories.  Each concept is then defined within his theory of 
practice including habitus, capital and the field cultural production, including 
how these concepts are used within the music industry.   
Chapter 4 outlines the methods used in data collection.  It discusses the 
rationale for the use of cases in answering the research question.  In addition, the 
use of interviews as a source of data and the use of direct observation and note 
taking will also be discussed.   Furthermore, the chapter will provide the 
approach used in case reduction, coding and analysis techniques and specific 
field procedures used when obtaining access, confidentiality and ethical use of 
data. 
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In Chapters 5 to 8, the findings and analysis of the data obtained in the 
field are undertaken.  Within this presentation, each chapter purposely contains 
two strategic decisions undertaken by one firm, which will enable the reader to 
navigate more clearly the findings of each case.  The details of the practice of the 
decision-making are highlighted and the influences behind those practices are 
specified.  The ramifications and justifications of the decision-making are also 
emphasised and the chosen cases will underscore the different perspectives and 
decisions often confronted within the industry by firm owners and managers. 
The culmination of all the data collected is brought together with a detailed 
description of how strategic decisions were made within this context.  These 
data are then analysed and interpreted through the methodology outlined in 
section Chapters 3 and 4.  The concepts of habitus, at both an individual and firm 
level, capital - symbolic, cultural, social and economic, will be brought together to 
describe the decision-making practice within the field of study. 
Following the presentation and analysis of the data will be a discussion 
about the implications of those findings on the fields of decision-making in 
micro-enterprises and in a creative and cultural business like the popular 
recorded music industry, the extraction of, the analysis and the framing of it with 
the theoretical foundations established in Chapter 2 and 3, while doing so 
through a Bourdieusian lens will shape the findings and contributions made to 
the strategic decision-making literature and application of the his practice theory 
in this setting.  The practice used in making strategic decisions highlight the 
importance agency has on the firm and the influences that the field has upon that 
agency. Highlighting these results in this fashion will demonstrate the new 
findings and rich description that contribute to the understanding of how 
decisions are actually being made, not only in micro-enterprises, but micro-
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As was suggested in Chapter 1, this study will examine the strategic 
decision-making practice in micro-enterprises, from the United States popular 
recorded music industry.  Although a significant body of literature looks at the 
strategic decision-making processes in high-tech firms, manufacturers and other 
specialty industries, there is a paucity of research on these practices in the music 
industry.  
In an effort to understand this practice better, the research will look at 
answering how and what influences owner managers of micro-enterprises in the 
recorded music industry to make strategic decisions. In this chapter, I will 
explain the process of strategic decision-making as practice within the recorded 
music industry.  The chapter is organised in four sections.  First, an investigation 
into the theories and concepts implicit in strategic decision-making, especially as 
it relates to micro-enterprises, will be highlighted.  This will be important to help 
explain and build upon the concepts to be identified in the findings of the 
research and later the discussion of those findings.  It also helps to build a 
framework that can be integrated into Bourdieu’s practice theory, which will 
later establish a richer description of the practice. 
In addition to the current threads of research that exist within strategic 
decision-making, three additional concepts that are explicit in the framework for 
this research will be explored.  Second, the current, commercial music industry, 
the characteristics that underpin it and the factors that have influenced its 
economic performance in recent history will be discussed.  Within that, how 
research within the music industry has developed within five general categories 
of inquiry, including the impacts on social and cultural influences, artist selection 
processes, the structure of the music industry, economic and pricing influences 
and, lastly, the impact of new technologies, will be presented.  Current threads of 
research as well as gaps in knowledge will be explored.   I have not investigated 
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those disciplines engaged most directly in recording, audio production and 
engineering, since their role, though applicable to the music industry, has little 
relevance in this current research. 
Moreover, an establishment of the important research currently being 
undertaken in the realm of strategy as practice will be undertaken along with a 
brief exploration in the differences that exist in strategic decision-making for 
micro-enterprises and small firms, especially as they relate to the recorded 
music industry.  
2.2 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
2.2.1 Decision-Making 
A decision can be defined as ‘making up one’s mind’ or ‘coming to a 
conclusion’ on a given issue. This definition is one that is inclusive of a ‘cognitive’ 
or thought process, but is not adequate in including additional attributes that 
may be in involved.  Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Théorêt (1976) recognised that 
a decision is much more than a cognitive process and defined it as ‘a specific 
commitment to action’.  Their definition for decision-making involves the actual 
doing of something, not just the mere thinking of doing something.  Others 
(Castles, Murray & Potter, 1971; Greenbank, 1999) have gone on to wonder 
whether this action includes the commitment to do nothing, or not make a 
decision at all.  These definitions extend the concept of decision-making from a 
simple cognitive approach to one that includes the actual making of the decision 
by taking into consideration the implementation of the process.  It also becomes 
more indicative of the importance of ‘body wisdom’, the intuitive or innate 
attributes of the process that an individual must consider when weighing several 
options (Simon, 1978; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992).   Body wisdom takes into 
consideration not only the rational thought process, or weighing of alternatives, 
by which decisions are made, but also leaves the process open to the influence of 
those attributes less tangible that may influence those decisions.  
The ‘less tangible’ attributes have led to a body of research focusing on 
cognitive psychology in decision-making and the influences they have on the 
process. This research includes the role of biases, past experiences and 
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heuristics as well as a thread of discourse pertaining to studies that focus on 
cognitive neuroscience.  Each of which will be elaborated in more detail. 
2.2.2 Levels of Decision-Making 
Different levels of decision-making have been identified to exist in firms. 
Ansoff (1971) classified them as operational, administrative and strategic, with 
each level increasing in complexity and impact.  Operational decisions are those 
that are routine in nature and will remain consistent with the organisation’s 
methods and routines.  Administrative decisions are those that tend to occur at a 
‘middle-management’ level and will be more complex as they are dealing with 
motivation or control issues.  At the top of this hierarchy lies those decisions 
classified as strategic that are typically executed and made by top management 
of the firm and will be more involved with the long-range planning and/or 
objective setting of the organisation (Gore & Richardson, 1992).  Mintzberg et al 
(1976) has gone on to define strategic decisions more specifically as those that 
are ‘important, in terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, or the 
precedents set.’ These clear lines of a strict hierarchy may become blurred when 
applied to small businesses and are discussed in further detail in section 2.6 
below.  Some small businesses may fall short of a strict hierarchy of this kind by 
the sheer nature of being a sole-proprietor, or micro-enterprise. The strategic 
level of decision-making is of interest to this study and will continue to be the 
focus of development. 
2.2.3 Strategic Decision Making as Processes and Dimensions 
Various strategic decision-making processes and dimensions have been 
identified throughout the literature.  Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) studied 
comprehensiveness and stable firm environments to conclude that strategy is 
itself a decision-making process.  From their observations they suggest that 
researchers should study individual, that is, single, strategic decisions. This way, 
researchers can attempt to observe whether firms integrate those decisions into 
an overall strategy.  Many rely on some key assumptions when studying the 
phenomena.  In particular, one assumption is that decisions are moments when a 
course of action is taken (Harrison, 1987).  This view has been challenged by 
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some researchers that consider decision-making a social process that consists of 
a series of events that begins with recognising that a problem exists, then 
developing alternatives solutions, and lastly making a choice (Simon, 1978).  
Others have found that strategic decision-making processes are more complex 
and begin with not recognising a need for making a decision immediately but 
rather when objectives are set out through to actual implementation of the 
decision.  Specifically, Mintzberg et al. (1976) compiled these steps to create a 
model of strategic decision-making based on empirical observation made from 
25 decision processes.  The authors identified seven possible pathways through 
the model which included different phases and sets of supporting routines.  
What Mintzberg et al. (1976) were able to demonstrate was that the strategic 
decision-making processes tend to be more structured than amorphous.  Even 
though they were not the first researchers to identify strategic decision-making 
as a process with multiple dimensions, they were able to demonstrate 
empirically that it does involve multiple steps of varying complexity.   
2.2.4 Influences on Strategic Decision-Making   
Although strategic decision-making processes have allowed researchers 
to understand some of the more objective characteristics, much of the current 
understanding of strategic decision-making has moved away from 
conceptualisations of the process (Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980; Mintzberg, 1994).  
Instead of it being a top-down, externally focused, calculable process as indicated 
by Simon (1978), there is much greater recognition of decision-making as an 
emotional, competence or heuristic-based process (Mintzberg & Quinn, 1991; 
Weick, 1995; Stacey, 1996) with multiple influences.  These include individual 
cognitive level influences of sense-making, heuristics, biases, intuitive patterns 
and even personal characteristics; and group or organisation-level processes, for 
example planning, data gathering and analysis.   
Research into individual decision-making cognition has shown that when 
decision makers are exposed to similar internal and external stimuli, it often 
results in differing interpretations of those stimuli (Dutton, 1993).  Gioia and 
Chittipeddi (1991) argue that this ‘sense-making’ process enables decision 
makers to collect information and helps them to make more informed decisions.  
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Although, when left to individual interpretation of events, these decision makers 
use heuristics, that is ‘decision rules, cognitive mechanisms, and subjective 
opinions’ to aid in making decisions (Busenitz & Barney, 1997).  Some argue that 
these decision aids are an inferior and flawed approach compared to a more 
rational method (Hastie & Dawes, 2009). However, recent studies have shown 
that using them can be as effective and efficient as complex models in some 
environments.  (Katsikopoulos & Fasolo, 2006; Smith & Gilhooly, 2006).  
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) have even tried reconciling this difference by 
identifying a ‘third way’ through the development of a family of algorithms that 
bridge the divide between reasoning, as one that is neither rational nor 
psychological.  The authors based these algorithms on Simons’ ‘satisficing’ 
concept in which the rational integration of all information is unnecessary and at 
times can perform better in speed and accuracy for the making of a decision.  
This model, more of a bounded rational one, stops after the ‘first discrimination 
cue is found,’ essentially creating an anchor on which a decision is made based 
on the knowledge of the individual making the decision.  That is, similar to that 
of certain heuristics, yet formally modelled.   
Heuristics 
 Heuristics have been identified as aids that help simplify the decision-
making process in uncertain situations and bring about a suitable outcome. 
Anecdotally, much of the decision-making that occurs within this industry is 
done to aid in ‘quicker’ decision-making due to the inherently turbulent 
environment and lack of time and knowledge to gather information.  Music 
industry decision-makers often need to take swift action, based upon trends in 
the market place or decisions based on subjective elements within a cultural or 
experiential product like music.  Simon (1990) defined these heuristics as 
‘methods for arriving at satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of 
computation’ (p. 11), which corresponds closely with Kahneman’s (2011) 
‘System 1’ idea – ‘thinking corresponds to fast, intuitive, emotional and almost 
automatic decisions’ (p. 20). They enable the decision maker to streamline the 
process and use less information when making the decision. Although research 
in the area of heuristics has been vast, leading to numerous heuristic types, and 
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leaving some to question the term and what it really means (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008), this research will focus on some of the most understood 
heuristics that have endured rigorous investigation.   Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) identified three types; the representativeness heuristic – decisions based 
on the likelihood of something happening; the availability heuristic – judgments 
based on exposure to a cue, or  use of our memory and ability, to remember; and 
anchoring and adjustment – basing decisions on previous knowledge that 
‘anchors’ an event in which we then make adjustments based on additional 
information.   
The Representativeness heuristic (Bruin, Parker, & Fischoff, 2007) (Shah 
& Oppenheimer, 2008) (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002); was first studied by 
Tversky and Khaneman (1971) when they explained why statisticians calculated 
the potential outcome of a sample based upon population parameters even if the 
sample was too small for it to be statistically representative.   They argued that 
this type of decision-making should be regarded as suspect because of its 
prevalence to lead to personal bias.  Since their first look at this heuristic 
however, Kahneman (2011) has continued his research in the area concluding 
that the use of a representativeness heuristic is often used a rules of judgement 
and is even necessary for effective decision-making under certain circumstances.  
Others (Hilbig & Pohl, 2008) (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006) have also gone on to 
investigate this ‘probability-based’ heuristic.  Hilbig and Pohl (2012) looked at its 
use under time constraints and effort-related factors and discovered its 
prominent use within those parameters as well. 
In addition to the work done on the representativeness heuristic, some 
studies also looked at the use of, and reliance upon, the availability heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), also known in some circles as the ‘recognition 
heuristic’.  Goldstein & Gigerenzer (2002) looked at how judgments are made 
based on a cue that triggers our memory.  Redelmeier, (2005) looked at how 
using these types of shortcuts can contribute to misdiagnosis in patients.  
However, when these life or death scenarios are not relevant, using a shortcut 
like availability heuristics can aid in quicker and often good decisions in less 
time, then a more thorough or calculated approach to the decision-making 
(McKelvie, 2000). 
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 The third heuristic to discuss that has been studied since the recognition of 
these ‘short cut’ rules is the anchoring and adjustment, (Simmons, LeBoeuf & 
Nelson, 2010) (Epley & Gilovich, 2006) where the decision-maker anchors a 
decision choice from a past event and adjusts his or her choice based on the new 
information.  Simmons, LeBoeuf and Nelson (2010) in their study on the 
heuristic demonstrated that people are often uncertain about which way to 
adjust from their anchor and this uncertainty causes them to believe they have 
adjusted too far from initial assessment, whereby effecting decision outcome.  
Epley and Gilvovich (2006) also studied this heuristic and found that once a 
plausible outcome had been reached by the decision-maker, the need to search 
for other alternatives ceased to exist, thereby proving the efficiency of the 
judgement rule, but recognising that if a more thorough anchoring search was 
done, that outcomes could instil better decision-making. 
Intuitive Behaviours 
In addition to sense-making and heuristics, intuition has also been 
identified as a cognitive influence.  Although intuition has not been widely 
studied in academia (Agor, 1989), some academics have found ways in which to 
quantify its qualities so that this phenomenon can be studied more in depth.  
Those who do write about it (Behling & Eckel, 1991) tend to classify it into six 
conceptualisations; 
1. paranormal power or sixth sense;  
2. personality trait;  
3. unconscious process; 
4. set of actions; 
5. distilled experience; and  
6. residual category.   
Miller and Ireland (2005) attempted to provide clarity to the many 
definitions and its applications as it is used in management research.  They 
determined that two levels of intuition exist, ‘holistic hunch’ and ‘automated 
expertise’.  
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‘Holistic hunch intuition is capable of providing benefits but only 
when firms are emphasizing exploration.  Automated expertise 
intuition left at a subconscious level does not appear to provide un-
equivocal benefits to firms’ (Miller & Ireland, 2005, p. 28).   
More recently, Seifert and Hadida (2009) identified intuition and its 
influence on managerial forecasts in the music industry as having a positive 
impact and increase in forecasting judgments.  This also demonstrates how the 
unconscious process of intuition lends itself to more improved business actions 
and talent selection decisions within the music industry.  Although academic 
studies related to intuition have increased in recent years (Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
Khatri, & Alvin, 2000), it continues to present challenges with regard to 
empirical measurement.  
Trust 
 
Trust has also been shown to play an important role in strategic decision-
making for managers.  In today’s business environment, the reliance upon sub-
ordinates or other colleagues to aid in decision-making has become more 
prominent.  Trust, an ‘individual’s willingness to be vulnerable to another based on 
the belief that another party is competent, honest, reliable and concerned about 
the individual’s own interest’ (Spreitzer, G. & Mishra, A., 1999, p. 159) is 
consistent with other conceptualisations of trust within the literature (McAlister, 
1995) and enables a manager to rely on another’s expertise in areas that may be 
less familiar to them.   Spreitzer and Mishra (1999) found that managers are 
more likely to include employees in the decision-making process when trust 
between the two had been established.  The relationship that has been 
recognised between decision-maker and ‘consultant’ demonstrates that a 
perception of honest and reliable advice will be given when asked about a given 
situation.  In addition, Dooley and Fryxell (1999) found a strong relationship 
between trust and dissent within the decision-making process and decision 
quality.  Trusting members of a decision-making team and relying upon them 
even when disagreements emerge can improve the quality of the decision 
outcome.  Liberman-Yaconi, Hooper, and Hutchings (2010) also found that in 
micro-firm strategic decision-making, owners often relied upon ‘external 
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advisors’ in seeking information before making decisions.  Using ‘external 
advisors’ enabled managers to seek out perspectives they were less familiar.  An 
outreach in this manner on major decisions is indicative of a trust relationship 
between decision makers and perceived professionals.   
Industry Environment 
 
Other influences on strategic decision-making that have been empirically 
studied include group or organisational level processes. Eisenhardt (1989; 1999) 
looked at strategic decision-making processes in high velocity environments.  In 
her observations she determined that firms engage in open discussions, and use 
more, not less, information when making decisions.  Scanning the environment, 
increasing alternative solutions and modelling different situations occurred 
more despite the pressures and time constraints inherent in a turbulent 
environment.  These results challenged the traditional views of strategic 
decision-making in high-velocity situations that indicate less information would 
be used rather than more (Eisenhardt, 1989).  She also concluded that to be 
more effective, strategic decision-makers in high turbulent environments should 
encourage conflict amongst its influencers - in this case the top executives - in 
order to foster better outcomes.  Cosier (1982) also advocates ways to foster 
better outcomes through the use of ‘devil’s advocate’ practices and dialectic 
approaches amongst decision-making teams.  He argues that surrounding 
yourself with ‘yes men’ may not be as conducive to effective decision-making in 
the long run and the use of dissent and critical thought could be more effective.  
Contrary to this argument, however, Cosier and Schwenk (1990) advocate for 
consensus in creating more effective decisions in some circumstances.  They 
went as far as stating, ‘consensus may be preferred for smaller, non-diversified, 
privately held firms competing in the same industry’ (p. 70).   These conflicting 
arguments and inconclusive outcomes appear to demonstrate a clear lacuna in 








Strough, Schlosnagle and DiDonato (2011) found a relationship between 
age and the tendency to move forward with a decision to escalate financial risk 
through sunk costs.  In their study looking at 21 older and 20 younger adults 
they found that older adults are less likely to commit to the sunk cost fallacy and 
are more likely to make decisions to correct it, being less likely to focus on the 
current problem.  In addition, Larrick, Nisbett and Morgan (1993) found a 
connection between demographic characteristics of an individual like education, 
age and intelligence and the use of sunk costs.  In their study looking at faculty 
and college seniors they found those with a lower income status had poor 
economic judgement leading to a higher probability of financial escalation. In 
addition, they also found a positive relationship between ‘intelligence’ and those 
individuals who use micro-economic principles like cost-benefit rules that lead 
to more successful life outcomes.   
The sunk-cost fallacy is an ‘irrational decision to invest more future 
resources in a situation after an investment has been made (costs are sunk) 
compared with the same situation without an investment.’ (Strough et al., 2011 p. 
681).  Although other studies (Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 1997) have also looked at 
the connections between how we make decisions that increase financial risk and 
exposure, Garland (1990), found that there was no indication that incremental 
costs played any role in decision-making within its study that created a research 
and development (R & D) and a commitment of funds.  
Past Experiences 
 
An individual’s past experience can also influence their future decision-
making.  Juliusson, Karlsson, and Gӓrling (2005) determined that an individual 
who had positive prior experiences in a given situation would likely make 
similar decisions in the future with the expectation of a similar outcome. The 
authors looked at how participants responded to an escalation of commitment or 
‘sunk costs’ in investment scenarios.  In one of two experiments it was shown 
that prior losses or gains affected the decision makers’ choices for future 
investment.  Through this they were also able to observe that a negative past 
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experience led to a belief that given a similar situation a similar, negative 
outcome would occur. Another study (Council, 2009) has also suggested that 
past experience is critical to complex decision-making, especially in confusing 
situations.  The authors found that past experiences actually ‘rewires the brain’ to 
help categorise and improve efficiency of our decision-making processes.  
Learning from how we perceive and react to things in the past helps the brain to 
re-shape how we comprehend that experience so that we can change how we 
respond in future events.  The impact that past experience has physically as well 
as cognitively has been shown to influence how decision-makers perceive future 
scenarios and impact biases, heuristics and other evaluative practices.   
Personal Bias 
 
In addition to past experiences as an influencing factor on decision-
making, personal biases have also been shown to impact the effectiveness.  
Cognitive biases are thinking patterns based on observations and generalisations 
that may lead to memory errors, inaccurate judgments, and faulty logic (Evans, 
Barston, and Pollard, 1983; West, Toplak and Stanovich, 2008).  Cognitive biases 
include, but are not limited to (1) belief bias - the over-dependence on prior 
knowledge in arriving at decisions; (2) hindsight bias - people tend readily to 
explain an event as inevitable, once it has happened (3) omission bias - generally, 
people have a propensity to omit information perceived as risky; and (4) 
confirmation bias - In which people observe what they expect in observations 
(Marsh and Hanlon, 2007; Nestler and von Collani, 2008; Stanovich and West, 
2008; see also West et al., 2008).   
 In decision-making, cognitive biases influence people by causing them to 
over-rely on, or lend more credence to, expected observations and previous 
knowledge, while dismissing information or observations that are perceived as 
uncertain, without looking at the bigger picture.  While this influence may at 
times lead to poor decisions, the cognitive biases enable individuals to make 
efficient decisions with assistance of heuristics (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).  
These biases and heuristics can also be triggered by the uncertainty of decision 
outcomes.  When decision-makers are uncertain of the positive or negative 
results of his or her actions, Naqvi, Shiv and Bechara (2006) found that these 
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decisions are often influenced by emotion.  Driven by the ‘Somatic-marker’ 
hypothesis, these researchers contend that decisions influenced by emotions 
driven by the state or condition of the body.  Essentially, the use of emotion 
becomes interplay between a neural state and that emotion driving the decision 
and potential outcome.  Cognitive neuroscience has played a prominent role in 
recent decision-making studies that have direct or indirect influence on personal 
biases including the emotions just mentioned, as well as moral judgement 
(Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001), and how and where the 
framing effect of biases impacts the brain (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour & 
Dolan, 2006).  Although significant research continues within the neuroscience 
realm in understanding how decisions are being made on a physiological level, 
especially related to biases and heuristics, the focus of this study will continue to 
concentrate not on the physiological effects or impacts, but on cognitive 
influences upon the decision practice. 
Age, Education and Socio-Economic Status 
 
Research on individual characteristics, like age, education level, and 
socio-economic status also influences the decision-making process (Finucane, 
Mertz, Slovic & Schmidt, 2005; Bruine de Bruin, Parker & Fischhoff, 2007).  
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) looked at these characteristics in a study that 
measured the impact these demographics have on decision-making.  They did 
this by administering an Adult Decision Making Competency (A-DMC) test that 
measured tasks that include framing, how to deal with sunk costs and social 
norms, among others.  Their results indicated that those individuals that were 
selected from social service organisations and had less education did more 
poorly on the (A-DMC) test.  However, they do not go as far as saying that there 
was direct causality between socio-economic status and education, but a 
correlation between the two when they measured validity.  They further 
conclude that having lower decision-making capability could lead to more 
difficult life outcomes that are caused by the stress of poor decision-making.  
Although direct empirical evidence does not support this later conclusion, what 
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is evidenced is that the amount of education and socio-economic background 
does influence an individual’s cognitive decision-making capabilities. 
In addition to socio-economic status and education, Bruine de Bruin et al., 
(2007) also looked at how age affected the decision-making process.  Their 
results indicated an inconsistent relationship.   
Older adults performed significantly worse on ‘Resistance to Framing’ 
and ‘Applying Decision Rules,’ they did significantly better on 
‘Recognizing Social Norms’ and ‘Resistance to Sunk Costs (Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2007, p. 948)’. 
This, they conclude, could be a result of the competing viewpoints. One, that 
cognitive abilities decline with age (Baltes & Baltes, 1990) and two, that 
experience and learned life skills increase efficiency and effectiveness in 
decision-making abilities (Salthouse, 1991). 
2.3 SMALL FIRMS AND MICRO-ENTERPRISES 
 
Small and medium-sized enterprises in the United States account for 95% 
of all businesses, almost half of the nation’s private sector work force and 
provide nearly half of the country’s GDP (Executive Office of the President & 
Small Business Administration, 2009).  Comparatively small enterprises in the 
UK account for 99.2% of all business (Stanworth & Purdy, 2008) and 99% of 
small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU, of which 90% of those firms are 
micro-enterprises – those businesses that employ less than 10 people (European 
Commission, 2009).  Although, the definitions regarding what constitutes a 
‘small,’ ‘medium,’ or ‘large’ firm vary from country or economic region, for sake 
of clarity and considering the proximity of where this research was conducted, 
the general definition offered by the Small Business Administration (SBA) in the 
United States will be used here. Respectively, the small firm would typically 
employ up to 500 depending on industry, while the micro-enterprise shares a 
similar definition as the European Union as one that employs fewer than ten 
employees.  Considering the amount of economic impact these firms have on the 
world economy and their prevalence in the popular recorded music industry, 
further enquiry and research on decision-making in micro-enterprises continues 
to be warranted and is the focus of this research. 
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The importance of small firms in general, and more specifically in the 
music industry, is also not widely studied.  One study, (Partnership, 2006) found 
that 90% of music businesses could be classified as SMEs in the UK.  Findings in 
this study indicated two key characteristics among them, one of which will later 
prove to be a factor in describing the strategic decision-making practice.  Those 
include ‘portfolio working,’ where firms tend to operate within multiple industry 
sectors at any given time and the predominance of ‘micro-businesses’.  
Although directly comparable data are not available for the U.S. market, these 
statistics can be used to infer the approximate industry make-up and business 
characteristics that exist there as well.  Currently, only anecdotal comment can 
be applied to similar firms operating in the U.S., some of which include a lack of 
management training to limited sources of funding available for day-to-day 
operations or expansion.   
Other studies have looked specifically at the differences among small 
enterprises and larger firms and how decisions are made within them.  For 
example, Wellbourne and Pardo-del-Val (2009) found that smaller firms place 
more value on relational capital than do larger firms.  These contacts and 
relationships tend to be so pivotal in the success of a small firm that they may 
often be the cornerstone to their on-going success and can often lead to failure if 
the relationships no longer exist.  These relationships can influence strategic 
decision-making by creating a sense of ‘collaborative entrepreneurship,’ when 
firms work together to achieve a competitive advantage.  This collaborative 
entrepreneurship is a cornerstone to the ways in which many of the micro-
enterprises in the music industry conduct business and make strategic decisions 
- often their very survival is dependent upon them.   
Research that has been undertaken within the broader SME category has 
shown some characteristics distinctive to small firms as well as some contrasting 
differences from their larger counterparts.  Because micro-enterprises are less 
formal in their planning and analysis, due to the limited resources and time 
constraints, strategic decision-making tends to be more of an extension of each 
owner-manager’s personal experience, personal limitations and bias (Simon & 
Houghton, 2002; Bazerman, 2009).  Because of the closeness these owner-
managers keep to the day-to-day operations and planning of the business and 
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their personal limitations and bias they carry with them, researchers have also 
found that personality traits tend to dominate strategic decision-making.  
McCarthy (2003) looked at these personality traits in entrepreneurs and found 
that the process of planning in these firms is largely dependent on the owner-
managers personality.  These entrepreneur types were classified as ‘pragmatic’ 
and ‘charismatic’.  The author also concludes that the charismatic type of 
entrepreneur was more common and that this personality type was ‘forced to 
prioritize planning and reduce the uncertainty of decision-making in order to 
satisfy stakeholders and safeguard the future of the company’ (McCarthy, 2003 p. 
336).  Brouthers et al. (1998) also looked at personality influences in small firms, 
those enterprises with fewer than 100 employees.  They investigated a cross-
section of firms in the Netherlands and found that procedural rationality in these 
companies was limited and that many decisions were made based on intuition 
and the personal characteristics of the managers.  Few people were involved in 
decision-making and the larger of these companies they sampled tended to be 
more rational in their strategic decision-making process with no significant 
difference between manufacturing and service firms, suggesting that the larger 
firms relied more upon these methods. 
Jong (2004) and Liberman-Yaconi, et al. (2010) have also found that 
entrepreneurs and those managing micro-enterprises tend to make decisions in 
different manners.  Specifically, Jong (2004) identified five types of 
entrepreneurs that differ significantly in their strategic decision-making.  These 
classifications identified key areas of difference from decision makers in larger 
firms.  In his findings, he identified found was that differences in the frequency of 
making decisions, search for information to make those decisions, choice 
alternatives, level of risk, consideration of other options and ‘risk-taking 
propensity’.  Liberman-Yaconi also identified various characteristics to those 
micro-enterprises they investigated.  Within the information technology sector 
of Australia, they found that many of them participated in bounded rational and 
intuitive behaviours, along with logical/analytical and systematic behaviours, 
internal, as well as external search tendencies. 
Other areas of research that have marked a difference in small firms and 
large firms, especially in regard to decision-making, are those studies that look at 
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the use of bias and heuristics - an experience-based approach to decision-
making. Busenitz and Barney (1997) have determined a link between the use of 
heuristics in decision-making and innovativeness.  They went a bit further in 
their research to ask not whether heuristics exist within strategic decision-
making, but rather if individuals vary to the extent they use bias and heuristics in 
their decision-making.  Busenitz and Barney (1997) found that: 
‘Under conditions of environmental uncertainty and complexity, biases 
and heuristics can be an effective and efficient guide to decision-
making.  In such settings, more comprehensive and cautious decision-
making is not possible, and biases and heuristics may provide an 
effective way to approximate the appropriate decisions’ (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997, p. 9). 
 
The use of heuristics in these circumstances of uncertainty and complexity in 
small firms demonstrate their importance of these characteristics in owner-
mangers in their use in strategic decision-making.   
2.4 THE MODERN COMMERCIAL MUSIC INDUSTRY  
2.4.1 The Music Industry Today and Factors Influencing Performance 
Throughout this review any reference to ‘industry’ or ‘music industry’ 
will encapsulate all business sectors that contribute to the value chain of any 
commercialised popular recorded music product.  When appropriate, a 
designated business sector within the popular music industry will be made 
explicit, for example, the recording industry.  Today, the popular music industry 
is vastly complex and comprises an interconnected network of businesses that 
contribute to the overall end product of music. The earlier recording industry 
business model before the recent shift in the market structure of the recording 
industry consisted of a rights-based model of distribution that relied heavily on 
‘mega’ hits to generate its revenue and sustain the major record labels 
dominance within the market.  This model is now moving towards one that 
focuses more on the ways in which organisations need to understand how best 
to monetise the relationship between content creator, the artist, and consumer, 
the fan.  As the prominence of MP3 technology, a common audio format for 
consumer audio storage, took hold in the 1990s and consumers began listening 
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to their recordings through digital means, the value chain shifted and became a 
much more ‘artist and consumer friendly’ model, which continues to shape the 
power and market structures in the industry as it is today (Bockstedt et al., 
2006).  However, with this shift in industry structure and dynamics, things 
appear fundamentally different as the music industry’s definitive model of 
operation is shifting to a more consumer based, market centric one dictated by 
customer wants and needs and ease of access to the product.  
Experts have been analysing and studying the current trends in the 
recorded music industry since the first indication of new technology disrupted 
the then ‘status quo’, or market dynamics.  That technology became well 
established in 1998 with the inception of the file-sharing service Napster.  Soon 
after, the recording industry began registering a decline in recorded music sales 
that continued beyond the next decade and even today.  The length and depth of 
this current decline is not yet known, but recent IFPI statistics indicate a 48% 
decline world-wide of recorded music sales from 1997-2010 (IFPI, 2011). The 
recorded music industry has attributed these declines to the advent of new 
technology, MP3s and its current method of distribution - file sharing.  Although, 
at first glance this seems consistent, continued research in this area has found 
other contributing factors. 
Sosnick, Schreiber, and Sandoval (2003) investigated a few of these 
influences including the impacts of ‘Minimum Advertised Pricing’ (MAP).  MAP, 
as implemented in the music industry in the mid-1990s, was an established 
retail price from a record company, which may be lower than its recommended 
retail price, but which retailers were ostensibly not allowed to undercut. Sosnick 
et al. reference the changing shopping habits of consumers in the 1990s while 
the record business was in the midst of consolidation and experiencing a period 
of pricing volatility. In 1995, the MAP policy, which was implemented by record 
labels, was developed to stifle a CD price war that was initiated by discount 
retailers, such as, Best Buy, Circuit City and Target.  The MAP sales policies of the 
major record labels established a price floor below which retailers could not sell 
music without losing vendor-supplied cooperative advertising dollars.  MAP’s 
control over this important mechanism created a demand for less expensive 
music than the market could provide.  Furthermore, minimum advertised pricing 
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made competing forms of entertainment, many of them upgraded or new to 
market, relatively more attractive. 
MAP pricing created the demand for low-priced music, just as the 
improvement in technology, the Internet and CD-burning, provided the means.  
Price supports, also known as price floors, create ‘black markets’, especially for 
products that have low physical production costs as a percentage of total cost.  
Products with high marketing costs, such as music, are particularly vulnerable. 
The low cost of distribution over the Internet exacerbated the problem. 
As the Internet was in its infancy, some trends regarding pricing and 
declining sales began prior to any widespread indication of an event.  In addition 
to their findings regarding the influence and impact of MAP pricing on the 
industry, Sosnick et al. (2003) investigated a decline in recorded music 
beginning in 1997, two years prior to the Internet phenomenon Napster and five 
years prior to the precipitous decline in sales we see continuing today (RIAA, 
2011).  The authors looked at sales on a per capita basis for one of the industry’s 
most targeted age groups, 15-24 year olds.  The analysis indicates that sales 
were actually declining, but population growth masked this change until 2001. 
By analysing the authors’ chosen age group it can be observed that the per capita 
music spending peaked at $111.44 in 1996 and had since declined 18% to 
$94.28 (7.1 units) by the year 2000. In addition, Alhadeff (2006) noticed that, 
beginning in 1990, recorded music started a decline in real prices, possibly due 
in part to decreased demand, and also masked by population growth.  Since then, 
the recording industry has seen a consistent year-on-year contraction and the 
value of recorded music decline.  Certainly, further investigation into this 
phenomenon is warranted to see whether or not additional influences other than 
population growth can be identified. 
In addition to studies focusing on the effects that triggered the current 
industry downturn, further research within the industry has looked at 
conditions of the market and factors that have influenced its expansion and 
contraction in recent decades.  Some industry experts have argued specifically 
that current performance is also a reflection of industry marketing strategies, 
specifically as they relate to the consumer purchasing behaviour patterns related 
to the ‘singles’ market in the 1990s and 2000’s. This bundling and distribution 
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strategy was in the midst of being phased out during the time MAP was a factor 
and when sales started declining.  With a steady decline since 1997 and a 65% 
decrease in sales since 1999, the life and promotional value of the single were 
questioned (RIAA, 2011).  The sales decline was not simply a derivative of 
consumer rejection, but due to a conscious strategic decision by record labels not 
to promote or manufacture them.   
‘The main reason that single sales are down is because most major-
label executives believe that singles cannibalize album sales.  
Therefore, they either do not put singles out or they put singles out 
but delete them when the album containing the song is released—in 
an attempt to force consumers to purchase entire albums, which are 
more profitable.’ (Christman, 2002, p. 1)   
 
When ‘Billboard’, a weekly industry trade journal, changed how it 
compiled the Hot 100 chart, it eliminated any incentive for the ‘labels’ to release 
this promotional configuration.  In 1999, in order to allow non-commercial 
singles to chart the Hot 100, ‘Billboard’ eliminated the commercial-availability 
requirement.  This type of ‘sense-making’ and ‘sense-giving’ (Weick, 1995) to the 
charts - and the then current strategies for positioning were and are industry 
standard - had an unintended effect on industry practices and/or strategic 
positioning.  Anand and Peterson (2000) studied these ‘sense-giving’ phenomena 
in the music industry as they applied to the ‘Billboard’ charts – the music 
industry trade used for market and charting information.  According to the 
authors, they felt that ‘Billboard’ charts were a good choice to study these 
phenomena for three reasons: 
‘First, they provide the attention focus for an Organisational field.  
Second, they essentially serve to help participants make sense of 
market activity within the field. Finally, market information 
regimes are socially and politically constructed and are hence 
fraught with biases and assumptions that are largely taken for 
granted.’ (Anand & Peterson, 2000, p. 271) 
This change, allowing independently released music to chart easier, enabled 
the ‘labels’ to secure good placement without releasing a ‘single’ for sale 
(Christman, 2002).  In an industry where activity rises and falls with positioning 
on the charts; where hiring’s, promotions, firings, resource allocation, retention 
or elimination of ‘inter-organisational relationships’ may be determined by 
positions held (Anand & Peterson, 2000) and the idea that ‘singles’ drastically 
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reduced album sales helped to contribute to shifting market dynamics while 
opposing the consumer’s preference for purchasing music.  
2.4.2 Review of Current Research Threads 
In order to continue understanding the challenges currently facing the 
industry today, and how music industry micro-enterprises make strategic-
decisions, it is important to look at how, and to what extent, this industry has 
been researched and what has been learned.  Prior to the 1970s, there was a 
paucity of research specifically related to the music industry.   Even then, it was 
centred less on the ‘management of’ and more on the social-cultural impact it 
was having. Current writings about the recorded music industry are typically ‘Do 
it yourself’ or ‘How to succeed in…’ guides, written by practitioners and 
individuals with prior music industry experience (Baskerville; Krasilovsky, 
2007; Brabec, 2008; Passman, 2009).  There are, however, some studies (Seifert 
& Hadida, 2009) (Gander, Haberberg & Rieple, 2007) that are being completed in 
the field that are moving it towards a clearer theoretical understanding.  Those 
studies, in addition to the social cultural influences previously mentioned, 
include research on talent selection strategies, industry structure and value 
chain studies, enquiries related to economics and the impact on new 
technologies like peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing.    
Social Cultural Studies 
 
Some of the first writings began with the identification of a ‘culture 
industry’ by Theodore Adorno and Max Horheimer (Adorno & Horkheimer, 
1997) where they discussed the mass production of cultural product.  Since then 
other researchers (Hirsch, 1972; Hesmondhalgh, 1996; Power & Scott, 2004; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2006; Gander, 2011) have taken to reflect upon the strengths 
and weaknesses of their arguments and have contributed to the understanding 
of cultural production.   One area of research by Peterson and Berger (1975) 
investigated the concentration of music industry firms and the corresponding 
diversity of the music that would follow.  They began a thread of culture 
production research in the recorded music industry that has since been 
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critiqued, built upon, extended and at times refuted.  Peterson and Berger (1975) 
looked specifically at the cycles of industry concentration and the diversity of the 
products being released.  By looking at Billboard’s top hits on the Hot 100 chart 
from 1948-1973 and other secondary sources they found a negative relationship 
between the concentration and diversity in the recording industry:  The more 
concentrated the record label consolidation, the less diversity in the music that 
exists.   
Rothernbuler and Dimmick (1982) built upon the Peterson and Berger 
study of concentration and diversity and demonstrated that similar results 
existed through 1980.  Their methodology was similar to Peterson and Berger; 
they also examined the Billboard Charts, but from 1974-1980.  Alexander (1996) 
also looked at concentration and diversity but studied the phenomena, not only 
through the charts, but also sheet music.  He was able to determine that both low 
and high levels of market concentration are associated with decreased product 
diversity, and that maximum diversity results from a moderately concentrated 
market structure.  This put into question some of the previous studies conducted 
on the topic, but also did not go without criticism.   The Alexander methodology 
was questioned by the sheer nature of the use of sheet music as a form of 
analysis (Peterson & Berger, 1996).  The study of concentration continued 
throughout the 1990s when Lopes (1992) extended the original Peterson and 
Berger study on innovation and diversity.  He found that major ‘labels’ would 
continue the ‘open system of production’ despite dominance in the industry and 
that an oligopolistic competition in the music industry, the current market 
structure at the time of study, can create a significant level of innovation and 
diversity.  This essentially contradicted the Peterson and Berger findings that the 
concentration of ‘labels’ would stifle innovation and diversity in the business.  As 
long as the open system of production through independent producers and 
independent labels existed, so would the diversity in music type.   Further 
studies continued looking at this issue.  Christianen (1995) looked at music from 
the Netherlands to try and create some conclusion to the inconclusive 
investigations done so far by Peterson and Berger to Lopes and Rothenbuhler.  
Continued investigation by Burnett (1992) found that concentration and 
diversity no longer have a negative correlation. This was mostly due to the new 
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music model of ‘open’ production, first investigated by Lopes (1992), where 
independent labels produce the majority now being marketed and distributed by 
the ‘major’ record labels, allowing for diversity in music to exist in an 
oligopolistic environment.  A more recent contribution to this thread of inquiry 
has been done by Dowd (2004) where he attempts to bridge the inconsistencies 
that have been identified by the previous authors.  The author looks not only at 
the record label creating the product, but the performer and temporal effects.  
His notable contribution to this literature is that diversity differs depending on 
the decade being analysed. He found that:  
‘when decentralized production is low, as in the 1940s, high 
concentration reduces the number of new performers and new 
firms. When decentralized production grows more pronounced, as 
in the 1980s, concentration's negative effect is reduced and 
eventually eliminated’. (Dowd, 2004, p. 1411) 
 
Although much of what has been learned about the number of recorded music 
producers in the marketplace and the diversity of music that ensues have 
determined that it may depend on the era being studied. The Dowd (2004) 
investigation on the issue brings the most comprehensive look at the phenomena 
to date and has led to a more detailed and thorough understanding of the 
connection between the two. 
Artist Selection Procedures 
 
One area of the industry that is often regarded as quite dynamic, elusive 
and hypersensitive to cultural preferences is that of talent acquisition, or ‘Artists 
and Repertoire (A & R).  Having on average a 15% - 20% success rate (Caves, 
2000), this industry practice of signing talent to labels and music publishers, 
albeit essential, is often regarded as a ‘hit and miss’ tactic to see what or who 
‘breaks’, and who does not.  A few authors have looked at these statistics to 
determine the chances for breakeven or success in the music industry.   
Papadopoulos and Rolston (2006) speak of these probability ratios through the 
use of SoundScan data analysis.  They were able to determine that there is a 23% 
probability that a release will sell between 100-1000 units and a 0.22% 
probability that they will sell 500,000 units.  500,000 units, as a level of 
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measurement is of particular importance in the U.S. market because of the ‘gold’ 
status, or certification that comes at that sales level.  Marcone, in his 2005 paper 
on success rates of label releases, also looked at SoundScan data and found that 
only ‘0.04% of the 9,406 titles released by the major record companies in 2004 had 
sales in excess of one million units.’ (Marconi (2005) cited in Papadopoulos & 
Rolston, 2006, p. 61). The recording industry is a highly, ‘hit-driven’ business in 
which successful acts often need to offset the costs of those who fail to break-
even. This talent acquisition strategy is often dependent upon exploiting the 
economies of scale that exist in a few artists, demonstrating the presence of the 
‘superstar’ phenomenon.  As the statistics indicate, the economy of scale strategy 
becomes necessary for the record labels to offset the risk and cost associated 
with signing, recording and marketing the talent.  Because of this risk, finding the 
right talent for a label becomes a quintessential component to its success in a 
highly turbulent and unpredictable environment like the music industry. 
Record labels that operate in this highly turbulent environment have a 
vested interest in understanding the talent acquisition process better to create 
or sustain a competitive advantage through artist selection procedures.  
Ordanini (2006) in particular looked at how prior independent label experience 
from an artist played a role in the success of that artist on the charts within the 
Italian music industry - both local and international artists.  He found that the 
selection process whether it is ‘direct’ through the major label, or ‘indirect’ 
through ‘the agency method’, determined to some extent the expected success of 
that artist – specifically with regard to the duration, frequency and speed of that 
success on the charts.  He went on to show that the type of selection process 
adopted by the label seemed to capture the ‘innovation philosophy’ of the 
players more, than does the advertising and promotion associated with 
achieving that level of success on the charts.  It is also worth noting that Ordanini 
(2006) linked some practical considerations with the importance of the selection 
process regime chosen.  His results demonstrate the importance of a mixed 
innovation strategy or blend of ‘direct’ and ‘agency’ that could lead to better 
market performance for the label and a more balanced short and long-term 
financial position.  Finally, he concluded the importance of acknowledging the 
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influence that the independent, smaller, more culturally sensitive ‘labels’ actually 
have on the long-term success of artists.   
Although the Ordanini findings have contributed to the existing literature 
within selection procedures within the music industry, the findings do not come 
without criticism.   Smith (2007) expressed some concerns about the Ordanini 
methodology as well as the analysis of his data.  After further investigation, 
Smith (2007) notes that a certain majority of success is inherent in the ‘Italian 
only’ artists and especially those that are solo acts as opposed to bands or 
groups.  He goes on to say that it is ‘difficult to establish that it is the signing-
mechanism that is driving success rather than the solo status of the artist that is 
driving success.’ (Smith, 2007, p. 158). 
In addition to the impact that prior, independent label experience may 
have on chart success, Ordanini, Rubera and Sala (2008) looked at the new 
product development process and how new product development teams used 
the prior knowledge obtained from previous releases to create a foundation of 
functional knowledge.  Here the authors looked at two in-depth cases from EMI 
Italy in which they analysed how the creative A & R and marketing teams 
integrated their functional knowledge in disseminating which artist to sign and 
consider a priority.  This knowledge transfer and coordination amongst different 
departments in the label led to more standardisation of procedures as well as 
more creativity for subsequent releases of artists.  The practicality and 
theoretical implications of this are of particular interest to the music industry, as 
well as other creative and culture-producing industries, because of the 
inconsistent and often ambiguous nature of the product.   
Another contribution to the artist selection literature was undertaken by 
Seifert and Hadida (2006; 2009) in which they investigated the ‘talent selection 
paradox’, a phenomenon where a small number of artists generate the majority 
of the firm’s income.  Yet, very little, probably less than 1% of total revenues, is 
invested in the talent selection process (Seifert & Hadida, 2006).  The authors 
investigated how labels could improve the talent selection in a blockbuster 
industry.  They  developed a framework that looked at strategic decision-making 
and the resource-based view of the firm and then applied this framework to a 
study looking at intuition.  They determined that ‘collective intuition based on 
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aggregated judgments can improve the quality of managerial forecasts’ (Seifert & 
Hadida, 2009, p. 1).  Neither the cognitive processes of strategic decision-making, 
nor the resource-based view of the firm alone is able to provide any direction, 
but combining the strengths of both can provide a more comprehensive picture 
that can then lead to better talent selection processes. 
The Music Industry Structure and Value Chain 
 
 In addition to studies focusing on product development and artist 
acquisition, some areas of study have focused on the analysis of industry systems 
(Graham, Burnes, Lewis & Langer, 2004; Tuomola, 2004; Bockstedt et al., 2006) 
general business practices (Gander & Rieple, 2002; Gander et al., 2007) and 
current power shifts in the industry (Huygens, Van Den Bosch, Volberda & 
Baden-Fuller, 2001).  Here, authors have been able to demonstrate the 
importance of industry structure and current market changes and what they 
mean for the future models of the industry.  Since Michael Porter (1980) 
introduced the concept of the value chain, it has become a mechanism for 
managers to assess where value is added to each aspect of a product’s 
manufacturing, marketing or distribution.  In the music industry, the value chain 
begins with the content creator, record label or songwriter, moves on to 
development, artist or producer, aggregation, then to marketing, distribution 
and ultimately to the consumer.  Bockstedt et al. (2006) analysed the changing 
value chain within the current recorded music industry.  The authors noted that 
the shifting digital distribution channels are contributing to an underlying power 
shift in the music business from those who traditionally controlled most physical 
distribution channels, the major record labels, to artists, consumers and digital 
retailers.  The authors believe that these power shifts have the ability for players 
in the music industry to take advantage of new strategic opportunities in the 
future.   
 Elaborating on the value chain, Graham et al. (2004) conducted a study on 
the changing supply chain of the industry.   Here, the authors demonstrate that a 
more ‘dynamic network of suppliers’, those with their own objectives, artists, 
managers and others, are influencing the music product, which is replacing the 
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traditional music supply chain.  The digital age has lowered barriers to entry 
within the recording industry by virtue of decreasing transaction and production 
costs.  This breakdown or reorganisation within the supply chain has led to a 
more prolific and dynamic group of suppliers entering the market and creating 
easier access to consumers.  They also state that it is important to note that the 
music industry is marked by high costs of entry and a tight control of the 
traditional distribution system and that artists are beginning to bypass record 
labels and integrate this element of the supply chain into their own operations.  
Others have agreed and have also gone on to confirm these findings. Lewis, 
Graham and Hardaker (2005) investigated the music industry supply chain and 
the barriers of entry associated with it.  They concluded that the largest barrier 
to entry in the industry has been the physical distribution network and high 
costs associated with marketing and promotion.   The Internet has impacted 
these barriers to entry in the past decade and the old model value chain has been 
greatly compromised.   
 The impact the Internet has had on the value chain is undeniable for those 
who work and study the music industry.  Tuomola (2004) identified cases of 
disintermediation – the shortening of the value chain, in which some actors 
within the chain become diminished in their role, or are no longer necessary.  In 
the music industry that could be either a record label, wholesaler or a retailer.  
Here the author was able to identify cases in which established artists have been 
able to shorten the chain with success.  However, this disintermediation and 
success is dependent upon the digitisation of content, and communication 
technology like the Internet.   
 In addition to supply chain and value chain studies, other areas of research 
have also looked at strategic alliances that exist within the industry and reliance 
upon competing partners.  For example, Gander and Rieple (2002) looked 
specifically at the management of alliances that exist between major and 
independent labels and the sharing of resources between the two.  They 
collected data from senior managers who were responsible for the management 
of relationships between the major record label and their independent partners. 
The authors determined that a paradox exists between these two alliances for 
their relationship is dependent upon each other’s strengths yet they still 
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compete within the same market place.  The relationship is seen more as a 
symbolic one rather than a competitive one.  Huygens et al. (2001) looked at this 
relationship and found that although major and independent labels rely on 
internal processes to stay competitive, they also rely on each other and depend 
on their interaction with one another.  The authors determined that this 
interaction enables the industry to co-evolve over time.   
Economic Theory and Pricing Considerations 
 
 In addition to artist selection decisions and industry structure, a research 
thread has developed around economic theory, including demand and pricing 
considerations, and its application to the music industry.  Hendricks and 
Sorensen (2009) took a close look at ‘backward spill-overs,’ in which an increase 
in demand of an artist’s first album is stimulated by a successful release of a 
follow-up, or second album by an artist, especially if the debut album was a hit.  
This ‘spill-over’ can have a profound impact on the financial success of both the 
artist and the label and can help in determining future strategic direction for 
them as well.   
 Other researchers have looked at the importance of pricing and the 
demand for recorded music product.  In taking a closer look at these economic 
principles, it helps to put the inconsistent and dynamic properties of this product 
into perspective, especially when setting the state for industry dynamics.  
Papadopoulos and Rolston (2006) looked at product pricing of a recorded 
product within market conditions of uncertain demand and believed that 
consistent pricing may be a more viable and practical approach to this pricing 
structure rather than dynamic pricing.  They applied stochastic demand 
principles to music industry recorded music products and determined that 
dynamic pricing for the tens of thousands of releases that come out each year is 
simply unworkable.   They maintain that, although consistent pricing strategies 
may put the label at risk of collusion accusation, it also provides a way for the 
label to offset the risk potential of this highly unpredictable product and the 
success ratios associated with it, as was discussed previously.   
 Whereas Papadopoulos and Rolston (2006) looked at stochastic demand 
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principles as they relate to price, Bhattacharjee et al. (2007a) looked at the same 
demand principles as they relate to the album lifecycle.  They noted that due to 
the changing supply chain brought about by the Internet, most notably file-
sharing, the album lifecycle on the charts has diminished.  If albums do maintain 
their position past the first week of entry, their likelihood of success increases 
due to the integration of information sources that are readily available to the 
consumer.  Bhattacharjee et al. (2007a) claim that understanding this ‘helps to 
create a more dynamic decision process on resource allocation to market music 
products’ (p. 15). 
 Other authors have considered the demand for pre-recorded music 
internationally (Stamm, 2000).  In his book, Music Industry Economics: A global 
Demand Model for Pre-Recorded Music, Stamm was able to show that: 
(1) Recorded music is a luxury good that is considered price elastic; and  
(2) Age is a determining factor in demand for recorded music.   
Stamm demonstrated empirically that these market assumptions do exist in 67 
countries worldwide.   
Impact of P2P File Sharing 
 
 In recent years, there has been an influx of examination into the effects of 
the Internet, including copyright implications (Wull, 2011) (Kretschmer, 2005) 
as well as business and economic impacts of P2P file sharing (Ahn & Yoon, 2009) 
(Bhattacharjee, Gopal, Lertwachara, Marsden & Telang, 2007b; McKenzie, 2009) 
(Fox, 2005; Aguiar & Martens, 2013).  A cross-section of that body of work 
includes a study by Fox (2005), where the author examined the impact that the 
Internet and digital rights management technology have had on record 
companies and independent musicians.  He explores the impacts these drivers 
have had on both the distribution of music on the Internet as well as possible 
social networking implications.  He proposes that a model for the industry will 
be based more on creating new revenue sources through social networking 
means as opposed to a model based on the selling of recorded music.  
Bhattacharjee et al. (2007b) tested the effects of file-sharing to determine the 
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impact that it may have on the length of time an artist remains on the charts.  
They determined that after the initial fan-base of an artist purchases the album; 
sales tend to depend on the ‘non-hardcore’ customers.  It is that factor that 
interested Bhattacharjee et al. (2007b) to determine whether file sharing could 
lengthen the time a song remained on the charts.  They concluded that P2P file 
sharing negatively impacts chart survival with the exception of superstar acts 
and female artists.  They also concluded that the major labels are increasingly 
‘widening the gap’ and suggest that independent label strategies may prove to be 
creating a competitive edge that might want to be investigated further.  
 More recently, the European Commission’s Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies (Aguiar & Martens, 2013) surveyed 16,000 European 
consumers and concluded that illegal downloading is not a substitute for legal 
music purchase activity.  Although these results will certainly be examined 
carefully in the coming months and years by many whom illegal music 
downloading directly effects, the importance of P2P file sharing and its bearing 
on business models and chart success are proving impactful, especially as firms 
move into this new value chain. 
 As illustrated, there is a wide array of academic research being undertaken 
within the context of the music industry.  Some look at existing theoretical 
models within respective disciplines, such as the management, marketing and 
economic fields, while others are looking closely at industry specific phenomena 
to try and move the understanding of the field forward.  Each thread continues to 
lay a more solid foundation to the understanding of the industry practices in 
hopes of understanding it better.   
2.4.3 Characteristics of the Field  
Although some authors have discussed the differing characteristics inherent 
in entertainment firms and culture-producing entities (Peterson, 1976; 
Bourdieu, 1984; Negus, 1999; Power & Scott, 2004; Hull, Hutchison & Strasser, 
2010), a few are indicative of the characteristics most relevant to this research.  
Prior to Peterson’s (1976) work on the ‘production of culture’, the industry was 
often characterised as being similar to manufacturing firms.   Peterson’s work 
found that popular music and other cultural forms were often created through 
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situated activity by groups that contributed to the body of creative work in a 
society.  By studying organisations involved in the production of these products, 
he enabled a debate that went beyond the creative output of one individual.  
Bourdieu (1984) also contributed to the discussion with his work on cultural 
intermediaries, those individuals who act as gatekeepers from creator to 
consumer, in industry terms this may include but is not limited to A & R 
representatives, booking agents, managers or record labels.  Although a 
Bourdieusian perspective on the production of culture extends beyond that of 
the organisation, he believed that multiple societal influences, external to the 
firm, must also be taken into consideration.  Negus also feels that the creation 
and production of popular music must be ‘interpreted and understood in different 
ways’ (1999, p. 20).  In addition, his work on genre cultures highlights the 
procedures employed by record labels and their formal ways in which knowledge 
about consumers is collected, produced and circulated and how this informs 
strategic decision-making’ (Negus, 1999, p. 20). 
 In addition to the work done on the production of culture perspective, Caves 
(2000) identified qualities inherent in the creative industries that exhibit 
distinctive characteristics that may influence the decision-maker, including: 
1. Uncertainty of Demand: Demand is uncertain and producers of creative 
products never really know if people will commit to purchase.  
Uncertainties exist before and after release. 
 
2. Connection to the Product: The artist’s taste and the quality and quantity 
of creative effort impact the product. 
 
3. Diversity of Skills: The need for a number of skilled and specialised 
outputs to create, market and promote the product 
 
4. Infinite variety: The endless supply of creative and substitute products 
 
5. A list/B list: The unpredictability and ambiguity of quality and control 
 
6. Time flies:  The timeliness of relevancy and need for temporal 
coordination of production and marketing activities 
 
7. Ars longa: The duration of the copyright and length of time available for 
exploitation. 
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Considering the work being done on the unique characteristics of the popular 
recorded music industry, the findings from Caves and others will enable me to 
create a baseline to the differences and influences that may exist as a deeper 
examination into the practice is undertaken within this thesis. 
2.5 STRATEGY AS PRACTICE 
 
Research into strategy-as-practice (S-as-P), the approach that this study is 
adopting in its examination into how strategic decision-making is being 
undertaken, has recently gained prominence in strategy research.  This approach 
has been chosen due to the practical nature of its philosophy, and the growing 
interest amongst strategy researchers. S-as-P research takes a different 
perspective from previous threads of inquiry - one that looks at how strategy is 
actually carried out in firms.    The strategy concept is not looked at as something 
to be ‘had,’ the resources it possesses or an overarching rational analysis of the 
internal and external environment, but one that focuses on the act of, or 
implementation of, strategy.  It is looked at as something that people in 
organisations ‘do’ (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Whittington, 2006). It also argues for the  
‘value of explaining (and therefore helping to improve) the 
performance of people as they interact and enact institutional 
and Organisational practices’ (Johnson, Langley, Melin & 
Whittington, 2007). 
Johnson et al. (2007) discusses the different areas of inquiry 
within the S-as-P research agenda.  The authors identified three levels 
that correspond to the research being done from a more macro-level to 
one on a more micro-level that includes an organising framework 
identifying a varying degree of ‘institutionalised strategies’ to ‘actors’ 
process strategies.’  It is the realm of ‘actors’ process strategies’ that this 
research closely relates.  This investigation looks specifically at the 
individual social interactions and practices as they relate to strategic 
decision-making within the meso-organisational level and macro-
industry level influences as opposed to isolated factors of influence or 
ones not rooted in the practices of individual actors.   
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In addition, Whittington (2006) has identified a seemingly natural 
progression of the current research within the practice literature.  He has 
identified a ‘bifurcation of inter-Organisational activity and external 
Organisational impacts’.  Whittington concludes that strategy should be looked at 
not only as something that is ‘done,’ but also something that has a broader 
context, including internal, external and social ramifications.  These two 
branches of internal activity and external effects should not be looked at, or 
studied, in isolation of one another but together, as they work hand-in-hand.   
Individual firm activities within the recorded music industry not only impact 
themselves directly, but these firms’ actions also have broader industry-wide 
and cultural implications as well.  It is an iterative practice between industry, 
societal and cultural influences, similar to Negus’ (1999) argument in which he 
makes the case that culture produces an industry, as industry produces a culture. 
Knowing that strategising looks closely at what people do in firms, this could 
ultimately help to improve the actor’s process as it takes into account the 
broader context in which it is being done, and creates a home in which my study 
fits. 
 To avoid confusion, it must be noted that the S-as-P enquiries are not 
linked to any one methodology of studying management, strategy or decision-
making.  I mention it here as a relevant and quintessential aspect of where some 
management enquiry is being undertaken, and the influence this approach to 
studying strategic practices has had on my chosen methodological lens for this 
research and the questions that guide it.  Although this gives perspective to this 
research, it is not to be considered as a methodology, nor a theoretical 
framework in which the research questions are answered.  The body of literature 
that is evolving from this viewpoint gives focus and attention on the relevance 
practice theories have on strategy.  Social practice theories have been developed 
as an alternative to individual social construction and include individual learning 
as a participatory subject of the world.  Practice theories 'exist … because people 
are engaged in actions whose meanings they negotiate with each other’ (Wenger, 
1998, p. 72).  An individual’s learning does not exist only in their cognitive 
actions but as a participant within the social world, where people engage within 
the fields of participation and play by the doxa dictated by the field and learn and 
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understand new knowledge.   
 It should also be noted that the choice to move forward with a practice 
theory is also personally driven.  Although, the reasoning behind why I chose one 
practice theory over another will be discussed further in Chapter 3, I did feel The 
importance of, and reliance upon, networking to get business accomplished in 
this industry is not an isolated endeavour and would be less effective if the social 




This chapter has provided context into what has been learned about 
strategic decision-making, current market conditions within the popular music 
industry and characteristics that embody it.  By reviewing the literature, I have 
established the relevant knowledge that can then be integrated into Bourdieu’s 
practice theory, whilst providing context that will later facilitate a richer 
description of the strategic decision-making practice. 
It has been established that SDM in micro-enterprises has been shown to 
rely on heuristics, bias, trust, past experiences and intuition and can often be 
affected by age, education and other demographic characteristics of the decision-
maker.  These established practices differ from those of medium and large firms 
where resources are often more readily available to decision-makers, thus take 
on a more logical, analytical or comprehensive approach to the process.   We also 
learned through this literature review, that the popular recorded music industry 
has gone through drastic changes throughout the past decade, with technology 
disrupting the value chain to one that is more accessible to the producers and 
consumers of music product.  In addition to having technology acting as a 
catalyst, it has been shown that key industry characteristics contribute to the 
construction of the field doxa and play a prominent role in the interpretation and 
action of individuals within the field. 
However, whilst this chapter has established the academic, and 
theoretical constructions of decision-making as well as characteristics of the 
popular music industry, it has also shown that we have very little knowledge 
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about how micro-enterprise owners and managers within the field construct and 
respond to strategic decision-making. These findings suggest that SDM within 
this field may have different aspects brought on by industry characteristics and 
the people who make the decisions, paving the way for further, descriptive 
research of the practice. 
Thus far in this thesis, Chapter 1 has considered the organisational fields 
within which this research is undertaken, along with the motivations and 
potential influences behind the collection, analysis and interpretation of the data.  
Chapter 2 has examined the multiple constructions of SDM in the academic 
literature.  Thus, Chapter 3 will now turn to the methodological framework, 
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The objective of this research is to examine, using a Bourdieusian practice 
theory lens, the decision-making practice that micro-enterprise participants 
engage in within the United States popular recorded music industry.  Of 
particular interest are the influences upon the decision practice and how habitus, 
field, capital and doxa are relegated to an actor’s desire for dignity and 
recognition (Wacquant, 1998). 
This perspective was chosen as being the best suited to answering the 
research question. Understanding the everyday world and the paradox of agency 
and structure is brought together through Bourdieu’s theory of practice – which 
is the interplay between actor and field through habitus and use of capital. Using 
this methodological paradigm allows the study of strategic decision-making in its 
natural setting, making sense of the complexity and depth of the information, 
while simultaneously being brought in to interpret it (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). 
In this respect, as other researchers have, I am seeking to produce findings that 
are compelling by using the work of Bourdieu as an aid to their fuller 
comprehension.  Some of this previous research has linked a firm’s competitive 
advantage to the intellectual capital that is created through its social capital 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  In addition, Bourdieu’s concepts have been used 
in entrepreneurial research (Steier, 2001), the education field (Gunter, 2002; 
Nash, 1990) as well as within political sociology, particularly research on the 
political environment and power (Kauppi, 2003; Schugurensky, 2000).  Music 
scholars have also found his ideas on taste and class applicable to their research 
in understanding preferences and consumption (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007; Prior, 
2011; Hennion, 1997).  Although these studies provide some insight into the 
applicability of Bourdieu within the business, education, political and music 
fields, there continues to be limited research using Bourdieu and his theories 
within the music industry. 
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Using a Bourdieusian theoretical lens anchors the research within the 
practice perspective, while using an appropriate sociological theory.  This chosen 
‘home’ fits well within the activities and business practices of the music industry, 
which relies strongly upon social and cultural influences for its success (Caves, 
2000; Bourdieu, 1993b).  Bourdieu discusses these influences and the 
importance they play in his concepts of field, habitus and capital (Bourdieu, 
1977), which will assist in defining some of the recorded music industry 
phenomena.  Especially relevant are his use of social capital, cultural capital, 
economic capital and symbolic capital as they can be applied to the activity and 
the practice of actors and their use of power within the music industry field, 
which relies heavily on these different types of ‘capital’ (Bourdieu, 1977).   
Although other prominent approaches were considered including 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978; Archer, 
1995) and activity theory (Leont'ev, 1981) none seemed to be as good at 
answering the research question as Bourdieu.  Giddens’ approach is not as well-
suited to consider the influences of the past that have resulted in an individual’s 
habitus.  It is those past, personal experiences that have helped develop an 
actor’s current decision-making ‘rules’ that will affect the accumulation of 
capital, and help shape the field.   Critical realism makes an attempt to overcome 
the dichotomy of structure and agency, through a strong belief that structures 
come first, are more durable and go ‘farther back’.  Although valid, it is the sense 
of hierarchy (Archer, 1995), or dualism, that is created in critical realism and the 
rigid structure that does not make ‘agency easy’ (Whittington, 2010).  The 
position of agency in decision-making and the properties that influence it are 
critical in answering the research questions.  Furthermore, activity theory 
focuses more on the artefacts or objects of engagement, as opposed to the field 
or more ‘macro’ perspectives.  What activity theory is not able to address is the 
prominent use and need for capital or an expanded use of those resources to 
engage in the power struggles and influence between the social actors.  It also 
does not lend itself to considering the more macro influences on the practice, as 
does Bourdieu.  Although it may be well suited for influences that occur within 
the more immediate situated activity, it is not as well equipped to consider the 
broader social spaces or fields that may have influence. The use of Bourdieu in 
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organisation studies, especially when looking at strategy practices, can elicit new 
and insightful findings that may not be as easily highlighted by other practice 
theories. 
3.2 BOURDIEU AND THE SCIENCE OF PRACTICE 
Bourdieu, through his work as an anthropologist, sociologist and 
philosopher was able to influence the current sociological discourse by 
challenging the accepted ways of thinking about how social reality is 
constructed.  His theories have had a profound impact on the world of sociology 
and his work on practice, specifically, has made a major contribution to the field 
(Léandre Gomez, 2010). In particular, others have found his work helpful in 
defining or explaining strategy through a practice perspective in organisation 
studies (Whittington, 2003; Jarzabkowski, 2005).  Bourdieu is able to contribute 
and transcend the deep-seated traditions and stances that have embattled the 
social world through the duality of micro and macro analysis of social life, the 
material and symbolic realities of society and the classic objectivism vs. 
subjectivism debate.  He felt that this dichotomy ‘must be overcome’.  
Objectivism holds that social reality consists of structures of relations that 
impose themselves upon the actor, whereas subjectivism is rooted in the 
individual actor’s will and ability to interpret and interact meaning with one 
another (Wacquant, 1998).  Bourdieu was able to overcome this dichotomy 
through his theory of practice - introduction of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’ and ‘field’ 
where actors interact, not only with each other, but also within the systems in 
which they exist.  It is this interaction that allows for a more descriptive 
depiction of reality.   
In addition to his anti-dualistic approach to social action, his scientific 
approach is ‘genuinely synthetic, in that it simultaneously straddles disciplinary, 
theoretical and methodological divides’ (Wacquant, 1998 p. 219). He attempts to 
achieve this dissection through the intimate relationships that he identifies in his 
theory of practice between habitus, field and capital.  Using a deep reflexive 
process enabled him and future researchers, through this theory, to see these 
relationships for what they really are.  He did this through the use of both 
objective and subjective elements of the data. 
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Most importantly, a Bourdieusian philosophical anthropology is rooted in 
one of the biggest and most misrepresented elements of his work – recognition.   
‘His is not a utilitarian theory of social action in which individual’s 
consciously strategize to accumulate wealth, status, or 
power….Bourdieu holds that the ultimate spring of conduct is the 
thirst for dignity, which society alone can quench.  For only by being 
granted a name, a place, a function, within a group or institution can 
the individual hope to escape the contingency, finitude, and ultimate 
absurdity of existence…Social existence thus means difference, and 
difference implies hierarchy, which in turn sets off the endless 
dialectic of distinction and pretention, recognition and 
misrecognition, arbitrariness and necessity’ (Wacquant, 2006 p. 219). 
The general misconception that an actor’s motivation is rooted in the 
accumulation of wealth, status and power and not the need for distinction and 
recognition in such a manner that only society can satisfy, is at the foundation of 
this research as are the influences on the decision-making practice.  It is 
imperative that a critical approach is used when looking at this phenomenon and 
that the objective and subjective elements influencing the strategic decision-
making practice be considered.  This will enable a more comprehensive 
empirically-based observation of the influences on the decision-making practice 
and the role that recognition and distinction play as actors negotiate and 
accumulate different forms of capital, while relying upon their personal 
dispositions, firm level habitus, and industry doxa to achieve the distinction and 
recognition they desire.   
The following sections will elaborate more on the specific concepts that 
Bourdieu uses in his practice theory and why they are best suited to answer the 
research question.   All concepts will be used, for Bourdieu believed you couldn’t 
use one without including the others; there is an ‘unconscious relationship’ 
(Bourdieu, 1993b) that exists between them.  Those to be considered include 
habitus, economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital, his concept of field, 
including his ideas regarding the field of cultural production and the doxa that 
dictate the ‘rules’ of practice.  
 




The concept of habitus was developed to bridge the ‘outside’ world with 
the ‘inner’ self.  However, Bourdieu was not the first to utilise the concept of 
habitus to describe human disposition or intimate connection to our personal 
past.  The concept was first coined by prominent thinkers like Aristotle and later 
adapted by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century when describing human 
habits and the connection with ethical discourse (Nederman, 1989-1990).  In 
Latin it literally ‘refers to a habitual or typical condition of the body’ (Jenkins, 
1992 p. 74).  Bourdieu interpreted the concept and developed the idea beyond 
simple human habits or body condition, but more specifically as an alternative to 
the structuralist perspective – one that would look at society as a complex 
system of parts or social structures that shape society as a whole.   This was 
outlined in his argument for a theory of practice and is critical in transcending 
the objectivist perspective by introducing the subjective element, habitus, as 
‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72). 
Here, the ‘structured’ pertains to our personal history, the influences that 
have shaped who we are today that include our past experiences and personal 
dispositions.  The ‘structuring’ refers to the current, present day influences upon 
the actor through the interaction of other actors and the structures and the 
systems that are part of his or her life - these may include, but not be limited to 
the company they work for, the industry they work in, and the political or 
economic systems in which they conduct their daily lives. The habitus is 
considered ‘durable’ in that it lasts over time; it is inherent and becomes 
inherent in individual dispositions.  The habitus is a product of who we are and 
have become during our lifetime and the experiences within it.  It is also 
‘transferable’ in that it is possible for it to cross boundaries of social fields.   
Although our behaviours may change depending on the role we are playing, be it 
father, brother, professional or husband, the core of these personal dispositions 
– our personality - are concrete. ‘These unconscious schemata are acquired 
through lasting exposure to particular social conditions and conditionings, via the 
internalization of external constraints and possibilities’ (Wacquant, 1998, p. 220). 
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Essentially, habitus tells us that we are a product of our past, the culmination of 
experiences learned and reinforced through our social interactions with other 
actors and societal institutions.  Yet we shape these institutions by our habitus, a 
cyclical reinforcing of events and practices.  
It is best to understand habitus in a more practical sense - one that is 
easier to understand in operational terms and can be more easily interpreted for 
this study.  Bourdieu refers to the habitus as ‘personal dispositions’ that 
designates a ‘predisposition’, a ‘tendency’, ‘propensity’ or ‘inclination’ (Bourdieu, 
1977, p. 214). This predisposition as described by Bourdieu is ‘a past which 
survives in the present and tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making 
itself present in practices structured according to its principles’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 
82). These practices and principles manifest themselves in the form of biases and 
heuristics that people rely upon for reasoning and day-to-day decision-making.   
It is these practices of decision-making that guide the individual’s past 
experiences and predisposed tendencies that influence the practice along with 
the principles of the field in which the practice is being done.  Furthermore, 
Bourdieu argues that the actor thus becomes a ‘practical operator of the 
construction of objects’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 13). This perspective enables the 
actor to affect and control his or her reality by using the experiences of the past 
to shape his or her future.  The habitus is the product of our history that 
influences an actor’s future history.   
Even though the actor is seen as an active participant in his construction 
of reality, this active engagement is often constrained.  It is constrained by the 
past and tends to give ‘disproportionate weight to early experiences’ (Bourdieu, 
1977, p. 54).  People always have the ability to invoke agency in their decision-
making, but their perspective that has been engrained in them since birth will 
limit them.  Their age, gender, familial roles assumed and parent relations are 
rooted in an actor’s ‘basis of perception and appreciation of all subsequent 
experiences’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 54). Our current and future dispositions start 
here, influence and constrain our decision-making.  These experiences cannot be 
changed, and form what Bourdieu (1990b) calls: 
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 ‘…schemes of perception, thought and action tend to guarantee the 
“correctness” of practices and their constancy over time” …a present past 
that tends to perpetuate itself into the future by reactivation in similarly 
structured practices, an internal law though which the law of external 
necessities, irreducible to immediate constraints, is constantly exerted.’ (p. 
54) 
In other words, the habitus can be seen like a game of cards.  In a card 
game, we may be dealt a certain hand that will include many different value 
cards.  But it is how we choose to play those cards in a certain fashion, the 
‘correctness’ of practices of what we have been dealt, but we must play those 
(emphasis added) cards that we have been dealt for that game.  
 3.3.1 Group Habitus 
Bourdieu (1990a) also argued that habitus is not limited to the individual 
actor, but can also manifest itself in the group.  Not only do individual actors 
possess a habitus, a group of individuals can possess a similar habitus.  Through 
common elements or ways of doing things, the group too can take on these 
qualities.  Bourdieu described this as having common ‘schemes of perception’ or a 
similar world-view that has been learned by and through the collective whole – a 
type of culture that manifests itself on a firm level, a corporate culture.  They will 
take on qualities that are products of their history and become engrained in the 
workings and dispositions of the group.   
The group habitus is also ‘socially constituted and constantly reinforced by 
individual or collective sanctions’ (Bourdieu & Nice, 1980, p. 291). This is most 
evident in communities where the group influences the individual habitus in its 
most formative years.  When gender roles, certain behaviours within social 
groups, rules and norms are learned and general ways of behaving are engrained 
in the individual, which in turn reinforces the group habitus.  These behaviour 
schemata are not mediocre events, but a dynamic process that can often be 
influenced by new members of the group that bring with them their own 
personal dispositions and therefore, new perspectives (Strauss & Quinn, 1997).  
The group can also assume, in its own manner, a type of ‘group think’ that 
carries with it the histories and traditions of the group and sometimes the 
inability to think beyond what new members can contribute.  Bourdieu (1990a) 
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believes that the group habitus has the ‘infinite capacity to generate products –
thoughts, perceptions expressions and actions (p. 55). This ‘infinite capacity’ 
suggests the power that is available to the group and that that power has the 
capacity to transcend that of the individual.   This could explain the synergistic 
properties that teams are able to profit from and the innate safety or growth 
capacity that is felt when an individual is working with or in a group.   
In addition, Bourdieu (1990b) also feels that the group habitus can 
function as the ‘collective memory, reproducing the acquisitions of the 
predecessors in the successors’ (p. 291).  This is the ‘history’ of the group that 
often depicts itself in stories, past experiences or events that contribute to the 
underlying dynamics and culture of the group.   
 3.3.2 Habitus Within the Firm using a Relational Approach 
In addition to the group habitus being commonly known in social class, 
families or communities, these ‘groups’ can be classified as groups within the 
firm – as all the employees of the firm or the specific employees of functional 
departments within the firm.  The definition or concept of habitus by no means 
limits this application to individual agency as was described above, but can also 
be an approach to looking at the group habitus within an organisational 
structure and the culture of a firm (Ölzbilgin & Tatli, 2005).  The power 
dynamics and struggles within an organisation between actors can be defined 
and applied using a group level or ‘meso-level’ habitus – the ‘micro-level’ being 
the individual agency, and ‘macro-level’ the field in which the firm operates.  One 
of the salient features of applying the habitus to the culture of the firm is its 
inclusion of history, ‘the habitus – embodied history, internalized as a second 
nature and so forgotten as history’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 56).  This enables the 
study of organisations to include not only the power plays constituted with the 
existence of the firm and the impacts they have on decision-making but also 
provides historical context - albeit unconscious structure - to the influence and 
context.  It would also enable the researcher to take into account many of the 
‘individual mechanisms and structures’ that are inherent in the firm. It allows for 
an account of power struggles, but also the influences between actors, the firm 
and the fields in which the firm exists.  It is the habitus that enables the tension 
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and negotiation among its members that ultimately help contribute to and 
transform its culture or competitive position within the market ((Ölzbilgin, 
2005).    
A ‘meso’ or firm-level of analysis of habitus (Özbilgin, 2005) enables the 
researcher to investigate the ‘relational interplay’ that goes on between actors in 
the context of the Organisation.  In addition, Wacquant (1998) along with 
Özbilgin (2005) make a case for using a relational method when investing the 
firm level differences.   
‘Bourdieu argues that using a relational methodology enables the 
researcher, and the researched to be more comprehensive in studying the 
social phenomenon as opposed to a more comparative method 
which…merely expose (s) the contrastive positions of two individual, 
cultural or structural phenomena against one another, failing to capture 
their rich relational interplay’ (Özbilgin, 2005, p. 247). 
A relational method approach allows for a more comprehensive study of 
the interplay between the individual level habitus or personal dispositions, the 
firm level habitus and the field.  The active interplay between them will enable 
the researcher to take an historical account of each while examining the 
phenomenon in its situational context.  It will also enable the researcher to look 
at the ‘inter-dependence’ each has upon one another.  A comparative approach to 
this would not be enough to wholly understand the influences of the strategic 
decision-making practice.  As Bourdieu noted: 
 ‘It is a reminder that comparison is possible only from system to system, 
and that the search for direct equivalences between features grasped in 
isolation, whether, appearing at first sight different, they provide to be 
‘functionally’ or technically equivalent (like Pernod and shochu or sake) or 
nominally identical (the practice of golf in France and Japan, for instance), 
risks unduly identifying structurally different properties or wrongly 
distinguishing structurally identical properties . . . what is commonly called 
distinction, that is, a certain quality of bearing and manners, often 
considered innate . . . is nothing other than difference, a gap, a distinctive 
feature, in short, a relational property existing only in and through its 
relation with other properties.’ (Wacquant, 1998, p. 220)  
Using a comparative method would only allow for a contrasting perspective on 
the practice, and limits a comprehensive investigation into what is really 
happening at the most intimate level with minute detail.    




Bourdieu argued that in order to truly understand a social phenomenon it 
must be understood within its historical context.  This is done by looking deeper 
than the social practice of actors and their interactions amongst each other by 
considering the social space or ‘field’ and the rules that are created by an actor’s 
practice within it: ‘A structured space of positions, a force field that imposes its 
specific determinations upon all those who enter it’ (Wacquant, 1998, p. 221).  
Thus if a person wants to enter or participate in a specific field they must first 
enter with the qualities or attributes with which they can play by the explicit and 
implicit rules of the game.  They may need to possess a certain level of 
credentials or certain level of ‘capital’ in order to be considered a legitimate 
player within the field.  They must abide by the ‘mores and regulations 
enforced…of that time and place’ (Wacquant, 1998, p. 222).  In addition, Bourdieu 
also argued that a field is an ‘arena of struggle though which agents and 
institutions seek to preserve or overturn the existing distribution of capital.’  Here 
it is a constant battle over the power, positions and hierarchy that exist within 
the field.  Actors in current power positions will tend to take a more 
‘conservative’ strategy in order to maintain the current level of influence.  Those 
who are struggling to achieve power within the field tend to rely more on 
‘subversive’ strategies.  Established actors desire to hold onto power while those 
new to the field attempt to overthrow those in the dominant position.   Those 
actors in the dominant position will also attempt to accumulate more ‘capital’ or 
expertly use accumulated capital in order to preserve existing power and 
influence within the field.  This may be done through the use of social networks, 
education credentials, and economic capital or other means necessary 
(Wacquant, 1998).   
According to Bourdieu, identifying the field not only meant looking at the 
historical relational contexts in which social practice occurs, but also its inherent 
history of what has been learned, who was involved and dispositions developed 
over time and the practices surrounding it. (Bourdieu, 2005; Grenfell, 2008).  
Field or ‘Le Champ’ (Grenfell, 2008) is used to identify any space of intellectual 
discourse or practice. Based upon the premises of being a ‘structured space’ and 
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‘arena of struggle’ in which actors vie for position and power, it is essential to 
define the ‘space’ that will be under investigation.  For this study, the field will 
clearly be defined as micro-enterprises that are directly involved in the 
marketing and promotion of recorded music product in the United States which 
sits within the broader field of cultural production. This may encompass firms 
including record labels, distribution companies, artist managers, booking agents 
– those who seek ‘employment’ for the artist - or firms that may provide the 
functions associated with the marketing and promotion for this cultural product.   
Although this study specifically looks at the marketing and promotion of 
recorded music in micro-enterprises, Bourdieu also argues that a field is not 
specifically confined to one specific set of rules or field type, but rather a social 
world may encapsulate a number of fields.  A good example of this exists within 
broader field of the creative and cultural industries, which Bourdieu would argue 
is a subfield of the economic field.  Within this field lies the music industry, which 
in turn incorporates the smaller sub-fields of, for example, the recorded music 
industry, marketing and promotion, and artist management and so on.  Even 
though each sub-field may have its own doxa or rules of the game that dictate 
actions within it, often each sub-field may relate to its larger field with 
corresponding power relations and rules (Grenfell, 2008). This innate hierarchy 
of fields that interrelate often affects each other.  Again, in the broader economic 
or technological field, events that occur here can easily affect the cultural 
industries and more specifically the music industry.  An example of this were the 
technological events of the late 1990s - the advent of MP3 technology – that have 
had a profound impact on the marketing and distribution of recorded music 
product and the corresponding sales of that product since, which has also 
impacted the broader economic field within.  The complex interweaving of 
events and interrelated actions can also easily be compounded when institutions 
within sub-fields are classified as fields (Grenfell, 2008).   
Understanding and taking into account this complex web of fields and 
sub-fields will be critical when examining the influences upon the decision-
making practice for this research.  The power dynamics and struggles that 
interrelate will need to be taken into account.  The economic space, the field of 
cultural production, recorded music industry and micro-enterprises will all 
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directly influence the marketing and promotion of recorded music product and 
the decision-making practice.   
In order to operationalise the study of a field or sub-fields that 
incorporate the specific social phenomena of study effectively, Bourdieu felt that 
three things were necessary.  First, the researcher must ‘analyse the position of 
the field, vis-à-vis, the field of power’ (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 105).  In the case of this 
study and within the context of the strategic decision, the recorded music 
industry sits within the broader field of cultural production, which itself exists 
within the field of power.  These interrelated sub-fields may also include firms or 
subsidiaries that distribute recorded music or the stock markets that influence 
the decision-makers as they evaluate the profitability of their artists, their supply 
chain and relationships with their consumer.  Although many fields are inter-
connected and some more influential than others, they must still be considered 
when looking at the influences upon decision-making in the recorded music 
industry.  Second, ‘one must map out the objective structure of the relations 
between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete for the 
legitimate form of specific authority’ (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 105).  This could include 
the industry structure and dominant institutions within the field, key players 
and the positional power of those actors.  Third,  
‘one must analyse the habitus of the agents, the different systems of 
dispositions they have acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social 
and economic conditions, and which find in a definite trajectory within the 
field under consideration a more or less favourable opportunity to become 
actualized.’ (Bourdieu, 1992 p. 105) 
Each of the key players that are involved in the decision-making practice 
will be investigated.  The personal individual dispositions and the histories they 
bring to the context along with the firm level habitus or organisational culture 
will also be taken into consideration.   
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3.5 THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Although I briefly mentioned Bourdieu’s concepts regarding the field of 
cultural production in Section 2.6 and 3.4 above, further description is needed as 
it relates to his theory of practice.  This greater depth of discussion will create a 
better understanding of its strengths and its limitations as they relate to this 
study.  
 Bourdieu’s field theory of cultural production has been interpreted 
broadly to encompass ‘the tradition of classical sociology, including science, law 
and religion’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2006, p. 212).  It is his work within the production 
of the expressive-aesthetic culture that is most relevant here.  Although much of 
his work and subsequent writings address art and literature, the concepts are 
equally relevant to the production and consumption of popular music.  Bourdieu 
offers a field theory using a vocabulary that invokes his concepts of habitus and 
capital, which enable a connection to be made between his ideas of practice and 
the field of cultural production.  Even though some of Bourdieu’s ideas are 
helpful in the discussion of the cultural production field, there are limitations 
that require guiding principles from other frameworks, such as those addressed 
in Section 2.6 above. These are considered along with other theories that help to 
explain the characteristics of this space. 
 Bourdieu’s definition of ‘field’, outlined above in Section 3.4, allows for 
the interconnections of various fields such as economics and politics, which 
come together to form the ‘field of power’ (Bourdieu, 1993a).  In addition are his 
ideas regarding the field of cultural production, which he positions within the 
field of power and characterised by the dominant fraction of the dominant class 
(Bourdieu, 1993a). He further divides the field into the sub-field of ‘small-scale 
production’ (art for art’s sake) and the sub-field of ‘large-scale production’.  The 
small-scale production is characterised by low levels of economic capital but 
high amounts of cultural capital, while the large-scale sub-field is characterised 
by high amounts of economic capital and low amounts of symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu, 1996).  Hesmondhalgh (2006) interprets this distinction between the 
divisions clearly: 
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These are primarily distinguished from each other by the degree 
to which they are autonomous of the field of power.  Small-scale 
or restricted production is described as having a relatively high 
degree of autonomy, but never full autonomy; mass production is 
‘heteronomous’; - subject to outside rule - but never fully so 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2006 p. 214).   
Bourdieu often referred to the small-scale production as that of ‘high-art’, one of 
more sophistication and ‘pure’, while the sub-field of ‘large-scale production’ is 
one that is more commercial to satisfy the masses (Bourdieu, 1984; 1996).  The 
popular, recorded music industry and its symbolic goods are a product of such a 
sub-field.  It is the ‘heteronomous’ characteristic of this field that enables an 
industry to be sustained through the continued production of its product by its 
creators and enjoyed by its consumers. It is also one that enables those in the 
higher fractions of the industry to maintain the power that they hold.  It is one 
that Bourdieu defines by higher sales and economic activity, with a lesser degree 
of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1984; 1996).  Although Bourdieu does discuss 
some characteristics of the field structure, it is one that he rarely addresses, 
which some believe is to the detriment of the theory (Hesmondhalgh, 2006).  
Bourdieu also speaks to what he calls a ‘new petite bourgeoise’, or the 
‘occupations involving presentation and representation (sales, marketing, 
advertising, public relations, fashion, decoration and so forth) in all the institutions 
providing symbolic goods and services’ (Bourdeiu, 1984, p. 359).  These ‘new 
cultural intermediaries’, or those actors that ‘mediate’ between the producers 
and consumers, are the industry personnel responsible for the production and 
distribution of product, what Featherstone (2007) identified as ‘generators’ of 
new consumer culture.  Hesmondhalgh (2006) has found this definition 
problematic and misunderstood.  He further argues that Nixon (1997) has 
misinterpreted Bourdieu’s definition, citing that the ‘intermediary’ function is 
not one that contributes to the production, but rather Bourdieu’s intention was 
that these individuals are ‘critics’ who act as cultural intermediaries in the 
recording industry.  I must argue, however, that intermediaries are not 
‘generators’ (Featherstone, 2007) of the new consumer culture, but rather 
‘enablers’ of the process of creation and agents of production. Recording 
industry personnel are essential ‘critics’, but do more than just ‘critique’ or 
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provide judgement, they act as gatekeepers who facilitate the production of 
music and at times may contribute, but not decisively so, to what is to be worthy 
of public consumption.  The consumer’s role as ‘gatekeeper’ of cultural product 
is underestimated, and their influence upon popular culture is seen regularly.  
Evidence of this can be found in the consumer’s use of social media and viral 
marketing. The artist Psy and his parody ‘Gangnum Style’, or more recently the 
Norwegian band Ylvis and ‘What Does the Fox Say’ have had substantial cultural 
impact and economic success in the United States, while not being subject to a 
‘cultural intermediary’ or ‘gatekeeper’ of a record label. The idea of the cultural 
intermediary being seen as a purveyor of what is to be successful, and what is 
not, or a ‘generator’ of new consumer culture, does not account for the role of 
the consumer in what makes it popular in its own right. They are agents and 
‘enablers’ of the process, but not ‘generators’. 
Bourdieu is able to provide some context for the power and positioning of 
actors within his field theory of cultural production, but even more so when his 
ideas of capital and habitus are applied.  Bourdieu has shown the effect of 
possession and use of capital within the sub-fields of small and large-scale 
production, but he is also able to account for how individuals within these fields 
attempt to maintain or acquire further power by the transformation of capital 
into other types; ‘as a rule those richest in economic, cultural and social capital 
are the first to move into the new positions’ (Bourdieu, 1993a, p. 68).  Although he 
quickly contends that this is true in all fields and the context pertains to small-
scale product ideas, the applicability of his practice theory concepts within the 
field of cultural production become clear. He also states that: 
 ‘Because economic capital provides the guarantees [assurances] 
which can be the basis of self-assurance, audacity and indifference to 
profit – dispositions which, together with the flair associated with 
possession of a large social capital and corresponding familiarity of 
the field…points toward the outposts’  (Bourdieu, 1993a, p. 71). 
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When accounting for practice within the field, Bourdieu poses some explicit 
questions; 
What is the degree of conscious strategy, cynical calculation, in the 
objective strategies which observation brings to light and which 
ensure the correspondence between positions and dispositions?’ 
(Bourdieu, 1993a, p. 72) 
It is this type of question that enables Bourdieu to utilise his concept of habitus 
and to strengthen his argument and flexibility when using his practice theory 
within the field of cultural production.  Not only is he accounting for power 
through capital, but he also sees the ‘cynical calculation’ or ‘conscious strategy’ of 
the actor.  Bourdieu contends that: 
 ‘Lucidity is always partial and is, once again, a matter of position 
and trajectory within the field, so that it varies from one agent and 
one moment to another’ (Bourdieu, 1993a, p. 72). 
He sees these actions as something that will always differ, depending on 
the situation and circumstances of the agent’s habitus and the capital he 
possesses.  One could argue that this is the very nature of what he is attempting 
to achieve in his sociological perspective. Combining his theory of practice with 
his theory of cultural production enables the researcher to investigate behaviour 
within a specific social space more fully. 
 Although Bourdieu’s field theory of cultural production provides for the 
potential to understand the meanings of everyday structure and agency, 
Bourdieu has little to say about the large-scale production of cultural goods and 
the impact it has on an important aspect of current societal trends.   He 
essentially leaves ‘no account of how the most widely consumed cultural products 
– those disseminated by the media – are produced’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2006 p. 218).  
Hesmondhalgh (2006) further believes that Bourdieu inadequately addresses 
the ‘significance in determining conditions in the sub-field’ unlike his more 
developed ideas regarding the sub-field of small-scale production.  These gaps 
allow for contributions to his ideas within large-scale production, but also 
expose the need to capture characteristics of the field developed by other 
theorists. 
 




Bourdieu’s theory of practice also includes his concept of capital.  Capital, 
or one’s position within a field, and its interplay between the actor’s habitus 
within the field constitute the premise or social context in which practice occurs.  
Capital, as defined by Bourdieu is: 
‘Accumulated labour (in its materialized form or its ‘incorporated,’ 
embodied form), which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis 
by agents or group of agents, enable them to appropriate social energy in 
the form of reified or living labour’ (Bourdieu, 1986 p. 46). 
It is important to note that the concept of capital goes beyond that which 
is commonly understood as economic capital or the financial assets that are so 
often associated with the use of ‘capital’ in economic theory.  When Bourdieu 
discusses capital, he intends it to extend beyond the financial assets that an actor 
possesses but also capital in the form of social capital – the professional or 
personal connections with other actors, cultural capital – the skills and education 
one has acquired, and the corresponding symbolic capital – the resources 
available to an actor through prestige, honour or recognition, that may result.  It 
is these various types of capital and their use or exchange across different fields 
and negotiation of power across the complex web of fields that is critical to his 
theory of practice.  Capital, in all its forms, takes time to accumulate and can 
often be exchanged for economic capital or for more capital of its own likeness.  
The existence of capital and amount hitherto is dependent upon the social world 
in which it exists.  The amount and types are constrained by the field and are 
‘inscribed in the very reality of that world,’ which help govern and determine the 
success of the practices within that field (Bourdieu, 1986 p. 46).  
 3.6.1 Economic Capital 
Bourdieu defines economic capital as an actor’s command or control over 
economic resources such as cash or assets, private or real property (Bourdieu, 
1986) by which further accumulation of social or cultural capital may be 
obtained.  Assets can be immediately turned into cash or be considered 
institutionalised through an actor’s property or intellectual property rights.  In 
addition to the most heralded understanding of economic capital – cash – within 
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this field of study, intellectual property in the form of copyrights and trademarks 
are at the benchmark of economic exchange.  This type of ‘mercantile exchange’ 
is at the heart of all capitals theorised by Bourdieu, including social and cultural, 
and acts as one of the primary forms of capital within his theory of practice.   
Being the ‘root of all other types of capital’, Bourdieu (1986) sees social 
and cultural capital as ‘disguised and transformed variations of economic capital’ 
(Bourdieu, 1986).   The ‘transformation’ or conversion process, however, is one 
that takes great effort and is often superseded by the desire for greater 
accumulation of economic capital in light of recognition.  This transformation 
process of capital types will be discussed further in section 3.6.5 below. 
 3.6.2 Cultural Capital 
Cultural capital is an actor’s knowledge, education or skills that enable 
social mobility and may be exchanged for additional economic capital.   It 
manifests itself in three forms; institutionalised - through educational 
credentials such diplomas, certificates or licenses (Bourdieu, 1986) an embodied 
form – ‘long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body’ (Bourdieu, 1986) and an 
objectified state - physical objects or ‘cultural goods’ like books, music or 
instruments. 
Cultural capital, in its embodied form, is developed over time and is not 
something that is instantly or easily acquired.  The embodiment of cultural 
capital is often ‘incorporated’, ‘cultivated’ or obtained through the self-discipline 
or personal pursuit.  It does not have to be a deliberate acquisition, but may be 
‘assimilated’ through family values and socialisation (Bourdieu, 1986).  It is a 
capital that becomes ingrained in one’s habitus and develops as a property, per 
se, of an individual’s disposition.   Critics will argue that it is not always easily 
observable, but becomes an integral part of an individual that is not easily 
transferable (Bourdieu, 1986).  Bourdieu (1986) does believe that this capital, 
much like the other sub-types of capital can be transferred into an economic 
asset.  In this case, an acquired set of skills through education or abilities learned 
through family or apprenticeship enables the possessor of this capital to 
exchange their knowledge for an economically accepted salary or ‘mercantile 
exchange’ of that knowledge.  This, argues Bourdieu (1986), can create a sense of 
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‘scarcity’ of the capital when it becomes so intimately aligned with the actor.  
Power struggles between others with a similar possession of cultural capital 
within the field create dynamics of distribution assessment among those who 
create the ‘laws and/rules.’ However, there are challenges and limitations that 
exist with the embodiment of cultural capital.  This capital is limited by the 
actor’s mental capacity to acquire it and will ultimately elapse with its possessor.  
It can become diluted or entangled in perception when transferred from 
generation to generation and can be difficult to measure (Meisel & Sullivan, 
2002).  
Objectified cultural capital consists of the physical objectification of the 
cultural capital that is owned or possessed by the actor.  This could include any 
number of representative artefacts that could include a work of art or a musical 
instrument.  These physical assets may be exchanged for economic capital or 
consumed.  Consumption can only occur if there is an appropriate understanding 
of the object.  For example, a violin cannot be played or a piece of art be 
understood without the proper embodied capital - education or knowledge of 
that art or instrument from previous acquisition of the knowledge is needed.   
However, Bourdieu also argues that this capital, and the power that embodies it, 
may be acquired through ‘proxy’, which gives evidence to the ‘executives’ of a 
field: 
‘To possess the machines, he only needs economic capital; to appropriate 
them and use them in accordance with their specific purpose (defined by the 
cultural capital, of scientific or technical type, incorporated in them), he 
must have access to embodied cultural capital, either in person or by proxy.’  
(Bourdieu, 1986, p. 50) 
 Although an actor or executive may not understand how to play an instrument 
or be an entertainer, they have the ability to acquire the power associated with 
that knowledge, embodied in cultural capital, through direct association or 
through economic capital exchange.  This becomes apparent within the creative 
and cultural industries, and specifically the music industry, where booking 
agents, managers or marketers of music and the artists who record that music 
are able to acquire this capital through association without actually possessing it.   
This also holds for individuals that possess a particular machine or device, but 
may not have the actual cultural capital needed to use it appropriately. The 
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ownership of these items, or association through proxy, also portrays a level of 
symbolic capital that then reinforces the actor’s social status or position.  Yet, 
this only remains effective if it is used as a tool within the field or social space 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  This is evident when a manager or booking agent who 
represents a well-known artist wields this power, intentionally, to his or her 
personal advantage or on behalf of the artist they represent.  Being ‘associated’ 
with a commercially successful artist and the symbolic capital represented in it, 
may be used to achieve further symbolic, economic or social capital if so chosen.  
Institutionalised cultural capital is a state that ‘institutes an essential 
difference between the officially recognized’ as opposed to the more 
individualistic development of embodied capital (Bourdieu, 1986 p. 51). 
Institutionalised capital brings forth the official ‘recognition’ of the cultural 
capital acquired that shows belief in the qualifications within the field.  This is 
often done through academic credentials, qualifications or diplomas.  It also 
enables the actors of the field to ‘compare’ qualifications or to put a monetary 
amount on the value of the education gained that enables the actor who acquired 
it to transform cultural capital into economic capital.  Institutions are able to 
recognise this type of capital that allows for easier comparisons and can often be 
used by them as a tool for easier decision- making (Bourdieu, 1986).  
 3.6.3 Social Capital 
Bourdieu (1986) also discussed the importance of social capital, that is, 
one’s resources based upon networks of influence and support, relationships and 
group memberships.  Not only is having a contact or network of individuals 
available at his or her disposable to forward their position in the field, but 
Bourdieu also felt that the actor has the benefit of the ‘collectively owned’ 
capital.  In other words, they have the access to the social networks of each of 
those members of the group that ‘entitles’ them to the ‘credential’ of the 
association.  The amount of social capital is in direct relation to the level of 
capital an actor possesses and to what degree he or she can mobilise their 
networks (Bourdieu, 1986).  Here Bourdieu suggests that economic, cultural and 
symbolic capital are ‘never completely independent’ of each other and that the 
larger amount of each is directly related the volume of social capital any 
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particular actor possesses.  Bourdieu (1986) also indicates that social capital is 
not given to an actor, but something that must be accumulated or pursued by 
effort over time and considered as an investment for the short or long term.  
Being a purposeful endeavour, accumulation of social capital must be deliberate 
and sought out by the actor.  Joining societies, clubs and other organisations that 
enable the collective whole to benefit from each other’s participation is at the 
heart of this element of his theory of practice. For example, actors within the 
recorded music industry field understand the benefit of joining the local 
musicians’ unions or industry-recognised societies like the National Academy of 
Recording Arts and Sciences - N.A.R.A.S.  They can associate with these clubs and 
see the value in the symbolic profits and potential economic capital that can be 
attained through their association.  The question is how and to what extent, does 
this social capital influence the strategic decision-making practice within this 
field.  Knowing this will also help to contribute to the understanding of the 
influences on the practice as they relate to the field characteristics established in 
Chapter 2. The actors understand the value and what they can receive from 
being a part of them, but there is little research on the influence that these social 
and professional networks have on strategic decision-making in music industry 
micro-firms. 
3.6.4 Symbolic Capital and Symbolic Power 
 Symbolic capital represents ‘accumulated prestige or honour’ (Bourdieu & 
Thompson, 1991).  This form of capital, similar to others identified by Bourdieu, 
embodies an objective or subjective form which, taken together, contributes to a 
shared meaning of value and prestige that can lead to a form of symbolic power.  
Within the field of the recorded music industry, the actual Billboard charts 
and/or a Grammy or Dove awards take on the highest level of symbolic capital, 
either in terms of an objective form as a structured structure of symbolic power, 
as an ‘instrument of knowledge and communication’, or subjectively through what 
it represents when a Grammy or Dove award is earned or a certain chart level 
position is achieved (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991).  This symbolic capital and 
power recognised within the charts and awards help to give meaning to the field, 
and help to provide ‘consensus which contributes fundamentally to the social 
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order’ (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991 p. 166). They act as ‘structuring structures’ 
that allow the actors of the field to make sense of the doxa and to guide their 
current, accepted practices.   
 This is also done through the positions occupied by the institutions within 
the field.  The symbolic value of the prominent institutions or ‘major record 
labels’ serves to some as the ultimate feat or level of success or attainment.  They 
boast a ‘we’ve made it’ ideal when an association with one of these firms occurs.  
This could be done through an artist being offered a ‘record deal’ from them or 
an aspiring college graduate being offered his or her first job by one of these 
firms.  The level of prestige or honour that signing, or that employment offer, 
brings to the actor positions them in a more competitive or prominent position 
within the field.  Bourdieu also sees symbolic capital as ‘credit, but in the broadest 
sense, a kind of advance, a credence, that only the group’s belief can grant.’  
Therefore, the symbolic capital and the power that it possesses within the field 
can only be granted and be given importance by the actors and the social 
structures within it.  It is these very actors that seek and give the power of the 
capital and its prominence.  Symbolic power is an invisible power that only has 
meaning for those who recognise it and utilise it to their advantage, and often 
under the ‘auspices of ignorance’ (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991).  This symbolic 
power, however, is not just limited to accumulation by individual actors.  Similar 
to the habitus discussed above, symbolic power may also be exercised by 
interactions between social networks – in this case the firm.  Understanding the 
possession of symbolic capital and the power that this can instil upon a firm can 
be seen as the framework for the formulation of ‘symbolic systems.’ 
‘Symbolic systems’ are fundamentally distinguishable according to 
whether they are produced and thereby appropriated by the group as a 
whole or, on the contrary, produced by a body of specialists and more 
precisely, by a relatively autonomous field of production and circulation’ 
(Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991, p. 168). 
 Symbolic systems were first discussed and identified through a neo-
Kantian tradition in which ‘symbolic universes’ such as language or art, which is 
relevant here in the form of music and the production of the recorded product, 
was recognised ‘as an instrument of knowing and constructing the world of 
objects, as ‘symbolic forms’ (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991).  With music, and the 
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recordings that embody it, come the institutionalised recognition of ‘knowing’ 
through ‘symbols’ of recognition that are being reinforced through the 
institutions of legitimacy in that ‘knowing’.  Institutions such as the Grammy 
Awards or the Grand Ol’ Opry that host the rituals of this recognition award 
objectified and institutionalised forms of power to firms or individuals that meet 
the criteria determined by those within the field. 
‘Symbols are the instruments par excellence of “social integration’’: as 
instruments of knowledge and communication…they make it possible 
for there to be a consensus on the meaning of the social world, a 
consensus which contributes fundamentally to the reproduction of the 
social order’ (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991, p. 168). 
 These symbols contribute to the legitimacy of the established order by 
reinforcing these distinctions or hierarchies by the dominant culture.  The 
dominant culture in this case are those industry leaders, like the major record 
companies or ‘majors,’ or commercially successful firms both in terms of 
economic, cultural and symbolic capital accumulation that exercise and reinforce 
their power and dominance in the field.   
 ‘In is as structured and structuring instruments of communication and 
knowledge that ‘symbolic systems’ fulfil their political function, as 
instruments which help to ensure that one class dominates another’ 
(Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991, p. 168). 
 What Bourdieu alludes to here is that class fractions are engaged in a 
symbolic struggle.  If the ‘majors’ characterise the dominant culture of an 
industry like the recorded music industry, by its very nature the same culture 
must include a dominated class.  Here, this role is represented by ‘independent’ 
record labels or a ‘Do-It-Yourself’ (DIY) artist within the industry; those with 
typically fewer economic resources, and less social, cultural and symbolic capital.  
This hierarchy of a dominating and dominated culture leads to the creation of 
social classes within the field.  It could be stipulated that the ‘independents’, 
often known as ‘indies’ fulfil the role of the middle class whereby the working or 
lower class segments would be fulfilled by the DIY artist within the industry - 
having even fewer resources and capital at its disposal when compared to their 
independent label counterparts.  
 ‘Dominant class fractions, whose power rests on economic capital, aim 
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to impose the legitimacy of their domination either through their own 
symbolic production, or through the intermediary of conservative 
ideologues’ (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991, p. 168). 
 The symbolic production within this industry - the award shows - 
reinforces the dominant culture’s position – the majors - in the field by 
legitimising their own efforts.  By rewarding or recognising those who have 
achieved what has been determined by the class as ‘success,’ public recognition 
of a ‘job well done’ or a ‘you’ve made it’ -  ‘you’re one of us now’ reinforces this 
message and helps to solidify its positioning in the field.  Those being dominated 
or seen as legitimate also recognise this, but a struggle exists between the 
dominating - who set the rules for these shows - and the dominated that wish to 
‘join the club.’  Bourdieu feels that ‘The dominated fraction always tends to set the 
specific capital, to which it owes its position, at the tip of the hierarch of the 
principles of hierarchization.’ (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991, p. 168). 
3.6.5 Transformation of Capital 
The transformation, allocation and distribution of capital can and often 
does occur, exchanging one for another is something that can happen explicitly 
or implicitly depending on intention and agency.  It is this intentionality that 
creates the boundaries between the habitus, field and capital within the world of 
each actor. Bourdieu does make clear that the sub-forms of capital can be 
derived from economic capital.  Simply, networks and forms of cultural capital 
can be bought, but may not be as concrete as if invested over time and require 
great effort for it to provide the power within the field (Bourdieu, 1986).  More 
common, however, is the actor’s desire to transform these capitals into economic 
capital. 
‘So it has to be posited simultaneously that economic capital is at the root of 
all the other types of capital and that these transformed, disguised forms of 
economic capital, never entirely reducible to that definition, produce their 
most specific effects only to the extent that they conceal the fact that 
economic capital is at their root’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 54). 
Bourdieu makes explicit that at the heart of all transactions within the 
social space or field of question; an actor’s intention is the accumulation of 
economic capital.  The possession of social, cultural or symbolic capital in 
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themselves is legitimate and allows for a more accurate depiction of practice, but 
intentionality lies in the acquisition of further monetary or economic assets.  
However, this is not at the heart of what lies in his theory of practice.  As 
discussed earlier, an actor’s true intention is that of distinction, being socially 
recognised for who they are and by what they possess or do, with the root of that 
distinction being disguised by the transformation of capital as the ultimate 
pursuit of further economic capital. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The rationale for using Bourdieu’s theory of practice as a chosen 
methodology was made explicit.  This has been achieved through a detailed look 
at the main components of his practice theory, the habitus, both at the individual 
(micro) level and group or firm (meso) level, capital and field.  Furthermore, it 
was also justified, in comparison to other practice theories and the inadequacies 
of those theories, as a chosen lens for investigating the strategic decision-making 
practice in recorded music industry micro-firms.  Lastly, the importance of using 
a Bourdieusian lens and conducting the research using a relational method as 
opposed to a comparative approach was discussed.  The next chapter will 


















In order to proceed with a discussion about the chosen methods for this 
research, it is worth restating the aims discussed in Chapter 1.  My objectives are 
to explore the influences on strategic decision-making practices in micro-
enterprises, from the perspective of individual actors, the objective variables 
that influence those actors and the fields in which they conduct business.  It was 
also stated that the reason for this research was to gain insight into how 
strategic decisions are made in the music industry, where unpredictability of 
success and an infinite variety define the product and the field.  As discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 1, this research takes an interpretive practice theory 
approach that will allow for a representation of experience.  Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice allows for an account of influences beyond the superficial description of 
the process. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the methods used to answer the research 
question, along with the epistemological and ontological foundations for the 
study, and the practical implications for such a research project.  Issues of access, 
the chosen data collection method and ethical considerations of the project will 
also be outlined. I will conclude with an explanation about the coding process 
and data reduction methods used.   
4.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR DATA COLLECTION METHODS USED 
 
 As discussed, a number of methods have been used when investigating 
decision-making in organisations and each has demonstrated appropriate 
attributes for the chosen study.  When using cases as a way to investigate a 
research question, Yin (2009) and Denzin and Lincoln (2011), have indicated 
that some of the most common data collection tools include interviews, direct or 
participant observation, archival records, documentation and artefacts. The 
habitus, being a conscious and ‘unconscious relationship’ resulting in a personal 
disposition that is both socially and individually constructed, is best understood 
by personal interviewing – the semi-structured interview.  It is in this approach 
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that actor intention can be explored and combined with their objective 
characteristics, the environment within which the practice is constructed and the 
field(s) in which they interact.  I chose this primary source of data-collection 
over other practices, including direct observation, oral history and critical arts-
based inquiry.  Each has their areas of strength when trying to extract the 
representations of experience that is at the heart of interpretive inquiry, but 
none seemed to be as suited as the interview for answering my research 
question.  Direct observation would allow for the ‘actions’ in behaviour to come 
to the forefront, but I am also interested in the ‘why’ behind those actions.  Oral 
history, could account for some of the ‘why’ but tends to keep the dialogue more 
‘open-ended’ and may not keep the dialogue focused on the phenomenon of 
study (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).  Using a more semi-structured approach to the 
interviewing process, allows me to focus the dialogue on the specific issues 
related to the decision-making practice.  Although a critical-arts based inquiry 
might be suitable due to the chosen industry of study, it situates its inquiry 
within the ‘artist-as-researcher’, and uses the ‘aesthetics, methods, and practices 
of the ...arts’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 415).  This thesis looks at but one 
business practice – SDM - and does not intersect at the borders of art 
performance and research.     
In addition to personal interviewing, other methods can be used to 
capture data within cases; often the use of secondary sources, archival records 
and direct observation can assist in securing an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomena beyond what any one data collection method is able to do, enabling 
the researcher to capture a more ‘complete’ and comprehensive account of the 
practice (Bryman & Bell, 2007).  By using additional data sources like field notes 
on direct observation and artefact analysis, it facilitates a more comprehensive 
investigation of influences beyond the actor’s interpretation of the events and 
takes into consideration objective and demographic influences.  These influences 
at the micro-level include individual dispositions, the type and quantity of capital 
an actor possesses and their personal biography.  When looking at the habitus of 
the firm or meso-level, using cases enables an investigation of the interactions 
between individuals and groups, and the power structures, practices and politics 
between them.  A clearly defined macro level or field enables the research to be 
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situated in a context that shapes and reshapes the understandings and reactions 
in relation to the perceived environment (Nord, 2005).  
 To answer my research question and enquire about their habitus while 
interpreting the practice of decision-making within the firm and the field in 
which the firm operates, I determined that the most suitable data collection 
technique would be the semi-structured interview.  Using the interview as a 
primary source for data when using Bourdieu’s theory is not unique to this 
study.  Previous research on the habitus and decision-making has also relied on 
the interview as a source for data collection.  Table 1 below outlines the different 
studies and approaches that have been used by other researchers to look 
empirically at the subconscious and conscious predispositions of an actor and 
the influences that surround the decision-making practice in organisations.  This 
would suggest that the interview is a reliable and suitable approach when using 
Bourdieu as a methodological framework for a study of this kind.   
Table 1 – Select Studies of Subconscious and Conscious Decision-Making 
Study Investigation Method Used 
McDonough (2006) Habitus Unstructured interviews 
Mutch (2003) Habitus Interviews, 
questionnaire, direct 
observation, documents 
Sayce (2006) Habitus Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Liberman-Yaconi, 
Hooper & Hutchings 
(2010) 
Decision-making Semi-structured 
interviews for study of a 
case (unit of analysis 
being the decision) 
Kauer, Prinzessin zu 
Waldeck and Schäffer  
(2007) 
Decision-making Interviews and 
questionnaire  
 
The interview allows for a targeted approach and a rich description of the 
personal experiences of the decision-making practice, as the actor perceives it.  
However, along with this intimate perspective comes personal bias.  The 
respondents may feel the interviewer wants to hear certain things and could 
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adapt their responses to the interest of the researcher and thus provide 
information that is less true and accurate than their perception.  
Semi-structured interviews encourage flexibility during discussions while 
providing guidance in data collection.  Using this type of method also allows for 
an active engagement between the parties to explore new areas of enquiry that 
may not have been discovered. To avoid moving into an irrelevant concept, 
however, a theory driven schedule of topics that acted as an ‘aide-memoire’ for 
the interview was used for guidance – see Appendix C. 
 Semi-structured interviews also allow for a more robust description of 
events, interpretations, accounts of experiences and context that more casual, 
surveys or other data collecting sources may not provide.  Bryman and Bell 
(2007) also indicate that using interviews enable the interviewee to ‘answer in 
their own terms’ and can facilitate unusual or unexpected responses that can 
lead to exploring new areas that may arise.   For this research, the semi-
structured interview enabled the respondents to reflect upon the influences and 
process involved in their decision-making practice.  For each specific decision 
that was discussed the respondents could elaborate on the actions taken, or 
inactions, on their part, and by other participants of the process and why and 
what factors may have contributed to the specific outcome.  Semi-structured 
interviews also allowed me to mine deeper into the meaning and motivations 
behind such action.  The time for reflexivity and ability to capture further insight 
made the semi-structured interview a particularly attractive choice for collecting 
data specific to the influences the personal and firm-level habitus has on the 
decision-making practice. 
4.3 GAINING ACCESS 
 
 Gaining access for research can be a challenging process, especially for 
firms within the music industry.  Access was obtained through my own 
professional network and then through a careful selection of firms. This is 
discussed in more detail in section 4.4.  Once contact was made with the owners 
or managers of those firms, permission to conduct the interviews and gain access 
to relevant data was sought by an introductory letter sent through email 
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correspondence - Appendix C.  The research agenda was made explicit to the 
respondents and the potential use of the data and implications of the study were 
made clear.  Appendix A lists the participants involved in the study.  Pseudonyms 
were used to protect their identity for confidentiality purposes.  In addition, 
further details of the interview are also listed including dates, times and length 
of the interviews.  Of all the thirty-six individuals and twenty firms contacted, 
only one declined to participate in the study due to his desire for confidentiality 
and unfamiliarity with the research process.  
4.4 DATA SOURCE AND COLLECTION 
4.4.1 Interviewing 
The fieldwork was carried out in two distinct phases.  The first consisted 
of eleven interviews that were used as pre-interviews. This stage enabled me to 
fine-tune questions and adjust the procedures when data collection ensued for 
the second stage.  Grbich (2007) describes this technique as a ‘recursive spiral,’ 
in which the research process starts with defining the question, data collection, 
preliminary analysis, then continually refining the question and/or method and 
going back out into the field, until no new data emerge.  Differing from a ‘pilot 
study’ or ‘pre-test’ in which data are typically not used for a full-scale study, the 
data within the pre-interview process were used and constituted an actual part 
of the research.  Most interviews were done individually, unless not feasible due 
to the professional constraints of the interviewee.  However, if an interview was 
conducted simultaneously with another person involved in the decision-making 
practice being present, each individual was presented with the same questions.  
Conducting the interview with more than one person present often led to 
memory recall that may not have occurred if the interview was conducted 
individually.  The dialogue of the semi-structured interview was guided by 
sixteen topics – Appendix C.  The approach was altered slightly in the second 
phase of the interview to reflect the position and responsibility, within or 
outside of the firm, of the individual that was involved in the decision practice.   
A total of forty-three interviews with thirty-six respondents were 
conducted over a one and a half year period.  Five were follow-up interviews 
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where further information or clarification of data was needed after initial data 
analysis was conducted. In addition, a third follow-up interview was required 
with two of the interviewees.  Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 
two hours. Consent was obtained for each by the owner/manager and all firm 
employees that were involved in the decision-making practice.  This process 
proceeded in two phases.  First, I conducted an initial interview with the 
owner/manager in which self-identification of what he or she believed to be a 
firm-specific, strategic decision was conducted followed by the schedule of 
questions designed to facilitate answering the research question.  Second, I 
interviewed the remaining employees and/or stakeholders involved in this 
practice. 
 I proceeded to inform the interviewees of the research agenda and asked 
them to provide permission to record and publish material.  In addition, 
individuals were granted the ability to withdraw from the research at any time if 
they felt expectations were no longer being met.  Assurance of confidentiality 
through the use of pseudonyms for the individual as well as the firm was also 
discussed and given. Digital recording devices were used to capture the data.  All 
interviews were conducted in-person and face-to-face, with the exception of 
four, in which the interviews were done electronically via Skype.  The use of on-
line interviewing in these cases was due to logistical matters and allowed for 
similar interaction with rich communication between the interviewer and 
interviewee with voice and a variety of visuals. 
 As mentioned, the interview was only one method utilised for these cases, 
additional data collection occurred through direct observation and note-taking 
at the firms’ headquarters.  Specifically, the capture of evidence regarding 
company culture and employee interaction, the décor and layout of offices were 
also included in the initial assessment of company culture and values.  In order 
to build upon this analysis, artefacts in the form of company emails, when 
supplied and were relevant, were coded to the criteria set forth in the research 
agenda.  In addition, company websites and social media sites were analysed to 
add further context and to determine the values important to the firm, as they 
wanted to be branded to their stakeholders.  Magazines were also used, 
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specifically trade magazines such as Billboard and MusicRow, to analyse chart 
positioning and relevant publicity. 
The idea of data saturation is one that is not specified and rather 
ambiguous and is often left to the discretion of the researcher.  Here, the quality 
and quantity of the data obtained was deemed appropriate when nothing new 
emerged from the transcripts of the interviews and other data collected.   Since 
the respondents were asked to elaborate on their own personal actions within 
the decision practice, the interview and subsequent follow-up interviews 
allowed for reflexivity and a description of the practice.   
4.4.2 Reflection and Analysis of the Pre-Study 
The pre-study was a useful test for the research design.  It allowed for 
greater clarity in the filtering process used in making choices.  It enabled a 
refining of the topics used during the interview, and aided my decision to collect 
data from multiple sources, including social media sites, websites and Billboard 
charts, and clarified coding procedures. Furthermore, after the initial interviews 
were conducted in the pre-study, I began my data analysis which helped to 
decide the firm type that would be best suited to answer the research questions.   
In one particular company, Water Toss Music, the themes and vignettes 
from interviewee’s responses revealed little information regarding strategic 
decisions in the music industry, especially when compared to the other firms and 
decisions that I was studying at the same time.  Although evidence of heuristics 
and planning were emerging, there was little discussed that would add to the 
thesis.  I determined that this was due to the firm’s business model.  Water Toss 
Music was not directly involved with the marketing and promotion of recorded 
music and did not exhibit the economically and culturally driven characteristics 
of a firm that functions within the music industry.  Although they were initially 
chosen due to their involvement with the hiring of musicians for the production 
of events, it was not a model suited to the challenges and opportunities that 
music industry firms confront in their SDM, which this research was seeking to 
uncover.  They more naturally met the criteria of an events management firm 
that just happened to hire musicians.  The company was removed from the list of 
firms that formed part of this study and the focus remained on those companies 
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that that were directly involved in the marketing and promotion of recorded 
music. 
In addition to the filtering of the company type, the pre-study also 
confirmed where the interviews would take place. Conducting the interviews 
within the workplace helped put the interviewee at ease and enabled me to take 
notes on certain behaviours and inquire about awards or artefacts displayed.  At 
that time, I decided that I would continue, whenever possible, to conduct the 
interviews at the respondents’ workplaces.  Furthermore, the pre-study helped 
refine the topics to be discussed within the interview.  After using my ‘aide-
mémoire’, I noticed that certain topics produced more detailed and interesting 
results than others.  Therefore, if I noticed that the interviewee was concerned 
about time, or was fidgeting, I would focus on certain topics that were more 
relevant to the discussion. 
Moreover, after conducting the pre-interviews, it became clear that 
additional sources of data would help in illuminating the subtleties in some of 
the decisions.  Therefore, I looked at all supporting artefacts that were relevant, 
including websites, social media sites, Twitter accounts and/or Billboard charts 
to which I could get access. 
 Lastly, the pre-study interviews enabled me to begin refining the coding 
and analysis procedures. Prior to the interviews, broad categories were 
established that included concepts from Bourdieu’s practice theory and the SDM 
framework established through the literature review.  Specifically, the pre-study 
enabled the creation of sub-categories of these broad classifications.  If 
something of interest was uncovered that did not fit into the established 
groupings, new categories and codes were generated.  For example, the coding of 
‘aggrandisement’ was created along with appropriate sub-categories such as 
‘name dropping’, which included evidence of ‘prominent artists worked with’.   
After an analysis of the pre-study data, the initial research questions were 
not changed.  Each interview, with the exception of those from Water Toss Music, 
was providing compelling data that would later be considered for inclusion 
within a case.  The emerging themes and descriptive vignettes heightened my 
interest in finding answers to my questions.  During the pre-study, the research 
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included an enquiry into the broader SME firm size and it was not until further 
case selection that it was refined to include only micro-enterprises. 
4.4.3 Selection and Dissemination of Firms and Cases 
A deciding moment in the research occurred after the results of the pre-
study were presented during the transfer interview from MPhil to PhD.  I 
decided that the data being collected would be better reported in the form of 
cases to allow for the Bourdieusian methodology, thus enabling an account of 
both the objective and subjective characteristics of the practice.  I then decided 
that each individual strategic decision would be the unit of analysis (case).  This 
allowed me to bring in the actor, the firm and the industry into context more 
easily.  The subtleties of the actor's past experience and age as influential factors 
would prove difficult to link to the practice if all the evidence was not connected 
to a specific decision.   
After the preliminary findings were showing promise in answering the 
research questions, adjustments to the choice of firms, collection of data and 
analysis procedures were undertaken.  I decided that additional companies to be 
considered in the study would be selected through personal contacts and 
recommendations from previously interviewed owners. With one exception, all 
initial contacts at these new firms came from the owner or manager.    Once 
interest in participating in the study was acknowledged, I followed-up to confirm 
the research agenda.  This correspondence also followed the protocol I 
established in the written disclosure in Appendix C.  After direct communication 
had been made, the individual owners agreed to meet with me and discuss the 
SDM practice of their company and, more specifically, talk about themselves, as 
the primary decision maker.   
This led to an additional fourteen companies from which I sought further 
data.  The final firm came from an ‘up-and-coming’ local band, two of the three 
members of which came from one of my classes at Belmont University.  Through 
personal conversations with these members, I felt that they could offer insight 
from recent decisions they had made.  These twenty companies that I had now 
identified fitted the more refined criteria of being ‘directly involved in the 
marketing and promotion of recorded music’.  These included record labels, 
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artist management companies, producers, entertainment attorneys, marketing 
firms, artists and production companies and consultants.  By the time the final 
company had been selected for inclusion, data analysis had been on going and 
data saturation was beginning to emerge.  The last company ultimately 
confirmed what I was already seeing through the other decisions and helped to 
limit the number of companies. 
 Approximately a year and a half from the beginning of data collection, the 
analysis of the forty decisions that emerged from the twenty firms began to show 
patterns in their description of the practice.  Since I decided earlier that cases 
would be used as a way to present the evidence, eight decisions from four firms 
were selected as an optimal number based on previously accepted criteria 
established by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009).  For those four firms, two 
decisions from each were chosen to portray the consistencies and differences 
among the actors' practices and circumstances.  Therefore, the decisions listed in 
Table 2 below were chosen from the firms identified.  Of the forty discussed in 
the interviews, some exhibited more interesting descriptions.  Those with a 
clearer and more insightful depiction of the practice were selected for 
consideration.  This quickly narrowed the number of cases down to eighteen.   
The final eight were then selected based upon my experience working in the 
industry.  For one specific decision-type, the ‘artist selection’, or the choosing of 
what artist to ‘sign’ to the label, was mentioned by more than one manager.  In 
this situation, I chose the one that was the most illuminating.  I decided the case 
from Hat Punk, LLC would be included in the final eight cases, even though it was 
discussed in ‘general terms’ and not to a specific artist they had ‘signed’.  Lastly, 
the final cases for inclusion were those from whom I knew I could get further 





      93 
 
Table 2 – Select Decision Cases 
Cases Firm 
Case # 1 – Radio Promotion Strategy Kapooshki Music 
 
Case # 2 - Expansion and Diversification  Kapooshki Music 
 
Case # 3 - Marketing & Promotion   Cisco Newman 
Case # 4 – Team Expansion Cisco Newman 
Case # 5 – Client Acquisition  Bench Puppet Entertainment 
Case # 6 – Firm Relocation  Bench Puppet Entertainment 
Case # 7 – Company Buy-out Hat Punk, LLC 
Case # 8 – Talent Selection  Hat Punk, LLC 
          
 During the interviews, I asked questions about specific strategic actions 
that had been taken by the individuals. Instead of imposing a specific definition 
upon the interviewees, the strategic decisions were self-identified by the owner-
manager.  They were then used as the unit of analysis for the case rather than the 
firm as in previous research.  For example Hickson et al. (1986) and Dean and 
Sharfman (1996), show that decision processes can often vary widely in any one 
organisation.  Looking at the decision rather than the firm allows for a more 
reflexive and pluralistic approach to the investigation within the context of the 
organisation.  After the decisions were identified by the owner/manager, they 
were then limited by when the decision or new direction was taken.  Huber and 
Power (1985) found that moderate amounts of time did not substantially affect 
the recollection or practice surrounding the decision, but Golden (1992) posits 
that those accounts greater than two years old tend to be remembered more 
inaccurately.  Therefore, those decisions or new directions taken within the past 
two years were chosen.   As will be shown in Chapters 5 to 8, the decisions 
chosen for analysis are in various stages of execution with some outcomes 
already known by the decision-makers.  Understanding that these varying 
degrees of completion and success may result in recall bias, compensation was 
made whenever possible by interviewing multiple individuals involved in the 
decision practice.  In addition to compensating for recall bias, using multiple 
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individuals and their perspectives helped to mitigate discrepancies and provided 
more detail. 
 As previously discussed, in addition to the semi-structured interviews, I 
took notes on employee interaction, as well as the use of artefacts in the firm to 
reinforce status and other observable characteristics that directly impacted, or 
were a part of, the decision practice.  These notes and documents were used 
along with the interview data and contained information about office locations, 
team demographics, financial performance and other specific information 
relevant to the strategic decision that was made.   
4.4.4 Managing Ongoing Relationships with Respondents 
Often access to proprietary information in music industry firms is difficult 
to achieve.  Industry executives tend to be cautious and sceptical because of the 
on-going pursuit by ‘would-be’ artists or unknown professionals that seek their 
attention.  As in other industries, relationships you develop and maintain are 
critical to getting things done. This was evident in many of the decisions in this 
study as managers talked about their relationships with others and the mutual 
trust they had developed when conducting business.   
 As many of the relationships established in this study were new, 
approaching the respondents with sensitivity was needed.  Although a certain 
level of ‘mistrust’ may have existed at the start, any scepticism was quickly 
replaced by a desire for mutual understanding of what was being investigated or, 
at the very least, the interviewee took a more positive attitude towards the 
interview process.    
4.5 THE CODING PROCESS AND DATA REDUCTION 
 
 All interviews were transcribed and entered into NVivo 9 qualitative data 
analysis software for easier organisation, manipulation and retrieval of the data.  
Respondents were asked to verify transcripts and interview notes for accuracy, 
as suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985).  I used a thematic analysis on the data, 
which included the capturing of key words and themes with a constant 
comparative analysis.  Here, the most descriptive and illustrative comments 
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were used as empirical evidence.  The data were coded based upon central 
themes first guided by Bourdieu’s practice theory and then by the theoretical 
concepts established in Chapter 2.  To aid in more thorough data analysis, I used 
conceptually ordered displays (Miles & Huberman, 1994) to assist in 
interpreting and explaining the theoretical concepts outlined in the 
methodology.  Using the data in this way enabled them to be analysed for 
similarities, differences and conceptual patterns in a much clearer and efficient 
way. 
 Coding began with the identification of the most common and relevant 
phrases and themes that had bearing on the research question.  Several themes 
either began to confirm some of the theoretical insights already established in 
the literature or began to show evidence of concepts not yet explored.  Once 
identified, a more thorough review of the interviews and the already coded 
sections were analysed and interpreted according to the established 
Bourdieusian framework.  I then grouped the codes according to their 
theoretical concepts and then sub-categorised by the theoretical framework 
established by previous research.  A total of 122 codes (See Appendix B) from ten 
major themes were created within this framework and used as the evidence trail 
for each of the cases being used. 
 The coded data consisted of words and themes from the respondents that 
were used to capture a specific meaning and context. In total, there were over 
218,000 words that were transcribed with 1,751 relevant quotes that were 
derived from the coding process.  From those 1,771 quotes, 110 of the most 
common/relevant themes were used to describe the research findings and used 
in the corresponding cases.  In addition, twenty pages of observation notes were 
also used to identify further themes and concepts, about twenty websites were 
explored to confirm people, places, awards and other pertinent data discussed or 
mentioned throughout the interviews and the notes taken.  In addition, two 
trade journals were also used to confirm chart positioning and multiple email 
threads were analysed to capture discrepancies or inconsistencies from the 
transcribed interviews. 




 In summary, although research has examined the social and cultural 
influences on the music industry, notably the recent changes in economic worth 
(Wikström, 2012) and the impact of file sharing on firms’ business models, 
(Michel, 2003) there is a paucity of research in two areas.  First, how do owners 
and managers within American popular recorded music industry micro-
enterprises make strategic decisions?  Second, using the Bourdieu 
conceptualisation of decision-making as interplay among social, cultural and 
economic capital, habitus, and field, what are the key influences on decision 
choices in this cultural and creative industry? These questions, along with the 
characteristics of the music industry as established by Caves (2000) and 
Bourdieu (1996, 1993a) and with the identified gaps within the literature, led to 
the current research.  The research questions are answered by using a multiple 
case approach using the strategic decision as the unit of analysis.  Primary data 
collection was completed through the use of semi-structured interviews with 
thematic analysis of the data to generate the most descriptive quotes portraying 
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5. Empirical Findings and Analysis I 
 
CASE #1: RADIO PROMOTION STRATEGY 
 
Enterprise:  Kapooshki Music  
Sector: Christian music  
Owner: Joe Jackson  
Turnover: $750,000 annually  
  
This first case is about making a decision to pursue an Adult 
Contemporary (AC) radio promotion strategy for The Groove, a regional Christian 
recording artist, and their most recent radio single.  The Groove is a regional 
band that is contracted to a management deal with Kapooshki Music, which 
operates within the Christian Music industry – a niche market of the popular 
recorded music industry. This decision, as with all others in this study, has been 
self-identified by the owner of the firm, as one that is strategic in nature.  
Strategic decisions typically, but not always, require a substantial amount of 
economic capital, relative to the net worth of the firm in order to be effectively 
executed.  Often, if the owner/manager identifies a decision as being strategic, 
that particular decision has probably had a profound impact on, or utilisation of, 
the firm’s resources.  Evidence of the resources used, among other 
considerations; including influences upon the decision practice will be discussed.  
 This decision, to pursue a specific radio promotion strategy was 
intentional, yet had evolved and emerged from previous decisions regarding 
radio promotions.  The Groove’s previous album release pursued a conservative 
Contemporary Hit Radio (CHR) campaign that achieved the aims set.  This time, 
however, considering shifting market forces, and the previous success obtained 
by The Groove with this strategy, Joe Jackson felt there might be value in 
pursuing a more aggressive Adult Contemporary (AC) radio campaign.  This 
decision to be made is which strategy to pursue, with the latter risking more 
economic capital and greater use of social and symbolic capital to implement.  
Considering this, Joe felt it was worth the potential outcome.  His assumption 
was that the greater the exposure, the greater the potential sales and return on 
capital invested.  Thus: 
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‘…trying to do the AC charts instead of doing CHR…number thirty 
on the AC charts has like three million listeners a week or 
something. And that’s equal to like number one on the CHR 
chart.’ 
 
The overall aim of the decision is to increase song popularity among 
potential consumers while achieving the highest possible chart ranking.  ‘Charts’ 
in the recorded music industry reflect the relative popularity of songs or albums 
during any given week and are often used as a sense-making and sense-giving 
form of objectified cultural capital, as it is a manifested form of social relations 
that embodies current industry and market knowledge.  They may be organised 
by genre, for example, country, R&B/Hip Hop, Christian, and Latin, and can 
reflect activity for an individual song or album, depending on the chart type.  
When factoring in chart statistics, again depending upon chart type, they reflect a 
numerical hierarchy ranking based upon sales and airplay of the specific song or 
album.  Although there is no direct economic return that correlates with a 
specific ranking on the Billboard charts, they do represent a sense of symbolism 
of status and power that has been placed upon it by field actors.  They assist in 
determining the ‘inter-organisational’ relationships (Anand & Peterson, 2000) 
among field actors and are used as vehicles of change in the power shifts that 
occur between them and firm dominance.  The symbolic capital they represent, 
for the participating artist and those associated with their success, be it 
management, record label or other team inputs (Caves, 2000) can later be turned 
into other forms of capital, which then aid in actor recognition.  
 Specifically, the Christian Music industry relies on reporting by various 
bodies compiled by Billboard.  These charts include the ‘Top Christian Albums’ 
and ‘Hot Christian Songs’ charts, the Christian Adult Contemporary (AC), 
Christian Contemporary Hit Radio (CHR), Christian Rock, and Inspirational 
(INSPO).   The relevant charts under consideration in this decision by Joe and 
Kapooshki Music include the Christian CHR and Christian AC charts.  Each caters 
to a specific audience of listeners with the most relevant differentiating factors 
being genre, number of reporting stations and audience reach. As Jackson said:  
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‘Yeah, the deal is that the rock charts are more indie 
[independent] oriented and easy to get into, but the audience 
sizes are really small.’ 
CHR represents a smaller audience size and potentially a smaller 
consumer base for the firm.  Although Kapooshki Music has seen prior success 
on the CHR charts and their respective audience, here they are considering the 
option of pursuing the more ‘coveted’ and ‘prestigious’ AC audience.  This will 
enable the firm to use the already obtained symbolic capital obtained through 
the past CHR ranking as a sounding board for this attempt at using the 
appropriate resources to accumulate potentially further status, while reaching 
an even larger audience base.  In addition to expanding the firm’s success, the 
industry environment has also undergone changes allowing for opportunity that 
once may not have existed for them.  Joe, in discussing these changes, 
commented:  
‘So that’s why we chose CHR then... fast forward three/four years, 
well now AC has gotten hotter, so it’s moving more in our 
direction, our bands have gotten better and their ballads now fit 
AC.’ 
The changing industry environment and consumer preferences have 
allowed for this new opportunity, as Joe perceives it.  Kapooshki Music needed to 
consider whether they were in a position to capitalise from past success in order 
to further their own position within the industry.  The internal and external 
environments had changed and, as will be shown, Joe Jackson carefully 
negotiated his existing social, economic and cultural capital along with his own 
personal dispositions, the Kapooshki habitus and symbolic capital as 
confirmation of his strategic decision-making practice. 
 
5.1 FIRM BACKGROUND AND DECISION CONTEXT 
 
 Before further analysis of this decision and the influences upon its 
practice is undertaken, the context in which it was made must be made explicit.  
Bourdieu (1990b) argued that in order to understand the social construction of 
reality, the researcher must take into consideration both the objective and 
subjective dichotomy, for he believed you cannot have one without the other. For 
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this case and all subsequent decisions, the objective elements include the firm in 
which the decision is being made, the industry in which the firm conducts 
business and the demographic characteristics of the actor who is making the 
decision.  The subjective elements will include the relational practices of the 
actor and my own interpretation in making sense of, and relating, their stories.   
This will be done by looking at the individual dispositions, behaviours and 
practices of the actor in the decision-making practice.  
 This, and each subsequent case, is laid out in a manner that first 
establishes the context in which the decision was made, that is, the objective 
factors that have a bearing or influence on the decision-making practice.  The 
factors will be discussed first and include the industry sector of the broader 
recorded music industry in which the firm operates, the attributes of the firm 
and the actors involved in the decision-making practice.  Second, a closer look at 
the decision itself will be undertaken.  A dissection of its practice will be carried 
out by first looking at the influences upon the decision before discussing the role 
that habitus, capital and doxa have upon it.  
5.1.1 Christian Music Industry  
 For this case, and the one to follow within Chapter 5, the decision under 
investigation was made within the Christian Music Industry, a sector of the 
broader recorded music industry that records, produces, markets and promotes 
the sale of Gospel, Contemporary and/or Alternative Christian music.  Often, the 
gatekeepers, those who control access to the decision-makers, such as the artists 
and consumers within this field, strike a balance between the economic success 
of the music being promoted and the spiritual message that may naturally 
conflict with the commercial success of that music.   
One of the difficulties these opposing concepts face is the challenge of 
garnering widespread acceptance and popularity within the broader popular 
recorded music industry. Bourdieu’s position on the influence of religion in 
social practice is vague.  What he does speak about is more organisational, as in 
the hierarchy of the church, but little is articulated about the influence of 
religious beliefs on the social practice of an actor (Verter, 2003).   Within this 
case, it is important to note that the religious beliefs of an actor that works in 
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this industry will have a bearing upon one’s habitus, thus likely to influence the 
decision practice.  The idea of religion and music becomes an economic issue 
worth studying when one takes the message of the religion, interprets it, 
produces it in a manner of entertainment and packages it for mass production in 
the name of enterprise.  As stated, these two fractions tend to oppose one 
another, yet must exist and cohabit as one.  Therefore, religious influence must 
be considered as a relevant factor in the social action of actors that are dedicated 
and committed to the strategic decision-making practice in this field.   
5.1.2 Organisation of the Firm  
 ‘Kapooshki Music’, owned and operated by Joe Jackson, is the legal name 
for the group of wholly owned subsidiaries, each a separate legal entity, 
operating within the Christian recorded music industry.  The separate legal 
entities that encompass this firm include Stealth Artist Agency, LLC, Kapooshki 
Music, Inc. Sanctity, LLC, Liquid, LLC and Little Avenue, LLC. Descriptions of each 
of these entities below help to establish the organisational context in which this 
decision was made. 
Stealth Artist Agency (Booking)  
 ‘Stealth Artist Agency’ is the booking division that primarily serves the 
developing Christian artist, The Groove, in the church, general music or college 
market.  Gross sales for Stealth Artist Agency exceeded $500,000 in 2009 and 
$750,000 in 2010.  They recently developed an efficient online booking process 
that has encouraged continuous growth while providing the opportunity to 
license the programme to other agencies.   This aspect of the business has the 
most proportional return on investment and is seen as one of the firm’s true 
‘cash cows’. 
 
Kapooshki Music (Record Label) 
 ‘Kapooshki Music’ is the record label division of the company, serving 
primarily faith-based artists.  Kapooshki noted successes include 2008 
recognition as the 8th best label in the world for Christian Pop / CHR radio 
according to R&R (Radio and Records) industry charts and the holding of 
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international distribution rights with a major recorded music distributor.  This 
business is noted by Jackson as the most capital ‘intense’, and will often see 
broad fluctuations in profit and loss, year on year. 
 
Sanctity (Music Publishing) 
 ‘Sanctity’ is the music publishing company of the firm.  They have had 
some modest success placing several songs in TV/film including movie 
trailers, and a major US network promotion.  They also have a limited 
partnership with a major music publisher for the administration of copyrights.    
 
Liquid (Consulting Business) 
 ‘Liquid’ is the consulting arm of the business serving primarily musicians, 
through business-to-business consulting.  It is also involved with ‘Little Avenue’, 
and several universities and churches. 
 
Little Avenue (Live Event)  
 ‘Little Avenue’ was co-founded by owner Joe Jackson.  It is an annual, 
major, Christian Music festival with about 20,000 attendees.  Joe Jackson serves 
on the board of Little Avenue and still considers it part of the Kapooshki 
portfolio.  Although he does not run it directly, there is still an active relationship 
between the two.   
5.1.3 Firm Habitus and its Competitive Advantage 
Bourdieu (1984) argued that large groups of individuals may also share a 
habitus and that firms could occupy a position where the micro-individual and 
macro-structural environments converge.  The firm’s habitus can also reflect the 
company’s strategic intent and culture that give insight into company values and 
the norms, systems and beliefs of the employees that work within it. This 
strategic intent can provide context and intentionality for what influences 
strategic decision-making within the field, and how.  
 Kapooshki Music identified its key competitive advantage as providing 
entertainment services, through the live performance of its artists to churches 
and church affiliated organisations that are looking to spend $500-$1,500 in 
      103 
 
Christian music entertainment. The owner/manager of Kapooshki music, Joe 
Jackson, also sees the firm as a ‘big fish in a small pond’.  As he commented: 
‘My theory was like…would you rather be the number forty guy 
on a major league baseball team roster, or be the number one 
guy on their farm team?’ 
Throughout the discussion, Jackson indicates his preference to see his 
organisation have a larger impact in a smaller market.  This was his primary 
rationale for locating the firm in a ‘non-traditional’ music epicentre, or what he 
refers to as an ‘up and coming’ music scene.  This town, the size of 50,000 people, 
is in stark contrast to being one of many players in a regional business cluster for 
music in the United States, like Nashville, New York, Los Angeles, or one of the 
many other, even less prominent ones from Atlanta to New Orleans. In addition 
to a desire for a regional dominance of the firm, Jackson also alluded to his 
propensity and his team’s role as more visionary rather than tactical.  This 
visionary strategy, as he sees it, is a way of differentiating himself, his team and 
his company from those with whom he may conduct business. As he said during 
his interview: 
‘we talk about a spectrum between artist management as being 
hyper admin oriented and then much more visionary strategy. 
And we put ourselves in the camp of being strategic; more like 
we're the chess playing camp. The pocket protector kinda guys 
out there, we're not them. But I do try to surround myself with 
staff who are more detail oriented and have more time so I can 
play the chess pieces.’  
He is the atypical leader that surrounds himself with people that can take 
on what he is unable to do, and he allows the team to play to its strengths.  He 
understands his role within the team and is not afraid to seek advice or provide 
direction when needed, especially with regard to larger decisions that need to be 
made.   
 Kapooshki Music and its employees take the industry they work in 
seriously.   All employees are self-described and devoted Christians that can 
personally relate to the Christian Music industry in which they work.  They 
respect the symbolism instilled in the industry’s award shows, sales and airplay 
charts, and certifications. Even though the basic industry doxa is understood, the 
owner/manager of Kapooshki Music does not always see himself as playing by 
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them.  This and the idea that Joe is not afraid to do what he feels is more in-line 
with his own personal philosophy or engrained dispositions on how to play by 
those ‘rules of the game,’ is evidenced by his approach to A & R:   
‘I don't like to see the band perform before I sign them, and 
National is all built on "oh you have to see the show". No, you got 
to get to know the character of the band. Who cares if you like it 
or not? Those people are all high on themselves thinking they can 
see something that other people can't see. You are an idiot. Go to 
the table and see who sold the merch, cuz I wanna know which 
artists the fans are connecting with.’ 
 
Joe’s statements here exemplify his feelings towards the industry 
standard or ‘typical’ rules of operation.  Usually, when labels seek new talent, A & 
R managers insist on seeing the entire ‘package’ the artist has to offer, including 
their live show.  Joe on the other hand is less concerned about how they perform, 
claiming that the one making the decision to sign them to the label cannot 
possibly tell whether they will be a hit.  Instead, he is more concerned about who 
is there seeing them, and who is purchasing their music.  This, he claims, will 
give him better insight into who the band’s customers are and whether he can 
establish a relationship with them.  He is more concerned about band ‘character,’ 
then he is about the inherent talent that may exist.  This he claims is indicative of 
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Figure 1 - Kapooshki Organisation Chart  
 
 
5.1.4 The Actors and Personal-level Habitus 
Joe Jackson – Owner, Manger – Kapooshki 
 Age:  34 
 Gender:  Male 
 Education:  J.D. – Valparaiso School of Law (2007) 
           B.A. – Biblical Literature, Indiana Wesleyan (2000) 
           B.S. – Biology, Indiana Wesleyan (2000) 
           B.S. - Economics, Indiana Wesleyan (1999) 
  
Susie Allen – Administrative Assistant, Sales 
 Age:  29 
 Gender: Female 
 Education:  B.S. – Psychology, Indiana Wesleyan University 
   Additional Coursework:  A few Economics Classes 
 
Lily Billings – Booking, Sales 
 Age:  23 
 Gender: Female 

















Lily Billings  
Administrative 
Assistant 
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Individual Habitus   
 
Joe Jackson 
 The key decision maker, owner/manager of Kapooshki Music, Joe Jackson, 
has a strong commitment to personal development.  He values the cultural 
capital that he has acquired through his upbringing, institutionally through his 
education and generally by the skills he has developed by working in the 
industry.  Priding himself in learning from the ‘ground up,’ Joe began his career 
‘laying out chairs at a show while he was in college.’ He speaks highly of his family 
and friends ‘seeing them as often as he can’ and has a desire to maintain strong 
commitments and attachments with them.  As he said at the interview: 
‘I had just spent the week with the extended family in North 
Carolina I moved one cousin [here] who was more like a sister. So 
she’s been here for the past five or six years. So she’s my 
connection to family. If she goes home then I go home. Her mom 
and dad came to visit us, my aunt and uncle. So and she just had 
a baby in January and we are always with him.’ 
As a self-described ‘people person,’ Joe states clearly that ‘relationships 
and depth of [them] mean a lot more to [him] then to the average person.’  In 
addition, he is attracted to the idea of an academic life and desire to increase his 
understanding of the world by developing his skills in the workplace and the 
classroom.  He holds his earned degrees in the highest regard and contemplates 
further studies to broaden his perspectives: 
‘I would like to read more, write, teach…going back to school and 
retraining for something completely different; A PhD in public 
policy interests me…something like medical or national 
security…’ 
He is a steward of learning, appreciates it and accepts it as part of who he 
is, whether it is specific to the industry he currently works in, or something 
entirely unrelated that would ensure continued learning.   
 Joe began his career in the recorded music industry, like most, in a menial 
job surrounding himself with the music and artists he grew to love growing up.  
His first job provided the opportunity to arrange chairs at a concert where he 
was attending college.  He later got involved in student activities, began booking 
bands and later became student body President.  He further explained: 
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‘By the end of the following year I was student body president, 
and I kept my student activities thing which was unusual. 
Partly…because of the stipend, party cuz I was doing concerts. 
Music was always part of my life, so that makes sense’ 
While still in school, Joe was already exhibiting the drive, leadership 
motivation, hard work, and independent mind-set of an entrepreneur 
(Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991), characteristics that will help contribute to his 
thinking and reasoning, and might explain why he makes decisions in the 
manner he does.  He does not shy away from hard work as long as he is doing 
what he is passionate about.  This passion comes through in observed 
behaviours and personal interaction with Joe.  He exhibits high energy, is always 
‘on the go’ and takes initiative with natural grace. Having these traits coupled 
with his work ethic, and having music ‘always a part of [his] life,’ drew him to 
start Kapooshki Music. These personality traits and vocational strengths led to 
success early on in his career for Joe giving him a ‘taste’ for success: 
‘I think the largest conference we ever had (in college) was 
when I ran the concert for a youth conference and we had 
like 5,000 kids come and we packed up the arena and that 
never happens.’ 
Such a successful turnout for a budding entrepreneur instilled in him a 
confidence and desire to continue building a career in this field.  It ultimately led 
to his first job within the music industry as a booking agent for Zero Sum 
Christian Times.   There he found further success, which drew him to follow his 
strength and desire to learn more about the field by pursuing his education in 
law. While in school Joe sought out other jobs outside the industry; this 
experience was short-lived and reminded him of his natural attraction towards 
the music industry: 
‘But when I came to Law School I volunteered at a used car 
dealer, selling cars. I worked at a pawn shop for a day, that was 
cool, the second day they moved to another location and I started 
handling guns which freaked me out cuz I'm Canadian and I was 
like I can't do this I'll just keep promoting my concerts.’ 
 
Drawing on his past, positive experience with promoting concerts, he felt 
compelled to start managing his first artist informally, which eventually led to 
the formation of Kapooshki Music.   
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Susie Allen  
 Susie, the firm’s administrative assistant and internal sales 
representative, comes from a typical self-described ‘middle class’ background 
where she was born and raised in Colorado Springs, Colorado.  There, she 
attended grade school through eighth grade before moving to the state of 
Michigan where she completed high school and then began attending Indiana 
Wesleyan University pursing a Bachelor of Science degree in Psychology.   While 
attending Indiana Wesleyan she met her future employer Joe Jackson and others 
within the local recorded music industry field.  This established a relationship 
that would later lay the groundwork for her and Joe’s personal development, 
trust, interactions and future decision-making within the firm. Prior to her 
employment in the recorded music industry, Susie did case management for a 
mental health centre and worked in childcare.  Later, she was hired by 
Kapooshki Music to take care of the firm’s business and administrative affairs.  In 
addition to these responsibilities, she has also taken on other aspects related to 
her work in the music industry including booking and sales.   
5.1.5 Resources Needed 
The Sharing of Costs between the Firm and its Artists 
 
Not all costs associated with this decision to pursue an AC radio strategy 
for The Groove’s most recent single were direct economic capital expenditures to 
the firm.  Industry doxa within this field tend to dictate the costs associated with 
managing an artist - as long as those costs are directly related to the furthering of 
the artist’s career - are to be paid for by the artist.  On occasion, a third party, 
often a record label or owner of the master recording may advance the costs for 
promoting a recorded song to radio.  Since the band owned their own master 
recordings, much of the costs associated with this decision fell on them to 
finance, not forcing a direct expenditure on The Groove, even though Joe was the 
one ultimately making the decision.  Having Joe make the decision and manage 
the process not only followed industry standards but also aided in the 
simplification and professionalism of the transaction. 
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‘…and because we manage the band and they aren’t actually on the 
record label, then they are responsible for those costs, so it would 
have actually been the band’s resources, but we would have been 
helping them allocate that out.’ 
However, some costs for this decision are not directly expensed to the artists, 
but do fall into risks taken on by the firm.  
‘And then it also costs money to create a radio campaign - but in 
that case we already have Awesome Promotions and his name is 
Tio…he’s the one that is calling the radio stations, he’s then 
pushing the single, tracking how much it’s playing and we have to 
pay him to do that, so that costs money’ 
Although Kapooshki does not have this particular band signed to the label 
division, it is able to use the resources available to it from its other wholly owned 
subsidiaries.  Because the record label division already established a 
professional network, Joe found that he could benefit from the synergy of the 
two, ultimately limiting the economic risks. Often, the owner of the master 
recording, which is typically the record label, does promote, using the medium of 
radio.  Since the band is in essence acting as its own label, the social and cultural 
capital available to Joe through the Kapooshki label division was better 
positioned to take on this risk on behalf of the band even though they would 
traditionally take on that role.   
 In addition to the up-front costs of radio testing and actual promotion, 
other economic incidentals were also a concern.   
‘Then the other big part of [this is] The Groove doing actual 
physical radio visits so that stations around the country are seeing 
who they are and are familiar with them, they want to play the 
song because they come. So that’s obviously an expense too when 
you are having to travel.’ 
These financial implications are taken seriously by Joe and the band and 
evidently influence this decision-making practice.  The underlying implications 
for expending this amount of capital lies in the assumption that those who can 
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The Reliance upon Personal and Professional Networks 
 
 In addition to the financial resources needed for this decision, Joe relied 
upon his accumulated social capital as well.  This was evidenced by the use of 
personal and professional networks including close personal relationships, as 
well as external advisors and consultants.  He also understood the importance of 
those relationships, especially those he has within the radio promotion 
community. They would eventually prove relevant and important in this 
decision.  He knew how to use them efficiently by capitalising on them in a 
manner that would be the most beneficial.  In order for him to pursue this new 
strategy, Joe understood that he did not have the personnel, nor the economic 
resources, to cover as many individual promoters directly, as may have been 
needed to launch effectively an AC campaign.  Therefore, he carefully selected 
those with the best connections and with whom he already had relationships.   
 
‘And each of those relationships that they build off the first radio 
single, they get ten more champions on the next radio single plus 
most of the people that liked you last time like you again.’ 
 
Knowing that those promoters had a previous favourable response, he also knew 
that if he had another quality product he could count on the social capital, his 
current professional network, of those promoters to aid in his objectives.  
 
‘He talks to other promoters and so it’s exponential, it’s not like one 
plus one equals two, it’s like one plus one equals twenty.’ 
 
These networks can either make or break the success of his decision.  What Joe is 
specifically referring to in his comments about the ‘exponential’ effects alludes to 
the importance that social capital and habitus play within this field to build the 
momentum and excitement needed for songs to reach critical mass and hence 
commercial success.  Even though technology and the advent of the Internet 
have had profound effects upon the industry, radio airplay is still the number 
one marketing and promotional strategy for commercially successful songs.  If 
just one radio promoter convinces a programme director to play Joe’s song, it 
will compel other programme directors at other radio stations also to play Joe’s 
song.  This can be attributed to the individual habitus of each radio programme 
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director. If momentum begins to build, they can claim that their judgement prior 
to critical mass was sounder.  This would enable them to be ‘recognised’ for the 
ability to do so and that could lead to more power and recognition within their 
own field.  Being recognised for having this level of cultural capital also equates 
to the potential symbolic capital that comes with hearing and supporting the 
‘next big thing.’  Joe understands the leverage that this momentum can create 
within the field, therefore committing himself to the importance of focusing on, 
and establishing, this professional network.  His experience to this point in the 
field has enabled him to see this play out over and over again, thereby 
reinforcing his own dispositions on the matter and impacting his decision choice 
of whether, or not, to pursue this more aggressive AC campaign over the more 
‘safe’ CHR one. 
Working with What You Know and the Quest for More Industry 
Knowledge  
 
 In addition to the economic and social resources needed, Joe also depends 
upon his prior learning experiences and on-going desire to further his field 
knowledge.  The accumulated cultural capital prior to this decision enabled him 
not only to pursue this decision but also how he pursued and perceives it.  The 
accumulation of certain knowledge and desire to continue increasing this capital 
was evidenced throughout the decision process.  These behaviours are rooted in 
his general knowledge and skills that he has accumulated in part by his 
institutionalised credentials through his education, his desire to learn through 
his continuous reading of books and wanting to understand how things work.  
Joe, with his self-acknowledged ‘modicum of intelligence and good intelligence 
quotient’ (IQ), has experience in practicing law, economics and free market 
discourse and, thus, is able to apply this to his understanding of the choice he 
needs to make in this decision.   
 In addition to his liberal arts education and skills that he has 
accumulated, cultural capital could be discerned in the understanding of the 
field.  Having worked in the music industry for over fourteen years has led to 
knowledge in many sub-sectors, including how to negotiate terms on contracts, 
how to market and promote recordings and how to deal with the politics of 
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managing and booking artists.  This has enabled him to use this information to 
aid in making his decisions. 
 
‘If we are doing Christian music or college music, thematically 
through all of this, those are the two worlds in which I know what 
I’m talking about.’ 
 
 His understanding of both fields, Christian music and what he labelled as 
‘college music’, would not be possible without his prior experience and early 
success in both, as evidenced in his individual habitus in Section 5.2.4.1 above.  
Each success encouraged further understanding as well as the confidence to 
continue pursuing this strategy that,  
 
‘…the thing that would be different between us is that I was 
bolder’,  
 
enabled him to take risks in hopes of accumulating more social and cultural 
capital.  Joe’s knowledge of marketing and promotion of albums is rooted in his 
success promoting live events in college.   Knowing that with his knowledge and 
ideas he could succeed, he expanded his capital assets and boosted his 
confidence to continue:  
 
‘I've also done consulting for artists,’ we have ‘Little Avenue here’ 
and the other legal entities that we are able to feed off of and learn 
from.’ 
 
After finding success by starting Kapooshki, bringing a set of investors on 
board within that time culminated with the success of a previous CHR radio 
promotion. 
‘…by the end of 2008 we were the number 8 CHR Christian radio 
label in the world. So, basically number 7 was Goatee – Toby 
Mac…(and I think that they had I think five hit singles. And we did 
too. But they have like say 6.2%, [of the airplay total] and we only 
had 4.8% of the airplay total.’  
 
Throughout this industry-specific, cultural capital accumulation, Joe felt that he 
was equipped to take this potential risk in the manner he did.  
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 ‘I may as well go, at this point in our career, with our experiences 
after AC.’ 
 
 Although being hesitant in pursuing this strategy a few years earlier, his 
accumulated knowledge and confidence in a potentially positive outcome could 
be attributed to the success just discussed.  Couple those successes with 
changing industry doxa, and the consumer shifts in preference, allowed for an 
opportunity to pursue the AC demographic.  Understanding the genre and 
market in which he is targeting and working within similar live entertainment, 
management, booking, publishing and consulting, through which his business 
operates, gives him a wide industry spectrum of knowledge on which he may 
rely when assessing risk and outcomes.   
 In addition to institutionalised and embodied forms of cultural capital, 
evidence also shows the use of cultural capital in its objectified form prior to, and 
throughout, the decision practice.  
 
‘Yeah, So I'm watching SoundScan, I'm reading R and R, Christian 
Radio Weekly, which isn't around anymore, CCM update.’ 
 
These reporting services and trades enabled Joe to track current 
economic and industry trends through Nielson SoundScan reporting, which 
tracks album sales. Although no direct correlation between chart ranking and 
economic outcome has been observed, one can assume in most cases that the 
higher ranking on the chart, the more return on your investment is made and 
therefore more economic capital is accumulated.  Due to its weekly reporting, Joe 
is able to track any on-going symbolic capital that might change through a 
weekly rise or fall on the charts of one of their artists they are promoting and 
then again the potential return on investment.    
 In addition to the weekly reporting and overall positioning within the 
marketplace, Joe is able to accumulate and utilise other forms of capital, 
specifically the on-going accumulation of cultural capital in the form of industry 
knowledge: 
 
‘So how do they make their decisions as to what they wanna play? 
They look at what’s on the chart.’ 
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 Again, the charts and sales data from Nielson SoundScan provide the 
knowledge and information needed to conduct business on a day-to-day basis.  If 
an artist is finding the success that they seek in a specifically designated 
marketing area (DMA), then Joe and his team can make decisions on how or 
where to invest further promotional dollars.  This information, with which those 
decisions are made, can extend the life cycle of the artist and their releases, or 
help to determine when decline is irreversible and the return on investment is 
no longer at the levels desired.  It is a recursive spiral that feeds on itself.  
Decision makers like Joe understand that what is being played by other actors in 
the field will likely benefit them and their listening audience as well.  Joe 
understands this and knows that, if he can achieve a chart position on AC over 
CHR, the payoff can become more exponential, similar to the network that he 
discussed earlier. Staying apprised of current rankings on Christian Radio 
Weekly or CCM Update enables Joe to assess industry trends, which will then be 
used to influence the decision practice.  
5.1.6 Influences on Decision 
‘Time is of the Essence’ and the Changing Music Industry 
Often ‘time is of the essence’ when certain decisions need to be made in the 
creative industries (Caves, 2000). Timing of the decision and the potential 
outcome for swift or delayed action can have positive or negative consequences.  
Joe understood this and realised that external uncontrollable influences impact 
his decision practice as he contemplates the potential effects the timing would 
have on the desired outcome.  ‘So there’s another issue, do we just wait?’ If waiting 
meant increased opportunity for success, it would have delayed his decision.  
However, just the opposite is also true.  If he delayed the exploitation of this song 
within the AC format, then the opportunity could be lost.   Joe expressed his 
concern about a delay, as it relates not only to the uncertainty of song 
exploitation and its financial return, but also as it applies to the content creators 
– the band. 
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‘So that becomes an issue of timing. Well, is the band going to be in 
business in six months?’ 
If he waits to exploit the song in a timely manner, Joe may risk the band’s 
desire for longevity.  Their livelihood is ‘on the line’, and if progress towards 
promotion is not done effectively, efficiently and in a timely fashion, opportunity 
may be lost for maximum return: 
 
‘It might be easier for them.  But more importantly, it’s [the band] 
new network, its new team and their money, but it’s not worth 
waiting six more months.  We are gonna go ahead ourselves, 
because six more months is a whole semester that the band doesn’t 
have radio airplay, so it doesn’t increase those shows like I was 
talking about, it doesn’t get kids singing their lyrics.  The band is 
the primary business that needs to move forward, they need to do 
radio and they need to do it soon.’ 
 
If progress is not being made, often the creative individual is forced to 
seek other avenues of income generation for survival and the opportunity may 
be lost.  The record label and other ‘team input’ resources, social, economic and 
symbolic capital could be put at risk.   
 Timing becomes quintessential in the industry, not only because of the 
opportunity to exploit the song, but also because of the intimate relationship 
between that timing and the changes occurring (Grenfell, 2008) within the field.  
Considering whether the timing is right to release the single is not only 
dependent upon market forces and band dynamics, but also changing field doxa.  
Joe realised how other labels in the industry wanted to promote their songs, 
contributing to why AC became a viable decision choice. 
‘And what he is saying [Indie Song Promoter] is that over the past five 
years it has gotten so bad in his view that it’s just as competitive now 
in CHR, meaning there are just as many bands trying to get their 
songs on there….so as an independent radio promoter he is probably 
the best reflection of how the business is shifting.’ 
 
Knowing this, and understanding that ‘AC is where the money is at’ led Joe to 
believe that now would be as good a time as any to pursue a more symbolically 
lucrative strategy, if it were to pay off: 
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‘…well now AC has gotten hotter, so it’s moving more in our 
direction, our bands have gotten better and their ballads now fit 
AC.’ 
 
 The changes within the industry that have occurred throughout the past 
decade, and continue today, have created a more competitive industry 
environment.  Joe is aware that 'there is more music available for fewer slots' but 
feels strongly about the potential this new song holds.  The strong competition is 
not only with other record companies, but also with the radio stations seeking 
the next popular single.  Decision-makers in radio seek to ascertain what will be 
the next ‘hit’ among its listening public.  When people tune-in to listen to the 
music being played, it can lead to an increase in ratings that ultimately impacts 
advertising revenue and future earnings.  Therefore, a tension is created 
between the program directors of radio and the music promoters of the record 
label.  This tension is a necessary and sustainable one that exists due to the 
vested self-interest of both parties.  Radio needs the music, and the labels need 
the listeners.   
However, enabling and constraining power struggles also have macro-
cultural impacts.  Although fewer slots may exist for airplay, if the song is a 
potential hit, actors within radio may be less concerned about where the music is 
coming from, as long as the result favours their own interests.   When the public 
believes the song is good, they will listen while satisfying the radio station’s 
agenda.  The more people ‘tune-in’ to hear a song the more they will play it, 
perpetuating the cultural influence.   
This also preserves the symbolic relationship with the record label.  The 
success of the song at radio enables decision makers at the label to anticipate the 
economic success of the music.   Therefore, radio can act as an entity that 
‘balances’ the power among the players in the music industry if the song they are 
promoting is superior to the symbolic power between them.  Joe understands 
this dynamic, which gives him the motivation to consider this new strategy.  He 
continues his rationale for wanting to pursue an AC format over CHR. 
'CHR stations have been flipping to AC format.  If he’s (radio 
promoter) a fair anecdotal barometer, a reflection of what the big 
boys are doing, what my industry is currently doing, it’s like people 
      117 
 
are putting all their money in AC, why because they are selling more 
compact discs still. Probably more people are more likely to go buy 
the cds when they have a smash hit on AC then when they have a 
smash hit on CHR.' 
Because of the industry changes, the majors, and other firms with more 
resources, have been exerting tighter control on radio promotion channels by 
flooding the market with product.  Having access to more cash and established 
contacts enables them to wield this power on the decision-makers in radio.  This 
in turn has consequences for less influential entrants like Joe.  It makes it more 
difficult to have his songs played.  This aids in reinforcing everyone’s position, 
including his own.  The major label’s resources are being used as an aid to 
maintaining control of the limited access to radio airplay.  When an actor, or set 
of actors from a firm, wields their influence on a music promotional tool like 
radio, it can impact the accumulation of economic, social and symbolic capital.  
  In addition, using accumulated resources to control the number one 
promotional mass medium for music also has far-reaching social and cultural 
impacts.  Those who have the power to control what listeners hear also influence 
consumer preference and taste and ultimately buying behaviour and purchase 
decisions.  Joe’s choices in this case impact not only himself and his business, but 
also the industry in which he works and the broader national social space 
(Bourdieu, 1996) in which a society’s culture exists.  Since all formats, including 
the traditionally less popular CHR, are just as difficult to enter as the more 
popular AC, then why not pursue the one that will have the greatest reach and 
greater return, namely, AC. 
The Symbolic Power of the Charts 
 The role of the industry ‘charts’ as an embodiment of symbolic capital 
cannot be underestimated.  The symbolism of ‘charting’ is representative of the 
power it holds as it influences decision-makers and their choice of music to 
promote, or, for the radio executives, as they decide which songs to add to their 
playlists.  As Joe reflects, he describes the influence and importance the charts 
play in his decision-making: 
 ‘So how do they make their decisions as to what they wanna play? 
They look at what’s on the chart. So you get an exponential increase in 
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impressions when you are on the chart because you obviously get the 
people who reported on the chart, but now all the non-reporters are 
more likely to play you as well.  So the chart is exponential nonsense, 
in that it gets all the stations who report and then it gets the 
concentric circle of the people who watch the chart, and then it gets 
the people who are really delayed and just play the local station who 
just plays whatever he wants, like two years later he might be playing 
your song because it charted two years ago…or, you might get 30, 29, 
28 [position on the chart]…some of the bigger and more powerful 
stations will say ‘’oh we will consider playing that song now’’. 
The achievement of ‘making a position on the chart’ symbolises the power that is 
now available to the actors.  If Joe chooses the right song that will be picked-up 
by radio, he can get the airplay he is seeking and hopefully a higher position.  
This creates an ‘exponential’ effect on its success.  As long as others perceive this, 
the more likely they are to also to promote it, which in turn perpetuates the 
success.  Again, this is indicative of the self-interest of those in radio.  If they see 
the song rising on the charts, they also desire to indulge in its success by 
attracting those listeners that will impact their profitability without having to 
expose themselves to the risk of an ‘unproven’ song.  They can delay playing it 
until the response is proven on an established and reputable tool like the charts.   
 However, it is not only decision-makers in radio that rely on this artefact 
for its influence, but so do the actors that compile, analyse and report the 
information.  The individuals who control these reporting mechanisms want to 
be relied on for this information.  It properly places them in the middle of the 
power struggle that exists within radio and the music industry by granting them 
the influence and recognition they seek and desire.  
 Furthermore, the charts not only represent the symbolic power embodied 
within them, but they also act as a controlling mechanism.  As long as the actors 
seeking radio airplay understand the important role the charts play in their 
success, they will continue to go to great lengths to achieve either higher 
positions on them, or, at least, to maintain their positions.  As long as the capital 
and resources are available to the actors, the chart’s role reinforces the 
inequality in power relations.  Joe recognises this as he speaks about the value in 
them, but is also mindful of the difficulty in being added to the playlists.   
 Although they go to great lengths to appear unbiased in their reporting, 
the collection methods used by the people who compile them are only as good as 
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the data that goes into the analysis.  Who will be considered a ‘reporting station’, 
and the decision to include streaming and other social media activity determines 
ultimately who will chart and how.  This was most evident in 2013 when 
Billboard changed their methodology to include streaming.  When this decision 
was implemented, the next week’s ‘No.1’ single was not even a song being played 
on radio at that time, rather it was based on the ‘YouTube sensation’ and Korean 
artist, Psy and his parody Gangnum Style.  Traditionally, this information was not 
included in reporting.  A sign of changing music consumption patterns, but also 
data that now includes channels which the industry ‘dominated’ have easier 
access. Motivated by self-interest, actors who compile the charts want to 
continue to be the industry’s decision-making resource by staying relevant, but 
also by balancing the symbolic power relations among the actors who use them.   
Firm Level Habitus  
 In addition to the macro-level field influences upon the decision, meso-
level or firm level dispositions also influence the decision-making practice. The 
firm’s decision makers exhibited analytical behaviours when evaluating 
alternative courses of action within the decision-making practice along with 
acting on incomplete information.  Evidence of power dynamics was also 
observed through the company’s position within the field due to current 
organisational culture dynamics. 
The Use of Song Testing as an Analytical Tool 
Some behaviour exhibited as part of the decision-making practice 
demonstrated a ‘logical and analytical’ approach to data gathering during the 
consideration or information gathering stage of the decision practice.  The owner 
manager in this case was attempting to find the optimal level of information 
needed to feel confident that a positive outcome or effective decision would be 
made.  This was done through the use of song testing.  Song testing is done in this 
field to determine, or attempt to forecast, the popularity of the song with its 
target audience prior to committing large amounts of economic capital relative 
to the firm value and potential sales forecast for its promotion. Joe felt strongly 
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about the positive results received from the song testing that encouraged his 
choice to promote through AC charts.  
 
‘The science behind it said that this was a song worth betting on’.   
 
Joe is alluding to the target audience response to the song when it was 
tested.  The ‘science’ here is an empirical observation made by a researcher that 
records the response made by a potential audience listener.  This response is 
measured on a simple Likert-type scale from ‘dislike,’ ‘like,’ to ‘likes a lot,’ and is 
sampled at a level that is considered statistically significant.  Age relevance is 
also considered in the equation as the results are then ranked compared to other 
songs that were similarly tested for identical markets, ultimately ranking the 
preference of the song within a percentile.  Although there is no guarantee of 
success, is it does allow the decision-maker to gauge whether they are pursuing 
the right audience.  It also allows them to see if they are pursuing the right chart 
for ranking potential, and how many promotional dollars they should invest.   
 Joe felt confident that the song was worth promoting, but only after the 
initial results tested well, specifically for the AC demographic. 
 
‘The opening reason for the band strongly considering AC was that 
the song tested better with an AC demographic then with a CHR 
demographic. So the quantitative analysis by the third party, and 
we probably used the best one for it, they did auditorium testing 
with real people.’ 
 
As previously discussed, the intention was not necessarily to push the AC 
demographic.  Many factors were influencing the choice between that or 
CHR, but Joe was open to the idea of either at that time.  Past, positive 
outcomes in the CHR category and the lesser amounts of economic capital 
needed to promote the CHR demographic indicate a bias towards 
continuing to pursue this strategy.  However, the song testing 
demonstrated the potential for acquiring more economic, social and 
symbolic capital that may result by pursuing the AC chart, if the outcome 
is successful.  It must also be noted that Joe’s previous statements about 
the changes occurring with the field also weigh heavily.  He understands 
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that the AC market is changing and knows that this audience is more apt 
to connect to this band and so these songs must also be considered. 
Acting on Incomplete Information 
In addition to the behaviour exhibited by logic and analysis through 
statistical testing, Joe also demonstrated the need to act on incomplete 
information. 
 
‘I think when it comes to radio it’s just so hard to extrapolate out 
what your income will be...it’s like you just sit there dumbfounded.’ 
Joe is referring to the uncertainty of demand that comes with the selling of 
a creative product like a recorded song. This uncertainty was found to be a 
roadblock in determining the potential payoffs associated with this decision.   Joe 
felt that it was nearly impossible to determine the economic impacts or return 
on investment of a successful radio campaign on AC. This behaviour is rooted in 
the field characteristics identified by Caves (2000). The ‘uncertainty principle’ 
refers to the inconsistency in the purchasing desire of the consumer for a music 
product.  Although Joe attempted to be as careful as he could through the testing, 
he is also constrained by the uncertainty of the field and the lack of information 
surrounding it.  Having to act on incomplete information is not new in decision-
making, but the ability to make effective decisions with this limited knowledge 
does come down to the habitus of the decision-maker and the traits and skills 
that have developed within it over time.   Many of these influences that are 
habitus driven will be discussed in 5.3.3.3 below and will explain the reasons 
behind the choices Joe made when dealing with incomplete information. 
A Need to Aggrandise the Firm 
In addition to the analytical behaviours, Joe was also influenced by how the 
company was perceived by other actors and firms within the field.  This was 
evidenced through the use of firm aggrandisement – to appear greater or 
enhance the power and position of the firm within the field.  Aggrandising a firm 
in the music industry helps to establish a perception of legitimacy by which 
another person or firm within the industry would want to do business, at least 
through the eyes of the owner-manager doing the aggrandising.  Joe’s attempt at 
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this was done through previous chart positions achieved in prior years.  As was 
just discussed above, the symbolic capital inherent in certain chart level 
achievement helps to establish a sense of legitimacy to others participating or 
conducting business in the field.  Achieving a top 10 hit or ranking on the Top 
200 Billboard chart indicates that either (a) you have accumulated a level of 
cultural capital others seek from you, (b) you have established your social capital 
to a level that other actors desire to tap into it, and/or (c) you have generated 
enough economic capital so that those other actors desire to associate 
themselves with you in order to generate more themselves.  Projecting a certain 
image to external stakeholders or even the other field players lays the 
groundwork and sense of self-confidence that Kapooshki and its owner, Joe 
Jackson are able to hold within the field doxa.  Joe’s perception is that the other 
participating players in the field have confidence in him and the business in 
which he operates.  The ramifications of this type of practice or behaviour will be 
discussed throughout the case studies in this research, but more specific 
psychological motivation for Joe is discussed in further detail below.  The other 
participating players in the game also benefit from this confidence: 
 
‘in the process of getting some of our bands to be on the radio 
that’s what we really wanted, then we ended up placing 8th in the 
world. So it’s something that we just tell people now. Or we will 
scan it and send people the image just so that they know we’ve 
been around and are legitimate. That kind of thing.’ 
 
By making explicit that Kapooshki Music is identified as ‘8th in the world’ 
to those with whom they conduct or want to conduct business, enables Joe and 
Kapooshki music to be perceived by themselves and others that they are a 
legitimate player in the field.  Additionally, this allows Joe, from his perspective, 
to conduct business in the manner he desires, by increasing his chances of 
accumulating and furthering his social, cultural and economic capital.  In essence, 
it becomes an establishment of power that the firm is then able to exploit to its 
benefit.   
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Individual Level Habitus  
Even though the macro environmental influences and firm-level influences 
have an impact on the decision practice, more directly involved are those micro-
level or individual dispositions brought by the key decision-making actor.  
Certain types of decision-making heuristics were evidenced throughout the 
practice, as were personal biases, the use of external and internal advisors to the 
firm and some evidence of intuitive behaviours.  
The Use of Heuristics 
One of the more prominent behaviours exhibited at the personal level was 
the use of different heuristics or decision aids to assist in the practice. The most 
common heuristics in the data include the representativeness heuristic, and the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic. 
 
 ‘and if the odds of success…it’s so hard to measure, just if I’m 
gonna be competing with just as many people, I’m gonna have a 
single that fits the format, I may as well go, at this point in our 
career, with our experiences after AC.’  
 
The purposeful action in making this decision was assisted by the use of 
the representativeness heuristic, a decision aid where the judgements about the 
probability of an outcome under consideration are made.  This was done by Joe’s 
deliberate attempt at determining the odds of success based upon his past 
experience and outcomes in working with CHR radio.  However, it was not just 
the past experience in which this decision was used as a reference; it was also 
the outcome of the past decision that allowed Joe to find value from which he has 
now based the odds of success for this current decision.  His positive, past 
outcome was used as a projective mechanism onto this new decision choice and 
provided the confidence needed to entertain the risk of pursuing the AC format.  
In addition, being a confident individual, his habitus facilitated the means by 
which the risk of utilising further economic and social resources seemed feasible 
for this new decision. This rationale was also reinforced by the amount of 
economic capital that was forfeited with the previous strategy. 
 
‘Because if I’m gonna spend $5,000 on a radio campaign with him, 
then I can spend the same five going into the bigger league’ 
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If Joe felt the odds of success were similar without sacrificing more 
economic capital, and with the potential returns of social, economic and 
symbolic capital greater, it seemed an appropriate risk to take in order to 
potentially increase his position within the field.  However, it must be noted that 
this also provides evidence of an anchoring and adjustment heuristic, a decision 
aid where some estimate of value is needed in order to place preference upon, or 
estimate a similar outcome for, a comparable decision.  Here, Joe is anchoring the 
economic costs in a past decision and adjusting or referencing the value of that 
cost as it relates to this current decision.   
 It must also be noted, that this decision and the heuristics involved were 
not isolated to an actor who was only influenced to trigger the heuristics or Joe’s 
specific and deliberate desire, at this moment, potentially to increase his capital.  
Circumstances close to Joe, including but not limited to the changing industry 
environment that is enabling him to pursue this type of radio strategy, include 
the product that has evolved from the recording of the actual songs. 
 
‘…and as their new project was kind of forming it seemed like this 
song or songs we were thinking about pushing to radio could be 
viable in AC. So it wasn’t like we are going to go out and make an 
AC song, it was just that’s what happened so now it seems like 
that’s the way to go about it.’ 
 
It was this circumstance by which Joe saw the opportunity that triggered 
the heuristics used.  The way in which the band and their producer were 
recording the album influenced this cognitive process to begin calculating the 
odds of a similar outcome for Joe and then anchoring the economic feasibility 
with past expenditures.  Influenced by this creative output, coupled with his 
personal predisposition to taking on risk and recognising the potential rewards, 
along with the evolving industry, trends came together to create this opportunity 
for Joe and his company. 
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The Reliance upon the ‘Trades’ and Networks in Strategic Decision-
Making 
 Each individual involved in this case also relied upon outside individuals 
within their social network to seek advice or guidance.  Also evident was the use 
of material objects of influence – objectified cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986), 
mainly the use of books rooted in marketing and economic theory as well as 
trade journals and the referencing of the Billboard charts.   
As Joe was contemplating the viability of this decision, he often sought 
outside or external advisors and their opinions.   
 
‘[I] talked to the radio promoter a lot…he helped me pick which 
radio test company to use this time.’  
 
This ‘sought-after’ advice encourages Joe and reinforces his decision to 
test the viability of the song within the AC market.  This reassurance from a radio 
promoter held a certain level of respect in the eyes of the owner manager.  
Because of this level of respect, Joe later followed through on that advice, ‘Yep, 
‘Centennial Promotion’ is who we are using on our campaign.’  The 
recommendation to use Centennial Promotion came from the same radio 
promoter and was ultimately used in the song testing as well. The trust in this 
recommendation was legitimised by Joe through his ‘title’ of ‘radio promoter’ 
and the unspoken credentials and embodied cultural capital of ‘expert’ that this 
title projects.  Although the promoter’s job is to do just what he is offering, and 
what Joe is soliciting, Joe is doing so without any direct experience, positive or 
negative, of the services that Centennial Promotion is offering him. The value 
that is perceived through this title is invaluable and essential in seeking the 
appropriate advice and cultural capital that Joe is lacking. 
Another member of Joe’s social network was used for advice, namely, an 
Artist and Repertoire (A & R) director from a respected record label, one which 
had obtained a high amount of symbolic capital through their past successes on 
similar charts:  
 
‘But here’s an interesting one, I put a call into one of the big boys, 
had him listen to the song, and some really cool insights, he felt like 
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it was linear.  Like it’s a good song, but not a great song, and [I] 
trust his judgement.’  
 
This external advisor’s opinion on the song demonstrates a ‘devil’s 
advocate’ (Amason, 1996) approach to the information giving and seeking.  Joe 
sought his perspective on the song and although his thoughts were not what Joe 
hoped, he found value in the opinion. He understands first, the credibility 
associated with a title that comes with a senior A & R representative from a 
major label, hence why he sought out that individual. Second, despite the opinion 
that his expertise and level of accumulated cultural capital provided, he 
understood the value in his opinion.  If, after he played the song, he received a 
favourable reaction, it may have either reinforced Joe’s decision to move ahead 
with the risk involved in pursuing AC radio, or it could have created an 
atmosphere of wanting to put at risk further capital.  The evidence in this case of 
seeking external expertise is certainly not affirming to Joe in this manner but it 
did enable him to see a different perspective in which a personal bias could have 
clouded his own judgement.  He sees value in the title of ‘A & R’ for a major label 
and believes this person symbolises success and holds the power to influence.  
Joe is hoping that his opinion and experience in fostering new talent will tell him 
something about his own abilities.   If a favourable judgement is made, it can aid 
in any insecurities he may be fostering about being a successful judge of new 
artists and music.  However, by respecting and seeking out the A & R director’s 
opinion demonstrates the empowerment that Joe grants him.  He is valuing his 
perspective over his own, unknowingly reinforcing the dominated position he 
holds in the field.  He continues to speak to the value of getting a major label 
involved for a radio promotion strategy such as this: 
‘we need them purely for their expertise, or to save time…if we could 
get a major label on board, it might help a little bit with getting these 
stations to play it more’. 
 
Associating with a major label adds value through the influence they can provide. 
Something as simple as ‘saving time’ demonstrates the capabilities actors 
possess when working for a major label.  In order to do things more efficiently, 
the A & R managers who occupy these positions use the symbolic power that is 
associated with the major label brand to ‘get things done’.  They use this capital 
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from the label in conjunction with their professional networks and economic 
recourses to convince others to act.  This persuasion can be a powerful 
motivating tool.  The individual being manipulated acts in fear and self-interest, 
fear of being seen as uncooperative with the one who holds power, the A & R in 
the label.  The response is quick in order to be perceived positively by the A & R 
manager.  They are hoping, or anticipating, an exchange for something of value in 
the future – a personal investment by performing a favour or request.  
By using the label to ‘save time’ along with the ‘trust’ and respect Joe 
speaks of is also associated with prior knowledge and experience that he has, 
having previously worked with other A & R managers.  On a previous project for 
the label, Joe recalls: 
 ‘the stations remembered that they had given them a gift in 
[Prominent Band], like they had done some visits earlier.’ 
 
He knew he could make more progress if he associated this AC promotion with a 
major label.  Granting a favour by bringing prominent artists to the station helps 
in acquiring ‘adds’ to playlists and higher ‘spins’ that contribute to chart 
positioning.  Calling on his A&R contact was not only a ploy to get his opinion of 
the song, but if he liked it, he could use this company and their expertise to 
position himself better.  In the end, however, and despite this, he took the 
opinion to heart, and ended up pursuing the AC radio strategy regardless. 
 In addition to seeking outside counsel, Joe also relied upon forms of 
objectified cultural capital in weighing decision choices that influenced his 
pursuit of an AC radio campaign.  In this instance, the culmination of macro-
industry influences, the resources of the firm and Joe’s habitus came together to 
assist him in making this choice.  Joe sought the use of Christian Radio Weekly 
and CCM Update when looking at what other artists were charting, how they 
were charting and how they related to his current artist and the single he was 
promoting.  The changing trends within the industry, as Joe alluded to 
previously, were reported through the symbolism that is represented in the 
charts.  The trending genre of music that has been successful recently and how 
this has evolved since his previous CHR strategy was tracked, monitored and 
verified by Joe through these resources.  The credibility of the charts and the 
ability to track trends is given to it by the industry that reinforces it and the 
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actors that maintain them.  It provides meaning to those seeking power and acts 
as a catalyst for the day–to-day decision-making within the firms who track 
them.  Joe is no exception here and as trends within the industry evolved, so did 
his attitude about the feasibility of pursuing the AC radio strategy.  He 
understood what resources the firm could ultimately use to make this strategy a 
viable pursuit while using his personal risk level as a benchmark to the timing 
and utilisation of the resources that would be needed. These external influences 
were continuously at play as Joe assessed his alternatives throughout this 
decision-making process.  
Close Personal Advisors and Colleagues 
 Further evidence of influencing the decision-making practice came from 
the use of colleagues and/or close personal advisors to the owner-manager.  
Although the firm structure is not designed to include a top management team, 
the owner-manager responded to Susie as if she carried those responsibilities.   
Joe often used her as a ‘sounding’ board to his thoughts and ideas as he was 
contemplating the move toward promoting to the AC demographic.  
 
‘and then Susie’s reinforcement. Like Susie is really good at 
grounding me in reality.’ 
 
 This advisory role appears to be established by his historical association 
with, and trust in, Susie that he has learned and acquired through their 
relationship. Often, trust is seen as an aid in promoting networks and can 
encourage cooperative behaviour among colleagues (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & 
Camerer, 1998).   The cooperative behaviour evidenced here provides the depth 
and historical connection of both actors’ past as it is currently influencing the 
present and future behaviour.  The trust acquired through past experience and 
reliance upon this formal social network enables Joe to perceive himself being in 
a better position to make clearer and more effective decisions. Susie influences 
his level of confidence and reinforces his current thoughts on the subject.  
However, she should not be seen as fostering a ‘consensus’ mentality, for Joe’s 
comments regarding the ‘grounding me in reality’ supports the idea that she 
often is not in consensus with ideas, but quite the contrary.  She provides a 
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sound, grounded perspective that may bring Joe down from an exciting idea is 
the true value that he is often able to see in hindsight.  This positive past 
experience with her advice-giving and consultation causes Joe to seek it often 
and for different scenarios. 
Joe’s perception of the value that he sees in Susie is not a one-sided 
perspective, as is evidenced. Susie also sees a similar role for herself in his 
decision-making. 
 
‘Well any of the major decisions, including the ones you were 
referring to earlier, usually him and I will meet about something 
like that. Kind of at the beginning and then after he has gathered 
more information and thought about it more, and then kind of 
more towards the end where we need to be making a decision. So 
he will ask for my opinion, and where I can be helpful is kind of be a 
sounding board or like this is what I hear you saying and this is 
what you said in the past’ 
 
It becomes clear that this is a mutually beneficial relationship in 
understanding Susie’s role in the decision practice.  This is evidenced by the 
consensus in the meaning of her role. 
 
‘So whatever he is saying I can kind of reflect kind of like a mirror 
so that he can see the picture in a different way. Because when you 
work with something so closely you can get bogged down in it and 
so it is helpful to get someone to kind of bounce it off of. So I think 
that’s my role in helping him.’ 
 
This does not mean, however, that Susie will concede to the owner-
manager’s perspective or opinion on the matter.  Evidence of both consensus and 
‘devil’s advocate’ behaviour is exhibited here and can have a positive influence 
on the outcome.  These opinions are continually sought out as the decision-
making practice continues through to the end. ‘He always comes back’ is evidence 
of the value and trust between the owner-manager and his employee within this 
dyadic relationship. 
Joe also sought opinions from another employee as well.  Depending on 
what information he is seeking, he will reach out to Lilly Billings on matters more 
specific to consumer perspectives.  
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‘…mostly because she is so fresh.  She is just a recent graduate 
herself, like getting her opinion shows me where the average 
people are at.’  
 
Joe is able to capture a more ‘grounded’ perspective on how the chosen 
demographic may respond to the song or how it may be perceived if promoted to 
the AC demographic.  Lilly is seen by Joe as more ‘in-tune’ with growing trends 
and what the consumer may respond more favourably to when the music is 
being marketed.  The evidence provided here demonstrates that Joe does not 
make strategic decisions in isolation.  Although Kapooshki is a small company, 
Joe still respects and actively seeks out counsel from select employees on specific 
matters before making a decision.  Whether this is an active pursuit for differing 
or confirming perspective and opinion, or a confirmation of bias on his part, he 
still finds value in pursuing this approach. 
Personal Opinion, Bias and Preference 
 Personal biases were also evidenced within the decision practice.  The 
different types of cognitive bias found include the belief bias and confirmation 
bias. The belief bias, where the logical strength of an argument is biased by one’s 
own opinion or belief, came through when the owner was evaluating the 
strength of the product for its chosen audience.  Here ‘my own opinion of the song 
itself,’ influenced whether Joe could even move forward as to whether or not it 
was an appropriate strategy to consider.  If he could not endorse the viability of 
the song and believe it was appropriate and have potential for success, it would 
be difficult for him to commit the capital needed to effectively implement the 
decision.   
 The use of a confirmation bias, a cognitive bias that confirms one’s own 
perceptions, was also evident:   
 
 ‘So there was a bias, but even my bias was, I would argue, well 
founded.’ 
 
 Here, Joe was acknowledging what he already felt was his preference 
towards not only Christian music and the band they are promoting, but also the 
desire to pursue the more coveted AC audience.  His perceptions of the symbolic 
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value inherent in the AC charts and the confidence in his abilities already 
confirmed from his previous success on the CHR also only helped to reinforce his 
perceptions of the ability to be potentially successful here.  
The Use of Intuition 
 Some limited evidence of intuitive patterns, or making decisions based on 
‘gut feeling’, were discussed and found to influence the decision practice.  
Although it can be challenging to compare with an occurrence of an intuitive 
pattern over a perceived heuristic or bias, previous research undertaken on 
intuition in decision-making has isolated these ‘gut-feeling’ events into 
observable data (Miller & Ireland, 2005; Seifert & Hadida, 2009; Liberman-
Yaconi, Hooper & Hutchings, 2010).  As admitted by Joe, he relied upon gut 
feelings over financial forecasting when determining the profitability of using the 
potentially, more costly, radio strategy: 
 
‘gut-feelings, on instinct because I can’t remember a time when we 
sat down and added up the cost and how much we wanted to get 
out of it.’  
 
Even though the song testing was approached in a more analytical 
manner, through statistical analysis and consumer response, the financial 
forecasting of the decision was rooted in intuition.  This was done for two 
reasons.  First, the statistical analysis used in the song testing was done by a 
third party and not by Joe.  Even though his educational background, specifically 
his study of economics, would provide him with the appropriate cultural capital 
in the form of the skill set needed to do the forecasting, he chose not to do so and 
relied on his ‘gut-feelings’ as to whether, or not, it was worth the investment. 
Two, his ‘choice’ to do so was done because of typical industry practice and field 
habitus.  As Caves (2000) has pointed out, the philosophical assumptions among 
the field’s actors, along with observed practices, indicate that there is an 
inherent unpredictability of success in creative product like music.  Joe makes 
this clearer with his comment that ‘there isn’t a way to quantify it’. He either sees 
it as (a) not worth the investment of hiring a third party to forecast for him, or 
(b) not worth his time and effort to forecast.  Although the more typical of the 
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two approaches here would be for Joe to do the forecasting, he had decided, 
through his past experience and ‘gut feelings’, and now, embodied industry 
knowledge about the accuracy in which it can be done, that it is not worthy of his 
time and investment.   This preference for a more logical or thorough approach 
to song testing and not the forecasting of profitability of the decision choice here 
is indicative of a prioritisation of the symbolic nature of the potential success on 
the AC charts outlined by the song testing and field doxa dictating the rules of the 
game. Thus, he justifies financial forecasting over ‘educated guessing’ based on 
his ‘gut-feelings.’  Even though song testing was approached differently from the 
financial forecasting, it was originally approached in a similar way:  
 
‘In fact he didn’t even really want to do radio testing, he didn’t 
intuitively want to do it’ 
 
Knowing this does offer some evidence of the questionable value that the 
song testing provides for Kapooshki and the value of the return on investment, 
regarding the expenditure of the economic capital.  Despite past dispositions, 
there is an inclination not to move ahead with supporting material, or perhaps to 
take a more analytical approach to the practice. Intuitive behaviour here does 
not override this, but it does indicate the value placed in going with your ‘gut-
feelings’ over the statistical analysis.  The value is there, but it is questioned 
because of the expenditure of economic capital to get it done.    Either way, a 
value judgement regarding the viability of such an approach, or the benefits 
outweighing the cost to do it, was included in the process. 
 It must also be noted that intuition played a role, not just in determining 
whether or not it was worth forecasting the profitability of radio promotion 
costs, but also in the choice to use a more analytical approach for song testing.  
The actual reasoning behind moving forward in the first place to test the song, 
before committing to an AC radio strategy was rooted in how Joe and his team 
felt about the song: 
‘All those indicators make it feel like a good song’ 
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‘Feeling like a good song,’ was enough for Joe to pursue it further.  ‘All those 
indicators’ in this case are not always quantifiable elements of a song.  Some 
qualities of a ‘hit’ song may be better predictors of success, including being 
memorable, having a good ‘hook’ and solid structure. However, whether the song 
ends up resonating with the consumers is not always easy to forecast.  Many 
songs have the aforementioned qualities, but that does not dictate a ‘success’ 
formula.  That ‘it’ factor that is often discussed in industry circles are those 
qualities that are not easily identifiable and are usually attributed to having a 
‘gut-feeling’ about the song, or having it just ‘feel like a good song.’  This ‘feeling,’ 
when analysed, can be attributed to Joe’s age, personal preferences in music 
types, past experience and his embodied industry knowledge, but also that 
‘hunch’, or intuitive feeling, he has about the song that is not as easily 
attributable to these factors. 
5.1.7 Conclusion 
This decision was a choice between pursuing an AC radio strategy over a 
CHR strategy for a new song on an album about to be released by one of the 
Kapooshki recording artists, The Groove.  As was demonstrated, multiple factors 
influenced and were critical to the practice of making this decision.  The impact 
of analytical behaviours, personal biases, heuristics and intuition all played a 
role in the decision choice.  These micro-level influences, however, were not 
contemplated in isolation.  It was the culmination of the macro, field doxa and its 
current change, along with the culture of the firm that helped Joe to feel he was 
making the best decision he could with the resources available to him at the 
time.
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5. 2 CASE #2: EXPANSION AND DIVERSIFICATION 
 
This decision is about a choice between diversifying Kapooshki Music 
through the creation of separate legal entities, which would allow for Joe’s desire 
to expand the services being offered by the firm, or to add separate functioning 
departments under the already established legally entity – Kapooshki Music.  
This choice was prompted by Joe’s past experience in promoting bands and his 
direct observations of the opportunities he saw for further expansion in sub-
sectors of the industry in which he currently worked. 
‘I started out as a concert promoter and I am taking all the risks to 
build these bands, but the managers are getting commissions off of 
the band…I am funding the concert and was building their following, 
their revenue in my market. But I’m getting no ongoing stream. I sell 
tickets, they sell t-shirts, they get the money from the t-shirts and the 
manager gets nothing.’ 
Joe was seeing the opportunities available to him and felt he had the needed skill 
set and assets in order to move forward with this possible expansion.  It also 
enabled him to begin satisfying his desire to be a part of a cohesive team. 
‘I was really a solo practitioner running a show for a different team 
coming in every week, doing three or four concerts sometimes even in 
the same day but usually over a weekend in different parts of the 
state with a different set of faces every time…the team was a different 
group of people. I wanted to be part of building a band, a team 
together where we are working every week together instead of once 
or twice a year.’ 
 Expanding the company would allow Joe something more conventional, 
more permanent. This desire for more consistency can be traced back to his self-
identified traits of being an extrovert and ‘a people person’ who values family and 
relationships.  Although this was a drive towards something more settled for 
him, the choice, the decision practice and the influences upon this practice were, 
on the surface, a viable economic opportunity to pursue.  This would enable Joe 
to not only satisfy his desire to build relationships and increase his economic 
capital, but also further evidence will suggest that the true rationale behind 
choosing to form separate legal entities over departments within the already 
existing business structure, is more rich and multi-faceted. This case, unlike the 
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one proceeding - and others that follow - will be analysed from a post-choice 
perspective and not through a real-time standpoint.  The rationale behind his 
choices will be studied and the motivations behind his decision choices will be 
made explicit.  As will be evidenced, the rationale ranges from logical business 
reasons to Joe’s more deliberate attempts at accumulating further social and 
symbolic capital in order to leverage his positioning in the field. 
5.2.1 A Limited Need for Asset Expenditures 
 The resources needed to execute either choice option in this decision 
were minimal.  However, there was some anecdotal comments that alluded to 
the necessary expenditure of small amounts of economic, cultural and social 
capital.   
 The economic capital needed included the costs directly associated with 
incorporating separate legal entities. As a minimal expense, Joe, as he weighed 
his options, did not see the financial implications of legally incorporating each 
entity as a deterrent.  This was to be a legal and a paper transaction and not one 
that needed further assets, buildings or space to execute. Therefore, Joe did not 
see this as a high-stake, economic risk on his part, nor that a substantial amount 
of other capital would need to be used in order to move forward with his idea. 
 The cultural capital needed came in the form of the knowledge and 
expertise to execute this decision.  However, Joe being an educated man 
understood that he needed a general level of knowledge in order to have the 
appropriate conversations with the right individuals to execute the decision.  As 
will later be evidenced, Joe sought several external advisors and consultants to 
assist him where he lacked the appropriate cultural capital. He relied upon his 
social network to provide the expertise to navigate through the incorporating 
process and enable him to move forward with his decision choice.  
5.2.2 Influences on Decision 
The Use of Scenario Planning and Isolating of Profit Centres: The Role of 
Information Analysis 
 Joe demonstrated logical and analytical behaviour, even though he was 
limited by the information provided to him to aid in this decision choice.  He was 
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first motivated to move in the direction of re-structuring his firm with each of 
the component parts as separate entities so he could shelter future assets and 
cash.  
‘…if we ran a big debt up with Sony, which we have, it only forces us 
to shut down our label division. It doesn’t touch our publishing… 
unless I did something crazy they have no contractual way to get at 
our booking revenues. It’s conceivable that labels shut down 
regularly, and their distributors take over the catalog. But they can’t 
touch my booking or my management or my festivals.’ 
 By keeping them separate from his label, Joe would be able to continue 
conducting business in other field sectors without compromising his cash flow 
and reputation within the field.  He is able to isolate the debt-ridden label from 
the more lucrative endeavours like management, festivals and booking.  He is 
also able to continue leveraging his position while knowing that if he had 
decided to keep them under the Kapooshki imprint, he would be continuing to 
struggle to keep the business profitable.  After a certain period of time, not only 
would his entire accumulated economic capital be utilised, but his social and 
symbolic capital could also be at risk.  This is seen as a survivalist tactic, one in 
which he minimises or mitigates the risk by ‘taking out the rotten apple from 
basket so as not to contaminate the entire bushel’.   
 Joe’s behaviour here is not an isolated event.  Having the institutionalised 
educational credentials and being one that appreciates a world-view he has little 
difficulty seeing ‘all sides of the story’. His desire to collect all data available to 
him in order to make better decisions is based upon the premise and 
assumptions at hand.  On multiple occasions, Joe exhibited analytical decision-
making behaviour when deciding and justifying his choice to create separate 
legal entities. When Joe was asked whether he and his team felt it important to 
model or forecast the profitability of opening up these new businesses he stated: 
‘…we did, but it was kind of… [for] a couple of them [we] actually had 
done a little bit of modeling.’ 
By approaching the information gathering stage of the decision process in 
this manner, Joe was allowed to make a more educated and thorough 
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decision.  It also enabled him to identify where his true profit centres 
could come from if he decided to focus more of his resources there. 
‘So at that point we did figure out that managing the band earned 
more maybe in the shorter run and booking more.’ 
More clearly understanding the profit centres and where much of the money was 
to go, would not have been possible without doing some scenario planning to 
help give him perspective. It also allowed him to avoid risking his reputation in 
the field by finding ways to stay in business and keeping the more debt-ridden 
label at arm’s length.  However, it is important to keep in mind that these 
influences, regarding the modelling are purely economic and transactional ones.  
Joe is reluctant to jeopardise his standing and reputation in the industry, which 
was earned through past successes on the Christian music charts through his 
label and the distribution it offers, and sacrifice the symbolic capital he has 
earned.  Joe must carefully navigate the close interaction between the two if the 
association of one (the economic) pollutes the other (symbolic), he risks losing 
much of what he has achieved within the field. 
 In addition to the cross-contamination of his economic and symbolic 
capital with his label, Joe exhibited other behaviours with regard to the logical 
accumulation of other capital through the association of the brands that come 
from setting-up separate legal entities: 
‘if you associate one brand with one sub industry and you want to 
hire or put the artists on somebody else’s roster for a different sub 
industry - so booking as opposed to a label. And you have to have 
your entities separate otherwise they'll say "why are you giving them 
to me.’ 
 Here, Joe is attempting to ward off future confrontation with actors from 
other firms within the field in which he desires to do business.  This 
confrontation is seen as threatening to Joe – not personally, but through his 
reputation as a viable firm with which to do business.  He fears that by having 
someone within the field in a more prominent position of power questioning his 
business tactics, he will be perceived as an inferior partner – putting at risk his 
current field positioning. The amount of capital one is perceived to possess can 
influence the way in which other players in the field react.  This may lead to 
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further opportunities for business, or diminish them.  This positioning, being a 
sought after social status within the field, is an aspiration for Joe.  He is 
influenced by the strong desire of other actors to be associated with that capital, 
success and strong position within the field.  By not setting up separate brands – 
separate legal entities for the firm, he has logically and systematically thought 
through the ramifications this may have on his perceived positioning and how it 
could potentially be compromised. 
Leveraging the Network for Understanding and Capital Acquisition 
 Thinking through this decision, as Joe did, was but one reason he felt it in 
his best interest to move forward with incorporating the different business units.  
He also saw benefits in the potential increase in his social capital.  
‘…if we signed a band to manage them, but they were labeled by 
somebody else or they were booked by us and managed by somebody 
else...let’s just say you are managing an act but they are booked by 
somebody else’s agency. When that agency gets a show, our 
management has to approve it. So let’s say they get ten shows in a 
month and eight of those shows are with promoters that we have 
never known before, we just picked up eight new contacts that we 
can use to benefit our agency's artists.’ 
 Joe is pretty clear in his strategic approach to expanding his 
professional network.  He understands that by creating the different 
entities and the brands that correspond with them, it will enable him to 
have access to people that otherwise he would not have.  He understands 
and sees the value in the strong social and professional network needed to 
do business in the industry and be perceived as a viable player in the 
game.  He discusses further how making this decision can expand his 
reach in the industry: 
‘…its’ sneaky right…because this booking agency is booking your 
band so that they can make commissions off of that, they are not 
booking the other band that you book. I used to put it up on the grid 
so you take artist one for us and we do management for them. And 
they were with some other agency - agency one. Artist two is with our 
agency but somebody else’s management company, but the 
promoters as agent or manager when the show is booked it doesn’t 
matter whether you are the agent or manager, you got to know who 
that promoter was…’ 
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 In the first example, Joe was capitalising on the new network he was able 
to accumulate within the live entertainment field – specifically those who secure 
employment for artists – the booking agents and promoters.  He understands the 
value in connecting with the promoters with whom he will now do business; he 
would not be doing this if he had not separated his management and booking 
businesses.  By not having everyone with whom he signs on every sub sector 
business, he is by virtue of extrapolation able to increase his social capital.  This 
again, will elevate his perception status in the industry. Further evidence 
reinforces this idea: 
‘…there definitely is building up network when it’s their agency 
booking 100 shows for us and we go down the list and we say we 
have only known 20 of these promoters. Let’s take the other 80 and 
send our other band their way.’ 
Closely related to the expansion of his professional network, which in turn will 
enable him to accumulate further economic capital, Joe sees the close 
relationship and value in expanding his industry knowledge that will add to his 
level of cultural capital. 
‘…okay let’s have each of our artists have at least one area that we 
don't do. So we can learn from the other side and we can gain their 
network.’ 
 Understanding who Joe is, his habitus, and what motivates him personally 
is really at the heart of his desire to expand his network.  Yes, one of the 
motivations for him is the potential to increase his business opportunities, which 
could translate into further economic capital.  However, why Joe has done this is 
likely deeply seeded in who he is as a person.  Joe loves to accumulate further 
knowledge, not only for the sake of knowledge, but in order to help him in 
achieving his goals. One of his mantras, ‘knowledge is power,’ coupled with his 
desire to expand his network will not only provide the sought after economic 
activity, it will also provide an opportunity for learning that he so covets.  ‘So we 
can learn from the other side’ is a motivating factor for him.  If he can understand 
better how ‘the other side’ does business, he can learn what to do and what not to 
do. He knows that having this embodied cultural capital will further elevate his 
positioning personally and professionally.  He has accumulated his 
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institutionalised capital through his law degree and multiple first degrees, but he 
also knows that he must embody the knowledge of the field and its 
corresponding fields in order to position himself better.  This, through personal 
observation and documentation, is not a superficial attempt at wanting to be 
perceived as knowledgeable; it is a genuine attempt at having him widen his 
world-view so he can understand better how things function.  Thus, if needed in 
the future he may be better equipped to handle a situation brought to him that 
could potentially shorten the path to more capital accumulation. 
The Desire to Learn 
 While understanding the rationale behind Joe’s desire to increase his 
professional network, the data suggest he also covets the accumulation of 
cultural capital.  It is then important to ask how this passion has influenced his 
decision-making.  He has already been explicit about his desire to learn ‘how the 
other side does business.’  He further states what he could learn from making the 
decision choice of expanding the company to include the separate businesses:   
‘So by us tapping into somebody else’s management company and 
maybe the label or the booking agent…we are booking [our] band but 
we are also learning how THEY manage bands. We are managing 
[our] band but they are on your label.  Tell us about YOUR radio 
promotion strategy. Well you know what; I can’t unlearn that when I 
go back to my label. I learn from other label’s mistakes because I see 
them from the inside.’ 
 By setting up a separate brand that book his acts, he is able to learn 
how other companies manage their business.  This is an attempt by Joe to 
further his understanding of how the management field, a sub-sector of 
the recording industry field, works.  This desire for understanding focuses 
on not only how the field is structured, that is, the role his firm plays 
within the field, but also his personal habitus.  He had clearly stated earlier 
that he perceives his strategy as a ‘visionary’ one and is willing to ‘take 
risks’ in order to succeed.  This approach is Joe’s way of navigating through 
the industry doxa in order to achieve his desired position. However, his 
idea of ‘risk’ is relative and may not be perceived as risky by someone who 
may come from a more liberal background, or from someone that is 
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personally and professionally motivated by his Christian values.  He sees it 
as an intelligent and creative way of doing business.   Others may agree 
but come from a ‘do what you need to do’ approach to get the business 
perspective and may not approach it from a morally grounded one.  Either 
way, Joe sees the benefit of creating these separate legal entities for the 
company well beyond just the economic point of view.  He goes on to 
reiterate his beliefs about how the industry and the actors within do this 
regularly to further their own knowledge: 
‘Every manager that manages a band I’m sure uses the lessons he 
learns from that label to apply to future management deals. The 
difference here is we were going to apply it to future label deals too.’ 
 Again, focusing on the rationale for his choice here, it is almost as if 
he feels guilty for trying to learn about the industry in this way.  By stating 
that other managers ‘use the lessons he learns,’ Joe hints at an element of 
uncertainty, he is not really sure that is what people do and he does not 
really have a way to find out.  What he knows certainly is that it is how he 
has decided to learn how the industry works for this situation.  A touch of 
guilt can be extracted from those words.  Joe is a man of strong faith who 
believes deeply in his religious affiliations that influence this sense of guilt.  
He knows that in order to be better positioned within the field and be 
more influential, he will be more successful knowing how the business 
operates from many perspectives.  But he wants to get there genuinely and 
honestly.  Although, nothing of what he does is illegal, he walks a fine line 
ethically and morally.  He values and knows the value in understanding 
how the industry works, having the right skills to do the job and the 
general knowledge that comes with working with people.  He also 
understands that the more he knows, the more he will be able to leverage 
for future transactions.  It becomes a delicate balance for Joe and he covets 
the understanding.   He has the desire to accumulate the capital that will 
provide the leverage for success, but because of whom he is the dichotomy 
of faith and profiting from the selling of music, he struggles with his 
actions.   Although, he ultimately overcomes this, by moving forward by 
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branding the business functions separately, he does so with some 
hesitance as to whether it is the right thing to do. 
Aggrandisement and the Perception of Credibility 
In addition to the attempt at expanding his social and cultural capital 
behind making this decision, Joe was also very explicit in his attempt and desire 
to aggrandise the firm through the eyes of other actors in the field.  
Aggrandisement – to make greater in power, influence, stature, or reputation or 
to appear greater or to exaggerate appeared to influence every executive’s 
decision-making process – was found to be at the core of Joe’s rationale during 
this decision practice: 
‘Why turn them all into separate entities? One, because credibility with 
those labels in Nashville and other companies, like it was all just one - my 
Mickey Mouse music company they wouldn't take it very seriously.’ 
 In order to appear legitimate within the industry - the appearance of 
being ‘legit’ or credible - seemed to be a priority and unspoken ‘doxa’ for Joe.  In 
the music industry, reputation and status can be fleeting which can lead to 
‘misrecognition in which power relations are not seen for what they are but are 
interpreted in a way that is seen as legitimate’ (Gunter, 2002).  In Joe’s attempt to 
be seen as a bigger firm by setting up these legal entities was his way of trying to 
shift the perceived power relations in and amongst other players in the field – in 
a sense - level the playing field.  He wanted the same opportunities to conduct 
business in the field as someone with greater amounts of symbolic capital than 
he possessed: 
 ‘…it looks small if you are this music company who says we do all 
these different things. And who do you represent, nobody famous. So 
by having Liquid, Kapooshki Music - which is our record company - 
Stealth Artist Agency, they looked [bigger] - individual logos, 
individual phone numbers and email addresses - it looked more 
legitimate.’ 
 His rationale could not be more deliberate and his strategic choice 
to set-up these separate entities instead of having one company would 
enable him to be seen by others as a viable person with whom to do 
business  – one with accumulated social, economic and symbolic capital.  
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Much of this need for recognition is also magnified by his choice to locate 
the firm in a non-music epicenter, far from where much of the business in 
the U.S. is done.  Although Joe felt he had some flexibility to do this, it was 
also out of necessity for the people with which he needed to do business.  
This was to ensure that those other firms and the managers running them 
did not feel as if it was wasting their time. 
 In addition, as Joe decided to expand into adding a recording studio 
to the Kapooshki brand, he was also deliberate in his attempt at inflating 
the reputation of the new studio.  He and his associates struggled with 
how it would be perceived to the field and whether they should brand the 
studio under the name Kapooshki Music, or something separate.  It must 
be noted however that some of this debate was also rooted in a rationale 
and a logical attempt at not exposing the new entity - the studio – to the 
debt burden of the label.  However, he again was very explicit as to why he 
wanted to brand it under a similar name as the label and eventually found 
a legal way around this without exposing the new entity to the debt.  This 
would now allow Joe to use the names and bands associated with the label 
through the act of ‘name-dropping’: 
‘Right now I think it’s going to be Liquid, LLC and ‘’Doing Business 
As’’ Kapooshki Studios…to everyone else - the public - it looks like it is 
connected to Kapooshki and has the prestige, which in Christian 
music for an indie band is a big deal…home of [artist name purposely 
withheld], home of [artist name purposely withheld] current artists 
that’s on radio, home of Dove award winning [artist name purposely 
withheld], they won rock album of the year in Canada.’  
Joe went on to clarify why this type of approach would benefit him and his firm: 
‘For this kind of thing yeah. This is the first time that we are trying to 
milk something. I have never… I’ve been about real value over height 
value all the time and I’m finally going to the dark side and saying 
well if that’s what people want we will give it to them…They are 
going to buy into us because of perceived value. 
This need to aggrandise through the public appearance of being seen as a 
greater size or by name dropping is really an attempt at making up for the 
lack of social, economic and symbolic capital needed in order to maintain 
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relevance, to conduct business and garner respect.  Joe often references 
the appearance of his firm if he did not set up separate legal entities: 
You'd look small…so you are a management company but you also do 
booking and you also do label, you must not be very good. 
The need and desire to accumulate the resources and capital to conduct business 
in the recorded music industry is, as Bourdieu would say, ‘the ultimate spring of 
conduct is the thirst for dignity, which society alone can quench’ (Wacquant, 1998, 
p. 219).  However, when those resources or capital are not yet present at the 
level at which the actor who seeks it, desires, an attempt at misrecognition 
occurs and is done through aggrandising.  It becomes an attempt at recognition 
in the music industry that can only be satisfied by their peers within the field 
who are respected or who hold prominent positions of power. 
The Pursuit of Personal Accomplishment and Economic Capital 
 
 Much of the personal level motivation behind this decision-practice is 
evidenced by a desire for personal satisfaction and the pursuit of economic 
capital.  Being a self-identified ‘extrovert’, Joe’s decision to expand the company 
in the manner he did is also a direct result of who he is, and how he wanted to 
pursue his business life. 
I wanted to be part of a team rather than having a different team 
every weekend…so my personality [influenced the decision]. 
 Much of this rationale for diversifying the business was to satisfy the need 
to be around people he knows, to ‘build long term relationships’ and to ‘have fun 
at work.’  This satisfied Joe’s personal desire ‘to have close deep relationships’, 
which he felt ‘meant a lot more to [him] then the average person’ and that it 
‘wasn't possible when you are a concert promoter…but it’s built in when you are a 
manager’.  The very business model of being a promoter lends itself to working 
with different people and seeing different faces regularly.  This did not match 
Joe’s personality and led to his personal desire to expand the firm, along with the 
economic and symbolic reasons as well.  For Joe ‘getting into 
management…financially it made sense,’ and when asked about getting into 
booking as well, he simply said ‘booking and managers get paid commission.’ This 
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was his chance at making more money as well as expanding the wide reaching 
perception of the firm.  If the money is in management, it is in booking as well 
and the return on investment is often directly correlated with the amount of 
work and effort that is made available.   
The Use of Attorneys and Other Professionals 
 
Joe did seek help outside the company to assist him and his company in 
analysing potential profitably of these firms.  This analytical approach to 
determining the economic viability of these decisions was done through the use 
of forecasting and modelling tools. However, Joe did not want to do this alone 
and sought outside help from his barrister to assist him: 
Phillip the attorney where we analyzed it because we came to a point 
where we created a graph that said if you sold this many records you 
would make most of your money, would you make more managing or 
being label? 
He understood that this was a gap in his knowledge and which only specialised 
individuals, with the skill set he needed, could provide.  He also looked to trusted 
advisors for opinions, not for the specialty embodiment of a specific knowledge, 
but the role they play in operating and overseeing one of his future businesses: 
‘I’ve talked to the people involved with the studio itself like Jeremy 
from [artist name purposely withheld] because he’s one of the key 
guys with overseeing the studio. I asked them a little bit of their 
input.’ 
He trusts Jeremy’s professional opinion and knows that he is best suited to 
answer specific questions because of his positional influence and knowledge of 
the job. 
Internal Colleague Influences 
Other members of the team – employees of the firm, also influenced this 
decision.  As was the case in the first, Kapooshki Music decision that was 
analysed, Joe consulted a few of his trusted employees when seeking out how to 
approach the decision of setting up a separate legal entity.  Specifically in this 
case, it was relevant to his choice to separate the recording studio from the label:  
This one I talked actually a fair bit with Susie.’ 
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Joe felt that he could trust Susie’s opinion here and trusted what she had 
to say about doing so.  This trust goes back to knowing and interacting with her 
since their time in college together.  Over the years, after she was hired by Joe to 
work in sales and administration, she has played an important role in the 
decision-making of Kapooshki.  Her counsel was continually valued by Joe - 
helping him to see things from a different perspective and often enabling him to 
see a more logical side of issues where he may have been emotionally involved, 
thus leading to, or including, strong personal bias. Knowing this, Joe felt he could 
go to her often seeking input on bigger decisions and this was no exception.  She 
offered sound advice that allowed him to reinforce his bias in the decision.  He 
trusted her understanding of the business in the field in which they conducted 
the business and in which she could be depended on to provide advice. 
 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
As was seen in this second decision by Kapooshki Music – whether to expand 
and diversify the firm through setting up of separate legal entities – the overall 
rationale was to be seen as a viable business within the Christian recorded music 
industry.  Although the use of economic capital here was minimal, as Joe decided 
between whether to separate out the companies or keep them within one larger 
firm, the important factor was how others would perceive him and his company. 
Joe determined that the perception and potential success are related and being 
seen as a larger, more experienced, better connected and knowledgeable 
business could enable him easier access to social, cultural and symbolic capital 
that could later be transformed into economic capital or further symbolic capital.  
The influences upon this decision practice included internal business colleagues 
and their perspectives, external resources in the form of industry skills needed 
to execute, logical and analytical behaviours when approaching the information 
gathering stage of the decision practice, as well as those of the owner-manager, 
Joe Jackson.
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6. Empirical Findings and Analysis II 
 
CASE #3: ALBUM RELEASE 
Enterprise:  Ronald ‘Cisco’ Newman, Sole Proprietor  
Sector: Americana music 
Owner: Cisco Newman  
Turnover: $35,000 Annually  
 
6.1 FIRM BACKGROUND AND DECISION CONTEXT   
 This decision is about choosing an alternative between two album format 
options for the Ronald ‘Cisco’ Newman upcoming album release.  The details 
about this release and the struggles that he faced as he was deliberating which 
direction to take will be outlined, as will the resources he used to make the 
decisions and the influences upon the decision practice.  Evidenced in this 
decision is the use of company and personal aggrandisement, a concern for 
reputation, past experiences, personal belief biases and anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics.  Specifically, there are two overarching observations that 
influenced the decision practice over those discussed in Chapter 5.  Here, due to 
the Cisco business structure, and his current possession of symbolic and 
economic capital, he is limited by the lack of these resources.  In addition, the 
effects of this decision upon his reputation and symbolic positioning in the field 
are deemed to be the most prominent influential factors. 
 Ronald Cisco Newman is a singer-songwriter based in Richmond, VA.  
Legally recognised as the sole proprietor of ‘Doing Business As’ (DBA) Cisco 
Newman, he is a one-person micro-enterprise that is typical of the ‘Do-it-
yourself’ (DIY) artist that has become prominent in the music industry since 
technology brought about changes in the distribution system beginning in the 
late 1990s and continuing today.  During his tenure as an independent musician, 
Cisco, on occasion, has surrounded himself with a team of agents – managers, 
consultants and barristers - that have assisted him with his operations.  These 
agents have enabled him to conduct business within multiple sub-sectors of the 
recorded music industry as his business has grown through the years.   
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6.1.1 Organisation of the Firm – Cisco Newman 
 Being a sole proprietor, Cisco Newman is, at the moment, his own 
manager, his own agent and his own record label.  He does have a third party 
working on his behalf as a publisher, securing a deal to represent his song 
writing interests.  And even though he does control and own all of his Intellectual 
Property – including the rights to his songs and recordings, he has chosen not to 
recognise each of these operations as separate legal entities – each operate 
under ‘Cisco Newman’.  Cisco, his brand and the legal entity that is recognised as 
a trinity, seen as one, but where all three are virtually inseparable as perceived 
by fans, agents and business partners. This is typical of the DIY artist that is 
pursuing a career in the music industry since the advent of digital technology in 
the form of MP3’s and the changing distribution channels.  A DIY artist can be 
described as a musician who performs, seeks employment (live performance), 
records, promotes, or any activity associated with the marketing and promotion 
of recorded music product, without the aid of ‘professionals’.  Within this 
context, the ‘professional’ would be considered any third party who may conduct 
specialised business operations within the field of the aforementioned sectors, 
these could include record labels, booking agents, and artist managers.  
 The breakdown of distribution channels within the recording industry 
throughout the past decade, and the advent of new technologies that prompted 
and perpetuated these changes, have allowed for easier accessibility to the 
consumer that has enabled many musicians to produce, distribute, market and 
promote their own product.  This virtual inseparability and accessibility to the 
market has brought with it new opportunities and challenges that have been 
represented in the decision-making practices that are evidenced in Cisco’s 
pursuit of his new release of an extended play album (EP: 4-6 songs) over a 
traditional full-length album (10-12 songs).  This decision represents the 
opportunities that have resulted from the changing industry landscape for 
independent artists like Cisco.  It characterises the choices available to these 








 Cisco Newman writes, produces, records, finances, and promotes his own 
recorded music product.  He does not partake in the signing of, recording or 
promoting of other artists or products as would be representative of a 
traditional label and their day-to-day operations.  He does not have a formal 
organisational structure that relies upon skill sets of employees through a 
division of labour, nor does he hire consultative services for operating his 
business.  He is a micro-enterprise that is legally recognised as a sole-proprietor 
that makes a modest living as a singer-songwriter.  Cisco grosses about $35,000 
a year and like many DIY artists trying to make a living struggle often with cash 
flow and profitability.   He conducts his daily business and administrative 
operations out of his home office, books his own shows, concerts and has no 
agents working on his behalf other than the occasional legal counsel or casual 
consultation. 
 
6.1.2 The Actor and Personal-level Habitus 
Cisco Newman – Singer - Songwriter 
 Age:  33 
 Gender:  Male 
 Ethnicity:  Caucasian 
 Education: B.A. Musical Composition 
 
  
Cisco Newman – Individual Habitus  
 
 Cisco Newman is a thirty-three year old male singer-songwriter that has 
been honing his craft for the past ten years.  He identifies himself as a brother, 
husband, son, teacher and performer.  Cisco is a modest individual grounded in 
strong family values and a strong sense of right and wrong. 
‘I don’t do anything really swarmy [unethical] at all.  People 
should base their decisions on what they value, not what they 
put in front of you’. 
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This was instilled in him through his upbringing and may indicate limited risk 
taking in decision-making.  He comes from a strong nuclear family in which he is 
emotionally involved and is closely connected.   
‘I had good parents, who were really involved in everything I did.  
After I moved out…I just practiced that.  Then, I was surrounded by 
coaches’. 
 
This left Cisco feeling grounded personally and professionally and ultimately 
confident in himself when beginning his DIY endeavours.  Understanding that, 
despite unforeseen or unintended outcomes,  he could always rely on a strong 
family unit.  He feels that it has impacted him positively, by keeping ‘me more in-
line knowing that my mom would check my business and hold me accountable.’  
 Cisco has describes himself as an ‘outgoing, but calculated’ individual…you 
have to be in this business to want to get on stage.’ He makes conversation easily 
with people he does not know.  And although this can often give the impression 
that he ‘fly’s by the seat of his pants,’ but he is not, he is more ‘calculated.’ He 
admittedly second-guesses himself often because ‘I don’t know what I’m 
doing…in a business that doesn’t know what it’s doing either.’  This leads him to 
feeling as if he is making decisions on a lot of uncertainty and uncontrollable 
factors.   These uncontrollable factors lead Cisco to believe that he has little 
influence in his own decision-making. This limited influence, from his 
perspective, is rooted in a lack of confidence.  Confidence that has been eroded 
through ten years on the road touring and attempting to make in-roads as a 
musician and seeing others less talented – as he perceives it - see greater success 
and longevity.  This perception of unwarranted success lies at the heart of the 
uncertainty principle (Caves, 2000) that is present within this industry.  Never 
knowing where or how success, or even what the odds of success can be, leads to 
a feeling of uncontrollability and erosion of confidence upon an actor who is 
attempting to make a career creating, marketing and selling recorded music 
product.   
 Cisco considers himself fiscally conservative, yet socially liberal.  He has 
an appreciation for art, and creativity and will respond favourably to new ideas 
and thinking beyond the ‘status quo’.  He is not a big consumer of music even 
though he makes a living creating, producing, marketing and distributing it. 
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Through observation and direct interaction, Cisco appears conscientious – 
efficient and organised, unlike what some may consider being the stereotypical 
‘eccentric’ artist – unorganised and aloof to the business dealings of his craft.  He 
has a good business mind and understands the difference between commerce 
and art and knows how to successfully merge the two to create a viable business. 
‘I know what I’m doing. I know the people I am reaching’ indicates he is 
knowledgeable, but also has limited power to influence.  Having the knowledge 
of how the industry works is obviously important.  However, knowledge is one 
thing, but being able to use it to garner influence for personal or professional 
ambition is another.  This creates a disconnect between the ‘knowing’ and the 
‘influence’, for which further resources are needed in order to ‘bridge this 
divide’.  Skill and experience in a given field can help close this gap, but those 
resources must first be acquired. This can be achieved through time and success, 
which can then lead to acquiring more authority, creating an iterative cycle of 
success and influence.  This generates a delicate balance and an ongoing struggle 
for those in Cisco’s position. 
Cisco also admits to a sense of insecurity.  At times he is unsure of his 
abilities or whether ‘he has what it takes’ to succeed, he is often ‘scared of 
regret…and having screwed up a lot of stuff’.  Anecdotal comments have also 
shown this level of insecurity or lack of confidence in many musicians and artists 
that pursue this type of career and lifestyle. These feelings of uncertainty and 
insecurity are not uncommon and should be considered when researching how 
personal dispositions may influence the decision practice for Cisco.  The 
rationale behind this insecurity can be partially attributed to the previous 
discussion regarding the influences the changing industry has had on DIY artists 
like Cisco, but he also states clearly: 
‘I don’t know they’re the right decisions.  I don’t necessarily know 
how to do this…there are so many ways of doing things now, it’s 
hard to know what is the right way’. 
 
This uncertainty he reflects upon in his decision-making abilities, along 
with his other personal dispositions will be analysed in the decisions that follow.  
The descriptions will take into consideration Cisco’s personality and objective 
characteristics as just discussed, as will his habitus, the business he runs and the 
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industry he works in.  It will then be shown how each of these factors influences 
his decision-making. 
6.1.3 Resources Needed 
The Constraints of Time and Money 
 
 Economic capital and the influence it has on this decision is evident as 
Cisco goes through the decision process. The need for economic capital for 
implementation was at the forefront of influence for this decision.  Cisco made 
this clear on multiple occasions:  
‘Yeah that was the biggest factor, that I didn’t have enough money to 
make a full-length record. I wanted to, and it would have required a 
lot of borrowing that I just didn’t feel like doing … there just wasn’t 
enough money for a full-length record’. 
 Even after taking into consideration other factors like reputation, and the 
field doxa, each of which will be touched upon in subsequent sections, it still 
‘came down to money’ for Cisco and he really felt that ‘the money just wasn’t 
there,’ to make it happen any other way.  He felt limited and constrained by his 
lack of financial resources to do what he felt he needed to do, or for what he 
wanted to achieve. Not having enough money was evident, but it was not the 
only factor.  If it were about the lack of economic capital, this decision would 
have been easier to make and would not have been self-identified as a strategic, 
or major, decision.  There was more at stake for Cisco here as he considered the 
alternative options available to him.   One of those options, albeit a more 
superficial one, included the potential return on investment.  He did not have the 
financial resources to do the full-length album, but he did consider the increase 
in time it would take to record and thereby release it. This would have affected 
the time in which he could see profits from his endeavour: 
‘If I went with the EP, I would spend half as much time recording, get 
out the EP quicker and spend half as much money’. 
He also considered whether he could increase his cash flow post-release 
over the EP:  
‘Make more by selling the album, spent more making it…all in all 
yeah, I think it would be a wash’. 
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 Both examples of Cisco’s thought process are evidence of a logical 
and analytical approach that he used when contemplating the economic 
aspects of the decision.  The details of this practice will be discussed in 
more detail below, however, it is important to note that taking this 
approach was justified when looking at the economic implications of the 
decision.  Some of which, are inherent in Cisco’s personal disposition 
discussed in section 6.1.2. Being fiscally conservative, Cisco’s personality 
favours looking at the options available to him and the consequences or 
implications of each of the decision choices.  Limited by his knowledge of 
how to do intricate financial modelling and the lack of time to execute a 
thorough vetting of all options he relies upon the broad-based estimates 
and the implications that may result: 
 ‘I think for me, now looking back I want to say that I made a 
decision that I wanted to put out more music more often as opposed 
to putting out one album every three years. So I knew…’ 
 He knew that he could have more capital coming in, and ‘more often’, 
which enabled him to ‘enjoy a spike in sales when the record came out’, and 
although the upfront economic incentive was appealing, there was more 
motivating him in this decision.   As the evidence demonstrates, the money was 
an important influence in his thinking, but it was more about his symbolic 
standing via his reputation in the industry, that is, how he is perceived by other 
industry professionals and by his fans.   
The Value of a ‘Name’ and the Symbolic Power it Represents 
 
 As discussed, economic resources influenced the decision, but so did his 
symbolic positioning within the industry.  His lack of options with regard to 
transforming economic capital into symbolic capital became evident here, for 
being a DIY artist possessing limited amounts of each, cornered Cisco into having 
to consider, not only the economic impact, but the symbolic one as well.  This 
symbolic influence first came out in his desire to work with a ‘big name’ 
producer, but in order to do so would entail either an amount of economic 
capital that he did not have, or a certain amount of symbolic capital, which he 
does not yet possess.  Because he did not have enough economic capital at his 
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disposal he was limited in the type of album he could logically release without 
losing further assets.  If further economic capital was available, Cisco made it 
explicit that he would have made a different decision:  
‘One, because you have someone who has that much pull you 
would want it to be a full-length to get the most of that 
experience. To make ten songs with that person as opposed to 
just five.  And the excitement level is higher - you know what I 
mean? I don’t know, I mean yeah of course, to me that’s like just 
using the opportunity’. 
 Not only would he have gone on to make a full-length album, but he would 
explicitly transform his economic capital to symbolic capital in the form of an 
established, industry recognised producer. This is evident in his comment about 
working with someone with ‘that much pull’.   
Being limited by his economic capital, Cisco was unable to move forward 
with this potential transformation into symbolic capital, but it is important to 
understand the important role symbolic capital in this form plays as DIY artists 
make decisions about their career every day: 
‘Those kind of things are like pipe dreams where everyone wants to 
work with a big producer, and I’ve thought about it as recently as the 
last couple of weeks. The resources just aren’t there at the moment’. 
Cisco stresses the importance of working with producers with a list of ‘credits’ 
and who possess a large amount of symbolic capital, obtained through award 
accumulation, producing albums with prominent artists, or working with other 
artists who have obtained a large amount of symbolic capital.  He acknowledges 
that the social and symbolic capital that an established producer brings with 
them could positively impact his own career, if he can associate himself with 
their success: 
‘Because it’s validating, you think that because the people who are 
having success in this industry, you like to think that by being 
associated with them that success is attainable as well….That’s either 
because they’ll mention you, which is as absurd as it sounds, they’ll 
mention you in some interview that they are working with you, or 
that you can just literally use their name on anything you are doing 
to promote their record. “So and so worked on my record” …that 
could be just enough, that could be enough that by mentioning their 
name people will actually listen to your record when they wouldn’t 
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have before. Oh T Bone did this record, I’ll totally check that out. And 
never mind that he has made bad records. But because he is involved 
in your album then it’s something that people will actually listen to’. 
 Success seems more achievable if even the slightest of association 
between him and a prominent producer occurs – by the very nature of 
working together.  Although a producer of this calibre may or may not 
outright announce to the industry that I’ve worked with Cisco or ‘so and 
so’, if in passing or through an interview a question arises about current, 
future or past projects, it may intrigue others to investigate further.  The 
very notion that a prominent producer or artist would work with Cisco is 
in itself validating enough.  The symbolic capital that is possessed by these 
individuals will transcend prior beliefs.   If they see the potential or talent 
in this individual or band, then there must be something to hear or see.  
The embodiment of that association could and has often been the trigger 
that has started the momentum for some artist’s career, like pop star 
Justin Bieber’s association with R&B artist Usher.  Whether it is warranted 
or not, the association and involvement of big names can cause others to 
see things that may, or may not, be present.  This is what Cisco is alluding 
to in his comments and why the association with someone with large 
amounts of symbolic capital can pay off for a DIY artist like himself. 
The Role of Management and Friends 
 
 This decision also relied upon a strong social network.  Here, the social 
network came in the form of a type of consultancy from his previous manager, 
the studio owner where he was to record the album and musicians from his 
band.   Cisco often went back to his previous manager to consult on whether he 
should pursue the EP over the full-length album.  This was done more as a 
‘confirming’ action to what he was already thinking or leaning towards and can 
be attributed to Cisco’s insecurities and uncertainty in making decisions.  
Questioning his abilities and decisions at times, Cisco used his social capital as an 
affirmation tool for what he was already thinking.  Trusting in the advice he 
would receive from his manager: 
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‘I just wanted to make sure that I was thinking through all the 
possibilities, that I wasn’t missing something and was considering 
the costs involved and the potential sales.  At this point I already 
knew what I wanted to do, but it was good to hear it from someone 
else I trusted too’. 
In addition to speaking often with his old manager on these issues, he 
sought out advice and direction from those closer to his day-to-day operations.  
This led him to consult with the studio owner where he was recording the 
album.  The studio owner was directly impacted by this decision because, one, he 
was going to be affected financially by this decision and, two, he was also the 
guitarist in Cisco’s band - when a full-band was used.  If Cisco decided to go with 
the EP, which consisted of fewer tracks, he would not spend as much time 
recording, editing, mixing or mastering in the studio.  This would impact the 
studio owner’s bottom line, potentially leaving a bias in his own favour, which 
would also influence the advice being received by Cisco on this decision.  This 
could be interpreted as a ‘devil’s advocate’ (Amason, 1996) approach being 
sought by Cisco through his social network.  However, considering the studio 
owner was also the guitar player, knowing Cisco personally for many years 
enabled him to secure the best rate possible, thus, already impacting the studio 
owner’s bottom line: 
‘…because the guitar player in the band owns the studio, there wasn’t 
a whole lot of shopping around for a good deal. I had a pretty good 
rate with him and he was already invested in it because he plays in 
the band’. 
Having this connection may have had a ‘devils’ advocate’ influence, but 
Cisco found that it made the decision easier for him to make in favour of the EP 
because of the cost savings the other actor was able to extend and the flexibility 
with time being in the band.  In addition, Cisco wanted to speak with others close 
to him, the ones that would actually be a part of the recording, knowing they 
would be directly impacted by the choice he made.  ‘I needed to talk that over 
with the guys’.  Again, this is indicative of an affirmation to what was already 
decided by Joe and reinforces the influence his habitus has on his decision-
making practice.  It could be argued that this affirmation from his previous 
manager and the band was more of a consensus (Amason, 1996) action.  He 
   159 
 
already had a good idea of what he wanted to do, but used a strong social 
network as a consensus-building tool, not for a team, but for himself. 
Knowing What You Know: The Reliance upon Experience 
 
 Much of the skills and knowledge that Cisco brings to his decision-making 
comes from what he has learned as he built his business.  He certainly has a solid 
foundation rooted in institutionally recognised cultural capital such as his 
undergraduate degree, but also his graduate studies that helped start his 
thinking as an entrepreneur.  Although Cisco does not directly call upon the skills 
and knowledge he acquired when he was studying the business side of the music 
industry, Bourdieu would argue that this history has influenced Cisco’s habitus 
and personal dispositions, which would lead to perspectives that influence 
decision-making.  Whereas his understanding of the industry may have been 
grounded there, Cisco feels that much of what he learned was from how he has 
conducted his business since 2002:  
‘Yeah I mean what I feel I bring to the table is what I know about 
what I do, and that’s it’. 
His reliance upon his embodied cultural capital in the form of industry 
knowledge was learned and ingrained through practice and hard work.  Cisco 
relies as much as he can on what he knows, his skills and education, but still 
reaches out to his network and advisors to reassure his thinking and actions – a 
direct result of his sense of insecurity.  
6.1.4 Influences on the Decision 
The Flexibility of a ‘DIY’ Artist in a Changing Industry Field 
 
 The ‘rules of the game’ for the DIY musician tend to differ from those 
firms that have a more centralised structure, a set hierarchy, and utilise a 
specialised division of labour.  Although centrally structured companies like 
record labels - that have multiple employees - and DIY artists both find 
themselves in a power struggle battling over consumer sales and field position, 
DIY artists must make decisions with less economic, symbolic, social and cultural 
capital.  They must do so while seeking the recognition of a position in the field 
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that is either already filled, or at least become better positioned to be more 
competitive with the more established players like those record labels just 
mentioned. What may be accepted practice for the small to medium size 
enterprise such as a publishing company or record label may be very different 
for a touring musician with limited resources.  These can influence the decision-
making practice for the DIY artist.  They may be concerned about expectations, 
influences or potential outcomes in a different manner compared with their 
hierarchal, specialised competitors.  For example, in Cisco’s situation, it became 
apparent that being an independent musician was often at the forefront of his 
thinking. He acknowledges the benefits that come from the ‘freedom’ of being 
your own boss, but also the perceptions that it brings:   
‘There is this coolness to being an independent artist, it’s really 
cool. It’s really cool to do your own thing and people are more 
accepting of that now in general, it’s more accepted to not be a 
slave to some of these bigger companies; that you’re doing your 
own thing because the tools are there for you. It’s awesome’. 
 This is evidence of what he considers positive attributes or ‘freedoms’ 
that come with the position he occupies in the field.  He perceives himself as 
having flexibility with his decision-making without the need to consult or ‘ask 
permission’ for what he feels is an important direction to take, or major decision 
to make.  He describes this freedom even further as a self-described benefit:   
‘I didn’t have to really have a conversation with anyone about 
what I needed to do, if I didn’t want to…I didn’t have to consult 
with anyone in order to move forward. And that’s a nice luxury, 
that’s awesome, a really nice thing’. 
 This could be seen as a way for the decision maker to seek permission or 
consult other firm employees on actions to be taken, ultimately influencing the 
decision maker in a particular fashion.  Although, in a previous case, the 
influence was deemed to be a positive one, at times this could lead to influence 
that may be politically motivated or undesired – depending upon the positional 
power that may be exerted upon the practice.  In this case, however, Cisco felt it 
a benefit to him and his firm that he did not have to move in a direction, or take a 
certain position, he did not want, or felt was appropriate for his pre-determined 
aims.  He is able to take ownership of the decision and reap the added value from 
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it, or suffer the consequences that may result, without being accountable to 
others.  Regardless of the outcome, value was sought in the freedom not to 
engage in or, at the very least, not to act.   
 This feeling of ‘freedom’ and ‘flexibility’ and not needing to seek 
‘permission’ from others to proceed is also at the forefront of his decision 
practice, as Cisco sees the ‘rules of the game’ shifting due to the changes within 
the distribution system.  He recognises that the rules are in a state of flux that is 
providing opportunity never before seen in this industry for a DIY artist. These 
changing rules have provided opportunity to distribute, market, promote and 
generally engage with your fans more than ever before.  However, this freedom 
also leads to uncertainty and the feeling of disorientation at times.  As Cisco 
previously mentioned ‘he didn’t know what he was doing, in an industry that 
didn’t know what they were doing either’.  This ‘freedom’ and opportunity, breeds 
uncertainty and with uncertainty comes doubt, doubt that can evolve into an 
erosion of confidence that then impacts how, or in what direction, Cisco will 
move for any given decision needing to be made. This doubt can often lead to 
overcompensation, which will be discussed in further detail below.  However, it 
must also be noted that Cisco feels positive about this freedom and feels that it 
brings with it an opportunity that his competitors are not always able to enjoy. 
He strongly feels that: 
‘You pretty much choose your own adventure. There are tons of 
different avenues you can take. You could if you wanted make 
music and never tour. There’s people that do that and do a great 
job of it. It’s a specific type of music or a fan base that doesn’t go 
to live shows anyway. I mean you can literally do this ten 
different ways; and then you can do those ten different ways ten 
different ways as well, as far as how you approach it. So since 
there isn’t a way to do things anymore you don’t just make a 
record, book a tour, and go out and push, push, push, push, push. 
You don’t have to do that anymore. One, because it doesn’t really 
work, or the machines behind that aren’t really available 
anymore, no one has $250,000 from a record label to push like 
that anymore. But the cool thing is, that you have ways to reach 
people digitally. You have lots of different social networks to get 
your music out there. The difference is though that there are tons 
of different ways to do it’. 
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 Cisco’s statements are in reference to answering or seeking permission 
from a record label or other entity that would exert undo power or influence 
upon his decision-making.  The changing distribution system within the field 
enables him to pursue his own marketing and promotion strategies that a decade 
ago would have been nearly impossible to do without the assistance of an 
established distribution network controlled by the major recording companies, 
or select independent record companies.  The changes that have taken over the 
field have provided opportunities for him and other DIY artists that enable them 
to seek power and position within the field with lesser amounts of social, 
economic, symbolic or cultural capital.    
Firm Level Habitus 
 
 As was discussed in Chapter 2, the evolving distribution system within 
the music industry has brought about changes in marketing and promotion of 
recorded music that has led to opportunities for artists and the music they 
promote that were not present ten years ago.  This has also led to an influx of 
product into the distribution system because of the easy access to market that 
was once limited.  With the prominence of DIY artists within the field, it has 
become increasingly more difficult for these musicians to differentiate 
themselves from others trying to grow their business organically.  Album 
releases have seen a steady increase year over year up until 2008 where they 
peaked at 106,000 releases.  Since then, there has been a steady decline with the 
most recent statistics showing only 75,000 new releases in 2010 (Peoples, 
2011).  Although statistics show a recent decline, it has not made it any less 
difficult for developing musicians to differentiate themselves and the music they 
create from their closest competitors.   Part of this differentiation process lies in 
having the firm or artist being seen as viable, not only among his or her 
customers or fans, but with those with whom the firm wishes to do business, 
leading to the concept of aggrandisement established in Kapooshki’s decisions.   
As will be shown, aggrandising behaviour also influenced Cisco’s decision-
making along with the symbolism it represents.  It was at the heart of why Cisco 
struggled with choosing to release an EP over a full-length record. 
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Aggrandising and the Concern for Fan Perception 
 Aggrandisement, although difficult to differentiate in this case between 
individual and company (they are one in the same for Cisco within this field), 
was evidenced as influential within the decision practice.  Aggrandising serves 
two purposes here; one, to be seen as credible by his fans and colleagues and 
two, to aid in differentiating himself among other actors vying for power, further 
symbolic and economic capital.  In Cisco’s decision-making practice, there was 
concern for how he, his brand and the firm in which he does business would be 
perceived.  It enables him to conduct business as well as be taken seriously by 
his fans that want to invest their time and money in the viability of the craft and 
the likeability of the artist.  Fan engagement has the potential to increase loyalty, 
which can turn into support both emotionally and financially for the artist.  
Therefore, making decisions that will position him, and how he is seen in the 
field, better are in his best long-term interests.   
 In the first instance, Cisco felt that releasing an EP may jeopardise his 
‘standing’ with his fans and being seen as a ‘smaller’ release may be something 
that would not be ‘on par’ with his current field position or standing.  It is 
important for the reputation of the artist to uphold a perception of ‘being 
relevant’ and ‘on the cutting edge’ of the music.  The newest and long standing 
fans desire longevity – the need or desire to feel involved with the next ‘great’ 
thing or success before it reaches the masses.  This makes them feel important, 
relevant and to speak to recognising cultural product before their peers.  This 
too is at the heart of recognition, but beyond the scope of this research.  The 
artist, by portraying him and his business in a fashion that reinforces that image 
helps to create a social network of people that want to be involved with them 
before success is achieved.  This is evidenced in Cisco’s concern for how is seen 
by his consumer: 
‘Yeah, it’s a weird double-edged sword [being a DIY artist]...at the 
same time you still want to appear like you’ve got enough going on 
that it’s a viable business, that it’s not that you are a lazy person who 
doesn’t want to get a job’. 
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It is important for Cisco to be seen as ‘viable’ and not just an everyday musician 
that has starry-eyed dreams for success.  His decision-making is influenced by 
this and will often try to avoid this perception, as he goes on to state: 
‘we are playing at xyz venue and opening for this ABC artist.  It 
shows that we are building something we have something going on’. 
 Here, aggrandisement substantiates itself in the specific name and artist 
in which Cisco chooses to play.  The specific venue may have a reputation for 
only allowing artists with a strong fan base or who can draw a certain crowd 
when performing, while a specific artist may be associated with a certain stature.  
If you are able to play with ABC artist, ‘you must (emphasis added) have a lot 
going on’ and therefore worth going to see.  Although deciding to play specific 
venues or deciding to play with certain artists helps to reinforce this ‘image,’ this 
phenomenon was also present as an influential factor in Cisco’s decision to 
release the EP.   In order to maintain his level of ‘relevance’ and perception that 
he sees as building and or maintaining in his career, his decision as to whether 
he should release an EP over a full-length album could jeopardise this perceived 
‘success’.  Cisco was concerned about how releasing an EP may be perceived by 
his fans or colleagues.  He wants to maintain the perception of ‘building his 
career,’ not one that has seen its prime: 
‘Like they are part of something great that’s moving forward, not a 
career that’s slowly dying because the $10,000 you borrowed from 
your dad ten years ago is gone now, you know what I mean’? 
Cisco’s concern in this case, was that by choosing to release an EP, he would 
potentially leave the perception of a ‘has been’, or that he could no longer afford 
to release a full-length album.  His relevance would be greatly diminished.   
 Leaving a perception of relevance is seen as just part of what he needs to 
do and the decision he needs to make to reinforce this image of legitimacy.  It 
also plays a role in differentiating oneself from others in the field in which the 
individual or firm is competing.  The field characteristics and changing 
environment have provided opportunities for firms like Cisco’s, but with these 
prospects come changes in how micro-enterprises conduct business and make 
decisions.  Cisco realises that opportunities now exist that did not before, while 
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at the same time providing challenges that he feels are leaving him in a position 
of being compelled to make decisions that reinforce this perception: 
‘Whether you want to or not you are actually or I am actually 
competing with other people who are doing the same thing that I am 
at different levels. So you have to when it comes down to it… not too 
often I think now people have a choice to buy between this song or 
this song or this album or this album. I really feel like there's not a 
whole lot of that out there anymore. When you go to a music store or 
a record store, the record store was literally albums right next to 
each other that you had to choose whether to buy one or the other. I 
feel like now when you are presented with music you have the choice 
whether to buy that song or not and move on’. 
 Although strong competition exists in many industries, the difference that 
exists here is the strong substitution effect that can occur along with the social 
phenomenon that occurs with viral marketing - an advertising strategy that 
relies on individuals to spread or promote a message.  The more people see 
others enjoying or seeing value in something, the more likely others will want to 
‘get on the bandwagon’.  That seems to be evidenced here as well, and by Cisco’s 
concern for portraying himself as not as ‘big’ or relevant or fading away into the 
next ‘has been’.  He strongly feels that consumers make purchase decisions 
based, not only on song or album appeal, but also on how ‘big’ you are, or how 
big you are perceived to be, in the industry.  It enables the consumer to choose 
between many options: 
‘Any fool can get Photoshop, Garage Band, MySpace, and a website, 
and look like they have enough going on. Anyone can do that. So you 
might as well take it a step further and go beyond what the bare 
minimum is’.  
Taking it a step further or going beyond ‘the bare minimum’ is a way for an 
independent artist like Cisco to differentiate himself from others doing 
something similar.  
 When Cisco finally decided that an EP was the most economical way to 
release his new songs, maintaining his ‘relevance’ to his fan base, and to continue 
differentiating himself in the industry, he went to great lengths to maintain this 
perception that he was not choosing the ‘cheap’ independent artist perception:   
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‘I can tell you I didn’t mention the word, it was called an album. My new 
album was coming out, that’s how I described it. It was not an EP until the 
day it came out’. 
By using the word ‘album’ in his marketing materials and communication to the 
public enabled him to continue the perception of being a musician that is not 
financially impoverished or concerned about expenditures.  Cisco felt it essential 
that his fan base and professional network continue to see him as  ‘a certain level 
artist, with a certain stature’, and that releasing an EP over a full-length album 
could compromise this position.  He is concerned about how he is perceived 
within the field and that it may affect his current positioning or future potential 
at accumulating the capital he desires. 
 Even though evidence showed that he could only go in one direction 
because it was ‘all about the money,’ the economic influence, albeit strong, was 
just one influential aspect.  One of the underlying influences in this decision was 
really about how his fans and professional network would perceive him and the 
impact that perception would have on his reputation as an artist. 
Individual Level Habitus (Micro Level Influences) 
 
Individual Aggrandisement and Concern for Reputation 
 
 Going a step beyond the company perception of Cisco Newman as a 
performer and professional, Cisco also felt concerned about how this release 
would be perceived on a more personal level.  Here, aggrandisement was 
apparent through a concern for reputation. How Cisco’s brand was perceived 
was one thing, but Cisco also contemplated the impact it had on him personally:  
‘Yeah, it was ego. It was totally an ego thing. I didn’t want to put out 
half a record. It seemed like I was showing my cards a little bit. 
Showing that I didn’t have the money to make a full-length record. I 
didn’t want to look like I didn’t have the money to make a full-length 
record’. 
 Again, concerned with how he would be perceived by not having 
the money to release a full-length album.  He felt that if he decided to go 
this route, he might jeopardise the symbolic capital that he has obtained 
throughout his career.  Artists that have had success at the level in which 
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he was attempting to operate are not concerned with the financial 
implications, or at least do not leave that perception if they do.   This 
concerned him and he felt that if he decided to go with the EP, that he 
would have to expend a certain amount of symbolic capital that he had 
gained, which he was concerned about losing, and indicating that it might 
be too much to sacrifice.   
 In addition to the financial and perceptive concerns, Cisco was also 
worried about how his reputation as a viable music-producing artist 
would be affected.  In the music industry, if too much time has passed 
since a release of new music, a fan’s engagement with the artist may 
diminish along with their ‘relevancy’ in the marketplace.  This is 
especially a concern in an evolving field like the music industry where 
monetising fan engagement has become a priority.  This relevance and 
potential dwindling of fans impact an artist like Cisco emotionally, for it is 
his personal reputation that is at risk, not just the brand.  Knowing the 
timing issues that producing a full-length album would bring, coupled 
with the limited tracks an EP would provide, Cisco also contemplated 
what either of these factors could do to his reputation: 
‘But at the same time I didn’t want my fan base to feel like they had 
waited two years for a record and they were only going to get a few 
songs’. 
Contemplating the two issues, left Cisco making a decision not only about 
what album type to release, but how this decision would impact his reputation as 
a musician, and how that reputation would jeopardise the symbolic capital he 
already possessed.  Using a sense of individual aggrandisement to preserve his 
reputation and thereby keeping a secure hold on his symbolic capital moves to 
the spirit of why artists like Cisco choose to aggrandise or use it to impact 
decision practice. When discussing his opportunities that come with his sense of 
freedom, it was explained that with that freedom of opportunity comes 
uncertainty and with that uncertainty comes doubt, doubt that can evolve into an 
erosion of confidence that impacts how or what direction Cisco will take for any 
given decision needing to be made. This doubt can also be overcompensated for, 
and turn into a sense of insecurity that instigates aggrandising behaviour.  If he is 
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perceived by any of his stakeholders as disingenuous, he could quickly erode any 
of the symbolic capital that he feels he has earned along with his accumulated 
social and economic capital. 
The Impact of Past Bad Decisions 
 Past experience often plays an important role in decision-making. Positive 
past outcomes can lead to similar decision-making given similar circumstances.  
On the contrary, negative, past outcomes can influence future decisions by the 
actor’s desire to avoid similar results (Sagi & Friedland, 2007).  Cisco’s past 
negative experience to a decision led to a similar avoidance behaviour, but also a 
prudent one:  
‘There was a series of really bad decisions made over a couple of 
years, and the money wasn’t there. I was having to pull myself out of 
a hole for a couple years. I was finally ahead for once, and I didn’t 
want to use more money than I had’. 
 The lack of economic capital and assets is common among DIY artists and 
can often influence decisions being made.  In Cisco’s case, and relevant to his 
decision to release a full-length album or EP, his financial position has direct 
impact, but this effect is also grounded in past decisions that now have bearing 
and influence on this particular decision.  He is exhibiting avoidance behaviour 
in that he does not want to endanger his current economic position as he did in 
the past.  This influence also causes him to proceed with caution and will lead to 
seeking further advice from external consultants and advisors.  These advisors 
will also help to reinforce his own dispositions that he has acquired from his 
previous experience.  In his decision to release an EP, Cisco’s use of past 
experience as a benchmark is explicit and impactful.  Often, past experience, as 
argued by Bourdieu (1990b) can impact an actor’s personal dispositions but 
often becomes part of the individual habitus, which makes it more difficult to 
isolate.   
 In addition to a past, negative experience, Cisco also relied upon a past, 
positive experience as he contemplated this decision: 
‘My most successful record was an acoustic record I made in a day 
and a half for $200…keeping that in mind I wanted this next to have 
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whatever charm that record had, but I was going to make a record 
using everything I had as well’. 
 He knew from past experience that he could create a great record with 
limited funds.  This would help to alleviate his concerns that the more money he 
spent on a recording the better the album would, or could, be.  He learned that he 
could do with less and still produce an excellent record.  This is what helped to 
reinforce his economic concerns that he equated with quality, and assist in 
neutralising that influential factor. 
The Need to Consult 
 Cisco’s desire to seek outside counsel served two purposes when making 
this decision.  First, he used personal advisors to aid in reinforcing his choice 
once it was made and, two, he used external advisors to consult and talk through 
concerns of past experiences that are now influencing his decision practice: 
‘There were certain people that I went to for advice like [my previous 
manager] and my wife’. 
 Seeking advice in these matters was not done to influence his 
decision-making but was used to affirm what was already decided.  Cisco 
finds it helpful to speak with those closest to him as a way to ‘talk through 
things’, which allows him to feel more confident in the decision he has 
already made: 
‘…It’s nice to talk it over with [my old manager] because he has an 
interest in it because he understands the music business side of 
things and I can talk to him...My wife has a vested interest in it 
because she’s looking at it like what’s going to make money and 
what’s going to keep our family happy. Trey is looking at it 
completely on the creative side. So I feel like I have a nice 
combination of people that I can bounce things off of. So that the 
decision that I need to make is going to validate my gut reaction or 
it’s gonna make me talk it over to the point where I can say that my 
gut reaction is wrong. I can be informed enough to say that it’s 
wrong’. 
 The roles he plays as a decision-maker are evident here, artist, husband 
and band-mate, all helping to define the ‘rules’ Cisco feels he needs to follow, to 
approach the decision appropriately.  He is influenced by these rules, but as he 
explicitly states, it is used as a validation to a self-described ‘gut feeling’.  He is 
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able to reassure himself and the decision he already made.  This was due to his 
personal disposition of insecurity and the past experience discussed above that 
he went through with other releases.  He also sought emotional support from 
those who are closest to him professionally when he plays: 
‘I talked it over with the guys in the band. We talked over what songs 
they were most excited about’. 
 Although external influences did not play a direct role in influencing 
which record Cisco would make, it did serve as a ‘post consensus’, or as a 
reaffirming mechanism.  ‘Post consensus’ in the sense that it enabled Cisco to 
affirm why he decided what he did.  On the one hand, it is similar to forming 
consensus, common in decision making in educational circles and top 
management teams (Amason, 1996) but without the process and debate that 
would come with the decision.   
Personal Bias and Heuristics 
This decision also provides evidence of heuristics and personal bias.  
However, not used independently, one was used to instigate the other and was 
essentially a culmination of his uncertainties and personal dispositions. Cisco 
uses a personal belief bias as something he already felt, a reaction to an 
aforementioned ‘gut feeling’, essentially treating it as a validation tool.  He 
exhibited preference, while reinforcing his concern for reputation: 
‘I feel like what I really did was I knew it needed to be an EP and I 
needed to validate it to myself by making this decision’’ 
This belief bias was rooted in his past experiences, anchoring that experience 
within his mind as a reference point, which then enabled him to adjust according 
to the circumstances of this decision.   He originally believed the EP was the right 
way to go because he anchored a past experience and learned from it. 
‘…just basically the amount of money I spent on making records in the 
past, the amount of money I had.’ 
This set him up in determining how exactly he should proceed.  Considering his 
current economic capital and what he knew it would cost, he felt that he needed 
to learn from his past mistakes in when budgeting costs for album production.  
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6.1.5 Conclusion 
 ‘So keeping that in mind I wanted this next to have whatever charm that 
record had, but I was going to make a record using everything I had as well.’ 
Cisco is referencing one of his prior releases where much success was gleaned 
with minimal use of capital.  He saw that release as successful because of his 
return on investment – not only on his economic expenditures, but also his 
transformation of social and cultural capital used in seeking further economic 
capital.  Cisco, like many DIY artists in the industry today, take chances and make 
decisions that use most, if not all, capital available to them in order to sustain his 
or her career.  To them, a major decision like releasing an EP over a full-length 
album means the difference between having a sustained career, or one that will 
end within months of release.  Much of the success is determined, like many 
small businesses, by cash flow, but even more importantly, as evidenced here, is 
the symbolic capital at stake.  Lack of economic capital can sustain a career for 
many years as anecdotal comment shows in much of the commentary from this 
industry.  However, if an artist’s symbolic capital is used or becomes non-
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6.2 CASE #4: SECURING A PUBLISHING DEAL 
  
 Cisco’s second major strategic decision was regarding an opportunity to 
sign a new publishing deal with Henson Music Publishing, an international music 
publisher with a new affiliate office in the United States.  He was approached and 
offered a deal unexpectedly and felt that ‘he really needed to weigh it out.’ Often, 
strategic decisions in small micro-enterprises like Cisco’s are unsought and can 
often be considered an ‘action’, or more ’interpretive’ perspective (Hendry, 
2000) on the situation.  Firm owners do not often realise at the time that the 
decisions they are making could be considered strategic; they evolve, are more 
organic and only after looking back on the circumstances are they able to 
identify them as such.  Though similar here, Cisco knew as he was being 
confronted with this option that it could have significant impact on him and his 
business.  That was certainly evident here as well and is affirmation of previous 
research done on SME decision-making (Hendry, 2000; Jong, 2004). 
 ‘Whether it was the right one for me, that’s what I needed to figure 
out, but it was clearly an opportunity. The potential was there…and I 
didn’t seek it out, not in the slightest bit’. 
 Being an unexpected choice for Cisco to make, he felt that this was 
something that needed careful consideration. He was cautious in his approach 
because of previous experiences working with individuals that wanted to assist 
in his career and the implications that adjusting his business model could have 
on him and his livelihood.  Through his understanding of the field doxa and his 
industry knowledge, Cisco understood the potential ramifications this decision 
could have, both negatively and positively.   What he needed to decide was 
whether now was the right time and whether this was the right company with 
which to make this move:  
‘I needed to decide if I wanted to have a publishing company and I 
looked at all the different companies and thought this is what I want. 
It was them coming to me and me figuring out if this worked with 
what I was doing’. 
At this point in Cisco’s career, he had been focusing his day-to-day 
business operations on the marketing and promotion of recorded product and 
performing live.  His business model was dependent upon ‘experiencing’ the 
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Cisco brand, whether it be through recordings, merchandise or the live 
performance.  He understood however, that this is a difficult model to sustain for 
him and other ‘life concerns’ were beginning to affect him.  Being recently 
married, envisioning a family and his general concern about life, Cisco began 
contemplating his vulnerability regarding his future longevity of his current 
business model.  His objective characteristics, his demographic profile, being 
married, thirty-three years old and living in Richmond, VA, are evidenced as 
influencing why this was such an important decision for Cisco: 
 
‘You know, I’m not getting any younger.  I married now and I feel like I 
need to think about securing some steady income, some security and a 
publishing deal could help in that.’ 
 
He recognises the potential in deciding to sign a deal with Henson, if song 
placements could be secured, and licensing deals in T.V. and Film could be in 
the future for him, it could create a more steady and lucrative income.  An 
appealing concept for a man in his early thirties starting to think about 
starting a family, frustrated at a ten year career with little capital, both 
economic and symbolic, to show for it.  These motivations along with past 
experiences and heuristics helped Cisco make the decision to sign the deal. 
Further detail on Cisco’s company and his personal objective characteristics 
will not be reiterated here. However, where necessary the introduction of new 
protagonists in the decision practice will be introduced, as will the relevant 
context for the decision. This decision was important for Cisco, because it was a 
pivotal one that later proved to contribute to a new strategy for him as a DIY 
artist, one that can be likened to a booking agency deciding no longer to secure 
employment for artists, but rather managing them. 
6.2.1 The Actors and Personal-level Habitus 
 Cisco’s demographic characteristics along with a description of his 
individual habitus traits were described.  For the sake of redundancy, it will not 
be necessary to repeat those characteristics here.  However, within this decision, 
a new protagonist is introduced as an active participant in the decision practice.  
Although her active engagement is limited, her involvement was critical to the 
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decision choice and therefore is relevant to the practice surrounding the decision 
and the intricacies of what Cisco contemplated as he chose whether to pursue 
this decision.    
 
Janet Housley – Creative Director 
 Age: 25 
 Gender: Female  
 Ethnicity: Caucasian 
 Education: B.A. 
 
Janet Housley – Individual Habitus  
 
Janet Housley is the publishing manager for the recently established 
affiliate office of Henson Music Publishing.  A UK based, internationally 
recognised music company that has chosen to expand its offices into the United 
States. This allowed the company to establish a presence in the local market 
while capitalising on the opportunities that exist within the largest music market 
in the world.  Janet is a twenty-five year old recent graduate of a local music 
industry program.  Henson recruited Janet locally because she was young and 
willing to represent the firm’s interests in the United States enthusiastically and 
with dedication. The company charged her with the responsibilities of 
overseeing the acquisition of talented songwriters as they executed their 
international expansion.  Janet is a motivated individual willing to do what is 
necessary to get the job done, in the best way she knows how:   
‘I would describe myself as driven and willing to go to great lengths to make 
the contacts needed’. 
 
Being a recent graduate, she has her hand on the ‘pulse’ of what is 
happening in the local songwriter’s scene.  She understands and recognises good 
talent when she sees it and is willing to establish relationships with those 
songwriters if she and Henson see it to be a good fit: 
 
‘We’re looking to establish relationships with songwriters who have a 
certain style of writing that will serve our interests.  We have very little 
to offer them with regard to advances, so we are not asking for 
ownership of their songs either.  We want to establish a relationship 
and see what we can do for them and vice versa’’ 
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Not originally from the New York area, positions Janet with limited social 
capital in the form of professional networks in which to exploit. Her comments 
about ‘going to great lengths’ reinforces this premise, which could pose 
limitations on the types of promotion needed for a successful firm such as 
Henson.  She has the institutionalised cultural capital in the form of Bachelor of 
Arts in Music Business, but no evidence exists that the industry knowledge that 
may be needed has been embodied in her habitus, or learned through experience 
working in the industry.  This is due to her having less than one year’s 
experience working in the industry.   Janet’s involvement in the decision practice 
for Cisco, albeit limited, is important to how and what decision he makes on 
whether to sign a deal.   
 
6.2.2 Resources Needed 
Limited Expenditures and the Retention of Copyrights 
 
The financial resources needed to execute this decision had minimal 
impact on the decision practice.  The limited expenditure needed to eventually 
execute the decision, if Cisco felt it was in his best interest at the time, would be 
limited to hiring a third party, a team input that would offer legal assistance to 
aid in execution – a barrister and the expenses associated with travel. ‘I had to 
spend money to draft a contract.’ This is a minimal expense, but is indicative of 
the lack of cultural capital needed in order to protect him throughout this 
process and beyond.  Cisco has insufficient cultural capital in the form of contract 
expertise and institutional knowledge in legal credentials needed for optimum 
protection.  He sought a barrister to represent him, negotiate for him and draft a 
contract that would protect him.  This transformation of economic capital for the 
proxy form of cultural capital was necessary if Cisco wanted this deal to happen. 
He recognised this and was willing to spend what was needed, within reason, to 
make it happen. 
In addition, Cisco knew that while he was contemplating whether to sign 
the deal, or not, he was being influenced by geography.  Being a resident of 
Richmond, VA, he was 500 miles from the home office of the firm with which he 
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would need regular and direct contact.  Knowing this, he needed to consider the 
costs of travel to and from their location to conduct business when needed. 
‘I had to get to know them, spending money going back and forth to 
[location purposely excluded] I wouldn’t have spent it, if I wasn’t 
seriously considering it’. 
The company would not pay these expenses for Cisco, nor would they 
offer any advance – often typical of this type of deal.  In exchange for no advance, 
he would be able to retain all ownership of his copyrights.  In essence, the use of 
contracts here is a standard; risk adverse tactic (Caves, 2000) that field doxa 
would consider a typical ‘Administration’ deal.  In exchange for the company’s 
services and active exploitation of his catalogue, they would retain 20% of all 
income earned.  This was appealing to Cisco, mostly because he wanted to retain 
ownership.  From his perspective, he has worked very hard in his career and 
wanted to do anything he could to maintain as much control over his Intellectual 
Property as he could. The risk was low for him in this deal and it made it all that 
more appealing.  The offering of this kind of agreement was certainly an 
influential factor, coupled with the limited resources needed to acquire a 
significant amount of symbolic capital associated with ‘having a publishing deal,’ 
would change how he did business and how he perceived his performing and 
song-writing career.  
Cisco also felt confident in what the firm could offer in the short-term.  
After discussing the details of the contract with Janet, her supervisor overheard a 
conversation regarding Cisco’s desire to connect with a prominent producer.  
Cisco was impressed when: 
‘…he offered to make the connection, which he did. He had no reason 
to do that, it was his idea, he made it happen’. 
Providing a favour before any vested interest in Cisco demonstrates the 
influence the actors within the company possess in order to ‘make things 
happen’.  Although Cisco is adamant that he had ‘no reason’ to make that 
connection, it is more likely that he did.  Janet’s supervisor was purposeful in 
reaching out in this way.  By doing so, he is establishing his authority over Cisco 
by demonstrating the power and influence he can wield by connecting him with 
the producer.  By establishing his position early on, he is making it clear to Cisco 
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that he wields influence when needed and is in control of the relationship being 
established between the two of them.  Although Cisco was not aware of the 
subtle power play, non-the-less, the favour appealed to him and reinforced the 
positive perception he had of the company.   
The Need for Industry Knowledge and the Role of Institutionalised Cultural 
Capital 
The role of cultural capital, and the lack thereof, also played a role in this 
decision and how certain choices for other influential factors were made.  
Through Cisco’s habitus, he understood that limitations in certain areas existed; 
therefore he sought external advisors to aid him.  Those advisors are discussed 
in more detail below, but it is worth mentioning the causes behind why they 
were sought and those are rooted in the lack of a certain embodied and 
institutionalised capital in the form of legal qualifications and expertise and 
other industry specific knowledge that Cisco felt would aid him in making a 
better decision.  However, he did possess a certain amount of that capital that 
enabled him to make a better-informed decision through a language in which he 
could understand.  This type of cultural capital was what he had gained through 
his graduate school education in music business. 
‘I wouldn’t have had intelligent conversations with Chris, if I didn’t 
tap into that knowledge I learned in school’. 
The education taught him to be resourceful and creative in his 
endeavours and throughout his industry experience that he has acquired in the 
past ten years and has now embodied itself within him.  He consciously realises 
however that much of that embodied knowledge was rooted in his education: 
‘I used some resources and skills acquired in school’. 
 The institutionalised and now embodied capital enabled him to discuss 
intelligently the details and options available to him as he was making his 
decision regarding possibly signing with Henson: 
‘It enabled me to speak intelligently’. 
Having the appropriate amount of cultural capital in this decision enabled 
him to discuss with what would be considered a different class fraction 
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(Bourdieu, 1984) to which he did not belong, at that time.  Indeed, he relied upon 
the barrister’s expertise in the matter.  The appropriately accumulated cultural 
capital enabled him to shift the power balance between Henson Music Publishing 
and himself, on behalf of a team input, momentarily so that he could make a 
more appropriately informed decision. 
Symbolic Capital and the Power of Association 
 Cisco’s desire to accumulate symbolic capital and/or associate with the 
prestige that was already accumulated and ‘in the name’ of the publishing firm, 
thereby enabling himself to associate with that capital was an influential 
component to Cisco’s decision-making about whether, or not, to sign this 
publishing deal:  
‘I felt that the sort of success that they have seen, I could see that 
success as well’. 
The success that Cisco’s speaks of is the desire to associate himself with the 
prestige that has been accumulated by the firm within the field.  He also alludes 
to an added benefit or mystique that is associated with a firm from Europe:   
‘Associating with a name like “Henson” from Europe of all places, it had 
mystique that could lead to my success’. 
 Evidence suggests that he clearly felt that this association could attribute 
to his success within this field.  They were not ‘committed’ to doing anything on 
his behalf ‘they don’t have to do anything actually…[the] deal wasn’t all that 
attractive once you started to consider it.’ But it is what it represents that makes it 
appealing.  As he saw it, signing with Henson ‘could’ lead to successful 
exploitation of his catalogue.  The very essence was in the name and what they 
had been able to achieve in the UK.  They are a prominent name because they 
have a record of success – they have accumulated the symbolic capital it needed 
for Cisco to feel that something good could come from the association of the 
name.  However, this symbolic capital did not easily transcend geographic 
boundaries: 
‘In the U.S. no one knew [who] they were, but because I knew who 
they were and the artists they attracted if made me want to sign with 
them more’. 
 As Cisco is weighing his option and contemplating the pros and cons of 
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making this decision, his desire to associate himself with the Henson name also 
extended to a desire to associate himself with the artists that already have 
publishing deals with that company. This speaks to the ‘type of firm’ or brand 
that Henson has developed for itself, the values they represent through the 
artists on their roster and how they desire to represent themselves in the field.  
Cisco understands this association and iterative benefit between artists, the firm 
and the field.  In addition, the added symbolic positioning could also provide 
further economic capital:   
‘I was left with the impression that they had serious money behind 
them and they couldn’t fail because of it’. 
 An assumption was made, one that came with the symbolism of the name, 
along with Cisco’s trusting disposition, that this could be a positive decision and 
one where he ‘had nothing to lose in signing this deal, but the upside could have 
been enormous’. The potential rewards outweighed the perceived risk.  He felt 
the company had the financial resources to back what they were saying and the 
disposition to trust someone that had achieved a reputable name and stature in 
the industry.  In his mind, they would have to support him, their new acquisition.   
It is what the deal had the potential to represent if he chose to move forward 
with signing a contract.  Although, it was made clear that ‘the company was not 
committed to do anything’ with his intellectual property, nor was he able to see 
an advance for future submissions of his work, the trade-off was that, in turn he 
also did not have to make any significant exchange of economic capital to 
associate himself with the symbolic capital that was already accumulated by the 
firm.  By mere association, and the ‘aggrandising’ opportunities that would exist, 
he could raise his perceived symbolic positioning in the field.  
6.2.3 Influences on the Decision Practice 
The Role of the Contract in the Decision Outcome 
Two industry characteristics (Caves, 2000) include the use of ‘team 
inputs’, that is, key advisors that have accumulated a desired cultural capital that 
will aid the decision makers to achieve further position and power and the ‘use 
of contracts’ in order to protect and mitigate the intellectual property being 
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exploited.  The use of team inputs will be discussed in further detail below under 
external advisors. However, the use of contracts was evidenced as key to 
influencing the decision practice for Cisco as he was determining how to 
proceed. 
The contract terms and the rules that determine the relationship between 
parties often lay the foundation for success of either or both parties.  They are 
taken quite seriously in this field and can often determine the amount and types 
of capital that may be accumulated between the parties.  Specifics of these 
contracts and the rules that generate them are beyond the scope of this research, 
but its relevance is important enough to be a key influence with this decision and 
the ownership of the property rights that were presented to Cisco within that 
contract: 
‘One of the biggest things to me was the idea of them owning any of 
my copyright, that was out the door. They never asked for that. Once 
this was on the table it was like okay, there are other publishing 
deals out there, so it was kind of apples and oranges because there 
are publishing companies that will give you an advance’. 
 Often, as industry doxa dictate, ‘an advance’ is in exchange for future 
earnings on the copyright that exists in a song.   Power and capital accumulation 
exists with ownership and commercial exploitation of those copyrights.  
Contracts determine the details of the ownership of those socially constructed 
rights and legally protect those actors involved.  They are at the heart of why this 
field exists and the players take the legal exchange of them and the details that 
dictate the exploitation with the utmost seriousness.  There is no exception here, 
as when Cisco considers the fact that Henson was not interested in ownership of 
those rights, but only to act on behalf of a third party collection of assets that 
may be earned on them.  In the industry this is typically called and 
‘administration’ deal.  However, as Cisco alludes to in his comments below, this 
deal was not strictly an administration deal either, but a hybrid of a typically 
publishing deal, where rights of ownership are handed over to the publisher in 
exchange for the previously discussed advance and opportunity to market and 
promote on behalf of the writer.  This deal was a mix of both.   Ownership stays 
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with the author, but Henson will market, promote and collect assets on behalf of 
the writer:   
‘What happened was he tried to draft the contract, where instead of it 
being the contract he gave to me which was some wacko crazy 
contract from the UK, he drafted something more like what Bug Music 
does, more of an admin deal that they do’. 
 Despite the cross-cultural differences that were made explicit in the 
terms of the contract that were originally presented, the heart of this contractual 
agreement is the same. The industry doxa dictated by the rules of how 
relationships with actors and the maneuvering of the ‘rights’ by which are being 
negotiated, are the same.  They influence the decision practice in how Cisco 
evaluates the viability of his choice.  He is being asked to give up minimal 
economic capital in exchange for this agreement.  As indicated in the first 
decision, economic capital is critical in Cisco’s evaluations of his decisions, even 
when symbolic capital and power is at stake.  The terms of this agreement and 
the industry rules that govern them, made his decision choice easier, but 
nonetheless influential.  It is also worth noting that from Henson’s perspective, 
Janet made clear why they presented the agreement they did: 
‘To us, Cisco is considered an investment; we were willing to take a chance 
on his talent.  We had little to offer him with regard to an advance, so we 
could not justify asking for the rights to his songs’.  
The evidence presented here indicates minimal risk with optimal return for 
Cisco, making his evaluation of moving ahead with signing a deal seem simple.  
However, Cisco’s past experience and habitus instill doubt, which makes this 
decision more difficult in evaluating and ultimately whether, or not, signing with 
them is an appropriate decision to make.   
Decision-Making on Limited Information 
 Many small firms have been confirmed as using bounded rational 
behaviours in their decision processes (Liberman-Yaconi et al., 2010).  This 
behaviour is often bounded by limited information available when decision 
choices are being made.  As Cisco indicates below, he too had limited information 
about the company and what exactly it may entail.  Being one of the first deals 
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being signed by Henson in the United States left little precedence for Cisco to 
make his decision: 
‘I had a conversation with someone recently who was going to sign 
with Henson who they solicited and they wanted to know what I 
thought about it and I thought ‘’wow that would have been a nice 
conversation to have when I was being [courted by them]. But there 
wasn’t anyone, this was a new thing for them, you know? All I had 
was this enormously successful British company, successful 
worldwide and then was going to start this little publishing company 
in the [United States]. So I had to promise only that there was a lot of 
money behind this theoretically and that they had success far away. 
But that the namesake at least was going to be enough to get 
something started. You know what I mean’? 
 This limited information caused Cisco to rely upon the symbolic capital 
and reputation that had been accumulated by the company - the capital that is 
now represented in the name ‘Henson’ and the artists being represented by them 
that Cisco previously discussed.  That symbolism, and the ‘international’ 
perception, creates an assumption by Cisco that economic resources exist with 
the firm.  Those resources along with the precedence of success make his 
ultimate decision to sign with Henson less risky.  Taking on less risk and 
associating himself with the name, Henson, was enough for Cisco to feel more 
comfortable signing a deal with them so he could feel more relevant in the 
industry. 
Firm Aggrandisement and the Perception of Credibility 
 Although Cisco was not originally anticipating this opportunity to sign a 
publishing deal, after weighing several options and contemplating the resources 
needed to execute it, he felt it would be worth the risk to get involved.   He did 
have deliberate intentions for this type of association with yet another third 
party.  He was hoping to have the opportunity, but did so with caution and 
scepticism.  Much of this is rooted in his personal habitus and his past experience 
working with third parties, but much of this caution is overcome by the 
anticipation of the association he would have with a ‘Henson’ deal: 
‘I think I was hoping that it would at that time it gave me a feather in 
my cap and that’s it. That’s the very least of what I hoped it would get 
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me. It would give me the opportunity to say that I had a publishing 
deal and it would open up doors for me that I didn’t have’. 
 Having a ‘publishing deal’ in Cisco’s eyes would give him the credibility, 
or at least be perceived as a credible business. Yet again the need to associate 
with this success is at the root of influence in his decision choice.  He 
understands that without this association his ability to conduct business is 
hampered by the industry doxa, or at least the interpretation of that doxa by 
some players: 
‘Because I run into closed doors all the time.’ 
 Knowing that things are difficult when success is not ‘perceived’ by others 
also indicates an element of past experience influencing this decision.  Not only 
by the limitation brought on by a non-association, but one brought on by 
association.  Associating himself with the ‘Henson’ name and the success that 
comes with it would give him the perception of legitimacy through firm 
aggrandisement by association of a publishing company: 
‘I would like to get a decent publishing deal in Nashville…because the 
perception there is I have value because someone else saw value in 
me already.’ 
It is worth noting that in Cisco’s comments here, he is foreseeing, yet again, the 
potential value by association with, and value of, what comes from saying he has 
a publishing deal.  Although he expects little financial return with this deal, he 
understands yet again the value that it will bring for further publishing deals.  
The specific mentioning of the business cluster - Nashville holds value to 
songwriters.  Knowing that the city is an epicentre of music, specifically to song 
writing holds value to Cisco both specific to social capital via professional 
networks and economic capital due to the sheer amount of business being done 
in the city (Raines & Brown, 2006).  He also understands that by using a name 
like Henson, and being associated with the publisher as a songwriter, he hopes 
that it will present opportunities for him with Nashville companies where his 
chances of capital acquisition are increased.   
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Individual Level Habitus (Micro Level Influences) 
The Lasting Impact of Bad Decisions 
Cisco makes very clear that ‘there was a series of really bad decisions made 
over a couple of years.’  This was first evidenced in his first decision and 
referenced as an experience related to financial matters.  However, Cisco was 
also referring to bad experiences that he had with ‘team inputs’ that had 
represented his interests.  This was brought out more clearly in his comments 
before, especially regarding the distractions that come with agents that are not 
as committed to your career and success as a DIY artist, as you might be: 
‘the guy also called me Donald or something. No he called me Dan. I 
had to make a decision. I had to say you know what this guy is an idiot 
and he’s not part of the acquisition. He’s not part of running the 
business, he is doing something completely different. He just didn’t care 
enough to know my name yes, but he also didn’t have to know it either 
because [Janet] was the person I was dealing with, someone completely 
different and I thought well whatever, I’ve made mistakes too before. 
This guy was just involved in other things’. 
This episode that Cisco is referring to is indicative of the past negative 
experience that he had dealing and working with third party inputs.  Those 
‘agents’ that worked on his behalf and represented his interests in the field 
include his first management company, not the one he now refers to for external 
affirmation – but one prior - and booking agents.  Much of his ‘caution’ and 
reluctance in wanting to secure a deal with Henson is rooted in those prior 
experiences – most of which were negative.  The ‘mistakes’ he references above, 
and this association can draw the feeling of not being a priority to his previous 
managers.  Although not getting his name right in the preliminary stages of the 
negotiation was not drawn as too significant to Cisco, it is evident by his 
comments that offence was taken and reference to his prior experience 
reminded him of the potential hazards that allowing a third party to represent 
his interests can bring.  Although the justification for not knowing his name was 
an attempt to make him feel better about this deal that he so desired to have and 
have work for him, it did make him hesitant in signing the deal.   
In addition, as his interactions with the ‘the guy running the business,’ 
Cisco’s regular interaction with Janet began to concern him as well, also 
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reinforcing scepticism of getting involved with third parties in his career. 
Although she was eager and willing to make the connections needed, she was 
also inexperienced.  According to Cisco, her age and lack of cultural capital began 
to place doubts in his mind about the credibility and ability for Henson to do the 
job that they were saying they could do.  There wasn’t any one event in which his 
scepticism could be attributed, but Cisco felt that she was very ‘green’ in her 
dealings and communications.  This feeling of being unknowledgeable is 
attributed to perspective.  Cisco has accumulated a substantial amount more of 
cultural and social capital within the field, which enables him to see things 
differently and speak in ways that are more conducive to conducting business 
with the field.   He is also older and the impact of age, life and business 
perspective can, and often does, influence decision-making (Bruine de Bruin et 
al., 2007) – with no exception here. 
This negative past experience with third party agents can also be argued 
as evidence of an anchoring and adjustment heuristic.  Cisco’s decision to move 
ahead with the deal was anchored by his negative past experience which he 
referenced when making the decision.   
He ultimately adjusted, not by avoiding the deal, but justifying in his mind 
that it was acceptable because of the limited amount of risk that he was taking.  
He proceeded with caution but did so knowing that the potential positive 
outcomes with this deal outweighed the risk. 
The Reliance upon Networks for Affirmation 
Individuals, firms and other artefacts were used to gather information to 
assist in making the decision to sign the publishing deal.  Cisco’s disposition and 
past experiences had led him to feel a certain way about third party agents who 
want to do business with him or indicate that they want to ‘help’ him and his 
business.  These feelings include scepticism, which have led to mistrust, and 
insecurity.   This sense of insecurity has led to a slower more uncertain decision-
practice that is evidenced here as he was contemplating whether it was a choice 
worth making, one that could and should have been an easy choice to make: 
‘No, I’m not a very quick decision-maker; I tend to turn to people 
around me to help me, validate what I am thinking. I don’t usually 
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change my mind, but I usually come to a conclusion and then talk to 
others about the conclusion that I made’. 
Cisco seeks out external opinions prior to making this decision, from a 
point of validation, not for information gathering.  Information seeking has been 
shown as the reason why actors tend to look outside the firm to aid in decision-
making processes (Liberman-Yaconi et al., 2010).  Although he is likely to query 
if there is something he has yet not anticipated, he comes from a post decision 
perspective, not a pre-decision one.  Similar to his decision-practice for his 
choice to release an EP over a full-length album, Cisco uses external advisors 
more as a validation tool – post decision choice - rather than to seek their advice 
on which direction to choose.  This is rooted in his habitus and general lack of 
confidence in making a concrete decision.  Feeling that he will make a bad choice 
comes from many past years of inadequate levels of cultural capital in the form 
of industry knowledge and the constant reminders of what he perceives as 
potentially bad choices due to negative past experiences.  The field doxa also 
plays a role in this sense of insecurity.  By the very nature of the ‘infinite variety’ 
principle (Caves, 2000), agents tend to place little value in any one artist unless 
they possess a significant amount of symbolic capital.  The association or 
behaviour that one exhibits when they perceive the talent as indispensable tends 
to create a difficult environment for the performer, leading to feelings of 
inadequacy in their skills, which can lead to a negative self-perception.  This 
negative self-perception affects confidence, which in Cisco’s case affects his 
decision-making practice.  He seeks external advice in some circumstance to 
make up for this loss of confidence. 
Those individuals from whom he sought advice aided him not in the 
efforts of making the decision – and reassurance, as just discussed, but also in 
navigating through the legal aspects of securing the deal through contract 
negotiation.  In order to do so, Cisco sought the expertise of a barrister: 
I had plenty of conversations with my attorney, Lilo Hollysworth’. 
These conversations enabled him to work through the legal ramifications 
and protection he needed. As was discussed earlier, he lacked the embodied and 
institutionalised capital necessary here for adequate protection.  The attorney he 
hired embodied this capital, in the form of needed legal knowledge and 
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credentials to practice law in the United States.  This aided him in effectively 
executing this decision.  Again, as evidenced this was done post-decision, but did 
aid in the effective iterative nature of decision-making inherent in small firms.  
This lack of appropriate cultural capital allowed him to use the social capital he 
had accumulated through his past successes in the field.   
In addition, even though Cisco indicated that this industry knowledge was 
adequate, based on prior institutionalised capital accumulation from his 
education, he also sought out post-choice advice and affirmation from his 
previous manager – also similar to the behaviour exhibited in his album format 
decision:   
‘I talked it through with my old manager…I consider him knowledgeable’. 
Speaking with his old manager enabled him to seek out validation and advice 
from a trusted advisor and to reassure him of his decision choice along with 
informal career advice. This behaviour is similar to the one observed in his 
choice to release an EP over an album and will be refrained from further 
analysis, due to the similar premises.  It is however, worth noting that similar 
behaviour did exist over these two major decisions. 
 
6.2.4 Conclusion 
Cisco’s decision to sign a publishing deal that would significantly change the 
strategic direction of his career should have been an easy choice.  However, a 
complex iteration of the habitus between actors, field doxa and desire for capital 
culminated in being a difficult decision choice for Cisco.  This decision would 
have enabled him to increase his symbolic positioning by associating his brand 
with that of a more established and reputable one within the field.  However, as 
doubt about the attentiveness of the actors and the cultural capital they 
possessed set in, a few negative past experiences and decision-making heuristics 
forced him to seek outside advice to reinforce his decision.   In the end, the 
limited risk involved outweighed the potential increase in symbolic capital by 
name association and the potential economic returns outweighed the ones in 
which he used, ultimately guiding his hand in making the choice to sign the deal. 
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7. Empirical Findings and Analysis III 
 
CASE #5: CLIENT ACQUISITION 
Enterprise:  Bench Puppet Entertainment, LLC  
Sector: Social Media Marketing  
Owner: David Sax  
Turnover: $80,000 annually  
 
7.1 DECISION CONTEXT AND FIRM BACKGROUND  
This decision involves the choice to take on a specific client that is 
requesting the development of a digital music application. Intentions were good 
at the outset and contracting the client was not difficult, especially since it fell 
within the skill set and services offered by the firm at the time.  However, the 
characteristics of this case that warrant closer investigation involve the on-going 
tactical decisions involved with a project that is escalating in cost and the 
‘uncertainty of demand’ principle that underpins the music industry (Caves, 
2000).  The idea of ‘sunk costs’ was first recognised by Barry Staw (1976) and is 
a term used when people justify the investment of increased risk in a decision 
based upon previous investment and not the current cost. The influential factors 
that impact this decision were recognised as strategic only after the fact.  That is, 
a post-decision analysis made well into the implementation phase of the 
decision-making process. Recognising it as such, provides further evidence of the 
Hendry (2000) concept of an ‘interpretive’ decision – ‘a retrospective 
rationalisation of a prior action’, that is common to small and medium sized 
enterprises, like Bench Puppet Entertainment. 
The evidence of how this decision was made and the factors that 
influenced it will show that the initial intention was to increase the firm’s 
economic capital, and using large amounts of social capital for its execution.  
After deeper analysis, however, and similar to the previous cases discussed, the 
underlying aim in this decision was to increase the firm’s perceived position 
within the field by attempting to acquire further social and symbolic capital.  
Considerations in this decision practice were also deliberated upon because of 
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the wish, to increase the actors ‘reputation’ within the industry that, thereby, 
affects the social and symbolic capital he could gain or possess. 
Bench Puppet Entertainment is a social media and marketing firm based 
in Nashville, TN.  The company began operations in 2007 and has since been run 
by owner-manager David Sax.  The company operates under the auspices of the 
music and entertainment industry and specialises in marketing and promotion 
of recorded music, specifically social media entertainment branding and web 
development.   
This decision to agree to take a client for the company that was 
requesting the development of a new digital music application had an upside 
that was apparent to David from the beginning of decision recognition: 
Why would I not do this?” So my assessment wasn’t very large…will 
this trip my business or will this increase my business? It was just a 
can I do this? Can I not? I don’t have any clients right now, why not 
make this happen?  
 
The choice seemed simple at the time.  However, it must be noted that 
David did not recognise this decision as ‘strategic’ until post decision analysis, 
simply tactical.   Although intentions were good at the outset, the project quickly 
spiralled out of control, occupying time and economic resources of the firm.  It 
ultimately became a key influence in the suspension of the firm in 2011 – 
changing the strategic direction.   The details about this decision and the 
struggles that David and his employees faced throughout execution and 
continued escalation of the risk will be outlined, as will the resources he used to 
make the decision and the influences upon the decision practice throughout the 
implementation and resolution. 
7.1.1 Firm Structure and Employees 
Bench Puppet Entertainment is a legally recognised Limited Liability 
Corporation (LLC) that employs two individuals and houses one intern.  The 
company office is located on 16th Avenue of Nashville’s coveted music row and 
is described as ‘Nashville’s Leading Entertainment Branding Firm’.  Clients of the 
firm include artists Keith Urban, Fall Out Boy, and major record labels such as, 
Epic and RCA.  Currently, Bench Puppet Entertainment is an entrepreneurial 
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endeavour owned and operated by David Sax that employs one Director of New 
Media, Sarah Stonewall.  The company started operations by capturing the 
growing New, Social Media market that many up and coming artists and 
established labels looked to for expertise and professionalism.  
Being young, recent graduates of higher education, setting up operations 
in a highly competitive music industry epicentre is representative of the 
motivation, drive and commitment to the business that David and Sarah try to 
portray. Many opportunities abound in the ‘music city’ for recording artists, 
songwriters and live entertainment.  It is home to the Christian and gospel music 
industry as well as the epicentre for country music.  With these breaks for 
musicians come opportunities for entrepreneurs in the music industry as well.  
The competition can be fierce in a crowded field where actors vie for power and 
is dominated by a class fraction of major record labels and publishers, yet leaves 
room for mobility if the product or service is right.  The high risk and high 
reward business like the recorded music industry gets challenged daily by new, 
up and coming companies like Bench Puppet Entertainment.  The dynamism and 
enthusiasm for this new entrant in the field is evident in their vibrant, yet 
personal office. They are intentionally small, yet nimble, and are able to respond 
to all clients’ needs quickly and efficiently.  Limited in industry experience, yet 
driven to succeed, their reputation was quickly established.  Sarah shares why 
she felt they are different: 
‘We took ownership of everything. If we didn’t have content from our 
clients we came up with it to the best of our ability and they got well 
above and beyond what they paid for - every time’. 
She went on to further state why their clients kept coming back and the referrals 
from previous work continued to come in: 
‘I think that the edge was definitely the personal touch, you always got 
an answer’. 
 David takes the level of customer service within Bench Puppet seriously.  
He understands the importance that your reputation holds in a regional music 
epicenter like Nashville, so much so that it becomes critical in influencing his 
approach to making this decision.  David leads this commitment to customer 
service and personal attention and actively fosters this culture within Mad Man: 
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‘it’s the small home town family vibe. We have a great product every 
time. We always show results, we are small and you get 'me' every 
time you call.’ 
This attitude resonates throughout the firm.  David and Sarah feel the key 
to the competitive advantage in this growing segment of the industry is 
keeping it small, approachable and personal. However, this sentiment is 
also what contributes to the suspension of the firm activities when a critical 
line is not drawn between sustainable business practices and customer 
service. 




7.1.2 The Actors and Personal-Level Habitus 
David Sax – Owner, Manager – Bench Puppet Entertainment 
 Age:  25  
 Gender:  Male 
 Ethnicity:  European Caucasian – Sicilian Descent 
 Education:  B.M. – Music Education  
 
Sarah Stonewall – New Media Director 
 Age:  25 
 Gender: Female 
 Ethnicity:  Caucasian – American Indian 
 Education:  B.M.  – Music Business and Entertainment Industries 




David Sax - 
Owner, Manager 
Mike - Intern 
Sarah Stonewall - 
New Media 
Director 




David Sax, is a self-described ‘driven’, Florida-born Sicilian with a passion 
for making a lasting difference in the music industry.  His entrepreneurial 
attitude was evident as he shared his rationale for taking on new clients and 
starting this new business: 
‘there’s no reason that you should not try something. You should never 
not set out to try something’. 
 
Although his original intent on venturing to Nashville was to become a 
professional saxophonist, his career path has taken quite a different turn.  While 
still a student at University, David created his own brand, marketing, design and 
fan-artist relations company, Bench Puppet Entertainment, where he currently 
serves as President. The company is five years old, and is building significant 
momentum and maintains an impressive client list.  Additionally, David has 
worked in conjunction with Orbison Records/Orbison Estate, Still Working 
Music, and Lytle Management Group, playing an integral role in the online and 
digital presences of recording artists Roy Orbison, Universal Music’s Gary Allan 
and RCA’s Chris Young, to name a few.  Highly active in Nashville’s professional 
community, David is also a member of Piecemeal, a music business-networking 
group committed to improving the future success of the industry via university 
outreach, workshops, community service events and leadership summits. 
 In addition to the driven and confidant disposition that underlies David’s 
personality he also shared his idea of being a man of pride, ‘I take so much pride 
in my work’.  He understands the importance of working hard and the payoff that 
can ensue from being dedicated. He is witnessing, first hand, through his own 
upbringing and interaction with his family great success in his entrepreneurial 
endeavours: 
‘My mother owned a business for 20, 30 odd years. My sister is a very 
powerful woman now, I say powerful like monetary…My sister has 
done well for herself’. 
Much of David’s personality, in addition to his personal characteristics 
like age, industry experience, and recent graduation from higher education, play 
a role in how he sees his decision choices that ultimately play into his decision 
   195 
 
practice.  This dynamic interplay between his habitus, his company and the 
industry in which he works come together to highlight how and why he made the 
decisions he did for this case. 
Sarah Stonewall 
 
Sarah Stonewall currently works for Bench Puppet Entertainment.  She is 
an avid student of all things new in the media, marketing and search engine 
optimisation (SEO) and search engine marketing (SEM). In addition to working 
at Point 3 Media, she shares a joint venture with Janet Hagan as the Social 
Deviants.  Social Deviants is an avenue for Sarah and Janet to blog, engage in 
conferences and speak at local and national events. Sarah was also recently 
awarded a research grant from the University of Miami for social media. 
Sarah has also worked for a prominent classical music label, a major 
record label, CC Productions, eHeart Records, Opening Bell, the Radio Spot, and 
Sands Entertainment. While she was at the classical label, she achieved growth in 
all social media avenues, and also managed the label’s brand online. She has a 
passion for wine, food, sports and travel. She graduated from University with a 
Bachelor of Music in Music and Entertainment Industries in 2007 and she is 
involved with Peace Meal, the Tri-Delta Alumni Association as well as her 
University Alumni Association.  
Sarah is a driven individual, yet calm and reserved.  She is a committed to 
her employer and a hard-working and passionate music industry enthusiast.  
Although she works for a start-up, she does not have the typical entrepreneurial 
spirit and drive like her boss David.  She is a loyal employee and works well 
when given direction and asked for input.  She is young and well versed in the 
lifestyles and interests of the target consumer of the companies to whom they 
provide service.  She is limited in her social capital, mainly due to her recent 
graduation from college and limited professional experience.  However, she 
holds this asset in high regard and actively works at increasing it.  Her cultural 
capital is also limited by her industry experience, but she has obtained a four-
year undergraduate degree.  Association of those who have achieved status in 
the industry and carry with them the symbolic capital representative of their 
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hard work and success motivates her to learn the industry and expand her 
network. 
7.1.3 Resources Needed 
Cash Expenditures to Execute 
The financial resources needed to execute this decision had minimal 
impact on the decision practice.  The limited expenditure needed to execute the 
decision included the hiring of third party developers, a crowd-sourcing strategy 
that outsources tasks instead of having an employee perform them.  David uses 
to minimise his internal expenses while maximising the expertise of the specific 
skill set of an individual that he needs for any given project that may go beyond 
his personal skill set.  His business is structured in such a way that the customer, 
through their initial hiring fee, would front these expenses.  For the development 
of this application, that is exactly what David needed to do and would not start 
his work until the fee was received: 
‘I brought in a third party to come and probe this entire app’.  
The hiring of this third party enables him to act as project manager, or a 
middleman in the development of the application, while limiting the risk and 
exposure to his economic capital.  Keeping services like this at arm’s length 
enables David to take on and manage projects with greater ease, but it does not 
come without risk.  In exchange for the limits on economic capital expenditure 
comes the exposure of his reputation and accumulated symbolic capital.  
Although a common industry practice that he has also committed to, if a third 
party developer acquired through crowd-sourcing, fails to meet expectations, it 
is his personal and firm’s reputation on the line, not the third parties.  Being a 
cash deficient micro-enterprise positions David in this vulnerable position. 
The Lack of Skills and Need for Contracting 
 The role of cultural capital and the lack of specific skills needed by his 
team to execute this decision triggered reliance upon the implementation of 
David’s social capital.  This again is evidenced in the use of his professional 
network that he called upon in order to compensate for the lack of appropriate 
skill. He quickly accessed his ‘network outside of Nashville’ and approached his 
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‘network and the people that he knew, his community’ to fill this role for the initial 
development and then later when the project was in need of rescue, after the 
terms of the initial developer failed: 
‘So I was looking for contractors. I am pretty well connected in the 
technology community of Nashville…it’s a very small community, 
about 8 people, 6 people. Better freelancers, so I emailed all of 
them…I let them know what happened and I gave them the project, 
and asked them to finish this project. In the end, no one would take it’. 
David understands the limitations in certain areas of his skills. Therefore, 
he sought his external network to aid him in the execution from the onset 
through to multiple episodes of escalation.  This network, discussed in more 
detail below in ‘External Resources’, and like Cisco’s situation discussed earlier, 
is rooted in the lack of a certain embodied and institutionalised capital in the 
form of technical qualifications and expertise that he needed to make this 
happen on his own.  However, he did possess just enough to enable him to make 
better-informed decisions by communicating his needs and expectations.  This 
type of cultural capital was obtained through industry knowledge that he has 
acquired since college and his four years working in the industry. 
7.1.4 Influences on Decision 
Sunk Costs and the Decision 
 Unlike the previous cases outlined, it is important to understand how and 
why David escalated his risks at various stages of the implementation of the 
decision.  This decision was about the choice to develop a music player 
application for one of David’s clients.  The economic incentive was an easy choice 
for David as was evidenced above, but not before further contemplation of the 
resources it would use and the benefits it could bring: 
‘Originally I didn’t want to do this, I tried to push him in a lot of 
directions and I said here’s Fanbox, here's Reverbnation, MySpace, 
here’s this, here’s that. Why are we recreating the wheel? There's no 
reason to recreate the wheel’. 
After his original reservation and the client coming forward with the money to 
develop it, he clearly felt it was the right choice at that time, ‘he finally had money 
and I said we could go forward with this.’ Not having the entire skill set needed to 
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execute this project entirely, David sought to expend a portion of his own social 
capital and the economic capital received as front money to make it happen: 
‘So I brought on the third company, he had application experience, so 
brought him in and I was going to be a source for him. I was going to 
do all the design and he was going to do all the programming and 
backend stuff.  So we set it up and met with the client, right from the 
beginning the client knows exactly what’s going to happen, exactly 
how it’s going to happen. He understood that this was a new 
development’. 
 Everything was off to a good start and going according to plan, David felt 
he has made an effective decision that would help him build his business 
economically and symbolically.  Nothing seemed out of the ordinary other than 
his original ‘holistic hunch’ (Miller & Ireland, 2005) that caused a sense of doubt.  
After some time had passed, however, the project was clearly not on the 
proposed time schedule: 
‘The project was only supposed to take two months, fast forward six 
months and the project is still not done’.  
Starting to feel distraught and frustrated over the unfinished project, David is 
concerned, yet cautious, that it can be completed shortly to all parties’ liking.  
Despite feeling that the client may have taken advantage of him: 
‘We are getting jerked around by the third party guy. I’m having to 
pay him for every single time we have one on there’.  
At this point, David understands that having to continue with this project is 
costing him money and time that is beginning to take away from other projects 
to which he should be devoting his efforts: 
Well, at this point I was committed to finishing the project, I felt like it 
could still get done if we were able to stay on him more’. 
 Although there is no empirical evidence to confirm it in this case, previous 
studies on decision-making and experience have shown a tendency towards less 
effective decisions (Juliusson et al., 2005) when the decision-maker has less 
experience within the industry in which he works. At this point it could be 
speculated that David, if he had acquired further cultural capital related to 
industry or general knowledge, may have discontinued the project at this time. 
   199 
 
Being overrun on costs, time and his original skepticism to take it on, may have 
led him to be more decisive.  However, David felt committed and wanted to 
resolve it to a positive outcome.  He was still working with a client that wanted 
the application developed and they were on good working terms: 
‘Jump forward now a year down the road. We are now all the way 
back around and the project still is not completed. We were about 
three months out of a year actually and Jackson was just going 
crazy…’ 
His client is frustrated, he is frustrated and he still does not have the 
project completed.  That is in the hands of the third party developer: 
‘[Jackson] and I were talking and we finally decide we are going to 
pull this from [Molly], bite the bullet, and find another programmer. 
Suddenly I call [Molly] and say, “hey you are done”. [Molly] is utterly 
pissed of course, bottom line is I paid [her] out. Exactly where we are 
is now $8000 that I have not received anything for. I literally fed all 
that money straight through to [Molly], no money in my pocket. So 
[Molly] got paid for a product that [she] said was our fault that it was 
not done, and it was her fault. We are now at a year’. 
 Bitter contempt and all economic capital expended, the project that 
should have been completed in two months is now one year old and not 
complete.  David attempts to appeal to his senses by stopping the project and 
moving on.  However, he still does not have a product that the client is expecting.  
It has also gotten messy and become problematic legally with contractors 
wanting to put what has been completed up on open access websites for anyone 
to use.  At this point, David decides again to escalate the investment and sink 
more capital into the completion of the project but not without expending more 
social capital as well.  Much of this choice to continue escalating the commitment 
is rooted in David’s habitus, concern for reputation and the impact it might have 
within the field.  David is a proud and stubborn individual, but committed.  He 
stands by his word and feels that if he made a commitment to complete a project 
he would. At this point, there is no financial incentive or ability to accumulate 
further wealth, he has used up much of his social resources and is willing to ‘save 
face’ for the sake of his reputation within the field and not to do further damage 
to potential future business: 
 ‘I am pretty well connected in the technology community of 
Nashville…In the end, no one would take it’.  
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David will be unable to offset the costs already incurred on the project and yet he 
is still compelled to escalate the costs of the project one step further.  He is 
compelled to complete it for his client: 
‘So I had to get this done, this is where we say we go above and 
beyond. I was willing to eat the money to get this for the guy, he had 
been with me for a year. We had gotten drinks, had a good 
relationship.’ …at this point the application was about 75% 
completed.  And I paid them around $2,500. So at this point they are 
saying they need stuff, Randy is saying they don’t need stuff. And I just 
lost another $2,500, and it’s still not done’.  
 This compelling notion and ‘irrational’ (Strough et al., 2011) decision-
making behavior of escalating the costs when an outsider with less at stake 
would cut it, goes deeper than the economic incentives of making a profit or, in 
this case, even coming close to a break-even point.  The project is a loss, he knew 
it was a loss and still invested 25% more finance to make a further attempt at 
completing it.  As some experts have found (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Strough 
et al., 2011), this behaviour might be expected considering his age and time 
proximity since college graduation.  When asked, post-decision, what happened 
and why he continued to escalate the risks he replied frankly: 
‘I did not expect to get screwed over by my contractors. And that’s 
what happened. I kept getting pushed by contractors and got stuck in 
the middle. I take so much pride in my work that I felt I needed to fix 
what happened’. 
But yet, even ‘feeling stuck in the middle,’ he decided to escalate the financial 
costs.  His sentiments here allude to a struggle he felt between the contractors he 
hired to complete the project and the consumer seeking his firm’s services.  The 
rationale for this decision-making practice is rooted in two concepts.  First, 
David’s concern for his personal and business reputation within the field as he 
struggles to preserve the symbolic capital he has acquired through his 
reputation.  Second, qualities of his habitus rooted in his personality, age and 
experience have also influenced his decision choices.   These, along with other 
identified influences will be discussed further. 
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Individual Level Habitus (Micro Level Influences) 
 
Concern for Reputation and Symbolic Capital 
The execution of the decision was not going according to David’s original 
expectation, putting at risk his positioning with the field through his social and 
symbolic capital.  Specifically his concern for his reputation as an actor – 
perceived as one who keeps his word and will get things done quickly and 
efficiently, a minimum expectation needed to stay competitive in a tight field like 
the Nashville Music Industry.  His concern over this and decisions to continue to 
inject money in the project, despite the time commitments that have now been 
taking him away from other projects, ultimately cost him further resources.  
As briefly mentioned earlier, this could be attributed to his lack of industry 
or professional experience – which could also lead to less effective decision 
making, and his drive to take on new projects to ‘prove’ himself – being a recent 
graduate - as a viable reputable company to do business.  Although David never 
explicitly discusses his concern for ‘reputation,’ this could be inferred in his 
comments, such as:  
‘I take so much pride in my work that I felt I needed to fix what 
happened’. 
 It appears that much is at stake professionally and personally for David, 
indicating his motivation to reject a normative approach to problem resolution 
and decision choice. 
It is also worth mentioning that being a younger entrepreneur, still in the 
midst of establishing his reputation within the field, he lacked a certain amount 
of capital that played a role in the attitudes of the other actors involved in the 
process:   
‘Sometimes I felt it was impossible getting a response from him or that 
days and sometimes weeks would go by without a word on how the 
project was going’. 
This kind of behaviour would be indicative of a lack of respect for David 
and his company.   Knowing that little was at risk at their end, other than the fall-
out from this specific project, they did not feel that similar capital was at stake.  
Being from outside the field, a similar concern did not appear to transcend 
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industry boundaries.  Their commitments and priorities were elsewhere, or at 
least that is the perception they leave with those on the receiving end of such a 
lack of response.  It can be inferred that the importance of symbolic capital in 
this field, may have played a role.  If David and his company had possessed more 
of it, this lack of response may have been avoided.  A higher level of respect and 
concern by the third party would have likely motivated them to be more 
responsive, for their reputation would also be more at stake. 
Personal Characteristics and the Role of Pride 
It must also be noted, however, that David’s concern for recognition in the 
field and desire to preserve his reputation is not simply a professional 
motivation.  Evidence suggests that it is intimately connected to a personal one 
as well, rooted deep in his personal habitus and individually objective 
characteristics.   Being a young, 25-year old male and recent graduate of 
University, coupled with the drive to prove he can succeed along with a prideful 
demeanour, David’s personality characteristics undoubtedly influenced his 
desire to escalate the commitment.  Again using the evidence from above - ‘I take 
so much pride in my work that I felt I needed to fix what happened ‘ – 
demonstrates that he is a man that chooses to live his life and conduct his 
business by his word.  He cares deeply about how he and his business is 
perceived and is willing to put his company and his reputation on the line to 
ensure that it ends correctly, with all parties satisfied.  Being a younger 
entrepreneur willing to take greater risks and armed with a limited set of 
cultural capital that may have been necessary to heed the warning signs of 
commitment, contributed to the decision outcome.   
Past Experience  
Past experience also played an influential role in David’s initial decision to 
take on this project, as well as his subsequent choices to escalate the risk of his 
choice, even though negative experiences continued to plague his original choice.  
Initially, David was confronted, from his perspective, with an easy choice: 
 ‘[I’ve been in business for] four months and I was definitely going 
through hills and valleys. I just got off the road, because I was going 
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on the road to do a side job on the weekends. I was a weekend warrior 
trying to make extra cash, and this came in and I needed money, so I 
was like “Shit $8000, why would I say no to $8000’’. 
David understands from his past endeavours on the road as a touring musician 
that income was low and inconsistent, so the appeal of a large amount of cash at 
the onset of the execution of this decision could satisfy this sense of financial 
insecurity to which, while touring, he had been accustomed. This negative past 
experience of unpredictable income in combination with his limited cultural 
capital in the form of industry experience at the time of choosing whether to 
move forward with the project, influenced his decision choice to say ‘yes’ to 
taking it on.   
The Need for Cash Flow and Desire for Recognition  
In addition to David’s concern for reputation, his personal dispositions and 
past experiences, the then current lack of economic capital influenced his initial 
decision to take on this project:   
‘When it came to me, my assessment really was why do you want to do 
this? What’s the bottom line’? 
For David, at the beginning, the superficial objective was an economic one.  
There is clear evidence through this case that he was concerned not only about 
his current financial position as a company, but what could be gained if he 
decided to say ‘yes’ to this project.  Through the Bourdieusian concepts of 
recognition and theories of capital, it could be argued that David’s true intention, 
at least the longer term objective, was one in which he could ultimately 
transform this economic capital into further social capital – through the use of 
newly formulated professional networks – and symbolic capital through the 
acquisition of another satisfied client.  This concern for symbolism becomes 
more explicit as David later attempts to rectify the decision when the evidence 
that was presented above indicated his concern for his reputation.  There should 
be no doubt however, that David’s concern at the beginning was to increase his 
economic capital.  
   204 
 
Consulting Trusted Colleagues 
As David’s decision to continue investing funds into this project, he was 
also influenced by his colleagues.  David felt he could trust his fellow employees 
and respected their opinions enough to seek counsel from them.  Although an 
informal process, he confided not only in his Director of Social Media, Sarah 
Stonewall, but also his intern, whom had a more technological, digital design 
background: 
‘I talked to her [Sarah] about it, and I talked to Mike about it. I talked 
to Mike about it more to tell Mike my intern exactly how to make it 
work, what was going on, what not to do when you do it one day’. 
Mike, in this case, played an important role in helping to resolve the 
situation. David sought from Mike the software development skills he did not 
possess.  He was hoping that turning internally, he might be able to resolve the 
escalating commitment and prevent further loss in reputation and or social or 
symbolic capital.   
In addition, he sought further strategic advice from Sarah: 
‘Should we go forward, should we not?’ 
 What he sought was not grounded in a level of knowledge needed to get 
him out of the situation. Sarah did not possess the needed cultural capital to do 
that, but what she was able to offer was another perspective.  A perspective from 
someone not as intimately involved, but understands the field doxa and the 
habitus of her boss.  As long as she could be frank, and she was, the advice sought 
by David could assist him in judgments on how to move forward.  Turning 
internally was important for David as he weighed his options and the evidence 
suggests the role and influence it had on the outcome. 
The Role of Close Family 
External influences, those outside the firm, also played an important role 
for David as he was implementing this decision and manoeuvring through its 
escalation of commitment.  Although the influences here were not professional 
colleagues or advisors, nor were they in the form of objectified cultural capital 
such as charts, texts or other artefacts, but rather they came in the form of close 
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personal relationships.  David felt, in this case that he needed to confide in 
people he knew well, and that had experience in these matters.  Being a family 
man, David felt compelled to reach out to his mother and sister: 
‘when things go South I call my mother and my sister’ 
He clearly sees value in what either has to offer. It is a safe way to seek 
professional counsel without showing vulnerability to a professional colleague 
who may perceive this as a weakness, a detriment in a field of competiveness 
such as the one under investigation.  This vulnerability, or perceived 
vulnerability, could lead to a risk in social and symbolic capital possession of 
Bench Puppet Entertainment:   
‘My mother owned a business for 20, 30 odd years. My sister is a very 
powerful woman now, I say powerful like monetary. Not a drug lord. 
My sister has done well for herself. So I usually call them and tell them 
what’s going on.’ 
With counsel from his sister, he was able to seek professional business advice 
without sacrificing this potentially perceived weakness, a weakness that could 
jeopardise his reputation from an employee perspective.  If he is seen as a weak, 
uninformed leader, their confidence in his abilities could erode quickly causing 
further loss of social capital and, in addition, lead to other internal problems. 
7.1.5 Conclusion 
Unfortunately, this decision did not end with an outcome related to what was 
expected at the outset – rendering it as an ineffective decision.  David’s choice to 
continue to escalate the commitment and to continue taking further risks with 
this project ultimately led to a suspension of operations for the company:   
 
‘I know many times that I said “I can’t do this right now, I have to 
deal with this.” That’s the problem. I don’t feel like it was a bad 
decision because I learned more than I could ever imagine from this 
project, but it’s definitely a factor of why we aren’t around today’. 
 
What, at first seemed like an easy choice, yet a big project to take on, led 
to a series of tactical decisions that paved the way to a dissolution of a great 
client relationship and a project that has yet to be completed.  As in all events 
that one is able to look back upon, hindsight is 20-20.  It is easy to analyse this 
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case to indicate what and where things went wrong and where a different 
approach to the decision-making could have avoided such an outcome.  The 
motivating factors behind his decision to continue to escalate are entrenched in 
David’s fear of losing his most precious, negotiating commodities, his social and 
symbolic capital - the capital needed to continue growing his business and 
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7.2 CASE #6: FIRM RELOCATION 
This second decision made by David within Bench Puppet Entertainment 
is about the choice to relocate company headquarters due to overcrowding of its 
current location.  The decision is a choice between locations that would 
ultimately enable the firm to, not only be in more suitable space to conduct 
business but also, be seen as a genuine player in the industry, as viewed by its 
competitors and other actors through the association within a geographical 
business cluster.   Specifically, there are two overarching observations that 
influenced the decision practice that affirm previous decisions discussed in 
Chapters five and six.  Here, due to the limited amount of symbolic and economic 
capital currently possessed, coupled with a chance opportunity, enabled David to 
aggrandise the firm through a business cluster association on ‘music row’.  In 
addition, evidence also affirmed the use of bounded rational behaviours, a price 
heuristic, and internal company pressures. 
The opportunity to make a decision on relocating company headquarters 
arose out of necessity and chance: 
‘we were just getting there. Sarah was coming on, I needed a new 
intern. We couldn’t be in a single fold-out table anymore. We needed 
more space…I live very much on the whim of things, that it will 
happen, I have a back-up plan always’. 
 The necessary space and the need to be perceived as ‘professional’ in 
order to conduct the day-to-day operations of the business was acknowledged 
by David.  His business was expanding and the need to hire Sarah became a 
reality.  Now that another employee was brought on, along with a new intern, 
David felt that he needed to have suitable working space for the team.  This 
prompted the decision process and recognition for David to begin evaluation 
suitable options for relocation. 
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7.2.1 Resources Needed 
Rent and the Need to Relocate 
Economic capital and the need for assets to make this purchase were 
again considered minimal.  David needed to evaluate carefully the cost-benefit of 
the purchase and whether it would be a viable investment opportunity 
financially.  He considered a few viable areas cognitively in which to relocate the 
company on ‘music row’– a geographic area in Nashville, TN that is home to 
hundreds of businesses related to country, gospel and the contemporary 
Christian music industries: 
‘It had to be ‘music row’, it had to be Brentwood, it had to be Bradley 
parkway. There were certain areas I had to be in because then it was 
no use. Why wouldn’t I just go back to my house and build an office in 
the back of my house?’ 
His particular interests portrayed in this statement have more to do with 
the symbolism, convenience and business opportunities that exist within these 
areas, than the actual cost of relocating the firm there. With his budgetary limits 
at $800 a month, David needed to be careful where he would relocate his 
business.  He needed the association of being a music industry firm conducting 
business in an area where others conduct business, but he had to do it within a 
strict budget.  Essentially this decision was a choice between the transformations 
of economic capital into symbolic capital represented in the association of a 
music business geographic cluster.  This association would enable his business to 
be seen as a professionally worthwhile firm in which to be taken seriously.   
 As David’s search for the optimum economic and symbolic 
transformation ensued, he was confronted with an ideal opportunity: 
‘…about two days before we had to move in, I saw this one [office 
space] and called right away…I was like holy shit $500? She said, well 
I made a mistake, it was supposed to be for $800, but since we told 
you $500 we will do that if you want it, but if you don’t this other guy 
is coming here in an hour and will take it for $800.” And I was like I 
will write you a check right now…The location is convenient. I am on 
12th Ave 16 south. I am on ‘music row’. 
Chance opportunity made this choice for David much easier, it enabled him to 
work within his economic parameters while leveraging his symbolic capital 
represented by a highly coveted position on ‘music row’.  
   210 
 
 
Understanding the Real Estate Market 
David knew what the costs were to locate on ‘music row’; he also knew a 
good deal when he saw it.  No use of objectified capital or institutionalised 
cultural capital was evidenced in making this decision.  However, embodied 
capital in the form of real estate and pricing knowledge, the convenience of this 
location and professional ramifications were culminated in the general 
knowledge David has acquired in that area. He saw an opportunity and needed 
to assess his options.  David knew what the symbolic ramifications of moving to 
‘music row’ could be, but no evidence of embodied industry knowledge was 
needed to execute or make choices.  Familiarity of the area and the potential 
outcome was all that was needed to influence this choice. 
 
7.2.2 Influences on the Decision 
Firm Level Habitus  
Firm Aggrandisement through Business Cluster Association 
Within this decision, a new type of aggrandisement of the firm became 
evident as a form of business cluster association.  A business cluster - or industry 
cluster – is a geographic location that consists of interconnected businesses 
within a connected field.  Porter (1990) discussed the importance of similar 
businesses strategically locating themselves within a geographic region in order 
to foster a competitive advantage through the benefits of the cluster, including 
the close proximity of suppliers and the wealth of knowledge.  The business 
cluster of relevance in this case, which provides the context for this decision, is 
that of Nashville for the music industry, even more specifically ‘music row’: 
‘What comes with ‘music row’ is 1209 16th avenue south, 17th avenue, 
east square east, east square west, now 18th avenue - those five streets 
mean so much’. 
 David recognises this and understands the importance of 
associating his business within this cluster.  This also explains his reactions 
when confronted with the opportunity to relocate his business here and 
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doing so at minimal economic risk.  In addition, not only does he 
understand the importance of this association, but so do others that know 
him and work in the industry: 
 ‘Everyone thinks ‘music row’. My old boss came to me on ‘music row’ 
offices and said “congratulations you are on ‘music row’. I am like, 
thanks, I don’t think it’s that big of a deal. He said, “I understand that, 
but everybody else does. When you finally get to ‘music row’ they think 
holy shit you made it’. 
Much of the ‘not a big deal,’ or ‘that wasn’t the real reason,’ attitude that is 
being exhibited by David is due to his personal disposition in stubbornness, then 
an accurate reflection about how he feels.  Although discourse or psychoanalysis 
has not been identified as a key data reduction tool for this study, the inflection 
and general disposition about the topic when brought up through the course of 
the interview reflects otherwise.  The response was indicative of a ‘quick reply’, 
or a ‘defensive’ act - a ‘prideful’ one - indicating that he did not want to be seen 
or portrayed as ‘falling victim to the game’, that is played.   He wants to be seen 
as more level-headed, than moving to ‘music row’ just because everyone else 
does and that it would really be in his and Bench Puppet’s best interest.   He 
understands that it is, but due to his prideful disposition would like to be 
perceived as being above the fray and not that he went out of his way to move to 
‘music row’, just to be cool – ‘because that’s what everyone does.’  
Not only was the importance of this business cluster association 
recognised by his former boss, but also his more recent addition to the firm and 
current employee, Sarah:  
‘I think when it came to my perception about where David was at with 
his business I perceived that he was doing well moving to ‘music row’, 
and that it was a big deal. It was a big deal to go from a wig in a purse 
to an office with desks and chairs and in a building with other music 
industry people on ‘music row’ where we can just walk down to any of 
the street events that were going on and just sit there mingle, shake 
everyone’s hand I thought was very important. On top of that all the 
people in this building just getting to make the connections that we 
made here were unbelievable’. 
 The importance of the ‘internal’ (to the firm) perception portrayed by this 
association appears to share in the importance, as did the ‘external’ perception.  
Making decisions that position the firm more competitively, not only increase 
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business potential through this association, but also attracts more and better 
talent to work at the firm along with motivating factors for those employed by 
the firm – which could lead to greater productivity.  In addition, the exposure 
that the firm has now obtained through this business cluster association has 
positioned it better to obtain highly coveted social capital – ‘to make the 
connections that we made here were unbelievable… and we definitely wouldn’t 
have made those connections unless we were in this building’.  Those ‘connections’ 
as Sarah clearly articulated are a direct result of this move to ‘music row’. Being a 
recent graduate, a recent move from another music company from Nashville and 
her age all come together in her desire and passion for easier access to contacts 
that can better her social capital position.  She understands, through her limited 
experience what access to other actors in the field can do for her and the 
company.  It is not only personally exciting for her, but also professionally.  
Having not had previous access to these resources will enable her and the 
company to position themselves better as players in the field. 
 It is also worth noting that when I asked both David and Sarah about the 
legitimacy that this relocation gave them, they further likened it to ‘name-
dropping…records on the wall…clientele…who your dad is...what kind of clothes 
you wear...titles’, in fact, many of the aggrandising behaviours being discussed in 
this thesis.  I asked them to elaborate on this comment and they were quick to 
say that perception goes a long way in this industry and that it is often 
experiential more than anything. People are looking at that and saying ‘I want the 
experience of being able to tell somebody that I got to do this thing with this 
person’.  David was quick to disagree with Sarah and felt it was more about: 
‘Power, like I look at my watch and go, ‘man she is going to Seattle 
on Monday and I think man that is awesome. All I want to do is go to 
Digi Music East, the conference, and if I got there I would feel like I 
made it somewhere’.  
Both perspectives come from someone who does not hold the influence or 
capital at levels that they desire.  It is these experiences that they hold in high 
regard and seek to pursue.  It is the power that those experiences ultimately hold 
as they learn more about what can or cannot be achieved with it.  This leads to a 
strong motivation to achieve it.  Additionally, if they can employ such 
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impressions on others in the field, this may lead to further recognition and 
‘respect’ by their colleagues.  This recognition and ‘respect’ grants them the 
ability to influence others and use this power to improve their own position and 
accumulation of capital.  From their perspective, the move to ‘music row’ is one 
of the first steps to legitimising their experiences and rise to recognition in the 
industry. 
Analysis and Logic in Firm Relocation 
Logical and analytical behaviours were also evidenced in David’s decision 
to re-locate company headquarters to ‘music row’.  Similar to Cisco’s situation 
above, David was left to making this one on his own.  He believed that it was time 
to relocate the business, but not just anywhere.   
‘So I was looking at I couldn’t go out by Hendersonville and Gallatin, 
it had to be ‘music row’, it had to be Brentwood, it had to be Bradley 
parkway’. 
David felt that it would be the most beneficial to the future of the business 
if he moved into one of these key epicentres where different segments of the 
industry operate. Being a younger, driven entrepreneur and understanding the 
need be seen and active in the field, David wanted to make the move in a way 
that would enable him and his employees to take advantage of the professional 
networks and business opportunities that exist within these areas.  
However, he also needed to balance the opportunities that would exist in 
these locations with what he could economically afford.  David’s level-headed 
disposition, yet cautiously audacious, led him to weigh the pros and cons of these 
options.  Choosing among these alternatives was done in a more informal fashion 
typical of smaller firms like Bench Puppet Entertainment. This informal 
assessment process was cognitive and internal, with little external influence.  
David contemplated his options by comparing the economic, symbolic and social 
advantages of the location choice. David mentally calculated the pros and cons 
through the limited amounts of information available to him: 
‘There were certain areas I had to be in because then it was no use. 
Why wouldn’t I just go back to my house and build an office in the 
back of my house? So I had a place on 18th that I was looking at 
actually. It was a long office that I was going to separate. That one 
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was for $800 a month nothing included whatsoever, so I had to pay for 
Internet, cable TV, all that…‘and of course I looked in ‘music row’ 
area…because it was closer to everything; closer to my clients, closer 
to here’. 
 Although David’s behaviour did not exhibit a calculated approach to 
costing out the risk, he did informally weigh the most obvious costs to 
going with a place on 18th before settling on the location closer to ‘music 
row’ at $300 less with all utilities included.  Albeit a small amount of capital 
to be considered, for a small firm like Bench Puppet any amount of added 
costs can highly impact the cash flow and profitability of the company. 
Individual Habitus  
The Price-Quality Heuristic 
David acts counter-intuitively to the price-quality heuristic that dictates 
that the higher the price for a product, the higher the quality of that product.  
This is not a definitive rule but rather a general association that consumers use 
when not having enough information about the product and the features and 
benefits it may offer:  
‘I was looking at days and was like holy shit $500 and I looked at her 
while we are in this room and said $50’? 
David, on the other hand, through his cultural capital accumulation and 
understanding of the product, location, pricing and opportunity understands the 
quality that he sees associated with the cost of this transaction and the benefits 
that Bench Puppet can gain from the capital transformation – economic to 
symbolic.  The use of a pricing-heuristic enabled David to reference the quality of 
the transaction while simultaneously understanding the value in the symbolism 
of associating his company on ‘music row’.  Shortly after the decision was 
executed, Sarah noted the difference: 
‘Yeah, it increased productivity, and having a different aura around us. 
We are much more legit in their eyes now’.  
 What Sarah is referring to is how other actors in the field see her, 
David and the company now that they have moved.  They are seen as a 
reputable business with which they would also like to associate themselves.  
The unintended result of internal morale was also a positive outcome.  The 
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atmosphere in the office had changed and a recognisable difference in 
productivity was noticed.  Sarah and Mike were beginning to work longer 
hours and were beginning to take on more projects with less direction.  
Generally, there was a more positive outlook on the future of the company 
and willingness to network on its behalf.  The transformation of capital 
here, by a location change is significant as the interplay between capitals, 
habitus and field and the decision-making practice come together to 
position the company and its actors better for further accumulation of 
assets and recognition. 
The Use of Technology in Location Services 
The external influences exhibited in this decision practice were not one of 
advice seeking from personal or professional advisors often seen in the previous 
cases analysed.  Here the external influences upon the decision-making was the 
use of technology and a third party owner of the office rental space, both of 
which were needed in order for this practice to exhibit the behaviours 
evidenced:   
‘On Craigslist, about 2 days before we had to move in, I saw this one’. 
 David made the initial contact through the use of technology – an online 
marketplace called Craigslist where buyers and sellers can converge to make 
local transactions of rentals, sales or services.  It was this relational interaction 
between actor and artefact that enabled the contact with the agent representing 
the office space.  When the appointment was set and the tour of the space was 
being undertaken the opportunity presented itself, David’s use of the price-
quality heuristic along with his experience in the industry and general 
knowledge of the area was referenced to determine the value: 
‘…well I made a mistake, it was supposed to be for $800, but since we 
told you $500 we will do that if you want it, but if you don’t this other 
guy is coming here in an hour and will take it for $800’. 
It was this new knowledge, the value of the opportunity in exchange for the 
economic capital for the potential increase in symbolic capital that prompted his 
initial response ‘holy shit…I looked at her while we are in this room and said $500’.  
This response and recognition of value would not be possible without David 
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referencing the price-heuristic discussed above and tapping into his internal 
understanding of the area and the retail space market. 
The Impact of New Hires 
 In addition to external influences on the decision-practice, the use of 
heuristics and a bounded rational practice to assess the costs to benefits of the 
transaction, internal influences also prompted the decision to be made.  These 
influences, internal to the firm, came as David hired a new employee and, 
through their day-to-day interactions, it became apparent that a change was 
needed: 
‘Sarah and I were literally sitting by two horses with a wood table, which 
was awful’. 
The space was needed and only compounded when a third party was brought on 
board to help out – an intern: 
‘And then when Mike came I was like this isn’t going to work. I tried 
looking everywhere.’  
These employee additions and firm expansion were a direct result of a successful 
year for Bench Puppet Entertainment: 
‘Now luckily we had money. Here’s a preface to all of this, I did great 
this year, but this past year we tripled our gross, so we had money’. 
 This lack of space and less than ideal working conditions at the firm, 
coupled with the growing business, prompted the need to make the decision.  
The time was appropriate and the productivity was being affected.  Both Sarah 
and David felt they were in a position to make a move and the expansion of the 
firm is what triggered David’s desire to start looking. 
7.2.3 Conclusion 
This decision was a choice between relocating an up and coming social 
media marketing and branding firm from a home office to an external office 
located in one of three geo-locations around Nashville.  As external 
circumstances provided the opportunity, the company owner, David Sax decided 
to relocate the firm to Nashville’s prominent ‘music row’.  This move, motivated 
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by the practical implications as well as the symbolic ones allowed David and 
Sarah the opportunity to be better positioned as available players in the field as 
they negotiate for social recognition and prominence.  The association by 
location on Music Row also enables the firm to be perceived as a viable player 
and a company that is worthy of doing business.  This legitimisation was 
accomplished by aggrandising its position, not actively but passively by the very 
nature of where it is located.  In order for this decision to be executed, David 
relied upon his colleagues for the cognitive-based heuristics and the internal 
habitus drive to be prominent and successful in the field. 
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8. Empirical Findings and Analysis IV 
 
CASE #7: ASSET BUYOUT 
Enterprise:  Hat Punk, LLC  
Sector: Record Label and Publishing Company  
Owner: Sam Caldwell  
Turnover: $1,000,000 + annually  
 
8.1 FIRM BACKGROUND AND DECISION CONTEXT 
 This case is about a choice that Sam Caldwell had regarding whether, or 
not, to buy back the assets of Green Tree Records – the label Sam started in 1999 
and has since been President - from Axis Media.  The challenge facing Sam in 
making this decision was dictated by what the terms of purchase would be and 
whether it would be viable and feasible. What prompted Sam to make this 
decision was grounded in how decisions were being made under the parent 
company, along with industry conditions and personal bias.  Sam felt this might 
be an opportunity to own the company, or at least the assets with many of the 
artists and staff remaining as part of the new label.  It must also be noted that the 
purchasing of these ‘assets’ did not include the purchasing of the brand or 
imprint of ‘Green Tree Records’. The purchase decision would include the artists, 
who are signed to the label, their catalogue of recordings, and the publishing 
company that holds the rights to the songs.  Contract conditions for this decision 
would force Sam into renaming the original label and calling it Hat Punk, LLC.  It 
would once again be under his vision and style of management, without the 
necessity of answering to a parent company.  As the evidence will show, this 
decision would be his and his alone: 
 ‘When it comes to the strategy of making the decision it was me’. 
But he would come to rely upon his staff, past experience, the need for large 
amounts of economic capital, external advisors and personal biases to influence 
his decision practice.  Sam Caldwell started Hat Punk, LLC, formally known as 
Green Tree records in the late 1990s.  Shortly after the start of operations, the 
company signed its first artist – releasing their album in March 2000:   
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‘When I first started [the label] it was me and I was in a house, sharing an 
office with somebody else - I had a little cubicle. I went from an office 
bigger then this to a little cubicle. Very shortly I started with one other 
guy and built from there’.  
After a successful three years, in mid-June of 2002, a larger media company, 
Axis Media – a privately held firm that publishes Christian music, film and other 
related cultural products - purchased the company.  During the ownership of 
Green Tree Records by Axis Media up to this recent decision, Sam Caldwell 
continued to be President and CEO of the company.  Sam eventually decided that 
he would buy back the assets back from Axis Media, therefore this decision is 
being analysed from a post-decision perspective.  Much of the evidence provided 
herein will allude to this, since the conclusion of this sale occurred one-week 
prior to the collection of data.  This case will be studied from when the 
opportunity was presented through to the post-analysis conclusion.  
8.1.1 Organisation of the Firm 
Hat Punk, LLC employs ten full-time employee equivalent positions that 
encompass two separate legal entities, Hat Punk, LLC and Hat Punk Music 
Publishing, LLC.  Hat Punk specialises in contemporary Christian music – CCM  - 
with distribution through a major distributor in the United States.  The company 
conducts business in multiple industry sectors including the producing and 
recording of popular Christian music, marketing, distribution, merchandising 
and music publishing.  It maintains a roster of between twenty and twenty-five 
artists and has been credited with developing multiple Grammy award and Dove 
award winning acts since its inception.  In addition, many of those acts have gone 
on to be RIAA certified gold, platinum and multi-platinum selling artists that 
have become household names within the CCM music market.  Much of their 
success is due to the culture and expertise of the staff at Hat Punk.  Of the ten, 
full-time equivalent employees at the company, three would be considered 
members of the top management team and more actively involved in the 
decision-making within the firm.   
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8.1.2 Firm-Level Habitus 
Competitive Strategy and Firm Culture 
Hat Punk, LLC has a self-labelled ‘third way’ of conducting business – 
described in more detail below.  It creates an atmosphere in the office that is in 
some ways is not unlike other record labels, yet it does set itself apart in many 
respects.  Through direct observation, the ‘look’ and ‘feel’ of the office leaves a 
distinct impression that you have entered a ‘record label.’  Modern furniture, 
gold and platinum records on the wall, certifications for multi-platinum records 
and countless recognition of past success of artists signed and/or affiliated with 
the label. However, unlike the ‘hustle and bustle’ that you typically find in 
businesses such as this, it has a more reserved, calm and collected feeling – Sam 
describes it as follows: 
‘When you walk in here we don’t have music blaring or anything 
because we have a lot of seasoned pros.’  
 
Some of this feeling may be due to Sam and his team describing their 
approach to doing business, their competitive strategy as one based on a 
‘philosophy of relationships’.  Through his life, spiritual and professional 
experience, Sam has grown confident of what he likes and does not like, quickly 
realising that he and the firm would only work with ‘mature artists, not by age, 
Sam Caldwell- 
CEO, Owner 
Jack  Johnson - 
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but by life perspective – [and] strong spiritually’.  Sam makes this clear that even 
now, post-sale of the assets, the company philosophy will remain intact: 
‘Because philosophically it’s at the very same place. I had done [it] for 
20 years, I had made many sales and did things right. One of the things 
I [also] figured out was what I didn’t like’. 
This ‘understanding’ of what Sam likes and does not like is also 
observable in how he interacts with his top management team and employees.  It 
is not a disrespectful or condescending communication style, but one of mutual 
respect and confidence.  This leadership style is modelled throughout and is also 
seen in the communications of its staff.  In addition, it transcends the boundaries 
of the firm and throughout the entire culture and habitus, how he and his team 
continue to foster and maintain their professional relationships with their 
artists, their professional networks and the industry in which they operate. Jack, 
the VP of A & R agrees: 
‘I think where we’re really competitive is “authenticity.” I think we 
are very comfortable being who we are and not trying to impress or 
bend for artists to fit us, but being who we are and knowing what we 
are good at’. 
Sam and Jack understand the ‘we’ mentality they are fostering when 
dealing with artists and the staff.  Sam describes the company as ‘An 
independently minded company that would compete toe-to-toe with all the 
majors…and win’.  It has become known in the CCM culture as the non-traditional 
‘Caldwell deal’ or a ‘third way’ of doing business. Sam describes where this has 
come from and the philosophy behind it: 
‘Before, in traditional artist label relationships…it goes into an "us 
against them" mentality. So the best relationships I had was when it 
was a "we" mentality and so when we would say “this is all we have, 
you may like it, you may not like it, but this is what we’ve got, lets 
figure out how to spend it wisely”.  
This description is indicative of how they conduct business in the 
industry and within themselves at Hat Punk, LLC.  The attitudes of the team 
extend into the culture of the firm with the stories, artefacts and general 
mentality towards each other and the people they conduct business.  The staff is 
also proud of this reputation the firm has earned.  Jack’s interpretation of the 
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‘third way’ is due to the company being ‘nimble like an indie, but yet you have the 
financial resources like the major’.   Sam describes it as the ‘independent way 
which has a lot more freedom and a lot more creativity but [NOT] understaffed, 
underfinanced, under resourced, [or] have a hard time delivering the results’.  It is 
the best of each, that is, the resources typically available to the ‘majors’ with the 
creativity and flexibility of an ‘independent’ label that the capital can provide. 
Here, symbolic capital and its power does not equate to size. Specifically, ‘bigger 
is not better’.  He speaks to the control he is able to maintain by not being 
constrained by corporate interests.  He has the flexibility to develop new talent 
and take creative risks while having control over the social and economic 
resources needed to bring these talents to the market place.  Sam also feels that 
the artist and label should work together, share the risk and share the resources 
at the same time:  
‘You know traditional deal - I fund the record, I fund the marketing, I 
give it all to you right after you recoup…I came up with a way to do 
deals where you risk, I risk. We shared rewards, and sow equitable 
distribution of the resource’.  
They saw a niche in the market in which, by the very nature of their size, the 
major record labels could not fill while at the same time was able to offer a 
service and flexibility of a smaller label. This approach: 
 ‘allows us to put all the truth on the table, figuring out how to do 
things wisely as opposed to how best to get things for ourselves to 
protect our interests. Because our interests are aligned, so if you 
don't win, I don’t win. If I win, you win’. 
 It not only provides artists with the access to a network and assets that 
most independent labels cannot provide, but it also allows Hat Punk, LLC to 
maintain and reproduce the inequality in the power relations between them. 
Although the sharing of risk indicates an attempt at ‘levelling the playing field’, 
Sam and his team are responding to a fear of losing power in light of a rapidly 
changing industry.  The more they risk, the less likely they will continue to be in 
business.  It is the expertise and the power to dictate the terms of the contracts 
that allow for Hat Punk, LLC and its artists to be successful. 
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Since the recent decision was made to purchase back the assets of the 
label and publishing company from a larger entertainment firm, Sam and the rest 
of the staff have already noticed positive changes in the culture that was recently 
weighed down by decisions and the financial position of the parent company.  
These ‘positive’ changes are bringing the company back to how Sam had 
described it as being in the past, but was now starting to fade – one of many 
determining factors that instigated the decision: 
‘The parent company got themselves into some trouble so it made the 
environment here tough. So we are coming off of a tough situation and 
so we thought, we got daylight ahead so we are all excited. We're 
pumped’. 
 The tough environment that Sam discusses here is a direct result of 
the downsizing and poor decision-making that the parent company has 
been making lately – at least poor decisions from Sam and his team’s 
perspective.  This downsizing and controversial decisions were a result of 
the changing industry.  The downturn that the recording industry has been 
experiencing since 2001 did not render the parent company immune, 
forcing them to make tough decisions – decisions that has now paved the 
way for opportunity for Sam.  The positive perspective from Sam for the 
future has brought about a sense of authenticity that Jack earlier described 
and has now began effecting the staff’s attitude within the environment ‘but 
what I think has happened is it’s a lot more real, and a lot more energised’.   
8.1.3 The Actors and Personal-Level Habitus 
Sam Caldwell– Owner, CEO 
 Age:  51 
 Gender:  Male 
 Ethnicity:  European Caucasian  
 Education:  B.A. – Radio, TV and Film  
 Time in Industry: 31 years 
  
Philip Esquire   
 Age:  47 
 Gender: Male 
 Ethnicity:  Caucasian – American Indian 
 Education:  B.M.  – Music Business and Entertainment Industries 
   Minor – Marketing  
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Jack Johnson 
 Age:  34 
 Gender: Male 
 Ethnicity:  Caucasian  





 Sam began his career in the music industry as an intern at Sound Records, 
a prominent Christian label based in Nashville, Tennessee.  After turning down a 
job offer from the company, Sam went on to work in an entirely different 
industry.  Some time had passed, and he was again approached to work for the 
firm he interned with, when he accepted a position working in radio promotion, 
before moving onto a career in marketing and then being promoted to general 
manager.  His career has been a successful one by any measure, holding 
presidential positions at various independent and major labels in the Christian 
music industry.  This time was not always positive; however, he had his ups and 
downs during those days, as he made clear ‘there were some dark days at that 
label’.  Those dark days were preceded by his personal drive and ambition to 
start and run Green Tree records.   He has a confident, yet humble disposition 
and he will be the first to say ‘It’s doesn’t mean I have it right all the time’.  He 
admits to making poor decisions and understands that where there are 
successes, there are also failures.  Having a positive disposition and 
understanding how things work could be attributed to his embodied cultural 
capital that he has acquired throughout his life and career: 
‘I think I’m just a lot more confident about what I know. I think I am 
less scared of what I don’t know. So when I don’t know things I don’t 
try to act like I do. I go get help, and I know where to go get help’.  
He is also not afraid to seek help or assistance when he does not know 
something – nor does a lack of knowledge affect his confidence.  He surrounds 
himself with a team of experts that is able to balance these deficiencies:  
‘The things that I know that I know...you, know it doesn’t really shake 
me if someone thinks differently. I’ll listen to it and I’ll weigh it and 
measure it’. 
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 Much of this confidence, according to Sam is due to his age, experience 
and success from working in the industry.   Research on cognitive decision-
making, and the correlation between effective decision-making and age would 
affirm (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) this.  This confidence has also led to a sense 
of resolution, unafraid to try new things and, if he fails, he can learn from the 
experience: 
‘…the courage part was living by my own set of rules and not the 
set of rules dictated to me by others. I don’t let someone else define 
what success is for me. I’ve had the opportunities, the biggest 
company I ran was 105, 110 people, and so I’ve done that…that’s 
not what I define as success.  And so I just had to be courageous 
and say here’s what success looks like to me. And here’s what 
happiness is and I need to just be real about that.’ 
 Sam’s habitus, mainly the product of his past, his age, and socio-economic 
status, is shaped by his experiences and interaction with the structures around 
him, just as those structures are shaped by the actors that interact with them.  
Sam and his current perspective on where he is and why he is pursuing this 
choice is no different. His attitudes have been shaped by the companies for 
whom he has worked and the people with whom he has worked, leaving him 
with the personality we see today – the courage, the humbleness, the strength 
and commitment to his religion have all influenced him in such a way that he 
knows what he wants and the ways in which this may be achieved.  As he just 
described, he knows himself well and is comfortable with that.   
 In addition to being a humble, confident and courageous individual he is 
also a man of strong faith and family values.  He often puts his family first and 
understands the appropriate work-family balance for him: 
‘And now certainly for me I want to make a living and I don’t want 
to put my family in danger economically’ 
With these personality characteristics, he is also a man of vision and understands 
the importance of having a strategic foresight if you want to run a company like 
Hat Punk, LLC.  Using that vision he understands the substantial amount of social 
capital in the form of professional networks and relationships that are needed to 
execute that vision: 
‘You have to have relationships, then strategy; you have to know 
where you are going. Too many people are informed on what they 
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are running away from not what they are running toward.  I’d say 
you have to have a clear strategy about what you are running 
toward’. 
With the vision comes risk according to Sam.  You must be willing to do, 
‘within your principle’, what is needed in order to execute that vision: 
‘you have to have the stomach for that…some people do, some 
people don't.’  
 Sam is referencing the ups and downs of money making and loss within 
the music industry.  Being an entrepreneur of cultural product, it is often difficult 
to forecast what song, what album or what artist will be profitable or find the 
commercial success needed to sustain a business like Hat Punk, LLC.  Sam is also 
an individual who can, financially, and is willing to take on the financial risk 
involved in working in this industry.  He feels he can because of his past success, 
his age, experience and personality characteristics that make him who he is. 
 
Philip Esquire 
Philip Esquire has worked for Green Tree for eleven years.  He is a modest man, 
reserved, with a wealth of industry knowledge and experience that he relies on 
daily.  He does not hold a higher degree, but relies heavily on his experience 
while he was a touring musician: 
‘As far as training, it was on the road…I was a performer so I 
started performing with different bands in the southern California 
area and from there I started absorbing information about how a 
booking agent worked. How merchandising worked...sales…live 
touring’. 
 Musician by trade, Philip began his involvement in the business side of 
the industry when he was touring with his band.  While supporting releases by A 
& M and Epic Records, he began interacting with promoters, the group’s 
manager, booking agent, and was active with tour management.  He took on that 
role and started taking care of more business, marketing, and transactional items 
separate from performing.  Later his band was offered their own production 
company where he would take on a marketing and promotion role.  This 
experience later led to his career in marketing and promotion with Green Tree, 
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LLC.  He oversees a staff of five at the company, which indicates a strong skill set 
in managerial capabilities and leadership.   
Jack Johnson 
 Jack Johnson has worked for Green Tree, LLC for seven years.  Prior to his 
tenure at the company, he worked for Sam Hood Publishing as an art coordinator 
before moving up to the creative department.  This was Jack’s first experience 
bringing in new talent to the company, albeit songwriters, before coming to 
Green Tree, LLC as an Artist & Repertoire - A&R, manager.  Sam recognised his 
talents through his ‘good ears’, and his ability to bring on successful new talent to 
the label, which ultimately gave him his current position as Senior Vice President 
of A & R.  Jack is a younger gentleman relative to his colleagues Sam and Philip.  
This enables him to provide a perspective to the team that they may not be able 
to have, due to age and life perspective.  He self-identifies as being ‘in touch with 
trends in the industry’ while keeping apprised of new and upcoming artists.  Jack 
is also a confident man that strongly believes in what he feels ‘he is called to do’.  
He has a strong passion for his work and is not afraid to share his opinion when 
asked, especially when discussing new artists with his team, Sam and Jack.  He 
can relate well to artists, their managers and represents Green Tree, LLC in the 
industry well through his overwhelming amount of cultural capital in music and 
trends and well established professional network.  This professional network 
respects Jack because of the symbolic capital he possesses through the artists he 
has signed and the talent he can recognise. 
8.1.4 Resources Needed 
The Need for Financial Capital 
Economic capital and the need for assets to make this purchase were 
considered substantial.  In order to make this decision, Sam needed to evaluate 
carefully the cost-benefit of the purchase and whether it would be a viable 
investment opportunity financially. Sam relied upon a strong professional 
network and team of advisors outside the firm to assist him in this evaluation.  
As part of his habitus would influence him, ‘he knows what he knows’ and he is 
not afraid to seek counsel in areas in which he may be deficient.  When asked 
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what resources he would need to execute this decision and were part of his 
evaluation, Sam made clear:  
‘I would say industry knowledge, relationships, and capital…then 
strategy’. 
He went on to clarify that financial capital, the money and assets required to 
purchase the firm, was needed:  
‘…financial capital, you got to be able to buy it, start it, sustain loses. You 
have to have the stomach for the way our sales record is these last few 
months, I Iost money in these two months and think I’m going to make 
money in month five’. 
 Although any specific amount was never disclosed, it could be inferred 
that in order to purchase the assets of a company that owns a catalogue 
containing a number of multiple platinum and award-winning artists, the 
amount would not be minimal.  In addition, as Sam alludes to in his comments, it 
is not only the assets he is purchasing, but he also needs enough cash to sustain 
months of loss as is often the case for recorded music product and this industry.  
This is especially the case in this environment, where the unpredictably of 
success is compounded by the illegal downloading of music.  The impact that the 
losses may have on the company can be critical to its success, especially given 
the track record of losses the company has sustained recently in an industry that 
often mirrors similar results.  Therefore, although the economic capital needed 
to make this decision was high, and the risks involved have been compounded, 
Sam still felt he had what it took to bring the company that he started over ten 
years ago back from its problematic state.  This kind of mentality is only possible 
through the confidence and sense of commitment that Sam brings with him 
along with the desire to be seen as the ‘saviour’ of the company.  The symbolism 
involved with being the one who started it and the one who brought it back from 
the brink of extinction would allow Sam the continued recognition and 
positioning within the field that he desires. 
Personal Relationships and the Need for Knowledge and Experience 
In addition to the substantial amount of economic resources needed to 
execute this decision, Sam indicated the importance that ‘relationships’ would 
have on effectively executing and evaluating whether, or not, to purchase the 
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assets.  Not all relationships established in the industry are considered equal and 
some may have a direct impact while others have a more indirect or no impact 
whatsoever.  Indirectly, Sam did indicate the importance of belonging to 
associations and clubs when fostering those relationships: 
‘…the gospel music association, Christian Music Trade 
Association…‘I help raise a lot of money for ‘International Justice 
Mission, which is involved in freeing primarily slaves, sex slave 
across the world’ ‘Borders Call, which is a nonprofit ministry that 
those in the music industry support so that families can go to 
counseling for free’. 
But when asked whether these relationships or belonging to these organisations 
had a direct impact on the decision practice, he clearly stated: 
 ‘Not really, no’ – [they didn’t really have any impact on the decision] 
Not having any influence on whether to move forward with the purchase does 
not mean there is value in belonging to, or being actively involved in, these social 
networks.  What they can and do provide is an indirect influence, meaning that 
the status and power membership of these networks imposes on decision 
makers may provide a sense of confidence, or alter the personal disposition, in a 
way that influences them to take action in a specific manner, and to take on more 
risk: 
‘So it’s having that knowledge, having knowledgeable people, so I’m kind of 
putting people in with knowledge. The knowledge of the industry, and the 
knowledge of the market.  Relationships about manufacturing costs, 
shipping costs, you know - how to make records…You have to be seriously 
invested in relationships, so when you start a new company, people look at 
you sideways. So you have to have long-term relationships that you've 
invested in and have invested in you. So you have to have those and that’s 
artists, managers everybody in the industry and frankly...staff’. 
 You cannot have the people without the knowledge - Sam sees them as 
intimately connected and a necessary resource if he wants to purchase the assets 
back from Axis Media.  He understands this and the abundance of social capital 
he has accumulated throughout his 30-year history working in the industry has 
enabled him to make this decision indirectly with the odds of success being as 
much in his favor as they could be.  His strong position on the need to have 
knowledgeable people…who have done it, not think they know it, but know it’, 
working with him can be attributed to his own success.  He understands the 
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importance that experience and the capital people possess are necessary to 
reach his personal and company goals.  They are more likely to use their own 
network and resources to help achieve his.  Their knowledge and experience 
provide comfort for Sam in that they will know how to leverage their resources 
efficiently and professionally when needed. 
Through his 30 years in the business and 51 years of life Sam has come to 
understand that the right people, the right professionals with the appropriate 
understanding of how the world and the industry works will be the ones that he 
will need to implement this decision:   
‘…you have to really know the business, you cannot start a company in 
today’s environment and hire enough people to do the job. You will go 
broke. So you have to, you personally, have to know how to do 
everything. And then you have to have people who know how to do 
three or four different things….and that have done it, not think they 
know it, but know it. So it’s very fortunate that in 30 years I’ve done 
everything possible’. 
When Sam is discussing ‘today’s environment’ and ‘hire enough people to do 
the job’, he is referencing the challenging and changing field that has brought 
with it the economic challenges and constraints.  This lack of economic capital is, 
therefore, being compensated for through an overabundance of cultural capital 
needed to maintain the status quo.  This added asset cannot come in the form of 
more actors.  The economic resources are not available so he must be 
comfortable with the team and their accumulated cultural capital to do the job.  
They must all be knowledgeable, to a certain extent in all aspects, in order to do 
the job.  If this accumulation did not exist, Sam would likely have not gone 
through with this transaction.  Although he mentioned that he needed enough 
economic capital to sustain a few months of losses, he cannot afford losses of 
cultural or social capital, as this would jeopardise the symbolic capital achieved 
to a level that would not be worth the risk for the investment. 
8.1.5 Influences on Decision 
A Shrinking Industry and the Reliance upon Positional Expertise 
 The industry rules that guide practice within this decision were 
evidenced in the importance of team inputs (Caves, 2000).  The expertise that 
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comes with advisors and managers, in order to assist in the commercialisation of 
a creative product, like music, helps to bridge the gap between individual 
economic gain and the public good, or for those who wish to enjoy the craft.  
Those who make decisions in this field rely upon these agents, and their personal 
and professional networks, to get the job done.  Sam knows that in order for him 
to continue to be successful he understands that it is not only his networks, but it 
is everyone that is involved in the business of commercially exploiting recorded 
music products within this field playing a role: 
 ‘So you have to have those and that’s artists, managers 
everybody in the industry’ 
According to Sam, in this field, the rules and power structures that dictate 
its functioning are rooted in the social and professional networks that contain 
them.  The cultural capital in the form of industry knowledge and the symbolic 
titles that come with it, like ‘manager’ embody this knowledge and the social 
capital that those who carry this title, have acquired.  It is this well-connected 
network and cumulative knowledge, which the ‘team’ utilises to create further 
leverage of the success and power within the field.  Sam’s understanding of this 
is important, as will be discussed below.  He relies on this network not only to 
aid him in this decision, but feels it must be in place in order for him to move 
forward with the execution of the buy-out. 
The Need for Budgeting and Planning 
In addition to the ‘team inputs’ (Caves, 2000) that have helped shape the 
field doxa generally and Sam’s decision practice specifically, there was also 
evidence of behaviours that aided in assessing the viability of decision options.  
This behaviour was ‘systematic’ and a ‘logical and analytical’ approach to data 
collection during the consideration and information gathering stage of the 
decision practice.  Sam was attempting to find the optimal level of information 
needed to feel confident that a positive outcome or effective decision would be 
made.  Using this approach to assist him in gathering information for a more 
comprehensive decision practice is based upon the Kahneman (2011) idea of the 
second system in decision-making.  The first being more intuitive and heuristic 
based with the second being based upon complex computation, agency and 
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choice.  These choices were situational options generated through sales 
forecasting and quantitative modelling: 
‘Certainly I ran my own budgets for the next 3 years. I did cash flows 
for the next 3 years. So yeah I did model it out.’  
 Doing this allowed Sam to see whether purchasing the assets of the 
company would be a wise economic investment for himself.  It was 
calculated through forecasting, not only the short-term but the medium 
term profitability as well.  Being a ‘humble yet confident’ man, and being 
first to say ‘he knows what he knows’, this modeling out the profitability is 
serving him in understanding whether this is a ‘good’ or ‘right’ decision for 
him to make now.  He understands that modeling out the financial 
implications would aid in offsetting the personal bias inherent in wanting 
to purchase back the assets of the company he started many years ago.  
Although no evidence suggests that he would have still bought the assets if 
it were forecasted as unprofitable, prior successful decision-making 
through his position as President would indicate that he would not move 
forward with an unprofitable endeavour – unless there was a strategic 
purpose for it.  However, this calculation was not simply an economic 
forecast based on whether or not, it was a sound business choice or one to 
aid in bias reduction, it was also one that relied on the use of cultural and 
social capital: 
‘I have a lot of history, 11 years of history; I knew what we had in 
the contract and what we didn’t. I had some suppositions based on 
I need a couple things to go right. Here and here. I had checkpoints 
along the way. I had a budget in mind, what I felt like based on the 
modeling and everything else, what I can afford, and what my wife 
was comfortable risking. So yeah we did do quantitative modeling’.  
 Starting the company and being a part of its operations for the past eleven 
years leaves Sam privy to the ins and outs of the business – its success, failures 
and ongoing challenges.  He has led and understands the company habitus and is 
relying upon his accumulated cultural capital and past experience in the firm to 
aid in his modeling and forecasting of the potential value of the firm, through 
how he sees it and has experienced it.  This alone makes it more than just an 
economic transaction for him.  He is connected emotionally, growing and being a 
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part of the firm for so many years.  In addition to his personal connection to the 
firm, Sam also consulted his wife when modeling the value of the transaction.  
The family unit was important here and is indicative of his strong commitment 
to them.  Being a faithful man and one in his early fifties, retirement not far off in 
the distant future, Sam also had to consider the personal and family 
ramifications of investing large amounts of economic capital into this decision.   
 Much of this behaviour indicates a propensity to model the future 
profitability of the firm to aid him in deciding whether, or not, this would be a 
sound business decision for him – at least at the surface.   As a reflexive 
researcher using Bourdieu as a lens, specifically his practice theory, I want to 
understand the motivation and behaviour behind his actions.  Sam, the one 
making the decision – albeit through decision aids like modeling – brings with 
him his dispositions rooted in bias and personal perspective, the cultural capital 
accumulated through industry experience, general skills and knowledge and the 
personal and professional networks that not only influence but may be directly 
impacted by this decision.  The importance that the personal motivations behind 
this decision have, even on the most modeled and analytical of influences, must 
not be under-valued.  
Individual Habitus 
The Role of Professional Personal Contacts 
External influences on this decision practice came in the form of 
professional and personal contacts, which enabled Sam further perspective and 
clarity.  In order for him to feel confident in making this decision while he was 
weighing his alternatives, he sought out expert legal advice from his professional 
network: 
‘I had three different companies and lawyers helping me do this 
acquisition, I certainly asked their advice on things like possible 
bankruptcy strategies, technical stuff’. 
 The assumption here is of Sam’s awareness of ‘what he doesn’t 
know’ and therefore he seeks out legal and bankruptcy advice through his 
network – his social capital.  Confident in his decision-making skills, he 
seeks expertise in areas he does not understand from people that he trusts. 
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He knows that they will aid him in providing him knowledge nor with 
information to make the best possible decision.   By trusting others in these 
areas he demonstrates his confidence in them and in himself.  According to 
the evidence provided in the discussion about his habitus, this trust can be 
linked back to the prior success he has had in the industry and his ability to 
enhance his decision-making skills through time and experience.  He has 
relied upon his social capital to aid him countless times before and has had 
positive experiences from them.  Because of this, he continues to rely on 
them to offer the advice he seeks in order to make this decision as well.  In 
addition to legal and bankruptcy advice, Sam also relied upon accountants 
to aid him in the potential tax issues that could arise from this decision. ‘I 
had to count obviously tax advice and structure advice’.  Coming from a self-
identified, upper-middle social class and holding positions of power 
throughout much of his career, Sam understands the importance of money 
and the tax implications behind it.  It cannot only affect profitability, but 
external stakeholder perspective as well.  If the firm does not follow good 
tax advice and account for its income and expenses properly, it may impact 
the perception that shareholders or investors have on how effectively and 
efficiently the company is operating.  However, since this is a personal buy-
out, the stakeholders and the perception they hold are not as a shareholder, 
but as artists, potential signings and those currently on the roster.  It also 
impacts the perception of his entire social network, professional and 
personal, as well as other firms within the field that see and begin to 
perceive the reputation of Hat Punk as one that is being run properly or 
one that is not, which could end up with the decision of whether these 
stakeholders choose to do business with them, or not.  Although this may 
not be an immediate response by its stakeholders, Sam’s behavior here 
does demonstrate his understanding of the importance of seeking external 
professional advice in making a major decision such as this.  Through his 
experience, he understands not only the economic capital at stake here, but 
also the social and symbolic one as well.  Although he may be willing to 
sacrifice one at the moment, he can only make what he feels is a good and 
comprehensive decision if he is considering all the implications of it.  
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 In addition to Sam’s professional advisors and the implications upon 
the economic and symbolic capital he holds through the auspices of the 
firm, he also sought advice outside the company from people close to him 
while considering the impact his actions it will have on the firm, in addition 
to his personal and spiritual life.  First, he sought advice from a close 
personal friend, one he has known for decades and trusts in matters such 
as these: 
‘Then really there’s only one guy I went to, this guy I used to work 
with. I know him very well; he knows me and is one of the smartest 
business guys I know. I use him as a sounding board, I use him, as 
a guy to say here’s what I am thinking, and your job is to shoot 
holes in everything that I say. And we have always worked that 
way together’.  
 
 Sam sought counsel from this gentleman because of the trust that 
has been established between them.  Sam respects his friend’s opinion, and 
knows that he can relate to the decision that Sam is about to make.  He 
understands it because of past similar experience and previous success 
working in the industry.  He also approached his friend because of his 
candor.  Yes, Sam trusts that what he has to offer will be valuable– his past 
experience in the industry, but he also understands that he is currently 
outside the field doxa and decision-making practice - he is no longer 
directly involved in the power struggle to improve his positioning.  The 
accumulation of capital within this context is no longer a motivating factor 
for his friend.  Yet, he understands the field doxa well and the power 
struggles within.  This alone is invaluable to Sam.  His friend’s advice comes 
with little or no underlying motives, and it is this candor is needed and 
appreciated.  Sam hopes that his perspective will help him in making a 
more thorough and well-thought through decision. 
  Such a major decision as perceived by Sam could also not be 
discussed by his wife: 
‘and certainly my wife. She is very involved in that. Again not 
that she knows how to make it happen, but in terms of whether it 
would be a good thing for our family, or for me, you know, things 
like that.’ 
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Although she is one outside the field practice here, her input is invaluable 
to Sam and weighs heavily on his decision practice.  Being a close personal 
confidant and one that knows him in ways that no-one else does, both 
professional and personally, Sam know that she is a good gauge on how this 
decision would impact their lifestyle and the effects it will have on family life.  
Sam is a ‘big picture guy’, strategic and when he makes decisions he wants to 
know how these decisions will affect him and his business financially, and also 
personally.  The ramifications of these choices go beyond just the commercial 
success of the label, they also affect his personal life – being a strong man of faith, 
a spiritual man committed to his life beyond the business, valuing the love he has 
for his family and how that would impact his spiritual relationship as well. He 
speaks of balance in his artists, he sees them as an extension of how he tries to 
live his life – this is evidenced in his discussion about how he runs his company 
and how others perceive it. Here, he is also seeking balance – balance that Sam 
equates to success, which equates to equilibrium and to him - power.   
The Seeking of Advice and Counsel from Trusted Employees 
As Sam continued his information-seeking in order to make his decision, 
he also sought advice and consultation from his trusted colleagues: ‘Well I 
certainly had talked to...,Philip and Jack…even Dana who has been here for 12 
years’. Having worked with them for so long, he trusted them for the insight they 
could offer as he mulled over his options:  
‘They were like “I think that would be great, I don’t understand 
the financial ramifications or how to do that. I know how to do 
marketing and promotions.” They didn't have the life experience, 
and so they could only respond to the idea’. 
 This would be in reference to his personal past experience in starting 
Green Tree (Hat Punk).  It is not meant to be a condescending perspective but 
they simply did not have sufficient cultural capital specific to the decision.  
However, it is apparent that their opinion mattered - influencing, or at least 
reinforcing his decision practice.  He used them as a sounding board, trusting 
their advice and counsel in specific matters that would affect them.  Jack 
confirmed this as he shared his perspective on how he and Philip were 
approached by Sam: 
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‘He walked us through the process, he made us a part of the 
process, but ultimately it was his decision’. 
 Jack understood that it was not a joint or group decision to be made 
by consensus or forum, but one shared with them that enabled an intimate 
conversation to be held over matters that would affect or concern them 
personally and professionally if he were to move forward with the buyout 
of the assets.  Even after initial counsel was sought, Sam often went back 
to Jack and Philip to keep them informed of the progress he had been 
making as he was going through the decision-making practice. ‘He kept us 
informed…we talked, we asked questions, those kinds of things. But 
ultimately it was his’. 
Understanding the Past and Recognizing the Opportunity 
 Sam also responded quite adamantly with a ‘yeah, oh yeah,’ to whether 
past experiences played an influential role in his decision-making for this buy-
out.  Both positive and negative past experiences were factors as he thought 
through his options: 
‘You know having done all this before, I had an idea. Being 
intimately involved with the company, I knew kind of where the 
bodies were buried’. 
 His connection and past history with the firm no doubt caused Sam 
to think about the things that he, and only he, knew – both positive and 
negative.  His mentioning of the ‘where the bodies are buried’ is an allusion 
to the inner workings of the firm.  Although no further evidence was 
provided as to exactly what those ‘bodies’ would be, they certainly provide 
insight into the institutional history, the spoken and unspoken lessons 
learned about how to conduct business, or how to cheat or honestly play 
the field doxa.  These are invaluable to him and even though they cannot 
always easily be traced back to their origin, these lessons impact how they 
do business today as well as whether Sam would decide ultimately to buy 
back the assets of the firm.  He goes on to recap his history with the 
company and affirms his detailed understanding of how it functions:  
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‘I have a lot of history, 11 years of history, I knew what we had in the 
contract and what we didn’t I had some suppositions based on I need 
a couple things to go right. Here and here’. 
 His experience and understanding of the artists on his roster, what their 
contracts entail and his understanding of the industry all come into play here.  
He understands what his employees are capable of doing and how well he can 
expect his artists to perform.  Understanding the history of how all of them 
interact is an indication of how things may function in the future.  He would not 
be purchasing these assets blindly; he would understand the value his team can 
bring to the business, the details of the contracts and well as the personal 
dispositions of the artists on the roster.  He knows what is important to them 
and how dependable they are and the potential they have for future success and 
profitability of the firm.  He knows them personally, professionally and, for him 
and this business, spiritually, all of which help to indicated future success.    
8.1.6 Conclusion 
Of all the decisions analysed thus far in this thesis, Sam’s decision to buy 
back the assets of a company that he started 12 years prior was one that utilised 
a more analytical approach to aid in the decision-making, while being influenced 
the least by the field doxa.  The reason this decision was chosen was to show the 
relationship between the level of accumulated social, economic and most 
importantly symbolic capital a firm has achieved in the recorded music industry, 
and the more analytical its approach to the decision-making practice.  This more 
logical, analytical and systematic approach is due to an actor’s perceived level of 
risk.  Sam, in his choice to buy back the assets, felt he needed to be more 
thorough in his analysis of the situation, although he ‘knew’ that he wanted to 
buy back the company from Axis, he also felt compelled to make sure that his due 
diligence was done correctly and thoroughly.  The desire for this approach 
allowed him to give a perception of competency to his stakeholders, while not 
irresponsibly putting at risk the accumulated economic, social and symbolic 
capital the firm had accumulated since its inception.  Although decision-making 
of this type often does occur within the recorded music industry, the field 
appears to have minimal influence on the decision outcome.  Much of this 
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decision, although not in isolation as just discussed, did focus on the perspective, 
motivations and individual habitus of Sam, the decision maker and was not 
rooted in the direct marketing and promotion of recorded music product. The 
characteristics of the field impacted the actor’s choice and the concern for 
capital, and the position held within the field were the prime motivators for 
decision choice and how it was made. 
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8.2 CASE #8: ARTIST ACQUISITION 
 Discussion of the final case relates to the signing of recording artists to a 
record label for the purposes of marketing and exploitation of sound-recording 
copyrights.  This decision, unlike the others that have preceded it, will follow a 
more generalised discussion, as a ‘decision-type’ rather than a specific 
acquisition of a particular artist.  This is due to the more general nature in which 
Sam, Jack and Philip chose to speak about this important practice.   Through the 
collection of data, many firms that I spoke with found this ‘decision-type’ to be 
one of strategic importance and, therefore, I deemed it important to be 
represented as a case.  In addition, I discovered that the details of the decision-
making for artist acquisitions from Hat Punk to be most illuminating.  Thus, it is 
within this context, and with reference to this firm, that I present the details of 
this SDM practice.   
 As in nearly all record labels, artist acquisition, or the signing of new 
talent to the roster is often seen as a major strategic decision.  The amount of 
economic, cultural and sometimes social and symbolic capital needed to develop, 
record, market and support an act often does not produce a profit, but when it 
does it can be the ‘cash cow’ or ‘blood-line; for the firm (Frith, 2001) A & R staff 
within the label, and those left with the primary responsibility in making talent 
selection decisions, are often the first in proposing which artists should be 
considered (Negus, 1992).  Stratton  (1982) describes the A & R position in a 
record label, like other similar positions within the cultural industries, as one 
that extends beyond that of a mere 'gatekeeper' and suggests that the 
'aesthetic/commercial dichotomy as articulated in the discourse of popular music 
serves as a metaphor for the articulation of the A & R person's position' (p. 90).  
The person who holds this position wields much of the continuing economic 
vitality of the organisation within their decision-making power.  He further 
contends that the A & R function is seen as fundamental, with the need for new 
product to flow into the label system to 'preserve its existence' (p 91).  It is seen 
as a role that connects artists and consumers together.   
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 The Hat Punk top management team, understanding the importance that 
this function serves, self-identified the signing of an artist as an act that is 
strategic in nature and fundamental to the existence of the firm and worth 
exploring: 
‘let’s pick apart an artist signing…and this can go for anybody… they 
all kind of fall in the same category [of decision]’. 
The artist acquisition process at Hat Punk, LLC is not taken lightly and is one that 
encompasses a team effort, one described by Negus (1992) that contributes to 
the firms power position that ‘arises out of, and is exercised through the internal 
and external relationships which are stretched throughout the production, 
mediation and consumption of popular music’ (Negus, 1992, p. 39).  Sam 
describes these relationships and the process of ‘courting’ and acquisition as 
more of a ‘marriage’ than a business transaction: 
‘I think what I am looking for is someone who will fit here. I don’t 
view the artists signing process as a pursuit, although there are 
times you do pursue. I don’t view it as a competition, but as a time 
to figure out if you are supposed to be together. Not unlike, I don’t 
want to use the word marriage lightly, but it’s about finding the 
right partner. And when you have those right partnerships things 
are great. One of the things we always say is we are working on our 
exit even more then saying hi to each other. Because after our time 
together we either want to iron it out and say we did it, or shake 
hands and say we did the best we could’. 
 By using the word ‘partner’ and ‘marriage’ in this description indicates a 
‘life-long’ commitment to each other and the seriousness in which he views the 
coming together of the people he works with.  This again can be attributed to his 
self-proclaimed ‘third-way’ of doing business.  The coming together of the artist 
on the label is not just a business transaction or a way to make quarterly 
numbers for the company’s shareholders, but a partnership in which the profits 
and the risks are equally shared and, as Negus (1992) posits, a display of power 
in the courtship ensues.  The artists are just as much a part of the company as the 
network of employees that help to market and promote them.  They must not 
only show commercial potential, but must be a natural fit to the firm’s habitus 
and also the habitus of those who work there. 
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 The influences that go into bringing new talent to the label, much of which 
is rooted in a labelled ‘intuitive approach’ (Stratton, 1982), encompasses 
effortless thinking based on impressions and feelings (Kahneman, 2011). 
Because of this behaviour for this type of decision – opposite the more logical 
and analytical practice undertaken by Sam in the decision discussed above – the 
evidence that surfaced was heuristic-based, entrenched with bias and other 
influential behaviour.  Although some planning behaviour was observed, much of 
it was done to confirm the decision that was already made through less 
comprehensive terms.   
8.2.1 Resources Needed 
Variability and Substantiality of Financial Investment 
 
No specific disclosure was made regarding the amount of economic 
capital needed for any one artist acquisition at Hat Punk.  However, every firm 
determines the value of the artist through multiple variables including, but not 
limited to, the potential return on investment, current success already enjoyed in 
the market place, the amount of front-end investment in the form of an advance 
and ownership rights. Then, in return for this value estimate, an investment 
determination will be made.  This can be done through a more objective-
orientated approach; one based on competitive behaviour or, more likely, what 
the firm can afford.  Either way, much of the economic capital needed in any one 
acquisition is typically substantial for any label and can be a sign of the 
commitment level and perceived risk by the record label. 
The Reliability upon Networks 
 
 In addition to the financial resources, A & R staff need to rely on their 
professional contacts to execute the decision effectively.  Negus (1992) writes 
about this in his own research on the production of pop music in which he 
speaks to their reliance upon a network of contacts at other production 
companies, managers, publishers and lawyers.  The dependence upon the 
decision-maker’s networks was no exception here, as Philip Esquire, V.P. of 
marketing and promotion reflects, based on his personal experience.  He too 
depends upon the use and acquisition of his professional and social network, but 
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considering his limited role in the artist acquisition process, he typically does not 
need to reach out.  He sums it up clearly by stating ‘I think networking is very 
important’.  More specifically Jack Johnson, V.P. of A & R discusses the 
importance and the reliance upon these relationships to make things like signing 
of an artist happen: 
 ‘…it’s business to business. It’s managers talking to labels; it’s 
producers talking to managers talking to labels. Its attorneys 
talking to you know. Most of the things we have worked with have 
come from some kind of referral. Even if it’s an artist saying you 
should check out this other artist. Generally that’s where it comes 
from’. 
These comments indicate the importance that social capital plays in this 
decision practice.  If, as an actor, your network is limited, you will have a more 
difficult time leveraging yourself to a more powerful position in the field, which 
would also limit your access to the artists who are perceived to have more 
commercial potential.  This indicates a cycle that tends to perpetuate itself and is 
reinforced by the industry doxa and those who possess more of the capital.  
When agents are talking to managers and managers are talking to labels, this 
creates an assumed and unspoken barrier to entry.  It is the industry’s way of 
filtering out the ‘unlimited variety’ of talent and artists that may want to pursue 
the prestige associated with working in the industry or being signed to a label.  
The tight knit, intricate network that is the social capital an actor possesses in 
this field can be, and often is, a determining factor in an artist’s signing of a 
record deal.  
Embodied Industry Knowledge 
 
The capital needed in this decision practice emerges as a form of 
embodied industry knowledge – obtained through experience and 
understanding of the field and not one of the institutionalised credentials like 
degrees or certificates: 
‘I would say there’s no substitute for experience when it comes to 
that. Jack has been here eight years and has gotten really good at it 
the past couple years’. 
 
If you do not understand the trends and learn what music is being 
successful, you will struggle to be successful at making these decisions.  
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This role is one often seen as connecting two groups together, namely, the 
artists and the audience, in pursuit of commercial viability for the label 
(Stratton, 1982).  Consumer sentiment and the ‘uncertainty of demand’ can 
attempt to be mitigated by continuing to understand market trends, 
breaking artists and consumer tastes.  This kind of capital, in the form of 
industry knowledge can really only be accumulated through experience 
working directly with those artists and the fans that follow them.  Even 
then, when a substantial amount of understanding has occurred, field doxa 
can still limit this certainty before and after release.  The more general 
knowledge of trends and bands is certainly important, but so is the specific 
knowledge and understanding that each genre brings.  Sam states clearly 
his lack of understanding and his bias when it comes to hip hop music: 
 
 ‘I’m not a hip hop guy…when it comes to music, it just sounds like 
noise to me’. 
Sam will be the first to tell you that if he does not have a member of his 
team that has the appropriate knowledge needed for a specific signing or if he 
does not have the certain type of ‘muscle’ needed for this type of signing, he will 
simply ignore the opportunity.  This again goes back to the ‘uncertainty 
principle’ (Caves, 2000) and the mitigation of risk.  If a complete and thorough 
understanding of a market niche, via a genre of music, is not understood, Sam 
and his team are putting at risk the very field position they have worked so hard 
to achieve.  This would be above and beyond the usual risk associated with 
signing any artist and the uncertainty of demand that is associated with music 
products, even those within a familiar genre.  It only takes a few bad signings for 
a company, and a lack of understanding of a market, for them to jeopardise a 
substantial portion of the symbolic and economic capital earned. 
8.2.2 Influences on Decision 
The ‘Uncertainty of Demand Principle’ and Its Influence Upon the 
Acquisition of Artists 
 Signing an artist and the potential commercial product that is then 
released by the label for sale to the public is at the heart of this field’s doxa and 
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incorporates many of the attributes described by Caves (2000).  Here, the level of 
‘demand is unknown’ to Sam, Jack and Philip.  They have very little 
understanding or knowledge of whether an artist will see the commercial 
success they need as they bring them into the ‘economic structure’ of the 
business (Stratton, 1982), yet at some point will decide if the level of risk is 
sufficient to move forward with the decision to sign, or not.  Those who have 
studied the artist acquisition and development processes in the industry (Negus, 
1992; Stratton, 1982) have discussed the challenges present in this 
aesthetic/commercial dichotomy and that the ‘gatekeeping’ characteristics of 
artist acquisitions as they distinguish between ‘music as cultural artifact [and] 
music as product’ (Statton, 1982, p. 90). 
 The ‘quality of the creative effort’ by the artist will not be determined 
until after the decision is made, at which stage the level of risk taken on by the 
firm must also be considered.  This ‘quality of creative effort’ may already be 
known by Jack and his team prior to the signing, but there is little that can be 
done if the artists feel this relationship is not living up to expectations and, 
therefore, lower their creative input.  The label can mitigate this uncertainty 
through the use of contracts, but yet the level of risk is still present.  Sam, Philip 
and Jack also understand the importance that the skills of their team are crucial 
in order to mitigate their risk.  As Sam described in his previous decision, he 
knows his team, their skills and what they are capable of doing.  This diversity 
and understanding is also important as they take on these new partnerships with 
artists.  They need to feel that they can help them be successful, as much as the 
artists want and need their expertise. 
Personal Level Influence  
Past Experiences and the Use of Heuristics as a Value Judgement 
Evidenced in this decision practice by both Jack and Sam were the use of 
availability, representativeness and the anchoring and adjustment heuristics.  
The reliance upon the heuristic to aid in the decision-making practice is in effect 
relying upon a quicker cognitive process in making a choice. This becomes 
evident as Jack describes his approach to the initial meeting of an artist he is 
considering to sign to the label: 
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‘At some point in time you learn to assess the heart of the meeting, 
you know if they are our kind of person or not’. 
 He is relying upon his feeling as to whether they are a good fit for the 
‘third way’ of the company.  Jack is essentially anchoring his choice based upon 
previous experience in these meetings and his understanding of the habitus of 
the firm and the consumer preference within the field.  He must marry all of 
these quickly to determine whether the risk is at a level worth taking.  He then 
adjusts his opinion based upon these many factors.  Sam reinforces this 
behaviour as well with a similar cognitive process when he meets with the 
artists using an anchoring and adjustment heuristic: 
‘95% of the time, there are certain things that I look for, and 
certain responses. So I guess there are some right answers as it 
relates to working here, you know not as a person. But you know if 
they are like, - “my target audience is everybody man and it’s all 
about bringing them to the kingdom.”  Really, what I hear when 
they say that is we want to be a rock band but we can’t get a deal. 
So you hear those things and kind of learn what some of that stuff 
is. There are exceptions to the rule, but you just try to listen really 
hard’. 
It is a form of interview or test.  Sam is making an initial judgement, the 
anchoring is based upon what he expects or hopes to hear from the potential 
artist.  He proceeds to adjust his opinion based upon what they say.  While using 
this decision aid to place judgement, he is also relying upon his past experience 
working with artists, along with his cultural capital in the form of industry 
knowledge and skills.  His opinion and perspective within this statement can also 
trace back to his socio-economic status and age.  He is no doubt influenced by the 
attitude that comes with a younger generation that quotes a ‘my target audience 
is everybody’ mentality.  He positions himself with a more status-orientated 
perspective when those comments indicate what he describes as the type of 
artist or behaviour he would not like to see.  The gap in knowledge of that 
market permeates attitudes and perspectives that aid in his idea of what should, 
or should not, be said by the artist, on whom he then places value and judgement 
regarding his decision on a possible signing. 
Jack also exhibits this type of behaviour in his use of an anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic in his assessment of potential artists: 
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‘Generally they aren’t all the way there, the music is not all the way 
there, but hopefully it’s a place where you can see the sparks, you 
see the potential and if we are like-minded people where we are 
going in the same direction’. 
Again, a value judgement is used in the anchoring of the decision aid.  He 
is comparing the current level of artistry and commercial potential from his 
personal perspective and how he perceives the market’s tendency when it comes 
to quality judgement.  If there is a dissonance in this comparison, based upon his 
understanding of the industry and personal habitus, he judges the act or ‘adjusts’ 
his decision in order to sign or not sign the artist.  However, within his 
comments it is apparent that this dissonance gap can also be bridged and is 
indicated by his use of ‘potential’ and ‘sparks’, further influencing his decision to 
sign. 
In addition to the use of an anchoring and adjustment heuristic the use of 
the availability heuristic was evidenced through data collection.  Jack in certain 
instances will judge the decision based upon the probability of the outcome, 
especially if there is disagreement in certain circumstances: 
‘Things we are kind of waffling on are probably things we don’t need 
to say yes to’. 
 This indicates a form of uncertainty or level of probability in risk he 
is willing to take.  If there is not a solid positive feeling about all aspects of 
the artist signing, including, but not limited to the fit with the label, the 
quality of their music, and potential commercial success, among others, 
then he uses a availability heuristic to aid in his judgment.  Jack feels that if 
there is any sense of doubt, his memory will be stimulated to formulate 
past examples of similar doubt and calculate the probability of a similar 
outcome.  He uses what is available in his memory to influence his current 
decision choice.  Sam also recognises this in Jack and actually relies upon 
this kind of decision-making from him:  
‘Jack has been here eight years and has gotten really good at it the 
past couple years. The first few years he would be like “dude they are 
right up our alley” and I would be like, ”nope, they are not for us”. 
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Even though Sam indicates that Jack’s use of this decision making aid 
has improved, he too used a similar type of heuristic when making 
judgements on the artist.  By claiming ‘they are not for us,’ Sam is relying 
upon his memory and the probability of a similar outcome in a similar 
situation.  This probability, like Jack, is based upon past experiences and 
knowing that the odds of success for this kind of artist is limited 
considering his and the companies resources and expertise. 
Personal Taste and Bias  
The use of heuristics in deciding to sign an artist to Hat Punk plays a 
pivotal role in judgement and value.  However, with personal judgement and 
value attached to a decision comes bias, which too was evidenced as influential 
in this decision practice in the forms of belief, hindsight and confirmation biases.  
Jack is very clear about how he goes about signing an artist to Hat Punk: 
‘It’s really easy, we only sign things that we both can’t live without’. 
From Jack's perspective, this decision sounds like it is based more in 
personal belief bias than the more logical and analytical approach taken by Sam 
in the previous decision.  However it could also be considered a type of 
confirming bias, in which each actor is affirming his or her own personal 
preference.  This bias is centered on the personal belief of each individual and 
how they feel about the potential commercial success of the music and their 
confidence in gauging what will, or will not, be successful in the market place.  
This idea of knowing and understanding comes with a certain level of 
accumulated cultural capital. Never the less, some assumptions are made, based 
upon prior success and failures of previous artists, and how the field is currently 
responding to certain creative outputs.  The habitus plays a crucial role here in 
forming the opinions of Sam and Jack and how they relate to the artists they are 
signing.  The interplay between the habitus, the bias that is rooted within, 
coupled with the industry doxa and field dynamics all seem subconsciously to 
influence perspective, decision choice and practice.  This appears to happen 
again and again as judgment and taste (Bourdieu, 1984) of each actor influences 
the opinion upon the commercial viability of the artist – hence playing a pivotal 
role in the decision practice of signing an artist.  Bourdieu (1984) and Trondman 
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(2004) would also argue that these perspectives are influenced by the actor’s 
social economic status.  Distinctive to this decision practice however, is the 
necessity to act as an agent or proxy for the consumer.  Jack and Sam need to 
determine the viability of the artist, their potential commercial success, and the 
inherent level of risk as they decide to sign them.   However, they must 
substitute, or at least be mindful of, their taste in music when making these 
decisions for their success does not depend upon their personal preference but 
that of the market for which they are the gatekeeper.  This awareness of taste 
and preference was evidence here by Sam. 
‘Well Jack could tell you there are certain types of music. I’m not a 
hip hop guy, if a hip hop guy walks in the room it’s no big deal, I 
can have a great conversation with him. But when it comes to 
music, it just sounds like noise to me’. 
Therefore, when accounting for this personal belief bias, Sam 
defers to Jack to act as the proxy agent for the market place.  He 
acknowledges the bias associate with certain music genre types that he 
has, and then empowers those with the appropriate amount of cultural 
capital and less bias to make the judgement, in this case, Jack.  However, 
Jack is also not free of a certain level of belief bias for which Sam then 
needs to compensate: 
‘He is a sucker for a pretty singer songwriter girl. And I have to really 
filter what he says about it’. 
It is as if Sam and Jack compensate for the amount of bias that can occur in 
a decision practice such as signing an artist and have developed a system 
of informal processes: 
‘He can bring me a song and I look at it and say I knew you would 
bring this. We had this conversation a couple days ago, and “I’m 
like why” and he says, “because that’s just not the kind of song 
that you like”.  “No it’s not”, so we have to talk about that. We 
defer to each other all the time.’ 
This deferment to each other, a check and balance, is a strategy for 
them to mitigate risk in a decision practice rooted in personal belief 
biases.  These biases can and often impact decisions both positively and 
negatively.  However, as some would argue (Hull et al., 2010) the entire A 
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& R process of signing and finding acts to record for a label is a continuous 
process in risk management, where this behaviour is no exception. 
Intuition, Heuristics or Bias? 
Very closely related to the heuristics and bias associated with this decision-
making practice was the use of what others have labelled ‘intuitive’ patterns 
(Negus, 1992; Stratton, 1982).  Intuition is traced through the habitus and is 
often found in the form of ‘gut feelings’, ‘hunches’ or ‘instinct’ (Negus, 1992; 
Stratton, 1982).  In prior research, Stratton (1982) found that the role of the A & 
R staff is one that continually requires the actor to make decisions about 'which 
artists to bring into the economic order of the record company' (p. 90).   This is an 
attempt by the actor to ‘reconcile the contradictions’ that exist through music 
and the product it has become, which is often accomplished through a 
‘subjectivist intuition’.   In addition, Seifert and Hadida (2009) (2006), in their 
work on talent selection decisions, were able to demonstrate that expert 
‘intuitive’ decision-making has a positive outcome when facilitating talent 
selection decisions.  The use of this ‘intuitive’ language could also be supported 
by this research as Jack describes his approach to the practice:   
‘Yeah, there is a gut feeling because there have been songs that I 
thought would be absolutely huge and the radio said absolutely 
no way, and so I was wrong, we were wrong’. 
The reliance on a ‘gut feeling’ speaks to the subjective and unpredictable nature 
of the product, but also the level of confidence that the A & R person has 
acquired.  Jack is ‘trusting that [he] know[s] what is good and what is bad by 
instinct’, and relies on his ‘gut feeling’: 
‘when I hear the right thing, I will know it, rather than this fearful 
process of; I don’t know and I have to listen to it some more and I 
have to play it for other people, and ask, ‘what do you think about 
this’’? 
His disposition indicates that he is a self-assured individual and confident in his 
abilities as an A & R person.  He does not conceal this, rather expressing it with 
pride: 
I have a big enough ego that I think what I like, I think everyone else is 
going to like too’. 
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 Being confident can impact the amount of risk Jack is willing to take 
on behalf of Hat Punk, LLC.  Taking this risk and leveraging capital to 
transform it into another can be determined by his experience.  Jack 
attributes much of this to his past success and ability to find artists that will 
be a good fit for the firm, economically and spiritually. 
‘Well the past experience doesn’t hurt confidence for sure. It doesn’t 
hurt to go I’ve done this before, I don’t suck at it’. 
Although Jack clearly is sure of his abilities, there is some indication of 
overconfidence masking a fear and insecurity of his ability to pick the ‘next big 
act’.  
‘Hopefully, me and Sam have the foresight to see things not necessarily 
in the commercialised format’. 
 
 Jack’s use of ‘hopefully’ or ‘trusting’, as used above, indicates a level of 
uncertainty.  Much of the ‘prognosticating’ of the future success is done by what 
they feel can only be attributed to something they cannot isolate either, intuition 
and their ‘gut feeling’. 
‘There are some things that you miss, but overall if you are geared for 
it, if you’ve got the practice, if you’ve got the experience, if you’ve got 
the ability and vision to hear some things, then that gut won’t let you 
down’. 
 
By highlighting the role of experience and confidence in making talent 
selection decisions, they indicate that something other than intuition may be at 
play. When Jack describes his decision-practice as being based upon ‘gut feeling’, 
he is using a heuristic that is influenced by bias.  Negus (1992) hints at some of 
the limitations of the use of ‘intuitive’ behaviour as a descriptor, although he 
does not dismiss it outright:  ‘A subject and intuitive response, in any context, is 
often obtained when people who are immersed in a particular environment are 
asked to explain activities that they take for granted and engage in habitually’ 
(Negus, 1992 p. 51).  By definition, intuitive descriptors are those referring to 
behaviour or actions based upon ‘sub-conscious’ reasoning.  A habit, by definition, 
is a behaviour learned through regular tendency or practice, and is often a result 
of a conscious, or deliberate, intention.  Although I am not arguing that the talent 
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selection decisions and the music the artists produce, and are subsequently 
brought within the economic framework of the label, are linked to a conscious 
‘practice’ to form a ‘habit’, I do contend that it may not be accurate to label this 
decision-making practice as ‘instinctive’.  My contention is that one’s preference 
for a song or artist is more closely linked to a learned behaviour rather than an 
innate perception.  
This ‘gut feeling’ that Jack referred to above, is based upon the 
personal preference or bias that Jack and Sam try to mitigate when 
determining song preference for the market.  This bias is rooted in a 
heuristic, which then reinforces the self-identified ‘gut feeling’.  If Jack 
senses the song would be successful based upon this, then that feeling 
must be influenced by what he has seen, heard and experienced prior to 
this decision.  This experience is a culmination of his habitus and the past 
success and failures of music with which he has been engaged.  This 
creates an atmosphere of information in which short-cut cognitive 
decision practices, like heuristics, are used to help him with these 
decisions that than become self-reinforcing.  If positive outcomes abound, 
as he suggests below: 
‘But I think that we had a feeling that she could do something and 
she did, she created this record’, 
then the likelihood of success increases, as Sam alluded to when 
referencing how Jack has become better at his decision-making for artist 
acquisition in the past eight years.   
The Importance of Experience in Making A & R Decisions  
Also closely related to the use of heuristics, bias is the impact that past 
experiences have on signing an artist to the firm.  Again, the positive and/or 
negative past experience helps to influence whether an actor expects a similar 
outcome in the future (Juliusson et al., 2005).  It can be a self-influencing cycle 
and one that is held in high regard by Sam:   
‘I would say there’s no substitute for experience.’  
His reference to no substitute for experience does not indicate value of 
positive or negative as being good or bad, but does indicate that the greater level 
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of industry knowledge and experience, the better off he or members of his team 
will be in making these decisions.  Past experience plays an important role in 
assessing whether a band has the potential to be a good investment by the label, 
or a commercial success to the extent they are needed to be.  Seeing and hearing 
successful and unsuccessful acts and how they impacted their audience is 
important to Sam.  He sees value in learning from those experiences that can 
then be used to make better decisions, similar to the evidence provided with 
regard to heuristic behaviors.  Jack sees it in a similar manner and references the 
improved confidence that can result from past, positive experiences. ‘Well the 
past experience doesn’t hurt confidence for sure. It doesn’t hurt to go I’ve done this 
before, I don’t suck at it’. 
The Need to Consider Marketing Potential and Reliance Upon 
Networks 
 
 Much of the evidence provided so far has been angled towards the 
personal level influences extending from the habitus.  In addition to those macro 
level influences, those coming externally from the field, also play in important 
role in the practice of signing an artist to the label for Hat Punk.  Negus (1992) 
found that the role of influences upon talent selection decisions went well 
beyond the individual’s past experiences or personal preferences as shown so 
far.  In his work studying British and American record labels he revealed a much 
more complex array of influences that extend beyond personal preference, 
including the impact the artist may have upon marketing and promotion efforts, 
such as, their live show, press potential and song-writing abilities.   That was no 
exception here as the importance of the relationship between A & R decisions 
and the marketing and promotions department were closely connected.  Philip 
Esquire, Senior V.P. of Marketing and Promotion has had little influence on the 
practice, however his understanding of the market place is crucial to 
determining whether the artist under consideration even has a chance at 
commercial success.  He needs to be involved with the decision practice because 
of the impact this signing will have on the perceived symbolic capital of the firm 
from outside stakeholders as well as the utilisation of social, cultural and 
economic capital.  His concern is with the media and retail partners, and he 
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proceeds to discuss the importance those external stakeholders have on the 
decision practice. 
‘Sure it’s very significant...it’s important to us to have a relationship 
with them [their largest retailer] because while our distributor does 
a fantastic job doing it, there is that level of we have all the real 
intimate detail knowledge…it’s been really key for me to go up and 
meet with the retailer’. 
 The importance of this relationship and the communication between 
them cannot be underestimated, for it is the retailer that is able to give Hat Punk 
the feedback from the consumer and the trends in the market that they are 
unable to acquire.  They hold the direct line to the buyer and if they feel that they 
cannot sell or carry the product of an artist they are signing, it will impact the 
decision of whether, or not, they end up signing an artist, or how much they may 
be willing to invest in them and their career. Philip also feels similarly about the 
relationships they have with radio, recorded music’s number one promotional 
mechanism: 
‘…yeah it’s very key. I will slide up to Sacramento where one of the 
larger radio networks is located, KLove. It’s very important …we 
have a strong relationship with them too so that they are well 
represented’.  
 The amount of social capital needed and used in order to acquire 
and maintain relationships with radio is tantamount to whether an artist 
will see commercial success at the level needed for Hat Punk to be 
profitable in many of their signings.  The use of social capital in this 
instance can be directly related to the accumulation of economic and 
symbolic capital as well.  If the relationships are maintained and 
professional networks used, then the radio promotion can turn into record 
sales and chart placement for the artist and the firm, whereby the 
transformation from social, cultural and economic capital into symbolic 
capital becomes a positive tradeoff and necessary for doing business.  
 Philip also repeats the importance that media plays in this decision 
and getting the message out to the consumers: 
‘People in media need to know the heart of the artist, they need to 
know the music. They need to know why they need to buy in to this 
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artist, whether it’s the listeners or the store managers, or online 
viewers, they can do a better job communicating if we 
communicate that to them directly’. 
 
In addition to retail, radio and the media as influencing factors, Jack also 
relies upon his producers to make acquisition decisions: 
‘Producers are generally important because we speak the same 
language, you know like if it sounds like this or if we do this.’ 
 They bring with them the industry knowledge that will assist the 
company in determining whether, or not, they can create a recorded 
product in which it is worth investing.  Much of the creativity that happens 
with recorded music happens in the studio, once the song being recorded 
is written.  These song producers are a good gauge of the artist and their 
songs and can be an influencing factor to the commercial viability of the 
product coming out of the recording studio. 
 Sam also relies often on friends and business partners in the 
industry to assist him in making artist acquisition decisions: 
‘Yeah there’s been a couple we see without seeing them live (Artists). 
We know it by reputation; you know our friends and what not. But 
yeah we do’. 
The important contacts through friends, attorneys, managers and sheer 
reputation can influence how Hat Punk approaches the signing of the artist.  The 
value and symbolic power that is at stake must be filtered through many 
opinions before a deal is signed.  This again is evidence of a risk mitigation tactic 
involved in the signing of an artist to a record label and an attempt at 
maintaining field status and power.  The risks are high, yet so too are the 
rewards if a record label is able to find the next hit artist and be able to claim 
their involvement in the artist success. 
The Reliance and Trust amongst Colleagues 
In addition to the external macro-level field influences, meso-firm level 
influences also have an impact on artist acquisition with Hat Punk.  These 
influences are employee specific and are a result of an assessment of the firm’s 
skill set, advice seeking and consultation amongst colleagues.  Sam, as has been 
well established, knows how Hat Punk operates, how it is perceived and the 
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strengths and weaknesses of his staff.  He is very explicit in his rationale for 
limiting his signings to certain genres but only after he assesses the capabilities 
of the team: 
‘Well I think that I try to be very nondiscriminatory in my signings. 
When it comes to hip-hop or gospel, I don’t because that requires a 
different set of muscles, and nobody on staff has those muscles’. 
Yet again, he exhibits behaviour of what he knows and what he does not.  
He assesses the strengths of his team to determine who can, or cannot, be signed 
to the label, whether, or not, the artist could be an economic success for them.  
Knowing the company’s limitations enables Sam to limit his risk and exposure of 
his symbolic capital to the field.  If Hat Punk were to take on an artist for whom it 
does not have the proper cultural or social capital to exploit, Sam then puts at 
risk the symbolic capital of the firm as competitors and other artists perceive it.  
One failure in this area influences the reputation of the firm and risks its current 
positioning.  By limiting this type of risk he minimises the unnecessary use of 
capital and can focus the capital of the firm on resources that will enhance its 
field position, not put it at undue risk. 
In addition to the internal assessment of the team, Sam seeks advice on 
specific artist signings from those within the firm that he feels have the 
appropriate embodied industry knowledge and experience and which he can 
trust.  He may at times solicit opinions from the general staff, but he makes it 
clear that this not always the case: 
‘If it’s a new artist for example and they have really good sounding 
demos, yes we would. If it’s a new artist and their demos are really 
rough, then no, because those guys aren’t trained to hear really 
rough demos. That’s not their job, that’s not their skill set’. 
He trusts those that have the skills needed to make these decisions 
and in this case it would be Jack and Philip.  He uses them as a sounding 
board either to reinforce the decision he has already made, or to ‘poke 
holes’ in his thinking and rationale for signing.  This is also true for Jack, he 
holds Sam to a similar standard, as they use each other to determine the 
appropriate ‘fit’ for the firm: 
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‘Yeah, what’s great about me and Sam is we default to each other’s 
strengths and weaknesses respectively. We make decisions together 
and generally it is us as opposed to a staff making the decision. 
Hopefully me and Sam have the foresight to see things not necessarily 
in the commercialised format…I bring things to Sam and Sam brings 
things to me, and there are a lot of both’. 
 This level of trust can only grow through time and positive experiences.  
In a sense, ‘it is earned’ and as both individuals perform to the expectations of 
the other, it develops into a mutual respect between the two.  This has allowed 
them to feel safe, to offer opinions and perspectives, and to put at risk each 
other’s capital.  Seeing it more as an investment in who they are and what they 
can achieve with the resources they both possess.  It is a form of empowerment 
each grants to the other through the trust they have earned.  When putting their 
own capital at risk, it demonstrates vulnerability, but also constrains them to not 
act in haste while having the freedom to act as they see fit to obtain the mutual 
objectives they share.  Jack is very explicit in his feelings about how far the trust 
has developed between them:  
‘After eight years…I think I trust Jeff, I trust his vision. I trust the 
leadership. I trust his financial resources that we are moving 
forward with this company’ 
They have relied upon, and have developed, a sense of commitment to each other 
as they have worked on other projects and signed artists to the label together. 
They depend on each each other, their accumulated cultural and social capital 
and shared value system that allows them to take control over situations when 
needed for the betterment of the firm.   
8.2.3 Conclusion  
This decision, albeit a generalised decision practice that is often gone 
through when Hat Punk is signing a new artist to their label, is one of the more 
heuristic based decisions influenced by past experience and rooted in personal 
bias.  The very field in which these decisions need to be made influences the 
reliance upon these cognitive-based decision patterns.  The field doxa of 
uncertainty, risk mitigation, unlimited supply and an artist’s close affiliation to 
their creative outputs encourages the decision makers reliance upon quick 
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decision making rooted in past experience.  The uncertainty in these decision 
choices is often met with wide input from close internal colleagues and those 
outside the firm, all in the name of risk mitigation.  It is the selection of talent for 
a record label that puts at stake the very motivation behind those making the 
decisions.  No other decision creates such high stakes positively or negatively to 
accumulate the desired capital and positively to position the firm and its 
decision-makers in the field for further power and recognition. 
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 In the previous four chapters, I have outlined the empirical findings and 
thematic analysis derived from the application of the Bourdieu’s practice theory 
to the decision-making practices in popular recorded music industry micro-
enterprises in the United States.  The findings in this thesis provide a rich 
description of the decision practice represented by the eight cases presented in 
Chapters 5 to 8.  Before further discussion, it is worth restating the aims of this 
research: first, how do owner managers within recorded music industry 
microenterprises, in the United States of America make strategic decisions?  
Second, what are the key influences on decision choices using a Bourdieusian 
conceptualisation of decision-making as interplay among social, cultural, 
economic and symbolic capital, habitus, and field?  The principle argument I 
develop here is consistent with Bourdieu’s concept of recognition, and explores 
the desire for individuals in this field to make strategic decisions that will 
position themselves better to acquire and/or use symbolic capital that will lead 
to further power and positioning.  My chosen methodological lens allowed me to 
surface the complex reflexive interplay among Bourdieu’s practice theory and 
the theoretical constructs of strategic decision-making, which led to a deep 
description of the influences on strategic decision-making practices in music 
industry micro-enterprises.  By bringing these nuances to the forefront, my 
analysis leads to a contribution to the decision-making literature for micro-
enterprises as well as music industry theorists and practitioners.     
The interplay between habitus and field, and the leveraging of positioning 
within the field allows for an account that the Bourdieu’s concepts of capital are 
able to provide. The differences between, and reliance upon, each to describe the 
details of the practice is readily suited for an analysis of a creative and culture-
producing field such as the music industry.  However, there are some limitations 
to Bourdieu’s ideas on capital as well as his theories on cultural production when 
applied to the large-scale production of popular recorded music.  Bourdieu 
(1986) and his work on capital and cultural field theory (1984, 1993a, 1996) 
allow for a critical approach to the decision-making practices here, even though 
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his work within his classification of ‘low art’ or ‘popular culture’ (Bourdieu, 
1984), in which much of this industry thrives, is limited.  Therefore, in addition 
to providing a rich description of the strategic decision-making practice, I will 
also position the music industry sub-field within the social space of large-scale 
cultural production.  I contend that Bourdieu has mischaracterised the 
possession of symbolic capital among actors within the field.   In addition, I will 
argue that in order to transform capital from one form to another, for example, 
social or economic capital into symbolic capital, there is a need for a field specific 
capital, in this case music industry capital that is used as a negotiating aid when 
agents vie for power and positioning within the music industry. 
9.2 Key Findings 
9.2.1 The Link Between Social Capital, Habitus and Field  
In an actor’s quest for recognition, a path towards leveraging social 
capital was seen as a prominent influencer among the decisions studied and the 
actors who were involved in making them.  In a field that relies heavily on the 
use of ‘team inputs’ or key advisors, be it managers, booking agents, barristers or 
other colleagues that have accumulated a desired level of cultural capital, the 
reliance upon them was evident.  Whether it was to maintain a current position 
and to see continued success, or an overt attempt at accumulating more social 
capital, each actor’s desire for this asset impacted the decision-practice in 
helping to decide how a decision choice would be made.  This was apparent as 
Jack relied upon his network to make talent selection decisions.  ‘Most of the 
things we have worked with have come from some kind of referral’.  Although the 
details of these comments were discussed in Chapter 8, it summarises the 
dependence upon those networks.  Sam and Jack trust and empower others that 
refer the artists with whom they eventually sign deals.  This is also true for those 
seeking professional referrals ‘Who you hang out with, says a lot about who you 
are’.  Actors rely on one another when a certain level of trust is obtained.  
Bstieler (2006) found that trust is established when communication and fairness 
in interaction between actors have occurred over time and where high levels of 
trust have contributed to successful outcomes.  His research also determined 
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that higher levels of trust differentiate between better and less effective 
outcomes in new product development decisions.  Signing new artists and 
releasing new albums would be considered new product development, and the 
behaviours within these cases demonstrate this.    
Each of the decisions in this research provides evidence of the need for 
the decision-maker to seek out people they trust within their social network to 
aid them in making strategic decisions.  Joe sought advice internally from Lilly, 
helping him see things from a different perspective and often enabling him to 
move beyond his bias, in which he may have been emotionally involved.  
Knowing this, Joe felt he could go to her often and seek input on bigger decisions.  
She offered up sound advice in an unpredictable field.  She provided an outlet for 
him in which an understanding of the contracts that are needed to mitigate risk 
could be weighed, negotiating an environment that is overloaded with potential 
products and an active and potentially powerful audience (Negus, 1997).  This 
doubt that can accompany new things (Bstieler, 2006) can be offset, at least 
temporarily, in order for the decision-maker to feel better informed about the 
choice as they balance the return on investment when advice is sought. 
 Jack and the team at Hat Punk, LLC are also able to shed light on this 
relationship in the role the field plays.  Their artist selection decisions are made 
with the explicit referral of those other actors in the field with whom they have 
established trust.  Although some of the decisions analysed demonstrated the 
need for the decision-maker to seek internal or external counsel in making 
decisions, a major decision such as the signing of an artist to the label will not be 
considered unless they are filtered through their network.  At times, as long as 
trust has been established between the two actors, social capital is seen as a 
necessary gatekeeper to those artists or ‘professionals’ that are seeking the 
power held by the firm that has acquired it.  It becomes a trusted network, that 
is, a perpetual screening device, as long as the capital is maintained.  When an 
agent deliberately seeks to expand his social capital in an effort to better their 
positioning within the field, the agent’s SDM is influenced by how much the 
network can be expanded. 
This was true for Joe at Kapooshki with both of his decisions that were 
studied.  His purposeful choice to expand his network enabled him to achieve 
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better radio promotion opportunities as well as his intentional expansion of his 
company.  Here, among other things, was an attempt at expanding his political 
reach by acquiring contacts at other management companies, labels and 
agencies.  This was also true for David at Bench Puppet and his office relocation; 
he was attempting to better his chances at expanding his social network.  The 
connection between position in the field and deliberate attempts at social capital 
acquisition are apparent.  The less prominent position held, as perceived by the 
decision-maker, the more deliberate the attempts were to analyse decision 
choices through the lens of a potential expansion of the network.    
 Using your network as a ‘gatekeeper’, or relying upon it to either maintain 
or accumulate more social capital, are two motivating factors.  Trust within an 
actor’s social capital aids in alleviating uncertainty, abating risk and minimising 
an insecure disposition.  Often decision-makers sought out other managers, 
booking agents, barristers or fans when seeking advice.  Mitigating risk or 
uncertainty, as much as can be done in this industry, has been found to be quite 
prominent by the use of contracts or ‘A-listers’ (Caves, 2000).  What Caves did 
not identify, however, was that an agent’s network or social capital also aids in 
trying to offset risk and the wasteful use of economic, social or symbolic capital 
when leveraging position or seeking success.  The agent’s social capital helps 
decision-makers by seeking advice or using their network to ‘see things they may 
not’, an example of which was just discussed above when the individuals at Hat 
Punk, LLC used their professional connections as a gatekeeper to artist 
acquisitions.  In addition, seeking out personal friends and old colleagues on how 
to proceed on a choice was also evident.  This was the case for Sam at Hat Punk, 
LLC and Cisco Newman when he sought advice from an old friend and manager.  
It also transpired when Joe was soliciting input from Lilly at Kapooshki.  This 
type of advice-seeking is certainly not uncommon in strategic decision-making 
processes across firms outside this field, but the role it plays in reinforcing the 
attempt at mitigating risk in this culture producing and creative field is an 
important one. Coupling the uncertainty with the infinite variety of the product 
available to the consumer and the limited time to exploit it (Caves, 2000) creates 
a cauldron of field-driven factors that must be considered by actors when 
deciding on these strategic decisions. The habitus driven reaction is to seek out 
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those you trust the most, either to confirm your bias toward the decision in 
order to give the actor the courage to proceed, or to act as a type of ‘devil’s 
advocate’ to aid in seeing things that the actor alone is incapable of seeing.  There 
is no doubt that in today’s broader economic field the role of risk mitigation is 
common, especially as the business environment has become more global and 
turbulent.  However, when you factor in the scrupulous consumer of music, 
where trends can be fleeting and time-sensitive, it creates an even more 
challenging environment to manage since broader societal forces influence most 
of those trends.  Having an adequate amount of knowledge of these trends aids in 
trying to combat this uncertainty, but the decision-maker sees their social 
capital, and the earned trust between them, as a way to assist in that process as 
well. 
Since uncertainty and infinite variety abound in the field, there is doubt in 
the mind of the decision-maker.  This doubt can at times lead to a sense of 
insecurity on how to proceed with a decision.  This doubt can be triggered 
through a negative past experience that that then triggers a decision-making 
heuristic, or even simply a negative reaction from someone in your network.  It is 
then, that the decision-makers were found to rely on their social capital to 
mitigate this sense of ‘insecurity’ and rely on the trust that has been earned.  The 
field tends to reinforce this insecure disposition and is why an actor will consult 
with friends and/or colleagues to offset it, at least temporarily until the decision 
has been made.  Cisco Newman admitted that he sought his old manager’s advice 
to make him feel better about what he was deciding.  David at Bench Puppet 
looked to family, purposely going outside the field for perspective and even 
when Joe was uncertain about how to move forward with a major decision, he 
would seek out Lily’s perspective.  
9.2.2 The Link Between Cultural Capital, Habitus and Field  
How the actor interprets the industry doxa and sees their role within the 
field impacts the decision-making practice.   Industry knowledge, doxa and 
habitus driven risk aversion affects potential deliberate and interpretive 
decision choices.  If industry trends are not well understood, especially those 
related to the production of culture, actors would struggle to be successful at 
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making decisions with a favourable outcome.  Consumer sentiment and the 
‘uncertainty of demand’ can be minimised by the actor by continuing to 
understand market trends, new artists and consumer tastes.  In order to do so 
they must embody this industry knowledge through experience, or be aided 
institutionally through academia. 
If a recognised lack of knowledge in a specific genre culture (Negus, 1999) 
of the industry is present, avoidance toward a specific decision can occur, as was 
the case for Sam at Hat Punk, LLC.  Sam acknowledges that a lack of 
understanding exists with him and his staff about a specific genre culture, which 
influences his artist selection choices, thereby affecting the decision outcomes. 
Sam’s lack of experience, interest and exposure to a specific style of music has 
influenced his perception of it, thereby avoiding any major decisions that would 
bring an artist of that genre to the label. 
  For David at Bench Puppet, his lack of understanding of how a project 
can escalate out of control negatively influenced his decision choice.  His lack of 
embodied knowledge of the potential pitfalls caught him off guard – indicating a 
lack of experience and understanding. In addition, the lack of embodied 
knowledge on industry doxa influenced Joe at Kapooshki in his desire to expand 
his company.  Joe’s desire to learn fostered a disposition that drove him to 
believe that he could benefit from acquiring knowledge about different industry 
subsectors.   His desire to further his understanding of the industry was not only 
driven by his habitus, but also reinforced by the field.   He was already in the 
business as a promoter and agent.  And, thus, able to understand how 
management, publishing and other aspects of the industry would assist him to 
accumulate further capital, in all forms.   
 Institutionalised cultural capital appeared to have little impact on the 
decision-making in these cases. One exception was that Joe at Kapooshki proudly 
proclaimed his education both of the field, through his economics and legal 
education, which then permeated through his understanding of the industry.  All 
other actors studied made no reference to the credentials of higher education as 
playing an important role in the decision practice.  It was characterised as either 
‘gut feeling’ or an intuitive reaction that they relied on for direction when making 
certain decisions.   This was particularly relevant when artist selection decisions 
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were being made at Hat Punk, LLC, as well as larger marketing decisions made 
by Cisco when releasing his album.  The role of intuition, or following ones ‘gut’, 
as a mode of embodied capital appeared to sit in high regard, as though it was 
the only way to make the decision since the actor’s relied on this method so 
often.  It is an answer to an unknown, something that the decision-makers ‘can’t 
put a finger on’ when it comes to what their, or the consumer’s, reaction may be 
to a song or decision related to that song or the artist who performs it.   
The embodiment of industry knowledge coupled with intuitive 
behaviours in the decision practice becomes an iterative process rooted in 
the use of anchoring and adjustment heuristics and personal bias.  
Preferring one song, or artist, to another for promotion or acquisition, and 
interpreting the success of them was done through the decision-makers 
own lens and bias.  This perspective is then coupled with the trends of the 
market, which creates a level of uncertainty that makes logical and 
analytical practices nearly ineffective, due to the uncertainty of success 
with music products, even though attempts were revealed of their use 
with Joe at Kapooshki. The personal bias that accompany the decision-
makers preference for one artist to sign are rooted in a heuristic, which 
then reinforces the self-identified ‘gut feeling’, or intuitive behavior.  Jack 
felt as if a song or artist would be successful based upon his ‘gut feeling’, 
then that feeling must be influenced by what he has seen, heard and 
experienced prior to the decision at hand – but done so subconsciously.  
This experience is a culmination of his habitus and the past success and 
failures of music in which he has been engaged.  It creates an atmosphere 
of information where short cut cognitive decision practices, like anchoring 
and adjustment heuristics are used to help him with these decisions that 
then become self-reinforcing.  This embodiment of knowing, when it is felt, 
is not something that can be taught through a formal education or 
institution.  
Although Bourdieu (1986) also discussed the objectified form of cultural 
capital in his work, it did not play a direct role in the marketing and promotion of 
popular music in the cases analysed here.  Objectified cultural capital certainly 
does play a role in the actual recording of the music to be packaged and sold, 
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with the knowledge needed to run the recording equipment that facilitates the 
creation of this cultural product, but little evidence of its involvement is shown 
here due to the nature of the decisions. 
 The presence of embodied cultural capital over institutionalised and 
objectified has shown to be a dominant form used in these decisions.  Along with 
the impacts of understanding industry rules, the use of cultural capital as a 
leveraging tool, whether explicitly or implicitly through a more intuitive 
approach, to increase stature in the industry is widely used, albeit less so than 
other forms of capital yet to be discussed.  The understanding of the field and 
what is needed to market and promote popular music with success is not 
something that is well understood, even to some that consider this to be their 
career.  It is yet again the very nature of the industry characteristics that are 
elusive, such as, the uncertainty of demand, the closeness of the creation to the 
creator and the endless supply of product (Caves, 2000) that impact how 
decisions are to be perceived and made. 
9.2.3 The Influence of Emotion – The Link between Field and Habitus 
When examining how decisions were made and the influential factors 
that contributed to them, the emotional state of an actor was found to impact the 
practice.  An ‘emotion’ is a state of mind that is derived from one’s 
circumstances, mood or relationships with others, or any of the particular 
feelings that characterise such a state of mind, which scholars (Ekman, 1992) 
(Velasquez, 1998) have come to classify as emotional systems.  These systems 
include, but are not limited to, joy/happiness, anger, distress/sadness, fear, 
disgust or surprise along with secondary systems that may divide each system 
further.  Mood is often associated with emotion and tends to be influenced by 
character, disposition and personality, which are also manifestations of the 
habitus.  It is an outward expression by the actor influenced by the field, 
subfields and negotiated through the transformation of the capital they possess.  
An emotional state can be triggered by cognitive or non-cognitive reactions, the 
latter of which are generated by physical objects and when applied to this 
industry can manifest themselves from objectified forms of cultural or symbolic 
capital like the Billboard charts, or industry created and recognised awards like 
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the Grammy, Dove or American Music.  In addition, emotions are also driven by 
memories or past experiences (Valasquez, 1998), and are indicative of influential 
characteristics that have been shown to influence strategic decision-making.   
In addition to his discussion about emotional states, Velasquez (1998) 
proposes a model based upon decision-making by emotion.  Within this model, 
the role of perception, drive, behaviour and motor systems create a non-linear 
process.  How we perceive a situation initiates our inner drives or ‘motivational 
systems’ that trigger an actor into action.  Emotional states are generated by 
those drives, which result in the behaviours taken.  Although this is not a critique 
of the model, or an extended review of the literature that has contributed to the 
role that emotion has played in decision-making, it is worth noting the influential 
systems that can affect an actor’s behaviour.  In light of these explanations, 
Bourdieu enables us to connect these systems through the habitus and an actor’s 
capital when making strategic decisions within this industry. 
Evidence of the emotional state of the actors studied in these cases were 
limited but did show its influential aspects, specifically that of fear, happiness 
and excitement.  When discussing the downside to many of these decisions, or 
what could go wrong if they did not manifest themselves in the way the decision-
maker had hoped or anticipated, it was made clear that ‘fear of failure’ was often 
‘assumed’.  Fear can ‘detect a dangerous situation and generate defensive 
responses that maximize the probability of surviving it’ (Valasquez, 1998, p. 3).  It 
was evident that fear can manifest itself in many shapes and forms, as it were 
here.  The actor would be driven by the perception of, or their underlying 
emotional fear that would influence their behaviour in, how they saw or chose to 
proceed with the decision.  As was shown, because of the business structure of 
micro-enterprises, it is more difficult for the owner/managers to separate 
themselves from the identity of the business; therefore personal character, 
reputation and livelihoods are at stake.  If a criticism of the firm is made, it 
carries through more easily to the owner/manager personally.  It becomes more 
difficult to remain objective and keep the business and its reputation at a 
distance, personally and emotionally.  This inability to separate emotionally from 
a business that operates in a field driven by perception, uncertainty and a ‘who 
has worked for whom’ mentality to leverage positioning drives this fear.  
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Unpredictability breeds uncertainty that drives the fear.  Fear that you will lose 
your social or professional connections, fear of losing your economic resources 
that feed your livelihood or, as Joe, from Kapooshki, clearly put it ‘fear of being 
perceived ‘as nothing special’; the antithesis of ‘recognition’.  
In addition to this fear of being perceived as ‘nothing special’ in an 
industry that recognises, rewards and elevates those that are ‘special’ is the 
influence that past experience has on driving fear.  In a specific instance, Cisco’s 
past experience told him that he could easily lose much of his social capital if a 
major decision was not carefully thought through.  Driven by a fear of losing his 
fans if they felt that he was a ‘has been’, or no longer ‘anything special’, was 
influenced by his past experience when fluctuations in his fan base had resulted 
in loss of income and inability to continue his business as usual.  The need to 
stand out or be at the forefront of the ‘up and coming’ or ‘the next biggest thing’ 
drives the popularity and economic bloodline of an industry that relies on 
profiting from new cultural trends. 
As fear plays a role in the struggle for capital acquisition in this field 
within the decision-practice, so does happiness and excitement.  Many of the 
actors and the decisions analysed were often driven by the ‘exciting prospects’ 
and the potential rewards of what their decision might bring.  This ‘excitement’ 
was often grounded in hoping to meet influential people, to learn more about the 
industry, the anticipation of economic rewards, or simply to be seen as influential 
to other professionals or fans.  Each of these prospects, the accumulation of 
capital in varying types and degrees, was seen as a way for the actor to make a 
decision in a specific way, one that would lead to its accumulation for further 
leverage at a future time.  If a decision-maker sees the potential of networking or 
connecting with an ‘A-list’ (Caves, 2000) producer or label president, they can 
then see that social capital could lead to the transformation into economic 
capital or marketing support to acquire a hit record.   It is also worth noting that 
the person’s time ‘playing the game’ within the field, that is, the longer they have 
been in business and the greater their leverage of their position with the capital 
they have acquired, the more inclined they were to pursue their idea of 
happiness.  This pursuit was rooted in their decision-making.  As Cisco clearly 
stated: 
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‘At this point I need to channel my energy to things that will make 
me feel happy’, 
 Or, in some cases, concern about their age and the length of time in the industry 
affected the decision-practice: 
‘…we ask ourselves what do we want to be doing, at this point, what 
makes us happy, even though you’re making bread, you’re dealing with 
people that you don’t want to be dealing with or doing stuff you don’t 
want to do, that don’t make you happy.’  I’m 40, he’s 46, we don’t want 
to be doing a bunch of shit we don’t want to be doing’. 
In both cases, whether in reference to projects or making smaller, tactical 
decisions to ‘keep the lights on’ and ‘pay the bills,’ the pursuit of happiness and 
present emotional state of their mind impacted how they saw the potential 
outcome of their decision.   Each decision for them is seen through this lens 
throughout the decision practice and, in the end, each is asking themselves 
whether the return on investment, or capital accumulation would be worth the 
price to be paid in ‘happiness’.   
The economic field and the recorded music industry subfield influence 
this strong desire of ‘doing things that will make them happy’.  The pursuit of 
recognition and the capital needed to leverage their position to get them 
ultimately to that ‘happiness’ have influenced the actor’s perception of the 
industry doxa as do others pursuing the same thing.  Being influenced by past 
experience and having ‘been burned’ by others, or pursuing projects that have 
cost them capital that had amounted to little, have left a habitus tainted with 
doubt, leaving the pursuit of projects that will satisfy their disposition positively 
at the forefront of why a strategic decision will be made a certain way.  Age also 
appears to factor in as well, as it relates to body wisdom.  As Sam put it in his 
desire to avoid a ‘bunch of shit’, that leaves little tolerance for taking on projects 
that are not going to achieve his intended aim.  They are less likely to respect 
certain industry rules if they know they are going to have to deal with things that 
will cause unhappiness and anxiety.  The actors understand that this must be 
dealt with to a certain degree, but by weighing the alternatives demonstrates 
that an emotional state influences the strategic decision-making practice. 
It could be concluded that this is likely to be no different from any other 
decision-maker needing to make strategic decisions in other fields, but what 
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makes this field function the way it does lies in the actor’s overwhelming desire 
for prestige – rooted in the popularity and fame that come with success on a 
regional, national or international level.  This ‘prestige’ is discussed in more 
detail in 9.2.5 below and explains the industry-specific rationale.  
9.2.4 The changing Industry: Impacting the Transformation of Capital  
The recorded music industry and the changes within the past decade have 
brought opportunity for some and challenges for others. With the shifting 
industry supply chain, has come a modification of industry doxa, especially with 
regard to the power available to those transforming capital in attempts at 
maintaining, or escalating, their industry ‘class’ positioning. This is not a timeline 
comparison of a ‘pre- and post-introduction of MP3 technology’ and the precise 
changes that have occurred, but rather an examination of how the decision 
practice has been impacted.  Actor attitudes related to perceived risk, the 
disintermediation of the supply chain (Tuomola, 2004) and how decision-
makers leverage the capital they possess, will be discussed.   
The attempts of risk mitigation have been a part of the industry since its 
inception through the use of contracts, but knowing that risk can be minimised 
by the symbolic capital of others has also proven to be useful.   The evidence of 
this came from Cisco when he sought a publishing deal from a prominent 
international publisher.  By associating himself and his company with this firm 
enabled him to mitigate his risk, not only through contracting with them on 
favourable terms, but by associating his name with their symbolic capital.  That 
capital, along with the precedence of success made his decision ultimately to sign 
with Henson less risky. By associating himself with the firm’s ‘symbolic capital’ 
gave the perception of relevance and legitimacy to others in the industry.  This 
was also the case for David and Bench Puppet Entertainment in his desire to 
relocate his company to Music Row.  He too, was mitigating his risk by 
geographic location in the hope of associating himself with the perception that 
came with doing business ‘on the row.’ By associating oneself or one’s business 
with another’s more prominent reputation, or possession of capital, has been 
shown to impact the decision-practice.   
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In addition, the disintermediation of the supply change (Tuomola, 2004) 
has allowed artists and decision-makers that possess less social, economic and 
symbolic capital access to social networks, audiences, fans and markets that they 
did not have before.  These changes enabled those who occupy the lower 
echelons of power in the industry more opportunities to leverage their capital 
for better positioning.  
Distributing one’s own album, as was the case for Cisco, would have been 
a moot point ten years ago, for he would have had limited access to formal 
distribution beyond that of a live event.  Changing technology has enabled Cisco 
to consider this kind of decision, let alone how to leverage what he has, to strive 
for a favourable outcome.  This was also true for David at Bench Puppet, for his 
business was built and sustained on this easier access to the consumer.  The 
changing industry doxa have allowed more people to see others enjoying or 
seeing value in something that they would not have been able to in the past.  
Even though others will want to ‘get on the bandwagon’ of a hot new artist, which 
is nothing new for popular music, the easier accessibility and ability for fans to 
share mp3s of their favourite music has allowed a level of fan engagement never 
before seen.  This has enabled artists who possess less social and economic 
capital opportunity to influence what they do possess.  Similarities can also be 
found in access and leveraging of economic capital.  Access to consumers takes 
less economic resources for some than prior to disintermediation.  Choosing to 
produce and market his own album and being able to reach his audience beyond 
his immediate geographical area is a reality for Cisco only because of these 
changes.  Being able to record an album or EP at a fraction of the cost and having 
access to distribute that album and promote it have enabled him to transform 
less economic capital for more social and potentially symbolic capital.   
On the other hand, those companies who have seen this disintermediation 
in the supply chain, the major record companies, have struggled to maintain 
their positioning by finding access to economic capital dwindling (RIAA, 2011) 
and the consequences of capital transformation more complex, as the social and 
cultural capital once needed for distribution of records have broken down 
leaving it accessible to many more artists and businesses.  The changing 
distribution system and expansion of social media, and the access both provide 
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have made it more difficult for those who possess more symbolic capital.   The 
increase in competition by these new firms have easier access to the distribution 
system and tools to promote their product. Because competition and ‘unlimited 
access’ to product perpetuates the field, fewer economic resources are being 
funnelled to those who traditionally controlled all access to the supply chain.  
This has made transformation of economic capital into symbolic capital a 
challenge, posing greater risk of maintaining the power and position they hold.  
This was true for Sam’s buyout of the assets, whereby the very reason this 
decision was an option, was because the company that sold the brand to him no 
longer possessed the economic capital needed to sustain the position in the field.  
This is also evident in the contracts that artists are being offered by firms such as 
Hat Punk, LLC.  The ‘sharing of risk’ speaks to the dwindling economic capital 
available to these firms, whereby they push some of that risk, which traditionally 
would be taken on by the label in full, onto the artist.  This is also seen in the 
kinds of contracts being offered.  When a firm like Hat Punk, LLC ‘shares in the 
risk’ they are offering what the industry calls 360° deals when the sharing of 
revenue from all sources is undertaken, not just the resources that come from 
the direct sale of the recording.   
The changing rules that dictate the industry and how actors choose to 
leverage their capital has impacted the types of decisions being seen and how 
they are seen.  This has provided opportunities for some and difficulties for 
others, but the dynamism within these changes has shown that the motivation is 
still the same.  Each actor and their company continue to vie for power and 
recognition despite the changes and access to those resources and to what 
degree one may be needed to transform the other.    
9.2.5 The Influence of Symbolic Capital on Habitus and Field 
 
The practice of strategic decision-making was often dictated by the 
individual’s concern for reputation and how others perceived their respective 
firms.  ‘Aggrandising’ provided a perception of legitimacy through an illusion of 
having greater social and symbolic capital.  This idea of an inflated self, has an 
intimate connection between the habitus, field and capital one possesses. 
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Aggrandisement will be used when a lack of cultural, social and economic capital 
is unable to be transformed by the actor into symbolic capital. 
It is a phenomenon that is implemented when an imbalance between a 
lack of cultural, social and economic capital is unable to be transformed by the 
actor into symbolic capital.  It is a conscious transformation of capital that occurs 
when an actor understands the importance that symbolic capital plays in field 
positioning.  It becomes a habitus-driven choice to use it in order to offset the 
imbalance that exists, details of which will follow later in this section.  Those 
firms that have yet to achieve prominent levels of cultural and social capital, like 
the decisions made by Cisco, Kapooshki Music and Bench Puppet entertainment, 
all felt compelled to use this in order to be seen as a legitimate actor and/or 
company with which to do business.   
Because symbolic capital is ‘accumulated prestige and power’ that 
‘contributes fundamentally to the social order (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991), the 
decision-maker’s motivation to inflate his position, or the micro-enterprise that 
they own or manage, is seen as a way, by them, to be an active player in pursuit 
of the higher social order, without actually possessing large amounts of symbolic 
capital.  This imbalance in capital was seen by Kapooshki as an opportunity to 
network by creating separate legal entities: a booking agency, a management and 
consulting firm, a music publishing company and a live events division. This was 
a tactical way to create a horizontally integrated synergy to help establish 
contacts within these other business sectors while establishing the perceived 
credibility with the other people and businesses in which they were involved.  It 
was also needed to offset the lack of knowledge within these business sectors 
that Joe recognised as a deficiency.  He could learn from the other businesses, 
establishing contacts to assist in this education, but could not do so without 
being taken seriously by those who had accumulated more symbolic capital with 
which he desired to be associated.  The decisions to set-up the separate legal 
entities and to be seen as a strong business by exploited past chart achievements 
was triggered by his previous attempts at conducting business within a field 
without the required capital. 
This attempt to off-set the lack of transformable capital and be seen as a 
company with which others want to do business manifested itself not only in a 
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superficial attempt at an expansion of the company, but also through association 
of where company headquarters would be located.  This was evident in David’s 
choice to move to the highly symbolic ‘music row’, but was also the case for 
Kapooshki in Joe’s decision to locate his company in a business sector that was 
not typically associated with an established music epicenter.  However, the 
motivation behind each of these geographic associations was the same, that is, to 
have an elevated perception of the business by the macro-environment.  In Joe’s 
case, it was more regional, to be seen as a ‘big fish in a small pond’.  He felt he had 
the confidence and the drive to overcome the hurdles of having his business 
located in a non-music epicenter and chose to focus on the potential benefits - to 
be perceived as a substantial contributor to the local economic, political and 
music scene.  This enabled him to satisfy his imbalance in symbolic capital by 
leaving a ‘larger than life’ impact at a local level.  He planned to establish further 
social and cultural capital by having a closer, yet larger network within the area 
while being perceived as knowledgeable about an industry that was 
geographically separated, like Nashville, thus raising his locally perceived 
symbolic capital.   Although David’s desire to move his company was also 
motivated by his lack of other types of capital to transform into symbolic, his 
motivations drove him to be a small fish in a large pond on ‘music row’.  This can 
be accounted for by his own perceived value in that association and what he felt 
it could bring him and his company and his innate sense of ‘pride’ disguised as 
insecurity and a sense of uncertainty. 
It would be a mistake suddenly to organise the use of aggrandisement 
only by the firm. It must be understood that the evidence in each of these 
decisions provides a varying degree of its use for personal inflation as well.  In 
the case of the sole-proprietors and the DIY artists that are so prominent in the 
music industry, the line of business and the person are often blurred and difficult 
to separate – so then is the use of aggrandisement.  Cisco demonstrated this 
clearly with the concern for his reputation when releasing his album.  Cisco’s 
decision to release the EP became a semiotic debate that was rooted in how he 
would be perceived by his fans.  Other actors were concerned for their 
reputations, but approached its use in a different manner by dropping big name 
artists or producers they had worked with, or by associating themselves with 
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other more successful acts. ‘Giving off a cool vibe or certain level of success 
or…having the posh office space’ lends itself to certain credibility for other actors, 
that they might not otherwise have.  Not to mention the self-assurance that 
comes with its use.  The choice to aggrandise becomes a value judgement in 
which the personal dispositions of the habitus may vary, depending upon age, 
social status or past experiences, but nevertheless is seen as an important 
attribute to project.  It enables the actor to satisfy this value-laden perception 
and give off a ‘cool factor’ or an ‘it factor’ that much of this industry is centred on 
for economic success.  It is a trend setting culture producing industry, that each 
of these actors, their firms and decisions come from and much of the finding and 
breaking of new talent is dependent upon being the company or person that can 
make that happen. The macro-environment and industry characteristics have a 
strong influence here and the decision-maker understands that the odds of 
working with the next successful act could bring them the economic and 
symbolic success they desire.  Putting forth an inflated sense of oneself in order 
to increase the odds of working with the next ‘breakout’ artist or company 
becomes a strategic decision-making choice, and a strategic one that is then 
decided in favour of, or against, depending upon the habitus.   
The prominent use of aggrandisement is also directly related to an agent’s 
confidence and their perceived ability to ‘play the game.’ With the field doxa, and 
the lack of certain types of capital already established as a way to justify its use, 
the decision-maker chooses to exercise their agency, which can be attributed to 
an insecure disposition, but its actual application is also determined by the 
actor’s desire for and contentment with self-promotion. Self-promotion, whether 
it is on behalf of the company they own or operate, or for personal advancement, 
takes a certain degree of confidence to execute.  If this confidence does not exist, 
an inferiority complex may abound, especially as an actor in this field sees what 
their competitors have been able to obtain regarding artist associations, chart 
success, earned awards or field status.  An inferiority complex – ‘a feeling of 
intense insecurity, inferiority or of not measuring up’ helps to guard against one’s 
self esteem, or lack of prominent positioning, in the field.  One such attempt was 
through a concern for reputation, as was the case for David’s motivation behind 
his desire to escalate risk, as well as Cisco’s choice to release an EP over an 
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album – each of them providing evidence of a lack of confidence in abilities or 
current status in the industry.  
In the case of a confidant decision-maker, the need to artificially inflate 
one’s position was not used.  When Sam, the key decision-maker for Hat Punk, 
LLC, was contemplating the buyout of assets from Axis media, there was no 
evidence that personal or business level aggrandisement occurred.   This was 
more of an ‘individual’ choice, an internal one being contemplated by Sam.  
Although factors such as the current financial state of the company and its parent 
company’s decision to divest the assets of the label, coupled with the recording 
industries uncertain environment, there was no evident need to offset a lack of 
social capital, financial resources, or knowledge of the company and/or industry.  
He was driven more by his personal commitment to the company derived from 
his past experience and his ability to recognise an opportunity through his use of 
a representativeness heuristic and ‘gut feelings’.  He then used more logical and 
analytical tactics to confirm these decision choices by bringing in accountants 
and lawyers, and budgeting the feasibility of his options.   
Because of the imbalance between symbolic capital and other types of capital, 
the decision-maker felt it necessary to inflate his or accomplishments to 
artificially elevate their position.  This is supported by Bourdieu’s idea of 
transformation, where symbolic capital must and can only be accumulated 
through its transformation of other capital types.  The prominence that this 
capital has been given can be and is only given by the actors within the field who 
have chosen to play by its doxa– similar to that of recognition – in which 
Bourdieu has made clear that society alone can satisfy. Therefore, the motivation 
to accumulate and transform the capital originates in the habitus, similar to the 
desire to aggrandise, even though each decision-maker viewed the symbolic 
capital and their own motivation for it through a personal lens.   
Joe, possessing small amounts of symbolic capital, sees himself as a ‘big fish in 
a small pond,’ which leads to a negative perception of how he feels he is 
perceived in large music epicenters.   This drives his need to associate with key 
decision-makers to help him pursue the social capital needed in order to 
transform it into symbolic capital, thereby increasing the opportunities for its 
use so that he can conduct business.  However, inflating one’s accomplishments 
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would vary depending upon how the actor perceived the potential outcomes and 
rewards.  An objectified form of symbolic capital, the industry charts, motivated 
Joe from Kapooshki, as they did for Jack, Sam and Philip from Hat Punk, LLC.  The 
differences between them, however, lie in the amount of social, economic, 
cultural and symbolic capital each already hold.  Joe, motivated by the 
accumulation of capital - so that an upward mobility in the field could occur - and 
Sam, Jack and Philip, motivated by maintaining the class position currently 
occupied.  
 The impetus to accumulate the necessary capital in order to achieve the 
desired level of symbolic capital is a strong and powerful motivator.  Not only 
does an actor’s drive for capital accumulation play a prominent role in the 
decision-practice as the habitus is influenced by the positions within the field, 
the mere notion of ‘association’ is believed to foster a ‘quicker’ path to legitimate 
acquisition.  Cisco Newman and his decisions were rooted in this association, as 
was David’s use of prominent artists and names on his website promoting his 
services.  David felt that if he could show potential clients, and others with higher 
amounts of symbolic capital, that he has worked with or has been associated 
with these more ‘prominent’ clients, it could lead to the acquisition of more 
business for him from well established artists and other companies.  In some 
cases it had enabled him to accumulate further social and economic capital, 
which he was then able to transform into the symbolic capital he desires.  
Association with other more prominent artists tells others that you ‘have what it 
takes to get things done’ and achieve what others are after – this is cyclical for 
Hat Punk, LLC.  They are the more established firm possessing the higher 
amounts of symbolic capital and associating themselves with prominent artists 
reinforces their positioning.  It shows they have the social and cultural capital 
needed.  Associations with more prominently positioned people or firms in the 
field also indicates to others that you do have the knowledge and network 
needed to ‘sit at that table’ as does the association with a prominent business 
cluster like ‘music row’.  The ‘awarding’ of gold and platinum record 
certifications, Grammy and Dove awards or ceremonies to recognition like 
American Music Awards and the Grammys, are industry-constructed vehicles to 
that ‘recognition’.  By associating oneself with those individuals or firms that 
   281 
 
have been ‘recognised’ also demonstrates that you have the knowledge and 
network to make it happen as well.   
In addition to the decision-maker’s concern for reputation and perception 
were the explicit and implicit exploitation of objectified cultural capital and 
symbolic capital.  This was often seen as a necessary practice to achieving the 
firm’s objectives while maintaining or achieving a higher-class position within 
the field.  This was often related to the level of ‘success’ in the field. When 
adequate levels of cultural, social and symbolic capital are achieved, as perceived 
by the actor within the field, the rapid demise of the explicit use of 
aggrandisement occurs.   This was most evident by the one firm who has 
achieved those levels – Hat Punk, LLC.   In Hat Punk’s second decision – the 
signing of an artist to the label – the actors of the firm were much less outspoken 
about who they work with, what had been accomplished, their current 
reputation, or where their office is located when making artist acquisition 
decisions.  Not explicitly, anyway, but implicitly through the use of objectified 
forms of symbolic capital in the prominent display of awards, gold and platinum 
records and other forms of field generated and reinforced recognition.  This 
provided a sense of legitimacy to those artists they were courting.  Being less 
explicit about inflating the company’s accomplishments was only evidenced 
within Hat Punk, LLC, the one firm of the four discussed here, that had 
accumulated a certain level of cultural, social and economic capital that was 
transformed into the objectified symbolic capital.   
Although no specific measurement was made in this study on ‘capital 
levels’ acquired by each, I can conclude that the more symbolic capital a firm 
possesses, the less degree of aggrandisement that occurs. There is no need for 
the actors to compensate for something that may be missing, like the recognition 
and symbolism of success in the field.  The decision-makers in these situations 
were much less willing to ‘drop names’ of artists, producers or other firms of 
which they have associated with.  This was seen more as a way to prove 
something by an individual or firm and was approached with caution when done.  
They felt, that their record often spoke for itself and an aggrandisement 
behaviour seen as a way to ‘hide something’ that wasn’t there.  They felt that their 
success had been earned and their position solidified and the need to ‘talk 
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themselves up’, unproductive.  The other decisions from the other less prominent 
firms had acquired less capital of all types, power and status in the field.  If the 
objectified forms of symbolic capital had been obtained, the explicit use in those 
decisions would diminish as the confidence in the actor increased and the 
implicit use of aggrandisement would occur to maintain power and status.   
If the actors possess a certain amount of confidence and symbolic capital 
already, whether it be through past or current dispositions or the attainment of a 
higher class fraction within the field, the exaggerated use of accomplishments or 
status can be seen by those actors as a way to ‘side step’ the natural process of 
symbolic power accumulation.  They are able, at times, to ‘recognise’ the use of 
this false perception being projected and see it for its deceptiveness, or attempt 
at ‘making up for something’ that might not be there.  It is a way of ‘seeing 
through’ the attempts of self-inflation that can often only come through past 
experience.  Clearly, this can have the opposite effect for those who do inflate 
their accomplishments, their network or their knowledge. 
 The desired accumulation of, or maintenance of, this power through the 
implicit or explicit use of exerting one’s status also serves as a strategy to force a 
perceived or actual upward mobility within the industry class-fraction.  ‘The 
symbols are the symbols of par excellence of ‘social integration,’ which contributes 
fundamentally to the reproduction of the social order.’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 166).  
These recognition symbols, have transformed themselves from objectified forms 
of cultural capital to that of symbolic capital. They are structured and structuring 
forms of knowledge that help to ensure that one class dominates another’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991 p. 167).  When one actor and their corresponding firm lacks the 
desired capital needed or desired, they will then make an explicit decision to be 
seen by the dominated class within the field as ‘one of them.’  This was evidenced 
through Joe’s decision to set-up separate legal entities for his firm, the deliberate 
choice to be seen as occupying a more dominant class segment so that he could 
compete or share in the benefits of such a position.  This was also true for David 
and his choice to relocate his firm to ‘music row’.  This was again, an explicit 
attempt to position himself and the company within the perceived domain of the 
dominant class.   
 However, when an actor is less explicit in its use, the day-to-day decision 
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practice becomes a way of maintaining the dominating class position within the 
field.  The dominant group has created and reinforced these symbolic systems 
and now uses them to hold onto its power and positioning within the field.  Hat 
Punk, LLC may not find it necessary to be so explicit when making artist 
selection decisions due to its position, and may even recognise a dominated firm, 
but it quietly reinforces its place by prominently displaying its accomplishments.  
Those being dominated, or seen as legitimate, also recognise this, but a struggle 
exists between the dominating - who set the rules for what symbolic capital 
owes its value - and the dominated that wish to ‘join the club.’  Bourdieu feels 
that ‘The dominated fraction always tends to set the specific capital, to which it 
owes its position, at the tip of the hierarch of the principles of hierarchisation.’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991 p. 168).  It is also the dominated that feel the need then to 
invoke explicitly an aggrandisement strategy within their decision-practice in 
order to compete, or be perceived, as a dominating class, not the dominated. 
In the music industry, reputation and status can be fleeting and can lead 
to ‘misrecognition in which power relations are not seen for what they are but are 
interpreted in a way that is seen as legitimate’ (Gunter, 2002).  The attempt to 
aggrandise the firm or oneself is an attempt to shift the perceived power 
relations in and amongst other players in the field, in a sense to level the playing 
field.  Actors desire the same opportunities to conduct business in the field as 
someone who has accumulated greater amounts of symbolic capital.  If certain 
levels of capital have been achieved then maintaining that level is in order for 
that firm or person.  Upholding this position and recognition within the field is 
done through a past perspective lens – one that uses the coveted symbolic 
artefacts given to those who have achieved the agreed upon levels of capital 
deemed to have reached ‘success.’  It is no longer explicit, it becomes implicit yet 
is still needed to hold onto the power that has been achieved. Ultimately, the 
amount of capital one is perceived to possess within this field influences the way 
in which another perceives. 
9.2.6 Influences on the Habitus 
In addition to the deeper understanding of the decision practice just 
described, many of the influences that also affect strategic decision-making in 
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micro-enterprises within other industries including past experiences (Juliusson, 
Karlsson & Gärling, 2005), heuristics, bias, and intuitive behaviour (Liberman-
Yaconi, Hooper & Hutchings, 2010) were also evident here and found to be a 
product of the relationship between the habitus, capital and field.  The use of 
these cognitive ‘short cuts’ was prominent when making artist selection 
decisions and assessments relevant to the value judgment of a creative product 
including song selection and marketing.  In Cisco’s decision about his new 
release, Kapooshki’s song selection for radio promotion and Hat Punk’s talent 
selection decision relied heavily on the use of personal bias related to 
preference, ‘gut feelings’ and short cuts.  Each of these is a direct reflection upon 
the habitus of the decision makers.  For these decisions, the habitus is at the 
center of the decision-making.  It is actor centered – interpreted and evaluated 
while taking into account the meso-level needs of the firm and the macro-level 
characteristics of the recording industry field and sub-fields that they impact.  
Little need for social or economic capital is evidenced with some degree of 
cultural capital needed to educate the habitus of the tastes and preferences of 
the market.  These influences were not as prominent in decisions that didn’t rely 
on the value judgment of music.   In more objective decision types like Bench 
Puppet’s firm relocation, client acquisition and Kapooshki’s diversification 
strategy, the actor’s reliance upon cognitively centered influences shifted 
outwardly to the use of advisors, both internal and external and with some 
varying degree, rational behaviour – although not a significant factor. Looking 
outwardly in these circumstances indicates a need to rely on the actor’s social 
capital to assist.  The consultation should not be seen as a lack of cultural capital, 
however, since in almost every decision made, whether significant amounts of 
industry knowledge were had or not, the concept of looking to someone other 
than oneself for guidance was used. 
Also evidenced in the decision-making practice of micro-enterprises in 
the recorded music industry was the use of analytical and logical behaviour 
when the actor perceived their accumulated capital was at greater risk.  In Hat 
Punk’s decision to buy back the assets of the firm and Kapooshki’s song 
evaluation decision, each identified high amounts of capital at risk.  The risk 
factors in each of these cases were the accumulated economic and symbolic 
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capital.  The more logical and analytical or systematic approach to the decision-
making in each of those cases was indicative of a habitus rooted in caution.  
Outcome predictors in the form of budgeting, song testing and forecasting, and 
modeling were techniques used to forecast anticipated outcomes.  The actor’s 
habitus felt better informed and reassured itself that the decision being made is 
the best one possible.  This is inherently a challenge for marketing of recorded 
music product, a product that tends to be individualistic in its taste in a field 
where uncertainty in demand exists.  This would explain why these approaches 
are limited in use within this field.  However, they are used when the habitus of 
the decision maker perceives that they and the firm they operate have much to 
lose. 
9.2.7 Characterising the Large-Scale Cultural Production Field and the 
Music Industry Social Space Within It 
Although Bourdieu’s theory of practice served the research well, as 
did limited aspects of his theory of cultural production, both of which are 
discussed in greater detail below in Section 9.3, there are some 
limitations.  These include further refinement of both his theory of large-
scale cultural production as it is applied to the popular music industry 
and his concepts of capital as it relates to his practice theory.   I will 
address both of these issues by providing context and support for the 
need to rethink these theories as they are applied to the music industry 
field.   
Due to Bourdieu’s limited discussion of the mass production sub-field, I 
am in agreement with Hesmondhalgh (2006) that this lack of dialogue is to its 
detriment.  Although Bourdieu’s field theory has the potential to help us 
understand the meanings of everyday structure and agent intention, he has little 
to say about the large-scale creation of cultural goods and the impact they have 
on production and consumption behaviours within society, especially within the 
music and entertainment fields.  My first aim here is to position the music 
industry sub-field within the larger social space of large-scale cultural 
production.  I will then argue that Bourdieu has misinterpreted the symbolic 
capital characteristic within it. 
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First, it is worth briefly re-stating Bourdieu’s (1984, 1993a, 1996) ideas 
with regard to the field of cultural production.  Figure 4 below is a 
representation of how Bourdieu portrays it within the broader field of power.  As 
illustrated, the field of cultural production sits at the top of the field of power, 
while simultaneously being within it.  The field of power is characterised by 
higher amounts of economic capital and lower amounts of cultural capital.  
Meanwhile, the field of cultural production is characterised by large amounts of 
cultural capital and lower amounts of economic capital.  Within the field of 
cultural production, Bourdieu positions two sub-field types, the small-scale 
production, ‘art for art’s sake’, characterised by low amounts of economic capital 
and high amounts of symbolic capital and the large-scale production, ‘culture for 
the masses‘, that he claims is depicted by high amounts of economic capital and 
low amounts of symbolic capital.   
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The popular recorded music industry sits within the sub-field of large-
scale production, but is not characterised by low amounts of symbolic capital, as 
Bourdieu indicates, but by large amounts of symbolic capital as measured by the 
evidence presented in Chapters 5-8 and the previous discussion in Section 9.2.5.  
It was shown through this discussion that actors, who have achieved success, 
possess it; and those who do not, endlessly pursue it or misrepresent themselves 
in lieu of it.  This re-characterisation positions the field at the top of large-scale 
cultural production, as well as the broader social space of cultural production 
and field of power (See Figure 5 below).  In addition, the creation of commercial 
music product, like that of the broader sub-field of large-scale production is 
largely ‘heteronomous’ – subject to outside forces – and thereby influenced by 
not only the audiences that consume it, but also broader societal and cultural 
forces that simultaneously shape it, while itself being shaped.   Although much of 
the case for the actor’s desire for symbolic capital and the power it represents 
was made in Section 9.2.5 above, it is worthy of a more explicit discussion.  
Essentially, two divisions exist within this subfield, those at the top who have 
accumulated it and those at the lower end of the industry class who wish to 
possess the symbolic capital.  
Bourdieu discussed the struggles over the positions within the field 
(Bourdieu, 1996), which ‘often take the form of a battle between established 
producers, institutions and styles, and heretical newcomers’ (Hesmondhalgh, 
2006).   This battle was highlighted extensively in the discussion above as actors 
make decisions while they ‘battle’ for position and use the resources available to 
them.  The industry ‘bourgeoisie’, who exert their positioning through symbolic 
power by possession of its capital, have been documented formally here and 
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Examples of individuals who are representative of occupying the higher 
positions and have achieved the honour and prestige recognised by the industry 
include Clive Davis and Katie Perry.  Clive Davis, a well-known ‘record man’, 
major label executive and producer who has won multiple Grammy awards and 
has worked with artists, such as Aretha Franklin, Alicia Keys, Rod Stewart, and 
Whitney Houston, exemplifies the cultural intermediary of a field that is 
characterised by higher amounts of symbolic capital.  Katie Perry, a well-known 
artist, who has sold over 11 million albums and 80 million singles world-wide 
(FM, 2013) typifies the musician that also occupies a field high in symbolic 
capital.  The power they hold through their accomplishments and positions 
within the field influence actors across the industry spectrum.  The discussion on 
the importance of symbolic capital in this thesis – the attainment of chart 
positioning by Kapooshki Music, or the acquisition of gold and platinum selling 
artists - give the individuals affiliated with those artists the symbolic capital to 
maintain their prestige. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are the industry proletariat. These 
include the actors dominated not only by economic means, due to the costs 
associated with reaching commercial success, but also by the influence of the 
Bourgeois success.  The great lengths to which decision makers will go to leave a 
perception of having acquired large amounts of symbolic capital exhibit the 
desire to possess it.  Without the large-scale production sub-field being 
characterised by symbolic capital, aggrandising behaviour and prominent 
displays of public recognition would not be the ultimate motivators for those in 
the field. 
This ‘struggle’ between the industry bourgeois and proletariat also exists 
within the two principles of ‘hierarchisation’. The ‘heteronomous’ principle, 
favours those who dominate the field economically and politically and the 
‘autonomous’ principle, whose advocates attempt to identify independently from 
the influences of the economy (Bourdieu, 1996).   When Bourdieu describes 
these two principles, he speaks to the field of cultural production broadly but 
attributes the ‘autonomous’ principle to small-scale production and the 
‘heteronomous’ principle to large-scale production.  Hesmondhalgh’s (2006, 
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1996, 1999) research on ‘alternative’ music found striking similarities with the 
world of art and literature that Bourdieu so often describes.  He further 
explained: 
‘Indeed, the very word ‘alternative’ seemed…a vernacular 
term, within the field of popular musical production and 
consumption, for what Bourdieu calls small-scale 
production…constantly defined itself against a pop 
‘mainstream’, a vernacular term for mass or large-scale 
production. ‘(Hesmondhalgh, 2006, p. 217) 
 
 Hesmondhalgh likens the vernacular term ‘alternative’ to that of 
Bourdieu’s sub-field of small-scale production.  Similarly, the vernacular 
‘alternative’ can be likened to ‘independent’ music.  In this comparison 
even the individuals that market and promote, ‘alternative’ or 
‘independent popular music’ – music produced ‘independently’ of major 
labels or their subsidiaries - have the same desired outcomes as that of 
more ‘mainstream’ consumer music, namely, economic success and the 
acquisition of symbolic power and recognition. ‘Independent’ firms that 
produce this music may be in the early stage of mainstream success, or 
may claim to have little interest in it.  Although they may exhibit 
characteristics of small-scale production as Hesmondhalgh (2006) 
described, the actor’s motivations and intentions are more aligned with 
large-scale production and the outside economic forces that influence it.  
They have just not yet achieved widespread distribution and ‘success’.  
Even Bourdieu acknowledged that ‘those of its [small-scale production] 
advocates who are least endowed with specific capital tend to identify with 
a degree of independence from the economy, seeing temporal failure as a 
sign of election and success as a sign of compromise’ (Bourdieu, 1993a, p. 
40).  Unlike some small-scale producers that see commercial success as a 
sign of failure, the producers of ‘independent’ music, the small-scale 
equivalent in this field, work towards success and recognition. If 
circumstances change for the independent and ‘success’ (sales and 
performances) is achieved, they will have acquired large amounts of 
symbolic capital and can be associated with – ‘the pop mainstream’.  They 
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can then expect to succumb to the demands of promoters, managers and 
consumers, which are indicative of heteronomy.  
In addition, award shows that are publicly broadcast, such as people’s 
choice awards, transcend the internal influences of the field of mass production.  
They validate consumers’ perceived preferences and taste for pop music culture 
that aid in re-enforcing these heteronomous characteristics.  The companies that 
try to satisfy consumer’s preferences and demand for music replicate this. 
Cultural and symbolic forces shape what is to be popular, creating a cycle of 
influence between the firms and the consumers.  The intermediaries enable the 
creation of a product that will sell or satisfy the public, while the public 
influences what is to be released and its success through preference and taste.  
These combined forces are not just economic, thus characterising the field as one 
with high amounts of economic capital, but the symbolism and the power 
associated with those influential ‘unseen’ forces are just as influential and 
characteristic of the popular recorded music industry.  
Bourdieu positions the field of cultural production high within the 
broader social space, yet simultaneously within the field of power.  In order for 
the music industry field to be properly positioned within this space and 
characteristic of high amounts of symbolic capital, it too must sit high in the field 
of power.   Symbolic power is ‘invisible power which can be exercised only with the 
complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that 
they themselves exercise it’ (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 164).   My discussion of symbolic 
capital outlines some of these power struggles, as will my further contributions 
on music industry capital in section 9.2.8 below, indicating its pervasiveness at 
the micro-level.   Although it could be argued that any social space consists of 
power struggles among actors, it is the broader social space in in which the 
music industry sits that constitutes the influence it wields. This begins with 
Bourdieu’s position on the intra-field struggles that ‘the different classes and class 
fractions are engaged in a symbolic struggle…one aimed at imposing the definition 
of the social world that is best suited to their interests’ (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 167) 
and permeates through to the broader ‘national’ or social space.  The actors 
within the music industry understand that if symbolic capital is possessed, its 
influences extend beyond that of the music industry field itself.  
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Actors who sit atop the hierarchy of the industry have the opportunity to 
influence society’s culture.  They are able to benefit from this position through 
the dominance that is associated with it.  They have the power to constrain and 
exploit from a micro-personal to a macro-industry and societal level. The mass 
consumed cultural goods and services the industry produces and controls is 
influenced by the culture within the national social space in which it sits.  This is 
best evidenced in Hat Punk, LLC, where the primary actors involved in the 
decisions introduce new artists to the public that have mass appeal and success.  
They have the capability and the power, through its capital, to act on what they 
feel can principally impact their consumer’s tastes and preferences.  They are 
then able to directly benefit from those preferences when consumers choose to 
purchase the music those artists produce. The opposite is also true, in that they 
are constrained by the symbolic power and resources accumulated by others 
similar to themselves in the field.  If other labels with comparable capital choose 
to introduce one of their artists, it creates a constraint on how Hat Punk, LLC 
may proceed.  It becomes a cycle of decisions and interconnected dynamisms 
that actors continuously shape and are being shaped by. The struggles in this 
dichotomy to maintain or acquire this legitimacy and the power to influence the 
masses are characteristics of an industry more properly positioned ‘atop’ the 
field of large-scale cultural production, and an industry with high amounts of 
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9.2.8 Bourdieu, the Field of Cultural Production and the Need for a Music 
Industry Capital in a Model of the Cultural Industries  
The music industry sits within the large-scale production sub-field of the 
broader cultural production social space.  My argument for this position overlaps 
with the need for re-characterising this space as one that sits at the top of the 
broader field of cultural production.  Based on this, I further argue that in order 
to substantiate the transformation of other capital from one form to another, 
that is, social or economic capital into symbolic capital, there is a need for a field 
specific capital, in this case, music industry capital that is used as a negotiating 
aid when agents vie for power and positioning within the music industry.   
Furthermore, those actors who occupy the ‘dominant class fractions’ (Bourdieu & 
Thompson, 1991) of the industry possess higher levels of field–specific or ‘music 
industry capital’ than those within the lower fractions.  Individuals who have 
acquired this capital possess the skills, knowledge and experience to navigate 
successfully through the industry doxa. They do so through the influence that 
music industry capital provides them, to maintain, produce, or reproduce, 
inequality in power relations.  It also encourages and discourages risk-taking and 
enables them to leverage their knowledge and experience to perform favours.  
The idea of a music industry capital is in direct response to an assessment 
of the value and applicability of ‘cultural capital’ as it was used within this thesis.  
Through the development of the framework and subsequent coding process, it 
became increasingly clear that the labelling of ‘cultural capital’ was an 
inadequate descriptor of the types of resource being used in some instances by 
the actors within the field.   
In general terms, Bourdieu defines capital as: 
 ‘…accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its ‘incorporated,’ 
embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, that is, 
exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to 
appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor’ 
(Bourdieu, 1986, p. 1). 
   
Although he proceeds to define different types of capital to account for how 
actors leverage it within the social space, his definition lacks the specific and 
necessary knowledge of a given field or industry in which firms, and those who 
work within them, find themselves.  Although individuals who fill these ‘social 
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spaces’ do negotiate with each other through their accumulated social, economic, 
cultural and symbolic capital, a void is created for the specific knowledge needed 
to manipulate and navigate through the field.  Music industry capital helps to 
account for this void with the experience, understanding and skills that an 
individual acquires while working.  Music industry capital takes time to 
accumulate and can manifest itself within the actor. This includes the knowledge 
of how the rules of the music industry are structured and how to play the game 
politically with other actors as they attempt to negotiate or maintain their 
positioning in the field.  It is a capital that goes deeper than the credentials that 
are associated with an institutionalised form of cultural capital, that is, a college 
education focusing on the industry, and can only be acquired through the 
experience and success of playing the established rules.  Furthermore, music 
industry capital has the potential to produce profits for the individual, and like 
all types of capital that Bourdieu prescribes; it too has the tendency to persist 
(Bourdieu, 1986).   
 Furthermore, the knowledge and experience one has acquired creates a 
dynamism among actors that allows them to influence one another.  It brings an 
‘empowerment’ to those who wish to wield it.  This dynamism is a type of 
‘expert’ power – when individuals assume or perceive that a person has a set of 
superior skills and reward them for it (French & Raven, 1959).  However, unlike 
expert power, which can exert influence through the perception of expertise, this 
know-how must be seen as genuine.  In the music industry, aggrandisement is 
used to project a perception of legitimacy and can be seen as disingenuous if 
inflated credentials or an exaggeration of experience are used. The consequences 
of this ‘misperception’ can have the opposite effect to that which the aggrandiser 
is seeking.  Instead of wielding the power and influence they hope to achieve 
through this behaviour, it is never granted by the actor who has attained music 
industry capital. This illusion of legitimacy may impact an individual who has not 
accumulated music industry capital, but not those that have.  This is often why 
those who name-drop struggle to get the opportunities they seek.  This was 
demonstrated in Joe’s attempt at legitimising himself and his business to those 
who work in Nashville, with limited results.  Music industry capital is attained 
through the experience and knowledge that a person has acquired and those 
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skills and abilities must be recognised as genuine in order for power to be 
granted.  When it is legitimate, it can have an ‘exponential’ effect on those being 
influenced.  It need not be a direct one-on-one; it can also create a ‘one plus one 
equals twenty’ effect.  The influence can transcend the individual’s direct 
authority and impact the time it takes to get things done.   If an actor can call 
upon individuals who have accumulated large amounts of music industry capital, 
they can also expect to accomplish tasks more quickly and efficiently.  This was 
demonstrated when Joe spoke about using influential promoters for a radio 
campaign, or when he felt he could call on the expertise of a major record 
company to save time.   
 In addition, this empowerment may be more passive.  Being able to 
‘experience’ something with the individual who has accumulated the music 
industry capital demonstrates their ability to influence relationships with others 
who are seeking an association with them.  Those who possess the capital may 
not need to use it to influence others.  The individual who desires the connection 
or wants to fall in good favour with the actor, who possesses it, sanctions this 
dynamic.   If they are seen as being connected with this individual, they too will 
benefit from that association.  David from Bench Puppet Entertainment 
discussed this when he shared his admiration for someone with whom he 
wanted to be associated.  The impact this kind of passive power has on people 
places the individual who holds it in an authoritative position, albeit 
symbolically.  They wield an influence that at times may be unknown to them.  
This influence can be subtle and will manifest itself in the enthusiasm and drive 
of the individual seeking the association.  They hope to leave a favourable 
impression so they can be seen as someone knowledgeable and competent in 
what they do.  
 The possession of music industry capital can also encourage or 
discourage risk-taking, depending on the habitus of the actor or firm in which 
risks are being undertaken.  Having accumulated a set of skills and industry 
knowledge can lead to a sense of self-confidence.   This confidence can lead to 
assessments of decisions that may encourage a higher level of risk-taking, 
especially if the past outcomes were positive.  As in the case with Jack being 
instrumental in finding commercially successful talent, ‘it doesn’t hurt the ego’, 
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reinforces his perceived ability to gauge what the public may want to hear.  
Therefore, he is willing to take risks in signing artists that he may not otherwise 
have, because of this confidence in his own abilities.   
 However, understanding the unpredictability of any given project and the 
potential outcomes, especially the unfavourable ones, can lead an actor to 
minimise or share in the risk-taking of a project.  In this case, it is not merely a 
confidence issue, as much as it is driven by past experience and the habitus of 
the individual.  It is a form of understanding that has been attained through 
experience in the industry.  Knowing that much uncertainty exists, and having 
experience investing large amounts of capital in a project with little return, can 
impact how an actor will make decisions.  Sam at Hat Punk, LLC has responded 
to this by the types of contractual relationships he offers artists.  By possessing 
this capital, he not only understands the risks involved in ‘signing’ new talent, 
but he has also changed the way he structures those ‘deals’ so that his exposure 
to the risk inherent in the uncertainty, is mitigated.  He doesn’t follow the ‘typical 
industry model’ where the label takes all the financial risk, he shares it, so not 
only is his company vested in the outcome, but so is the artist.  This type of 
behaviour and the dynamics associated with the decision-making can be 
accounted for through this capital one possesses. 
Furthermore, music industry capital can be used to maintain, produce or 
reproduce inequality in power relations. Those who possess it, reinforce their 
positions by ‘doing it just this way’, or in a similar manner that enabled them 
initially to accumulate it.  They use this capital to ‘protect interests’ so that they 
can reinforce the place occupied in the field.  Those who have achieved a level of 
success deemed adequate, and recognised by those who have attained it, see this.  
They fear losing this influence and use it to reinforce the inequality in the 
divisions that exist.  By knowing ‘who’ to talk to, when or how often, or what 
strategies to pursue allow for a leveraging of other forms of capital in an attempt 
to maintain the power relations.  The skills and knowledge of the industry 
manifest themselves in such a way that the actor can use this to leverage his or 
her social, economic or cultural capital.   
Sam was able to utilise his accumulated music industry capital by 
fostering a business model that challenged the standard industry doxa. ‘Making 
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things happen’ through his resources is only possible because he has acquired 
large amounts of music industry capital that enables him to understand the 
industry doxa and then work ‘against’ them, to his benefit.   Joe at Kapooshki also 
discussed the major labels use of this power in an attempt to continue 
dominating radio promotion.  By having more resources, the knowledge and the 
power that music industry capital provides, maintains actors like Joe subjugated.  
They do so by limiting the possibilities available to them, either by flooding the 
market with product or by ‘driving-up’ the costs associated with access.  
Although major labels cannot directly control the price of radio promotion, by 
flooding the market and reducing opportunities to a limited number of available 
‘adds’ per week, they are inadvertently increasing the demand and those costs.  
 Music industry capital is acquired by achieving success with songwriters, 
artists and other actors within the field and by leveraging that knowledge and 
capital to perform favours.  ‘Gift giving’ can be exercised through the granting of 
complimentary tickets, back-stage passes or invites to red-carpet events.  It can 
also manifest itself in the form of making ‘connections’ for others by introducing 
one person to another.  This action reinforces the power position an individual 
holds while strengthening the legitimacy perceived by the person benefiting 
from the favour.  Joe mentioned how record labels had influenced radio stations 
and promoters to gain airplay time. Those who hold the power that comes from 
music industry capital can use it to persuade prominent musicians to visit radio 
stations in exchange for airplay consideration.  Associating with ‘big-name’ 
artists motivates the decision-makers within the radio stations.  The exchange of 
favours not only benefits the receiving party, but also the granting party.  This 
action enables the one in power to reinforce the influential relationship between 
them.    
 When favours are performed, the perceived power of the actor who is 
using his music industry capital also increases.  If this individual is ‘doing a 
favour’ for you, your perception of that individual becomes even more 
auspicious, leaving a debt of gratitude or appreciation for their act.  Similar to 
that of ‘gift exchange’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), it enables the actors to 
build a stable and longer-term relationship with each other.  It can also keep the 
receiver of that favour indebted to them, creating a sense of ‘authority’ over the 
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individual for the favour being performed while reinforcing the dominating 
power relations between them. 
Music industry capital can also perpetuate itself though objectified forms 
of symbolic capital.  Not only does it demonstrate the prestige and honour 
earned and accumulated, but it also indicates to others that they possess 
something of value, namely, knowledge of the practice that those who have not 
yet accumulated enough, have yet to achieve.  Although the displaying of 
industry awards acts as an objectified form of symbolic capital, actors in the field 
also understand that those who possess such prestige also acknowledge that a 
level of understanding of the music industry doxa has been achieved.  It points to 
an experience to which only those who legitimately possess it can attest.  Sam 
was clear when speaking of those colleagues from whom he often sought advice, 
that is, those who have achieved similar success to him in the industry.  
However, for those who do not possess similar success, they look on these 
artefacts and the understanding embodied in them as a mystery.  They idolise 
those who are successful, as if its acquisition is only for those who are privileged 
enough to achieve it. 
Earlier in Section 9.2.1, the link between social capital and trust were 
touched upon briefly.  However, the establishment of trust warrants further 
discussion as it creates tension between aggrandisement and music industry 
capital.  This capital being defined as the skills, knowledge, experience and the 
power attributed to actors in the music industry.  Aggrandisement will not lead 
to a trustworthy relationship between actors unless the one doing the 
aggrandising possesses high amounts of music industry capital.  Awards such as 
gold and platinum records embody music industry capital, but can also be 
separated from aggrandising, even though they may be used as part of that 
behaviour.  When an individual aggrandises, it indicates to others the possibility 
that success has been attained.  However, awards are a genuine embodiment of 
music industry capital.  Trust is something that is established over time and 
typically ‘earned’ through the reinforcement of expected behaviour.  Jack was 
very clear in the level of trust that had developed between him and Sam over 
eight years, which led to reliance upon each other and their expertise. The only 
reason trust – a non-contract based commitment of recourses - was established 
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among the social network at Hat Punk, LLC was because Sam and Jack felt that 
the managers, lawyers and producers, from whom they sought input, knew what 
they were talking about and had established relationships with them over the 
years.  All of them had acquired music industry capital and did not aggrandise, 
which led to the trust between Jack, Sam and the producers, managers and 
lawyers from whom they sought advice.   
Trust is more difficult to establish between two people if someone that 
possesses large amounts of music industry capital is the recipient of 
aggrandising behaviour.  Bstieler (2006) found that communication can be a 
positive contributor to establishing trust, while perceived egoism appears to 
have a detrimental effect.  Perception of egoism can be an unintended 
consequence of the aggrandiser.  While his or her intention is to be perceived as 
someone who has attained success and is worthy of a professional relationship, 
often the receiver, who has accumulated high amounts of music industry capital, 
can differentiate that behaviour as an artificial, or an inflated ego.  They 
approach this interaction with scepticism as if the aggrandiser is hiding 
something, or not divulging the ‘whole story’.  If, having had the experience of 
being in a similar situation, or having been previous subjected to such boasting, 
they know, or understand, there is likely to be a ‘holding back’, or limited 
disclosure.  This creates a tension between the two, which adversely affects the 
relationship and can delay, or even extinguish the trust needed in order for a 
professional relationship to be established.  An actor that does not possess high 
amounts of music industry capital will be less inclined to make this connection.  
They see the behaviour as genuine, or less threatening.   
Moreover, this tension can escalate beyond the development of a 
trustworthy relationship and escalate to an outright feeling of  ‘mistrust’ 
between the actors resulting in lost opportunities. Portraying a false 
sense of who you are, or what you have achieved, signifies that you have 
something to hide.  This can create a feeling of doubt among the 
individuals who are being targeted by the aggrandising.  Sam questions 
those artists who approach him with ‘visions of grandeur’, or inflate the 
credentials of what they have done.  His business model is built on the 
maturity and strong sense of spirituality that he receives from the artists 
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he wishes to sign. When they aggrandise their achievements, or whom 
they have worked with, it creates a tension between what Sam hopes to 
achieve and the trust he feels is needed to share in the success and risk of 
their career. Although some of these artists have yet to achieve 
substantial amounts of music industry capital, Sam does possess large 
amounts of it and is sensitive to aggrandising behaviour and what it can 
signify, creating a sense of mistrust.  Because of this, he will not ‘sign’ 
those artists to his record label.   
Not being able to establish a sense of trust, or even mistrusting an 
actor, can impact the amount of risk the possessor of MI capital is willing 
to take.  Being a key characteristic of music industry capital that was 
discussed, the willingness to take risks can have a direct impact on a 
potential artist signing to a label, or to someone’s career.  If Sam does not 
feel that he can trust his artists, he will not be willing to risk his economic 
and symbolic capital to sign them to a recording deal.  Similar 
comparisons among other professionals can also be drawn.  If a 
trustworthy relationship has not been established, the possessors of 
music industry capital will not be willing to risk their own social or 
economic capital for the sake of the relationship.  When Jack or Sam reach 
out to other managers or attorneys for advice on artists, they are also 
putting their own reputations at risk.  These risks will not be taken if 
either party that possesses the music industry capital perceives 
aggrandisement behaviour. 
Whereas I posit that a connection between trust, aggrandising 
behaviour and music industry capital exists, I would also like to consider 
the use of symbolic power and the connections among domination, trust, 
fear and music industry capital.  Bourdieu (1984) suggests that situated 
cultural functions in society are more dominant than economic ones, but 
that status and economic resources are necessary.  His ideas on symbolic 
capital, discussed fully in Section 3.6.4, help to set apart the hierarchies of 
power.  Often, the distinctions between those classes are determined by 
the acquisition of capital.  As I established in Section 9.2.3, 
unpredictability in the field breeds uncertainty within the habitus that 
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drives fear.  The potential loss of financial resources, social capital, or 
being seen ‘as nothing special’, impacts how actors perceive their 
environment and make decisions.   
Music industry capital reinforces Bourdieu’s ideas on symbolic 
power as a way to set apart the classes within the field, and supports his 
ideas that these situated cultural forces are stronger than economic ones.  
It is not an oppressive force directed toward the lower fractions to instil 
fear, but one they create themselves.  These inhibitions are created by the 
prospect of not attaining their own upward mobility and can trigger an 
aggrandising behaviour.  However, fear is also a concern for those at the 
top, a fear of losing their current standing within the industry class.  It is, 
in many cases, a fear of failure, or fear of losing their reputation or other 
capital, that motivates the individual.  Reflecting back on Joe’s situation, 
he was motivated by fear of losing what he had attained; fear that 
pursuing the wrong radio strategy could cost him his ‘8th in the world’ 
reputation and that he would have to use increasing amounts of other 
capital to maintain it.  This fear triggered an aggrandising behaviour, 
while simultaneously understanding that he needed to build trust with 
others if he wanted to pursue this new radio strategy.   Maintaining his 
reputation without some music industry capital would have been much 
more difficult. 
An actor also relies on trust as a way to alleviate the fear of capital 
depletion.  Even though music industry capital is a ‘sub-type’ of capital, it 
is not easily ‘used-up’ and aids in the transformation of one capital type to 
another.  The fear of losing any resource impacts the emotions and 
actions of the individual, much like Cisco’s fear of losing social capital. In 
this sense music industry capital acts similarly to that of cultural capital – 
it has a tendency to persist and, as Sam stated, ‘you know what you know’.  
Trust between actors thus provides for a way to mitigate that fear.  Jack 
relies on this trust in the hopes of making sound choices by consulting 
with his manager, producer and attorney contacts when making talent 
selection decisions.  However, this trust cannot be established without the 
needed music industry capital.  
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In summary, music industry capital can account for the skills, 
knowledge, experience and power that enable individuals to transform 
their social, economic, or cultural capital into symbolic capital. It is an 
asset, a fundamental capital that needs to be accounted for within the 
music industry field and for which Bourdieu and his theory of cultural 
production and theory of practice do not clearly or adequately postulate. 
The evidence from this research demonstrates the need for this type of 
capital to provide meaning and understanding about how decision-
makers in this field navigate for power.   
The Applicability of Findings to Similar Fields 
I was at first cautious of extrapolating claims from my findings to 
other industries, nevertheless, I do believe that similar principles could be 
drawn if comparable conditions exist. The unpredictability of success, the 
high risk, low success rate and the infinite variety of product available are 
characteristics of the music industry that are shared with other 
entertainment products like video games, television or film.  They also 
share the social space of large-scale cultural production as creators of ‘the 
pop mainstream’.  The shared characteristics of these industries lead me 
to propose that these fields are characterised by high amounts of 
symbolic capital and, thus, could also be placed at the top of the field of 
cultural production.   
The discussion of a music industry capital pertains to the field of 
study in this thesis, but could also be useful as a ‘field’ capital within other 
industries.  As previously indicated, this study’s intention was to provide 
insight into the practices of music industry strategic decision-making.  
However, as an analysis of the field of cultural production it is able to 
provide greater insight into any field where actors find themselves 
participating where knowledge and skills specific to that field provide 
further negotiating value for which Bourdieu’s capitals are unable to 
account.    Bourdieu himself, for example, in his limited analysis of the 
journalism and large-scale production field, could have provided us with 
further insight if he had accounted for this gap in capital.  It would have 
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enabled him to speak to the subtleties among individuals as they 
negotiate for power within a specific industry.  The ‘rules of the game’ or 
‘doxa’ speak to the ‘taken-for-granted’ ways of doing things, but the field-
specific capital can account for the dynamic power relations that are 
grounded in the skills, experience and knowledge of a specific industry.   
9.3 Reflection on My Chosen Methodology  
 
 Using Bourdieu to examine the influences on strategic decision-making in 
music industry micro-enterprises allowed me to demonstrate how actors 
construct the subtle realities of the practice while simultaneously providing 
insight into the limitations of his theories.  However, it would be a mistake not to 
use Bourdieu’s theory in its entirety here as we look at the practice of decision-
making.  It is often thought that Bourdieu can be difficult to apply (Ölzbilgin & 
Tatli, 2005) in organisation studies and is often segmented in ways 
inappropriate for its application to the practice theory.  Isolating the habitus, or 
selectively choosing the influences a particular capital may have upon agency 
disregards the intention and may misrepresent the influential and reinforcing 
nature each concept has upon one another.  Researchers often isolate one or 
another in order to demonstrate the impacts the concept may have on the 
phenomena of study.  However, by not taking into account how each aspect of 
the practice theory influences the chosen concept disregards the iterative and 
comprehensiveness of the theory itself.   If the researcher is to study the practice, 
it must encompass the habitus, capital and field simultaneously while accounting 
for the interplay between structure and agency.  The habitus is key to actually 
making the decision choice, but it is the firm in which they work, the fields they 
exist within and the desire for capital that allows the actor’s habitus ultimately to 
decide how to approach strategic decision-making.  In contrasting examples, 
David, from Hat Punk, LLC, is identified as a confidant, well-educated, 52-year 
old Caucasian male, while Joe from Kapooshki Music identifies himself as a 
Canadian Born, 33-year old Indian American.  Who they are and what they have 
become has been influenced by the field, leading to how each decide to leverage 
their capital.    My contributions from this thesis help to explain a few of these 
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behaviours and should help to alleviate some of the difficulties in researching a 
field like the popular recorded music industry.    
Understanding this approach to how decisions are made provides 
evidence that indicates the importance that social capital, the emotional state of 
the actor, the knowledge they have acquired about how the industry works and 
the role symbolic capital plays in the decision-making practice within this field.  
The ‘black box’ of the habitus, the mechanism for interpretation and evaluation 
of the meso-firm level and macro-industry environment determines the 
reactions and practice that encompass the decision-making.  Although there are 
many similarities in the influences and approach to making a decision in each 
firm, the choice of sample, analysis of the data and the chosen methodology 
enabled an exploration of those similarities and differences that would have not 
been possible without looking at the decision practice more than once in the 
same firm.  
From the findings in Chapters 5-9, I feel that Bourdieu’s practice theory 
served the research well, while simultaneously highlighting a few limitations to 
both that and his field of cultural production.  The use of habitus, capital and field 
as a lens into interpreting decision-making practice allowed for the account of 
past personal dispositions.  It also enabled an explanation of the influences upon 
the practice as well as the interplay between the field of cultural production and 
actor, as power and positioning within it are negotiated through the use of 
capital.  What the practice theory is not as well equipped to account for, 
however, is the radical change that has been occurring in the field caused by the 
implementation of new technologies.  Bourdieu does attempt to account for 
some change through the use of hysteresis, but is not as well equipped to 
account for the non-human interactions that have been occurring, especially as 
they relate to the technology and the influences they have had.  It is in this 
regard that Activity theory or Actor-network theory could have assisted in 
explaining better the role non-actors or artefacts have in the constitution of 
practice, especially as it relates to strategic decision-making in firms (Nicolini, 
2013).  For example, the use of computers as they aid in marketing and 
promotion of music, provide access to artists as potential ‘signings’ and the 
facilitation of distributing that music, can and do influence in ways that Bourdieu 
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is less equipped. However, the use of Bourdieu was sufficient in answering the 
research question, for at the core of its understanding is the interplay among 
actor, field and capital as they contribute to an actor’s desire for recognition.  
9.4 Research Contributions  
  As stated earlier, my chosen methodological lens allowed me to surface 
the complex reflexive interplay among the concepts of Bourdieu’s practice 
theory, which led to a deep description of the influences through thick textual 
renditions on strategic decision-making practices in music industry micro-
enterprises.  My research also allowed me to demonstrate a few limitations in 
Bourdieu’s field theory on cultural production, as well as his theories on capital.  
In addition to understanding this practice better, my study contributes to the 
research on strategic decision-making for micro-enterprises as well as the 
growing body of literature being conducted within the music industry.  No study 
has investigated strategic decision-making practices within micro-enterprises 
that market and promote recorded music product. This study lays the foundation 
for further study into these practices and can be aligned with similar research 
into marketing, talent selection and other management practices.  The literature 
that populates the current research on the music industry is fragmented, and 
although this contributes to that fragmentation by adding to it a line of inquiry, it 
can also be used to help bridge the gaps between the multiple disciplines that 
have been investigated. 
Furthermore, this research is also able to contribute to the growing body 
of organisational studies that are finding Bourdieu as a relevant and often well-
suited methodology for understanding practice.  By applying his praxeology, it 
has been possible to use his concepts of habitus, capital – in all its forms – and 
field in a research context that takes into account the individual, the firm and the 
influencing forces of the field.  By peeling back these elements, the research was 
able to demonstrate how decision-making within the music industry is socially-
constructed and influenced by the actor’s predispositions, interactions in and 
amongst the firm and how these are predicated upon by the field doxa. 
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9.5 Implications for Future Research 
Using Bourdieu’ theory of practice as a lens has provided much insight 
into how decisions are made and what influences them in music industry micro-
enterprises in the United States.  First, the sample of this study focused on micro-
enterprises within the popular recorded music industry – but one segment of the 
broader SME category of firm size - provides opportunity for inquiry into larger 
music industry firms in the recorded music industry.  This could shed light onto 
similar or dissimilar practices when the size of the firm is taken into 
consideration.  The amount of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital 
achieved resulting in greater human resources and cash flow may impact the 
aggrandisement behaviour and/or strategic decision-making behaviour in a 
larger music industry firm.  Differences in strategic decision-making within large 
firms have already been uncovered (Busenitz & Barney, 1997) in some studies, 
but taking into account the culture producing and creative field and its doxa may 
also uncover different findings such as a lesser use of intuitive behaviours or 
purposeful suppression of them.  It may also provide further nuances on the 
accumulation of larger amounts of capital or the role of hubris or confidence by 
its leaders on the practice. 
Second, further exploration into other entertainment fields may also 
exhibit characteristics and/or influences that may not have been observed in this 
study.  The classification of ‘entertainment’ can be wide and often incorporates 
the fields of sport, gambling and movies (Vogel, 2007) and should be limited to 
those that would be cross-referenced into entertainment fields within the 
culture producing or creative industries.  The key determinant in these further 
explorations would and should be the characteristics of the culture producing or 
creative industries (Caves, 2000) when marketing and promotion of product is at 
the core of the business activities. 
Third, taking into account the geographic limitations of this study could 
also prove to be another opportunity.  A cross-cultural analysis of the same field, 
with the same segment and firm size could demonstrate to what extent cultural 
influences impact the decision-making practice.  If one is to use Bourdieu and his 
practice theory as a lens, you must take into consideration the habitus, these past 
dispositions and the interplay of the structures from which the actor has 
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partaken, for they could influence the decision-making practice in a different 
way. 
9.6 Limitations of the Research  
 
In addition to the key contributions, some limitations within the study are 
also recognised including the personal bias that I, the researcher bring to the 
sampling, chosen method of analysis and interpretation of the results.  As was 
made clear within the introduction chapter, my personal experience working in 
the industry for well over a decade, enables me to see phenomena in a manner 
that others may be unable to see, but may also lead me to interpret things with 
bias.  Giving preference to coding specific dialogue or not noticing subtle 
behaviour during observations may cause me to overlook valuable data that can 
add to the depth of the research.  However, it could also enable me to dig deeper 
into aspects that may otherwise be overlooked.  By understanding the industry 
jargon, or probing deeper into what may be an ‘off the wall’ comment by an 
interviewee can lead to the subtleties I am after.  Furthermore, I can easily 
misinterpret intentions and distinctions that other researchers, outside the field, 
would not.  Seeing things from this perspective, could lead to a different 
understanding and interpretation of the results. 
This interpretation was also influenced by my own habitus and the 
disposition that I bring from the culture in which I have been raised.  Being a 
researcher from the United States, conducting my research in the United States, 
has certainly impacted how I have perceived, analysed and have written-up the 
results of the data collected.  Coming from a culture rooted in a more positivistic 
epistemology, I often found myself falling victim to the belief that what has been 
learned can only be obtained by collecting the data in a systematic and objective 
manner so that a universal applicability can be applied.  Staying true to a more 
interpretive methodology and using a Bourdieusian lens was challenging.  This 
became most evident during my discussion of the data when I was often drawn 
to a need to find one or two generalisable findings.  The data were often 
disguised by an incessant need to satisfy this more positivistic perspective when 
looking and interpreting the data.  Also being brought up in this type of 
environment has acquainted me with the terminology often more suited to that 
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type of research.  Its use would find its way throughout my analysis and writing 
up of the results.  Knowing and understanding this is the first step to its 
limitations when appreciating and applying the richness of research that can 
come from a more interpretive approach. 
Furthermore, the selective dissemination of knowledge by the 
respondents has also influenced the results.  Through personal experience and 
direct observation, the offering-up of information, especially information that is 
at the strategic core of the firms being investigated, could be seen as threatening 
to the interviewee or an opportunity to exhibit a power influence over the 
dialogue.  If trust, as perceived by the interviewee was not established to a level 
where highly sensitive information could be freely discussed, this could have 
brought upon reservations by the respondents, which could have limited the 
discourse of the information or conscious filtering of it when we were in 
discussion.  If power was at play amongst the interviewer/interviewee 
relationship, the interviewee could have seen that his knowledge, being what I, 
as the interviewer, sought to obtain could be controlled by him or her – thereby 
influenced what he or she would be willing to divulge.  Although I felt this was 
not the case within many of the interviews conducted, often where there was a 
feeling of excitement and enthusiasm to discuss what the managers were doing, 
there was certainly a different dynamic at play when interviews were being 
conducted at those firms that were perceived by the field as having achieved 
more success.  I do believe trust was established, but I perceived a limiting of 
information in some of those interviews where a stance of ‘on a need to know 
basis’ was taken because the interviewees may have felt that statements could be 
used against them.  I did my best to overcome these limitations by reiterating the 
use of pseudonyms in the research and emphasising my understanding of their 
concerns.  
Moreover, although a brief discussion about why one decision was chosen 
over another was carried out in section 4.4, I believe that the choices I made and 
the rationale behind their selection for inclusion should be highlighted further, 
because their purposeful selection could also have limited the understanding of 
the phenomena.  I chose decisions based upon my own experiences in the 
industry along with witnessing some of the more critical choices needing to be 
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made by these firms.  Although I chose not to include thirty-two other decisions 
that were discussed, the dissemination of them down to eight provided the 
rigour, breadth and complexity that I was seeking in understanding the SDM 
practice.  Many decisions that were discussed were identical in nature, for 
example, those associated with artist selection for the company.  Many owners 
found this to be critically important for their business and considered it to be 
strategic.  While including four or even six decisions of this type would have 
been possible, I chose the one that demonstrated the complexity and richness of 
detail for this inquiry.  In addition, choosing the other seven cases for this thesis 
provided a sample that would best highlight the themes that were emerging 
across the different decisions while providing the most insightful data.  
Furthermore, the firms were also considered when deducing the cases involved.  
Although each firm was a micro-enterprise, the differences in the type of 
business they conducted were diverse.  For example, during my pre-study, I had 
interviewed individuals from a company that could be considered a ‘border-line’ 
company within the industry.  Although, they conduct business for clients in the 
music industry, they did not exhibit the same challenges and characteristics that 
a firm that is directly involved in the marketing and promotion of recorded 
music product would entail.  Therefore, I purposely chose not to select that firm 
and the decisions it made for inclusion here.  I took into consideration the 
number of employees as well as the business and tried to provide a cross-section 
of the firms operating in the industry on a daily basis.  This included DIY, one-
man operations to start-up marketing firms through to a multi-million dollar 
business with a proven track record in the industry.  Therefore, these choices of 
what decisions, and what firms to include in this thesis, have impacted how this 
studied is now viewed.  Although the contribution is strong and the data is rich 
in detail and complexity, it is necessary to be mindful of the how the decisions 
and firms were chosen and how they can limit the interpretation and 
presentation of the study. 
9.7 Reflexivity and Conclusions 
This final section aims to provide the position, context and reflections of 
the author.  I am a thirty-seven year old male that currently works at a university 
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in the United States, lecturing on marketing and management in the music 
business.   I have worked in the music industry for more than sixteen years, 
beginning my career as a percussion instructor, musician and later a career in 
marketing and business development.  As I briefly mentioned in my introduction, 
it is the transition from working in the industry to teaching that prompted my 
desire to learn more about the theoretical constructs of this industry and, in 
turn, this thesis. 
However, there were a number of challenges during the process 
described throughout this thesis and specifically Chapter 4 that I would like to 
reflect on, especially in regards to the data collection and analysis. Although my 
academic background includes a graduate degree, prior to my research training 
for the pursuance of my PhD, I had little understanding of the process and the 
rigour that it would entail.  My career was in an industry that not only shows 
little interest in theoretical concepts but also shows little respect for an academic 
background.  Because of this limited research background and eagerness to 
‘contribute substantially to new knowledge’, I fell victim to early confirmation 
bias during my pre-interviews from some of my initial findings.  Once I 
uncovered what I felt was a very interesting phenomenon that would drive the 
research and one that I experienced regularly working in the industry, I became 
closed-minded about other aspects that might be influencing the practice.  This 
became a ‘leading’ factor in further analysis that limited the richness of many of 
the themes and vignettes I was extracting from the data.  Disappointing and 
confidence knocking, it made it difficult to extract the subtle nuances that I 
sought in this interpretive study.  I started to question my analysis of the 
interviews and my ability to look beyond this concept.  After further discussions 
with my supervisors, going back to the data and re-interviewing a few of the 
individuals, I was able to extract and interpret the themes and vignettes in a 
deeper manner.   It was also a real learning point on the process of qualitative 
analysis, that the lens in which you approach your data can impact what and how 
you see them. 
There was another issue related to ontology and epistemology that I had 
also alluded to in Chapter 1, as well as Section 9.6 above, and found challenging 
when writing-up the results of this thesis.  Because of my limited knowledge of 
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research practices prior to this process and coming from the United States, I 
bring deep-rooted assumptions about what research should be.  Clearly I have 
found a home, personally, and for this research, that serves the answering of the 
questions I have proposed.  However, the path to this result was challenging and 
defeating on multiple occasions.  A positivistic ontology is assumed in almost all 
business research in the U.S. and therefore that assumption had also permeated 
through how I saw the data and wrote up the results.  This perspective was so 
engrained that, from my perspective, it prolonged this phase of my thesis with 
multiple rewrites so that cohesiveness throughout the narrative would come 
through.  The past year was also a real learning process, not just in how to write-
up results of your research, but also how important your ontological and 
epistemological assumptions influences the analysis and presentation of your 
data.   
In summary, through this process of critical self-reflection, and being 
cognisant of these issues contributes to the richness and complexity that I am 
seeking in this research.  I have many words that describe my reflections of 
collecting and analysing these data: exciting, fascinating, shocking, illuminating, 
humbling, addictive and never-ending.  I acknowledge that the analyses and 
writing-up can never be complete, and that yet another researcher may find 
other meanings and interpretations in the same data.  However, through the 
iterative process described in this chapter and the findings presented in 
Chapters 5-8, my intention is to provide a rigorous, consistent and convincing 
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Appendices 
Appendix A - List of Interviews 












Sutherby, LLC 9.6.10    
Skype   
6:09 pm 1:07:02 







3:21 pm 41:40 






2:16 pm 51:47 




9:22 am 1:37:45 
4b. Massey, Jack   
(Follow-up 1) 




9:04 am 20:15 







10:35 am 1:01:40 
6a. Jackson, Joe Owner, 
Manager 
Kapooshki Music 5.7.10 
Office 
10:12 am 1:00:58 




Kapooshki Music 5.7.10 
Office 
5:33 pm 1:04:02 




Kapooshki Music 13.6.11 
Office 
1:30 pm 28:43 
7. Billings, Lilly Administrative 
Ass. 
Kapooshki Music 13.6.11 
Office 
5:39 pm 27:51 
8. Alva, Seth Administrative 
Ass. 
Kapooshki Music 13.6.11 
Office 
2:34 pm 33:37 
9. Allan, Susie Business 
Affairs 
Manager 
Kapooshki Music 13.6.11 
Office 





Kapooshki Music 5.7.10 
Office 
12:46 pm 43:35 
11. Schroeder, Jamie Booking & 
Promotion 
Kapooshki Music 5.7.10 
Office 
2:03 pm 25:56 
12a. Newman, Cisco Singer 
Songwriter/O
wner Manager 
Cisco Newman 11.4.11  
Skype 
9:48 am 47:03 





Cisco Newman 24.8.11  
Office 
7:57 pm 31:39 

















Cisco Newman 4.2.12 
Office 
30:28 1:26 pm 






46:52 9:04 am 






1:15:07 10:28 am 


















1:15:07 10:28 am 
15b. Stonewall, 








58:31 7:16 pm 
16. Caldwell, Sam CEO, Owner Hat Punk, LLC 14.6.11 
Office 
52:51 2:01 pm 
17. Johnson, Jack Senior Vice 
President, A & 
R 
Hat Punk, LLC 14.6.11 
Office 
24:31 4:04 pm 




Hat Punk, LLC 14.6.11 
Office 
48:37 3:13 pm 
19. Scott, Michael Owner, 
Manager 
Scott5 Music 8.12.10 
Office 
1:19:31 11:20 am 




1:10:24 4:35 pm 






15:14 5:50 pm 
22. Jones, Anita Entertainment 
Attorney 
Anita Jones 4.22.11 
Office 
48:32 10:02 am 
23. Lester, Daniel Entertainment 
Attorney 
Lester, LLC 15.4.11 
Skype 
1:05:59 6:30 pm 




Red Hot 15.6.11 
Office 
1:12:49 11:06 am 




Red Hot 15.6.11 
Office 
1:12:49 11:06 am 
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26. Sturm, Jessica 
 
Engineer Solstice Music 3.2.12 
Coffee 
Shop 
1:22 pm 50:51 
27. Geonivich, Lisa Partner, 
Manager, Artist 
Black Line 20.3.12 
University 
Office 
9:15 pm 28:08 
28. Leland, Jessie Partner, 
Manager, Artist 
Black Line 20.3.12 
University 
Office 
10:02 pm 40:35 








10:06 am 46:09 




Kingsbury Music 6.5.11 
Skype 
7:43 pm 59:05 
31. Iglar, Brian Entertainment 
Attorney 
Lester, LLC 20.10.10 
Office 
3:36 pm 42:31 








7:25 pm 16:25 




Hoyer Music 15.6.11 
Office 
12:15 pm 1:02:39 




Steven Willshot 7.7.11 
Office 
2:33 pm 56:34 








9:03 am 45:34 
36. Williams, Xander 
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Appendix B – List of Codes 
 
Descriptive Label  Code 




BC:  Field FD 
Demand Uncertainty FD: DH 
DU:  Influence of fixed and sunk costs FD: DU-SUNK 
DU:  Risk assessment (use of options in contracts) FD: DU-RISK 
  
Connection to Creator  
CC: ‘Art of art’s sake’ influence FD: CC-ART 
CC:  Avoidance of ‘humdrum’ commerce FD: CC-HUM 
  
Diversity of skills to create, market and promote product  
SD:  Choosing of ‘team inputs’ influence FD: SD-CHO 
SD:  Sustaining ‘team inputs’ FD: SD-SUS 
  
Infinite Variety (endless supply of product)  
IV:  Uniqueness quality FD: IV-UNIQ 
  
Unpredictability of quality and control  
QC:  Decisions to use ‘A’ list inputs FD: QC-AIN 
QC:  Decisions to use ‘B’ list inputs FD: QC-BIN 
  
Temporal Coordination  
TC:  Timing decisions and coordination FD: TC-DEC 
TC:  Economic impacts FD: TC-ECON 
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Ars Longa (Limited time to exploit)  
AL:  Time considerations to exploit FD: AL-TIME 
AL:  Capacity to exploit copyrights FD: AL-CAPA 
  
BC:  Habitus – Individual Dispositions BC-HI 
Bias  
BI: Belief Bias (Based on personal beliefs) HI: BI-BELI 
BI: Hindsight Bias HI: BI-HIND 
BI: Omission Bias HI: BI-OMM 
BI: Confirmation Bias HI: BI-CONF 
  
Aggrandisement  
AG: Personal HI: AG-PERS 
    Name Dropping  
       Prominent artists that have been worked with HI: AG-PERSNDA 
       Prominent Producers that have been worked with HI: AG-PERSNDP 
       Prominent companies worked for or with HI: AG-PERSNDC 
       Prominent Positions Held HI: AG-PERSPH 
    Exaggeration of Truth HI: AG-PERSEX 
  
Past Experience  
Negative Past experience HI: EXPN 
Positive past experience HI: EXPP 
  
Heuristics   
HE: Representativeness HI: HE-REPR 
HE: Availability HI: HE-AVAIL 
HE: Anchoring and Adjustment HI: HE-ANAD 
  
Personal Characteristics  
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PC:  Age HI: PC-AGE 
PC:  Cognitive Abilities HI: PC-COG 
PC:  Socio Economic status HI: PC-SES 
PC:  Hubris HI: PC-HUB 
PC:  Ability to Take on Risk and Uncertainty HI: PC-RISK 
  
Intuitive   
IN: Gut Feelings HI: IN-GUT 
  
External Influence  
Books, Trades HI: EIBOOKS 
Conferences HI: EICONF 
Artists HI: EIART 
  
Reputation HI: REPUHIHF 
  
Vision (For the Future) HI: VISION 
  
Actor Personal History HI: PH 
Propensity Towards Career HI: PH-PTC 
Early Success HI: PH-ES 
  
BC:  Habitus – Company Specific BC-HF 
Aggrandisement  
AG: Business HF: AG-BUS 
AG: Chart Rankings HF: AG-CR 
AG: Firm Ranking HF: AG-FR 
       AG: Firm Ranking - Objectified HF: AG-FROB 
AG: Firm Size HF: AG-FS 
AG: Firm Associations/Business Dealings/Networks HF: AG-FAN 
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AG: Firm association within business cluster HF: AG-FIRMA 
AG: Clientele HF: AG-CLIENT 
  
Bounded Rational Behaviour  
BR: Bounded by time and resources HF: BR-TIME 
BR: Limited ability to be comprehensive HF: BR-ABIL 
BR: Incomplete Information HF: BR-INCO 
BR: Incremental HF: BR-INCR 
BR: Non-linear and iterative HF: BR-ITER 





RA: Comprehensive HF: RA-COMP 
RA: Linear HF: RA-LINE 
RA: Logical and analytical HF: RA-LOG 
RA: Systematic HF: RA-SYS 
  
Internal Influence  
II:  Positional Influence HF: II-POSI 
II:  Colleague Influence HF: II-COL 
II:  Emergent Behaviour HF: II-EMER 
  
Encouraged Disagreement HF: DISAG 
Encouraged Consensus HF: CONCEN 
Competition HF:  EICOMP 
  
BC:  Social Capital BC-SC 
External Advisors or Consultants SC: EADV 
External Stakeholders SC: ESTAK 
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Internal Stakeholders (Staff) SC: ISTAK 
Networks SC: NET 
References SC: REF 
Social Media Membership SC: SM 
     LinkedIn SC: SMLI 
     Facebook SC: SMFB 
Professional Organisation Membership SC: MEMB 
     N.A.R.A.S. SC: NARAS 
Close Personal Relationships SC: PERS 
Spiritual Relationships SC:  SPIR 
Casual Conversations SC: CONV 
  
BC:  Symbolic Capital BC-SYMC 
Branding SYMC: BRAND 
Reputation SYMC: REPU 
Objectified:   SYMC: OB 
     Artefacts – Trades  SYMC: OBTRAD 
     Artefacts - Charts SYMC: OBCHRT 
     Artefacts – Grammy Award SYMC: OBGRMY 
     Artefacts – Certification Records (Gold, Platinum) SYMC: OBCERT 
     Artefacts – SoundScan Rankings SYMC: OBSNDS 
Embodied SYMC: EMB 
Institutionalised SYMC: INST 
   Award Shows SYMC: INSTAS 
   ‘Breaking an Artist’ SYMC: BREAK 
  
BC:  Economic Capital  BC-ECONC 
Low Economic Capital ECONC: LOW 
Modest Economic Capital ECONC: MOD 
High Economic Capital ECONC: HIGH 
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     Cash ECONC: CASH 
     Stocks/Securities ECONC: SEC 
     Bonds ECONC: BOND 
  
  
BC:  Cultural Capital BC-CULTC 
Objectified CULTC: OB 
     Studio Equipment CULTC: OBST 
     Other CULTC: OBOT 
Embodied CULTC: EMB 
     Knowledge  CULTC: EMBK 
          General CULTC: EMBK-G 
          Field (Industry) CULTC: EMBK-I 
     Skills CULTC: EMBK-S 
     Advantages CULTC: EMBK-A 
Institutionalised CULTC: INSTIT 
      
BC:  Doxa BC-DOXA 
    Percentage for management BC-DOXAM 
    Shifting Promotion Landscape BC-DOXAPR 
    Radio Promotion BC-DOXRAD 
      
BC:  Interest BC-INT 
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Appendix C – List of Interview Questions and Disclosures 
 
  Disclosure 
The purpose of this interview is to take a closer look at how you and your 
employees make (big) strategic decisions your firm.  In addition to two key (big) 
strategic decisions that have been made, I will be investigating six other decisions 
from three other firms. A total of eight decisions and the businesses in which they 
were made will be investigated using interviews (all members of the firm that are 
involved actively or passively in making (big) strategic decisions for the company), 
direct observation, and document data sources.  Your expertise and experience in 
the field will be beneficial to better understand how to improve the decision-
making process as it relates to the recorded music industry, especially in this 
turbulent and dynamic market.  In order to do my study effectively, I would ask of 
no more than an hour of your time for an in-depth semi-structured interview.   In 
addition, I would like to examine any secondary sources that may have contributed 
or were involved in making this big decision.   This is for pursuance of a degree 
from the University of Westminster and I understand that all conversations will be 
confidential and the use of pseudonyms will be used in the reporting of the results.   
 
Statement of Research Objectives 
 
 
The objectives listed below will assist in an effort to better understand how 
recorded music industry micro-enterprises make decisions.   
 
Objective 1: How are (big) strategic decisions made in recorded music industry 
micro-enterprises and small enterprises in the U.S.? 
 
Objective 2: Does the strategic decision-making practice within this field differ 
in relation to actors and firms in other fields? 
 
Objective 3: Using Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of decision-making as interplay 
between social, cultural and economic capital, habitus, and field, and what are 
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Example: Case Study 1 – Strategic Decision Practice (Process)#1 
Micro (Agency, dispositions, capital): Actor 
Meso (Habitus): Firm 
Macro (Structure, Objective, Field): Industry 
 
Proposed Data Sources: 
1. Phase1 - Initial CEO Interview 
2. Phase 2 - Interviews from other members of the firm or stakeholders  
   involved in the decision 
  
3. Other Sources (Including the use of artefacts, information about 
external stakeholders or objectified capital surrounding the decision, i.e. 















































3. How would you best describe your social class? 
A. Lower  
B. Working 
C. Middle 
D. Upper Middle 
E. Upper 
 
1. What would best describe your ethnic background? 
 
2. How many other individuals are currently employed in your business? 
__________________________ 
 
3. What year was your business established?  
 
4. What industry sectors do you operate within? (Mark all that apply)  
 _____Recording  
 _____Production 





 _____Other (Please describe below) 
 
5. Highest degree obtained? 
 High School Diploma or Equivalent 
 2-year associates degree 
 4-year bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 J.D. 
 PhD or equivalent 
 
6. What was your degree(s) emphasis?  
 
7. How long have you worked in this industry? What other experience do you 
have in this industry? 




Interview Questions – Owner/Manager/CEO 
 
I want you to think about two big decisions that you had to make in the past two 
years that have had or you anticipate having a big impact on your business.  
 
 
1. Can you describe to me a bit about your company, where you’ve come 
from, key accomplishments, how you’ve changed since you’ve started, 
etc…? 
 
2. What is the legal name of your business?  
 
3. Are there other businesses that exist under this umbrella?  If so, what are 
the names, how would you ‘classify’ them and what is the legal entity 
associated with it? 
 
4. What would you consider to be your firm’s competitive strategy, 
distinctive competencies, competitors and overall performance? 
 
5. Can you describe to me a big decision that you had to make in the past 
two years that had an impact on your business?  What kind of resources 
were needed or allocated to make this happen? Why?  Social, Economic, 
Network, Technological? 
 
6. What was the outcome of this decision?  Was the outcome better than, 
worse or what you expected?  Are you still anticipating a specific 
outcome?  Why? 
 
7. How has this decision impacted the workplace environment?   
 
8. How much of your success in the industry is based upon that decision? 
 
9. Do you feel there is an inherent ‘structure’ or ‘way of doing things’ in this 
business that influences how or what decisions you take?  Past 
experiences, certain expectations?  What do you feel you can control vs. 
what you can’t?  
 
10. Do you feel there are restrictions or limits in the way in which you make 
decisions? Do you wish you could do more? Why? How could or would 
you do that?  
 
11. What role does your current financial position or potential financial 
position play in how you make important decisions?  How about your 
‘level of success’ or position in the industry?  How important is the 
influence upon your social network? 
 
   341 
 
12. Does your competition influence how or what decision you make?  How? 
Why? 
 
13. When a big decision needs to be made that may have a substantial impact 
on your business, do you evaluate different options or potential 
outcomes?  Do you use financial or quantitative analysis tools to help you 
determine the monetary implications?  How long did it take you to decide 
on a particular option? Has this amount of time changed in the past 10 
years? How do you feel you ultimately came to a final decision?  Was 
there a particular ‘a-ha’ moment? 
 
14. Whom do you consult with, if anyone, before you make a big decision? 
Why? 
 
15. Why do you think is important to keep in mind when considering a new 
strategic direction or making a big direction? Why is this important? 
 
16. Are there any external sources that you consult with or use for analysis 
before you make a decision? Why? 
 
17. Do you belong to any professional organisations or clubs? If so which 
ones?  Why?  Has belonging to one of these organisations influenced your 
decision making process in any way – directly or indirectly?  Why?  
 
18. How do you deal with the ‘demand’ uncertainty and rapidly changing 
conditions inherent in this business?  How do you manage the 
uncertainties that come with the temperament of the creative individual 
like an artist? Do you plan for these uncertainties and do they influence 
which direction you decide to go? 
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Interview Questions – Employee 
 
1. Can you describe to me a bit about yourself, where you’ve come from, key 
accomplishments, how you have changed since you have started, 
education, etc…? 
 
2. What would you consider to be your firm’s competitive strategy, 
distinctive competencies, competitors and overall performance? 
 
3.  What is the functional strategy of his or her area?  What do you do? 
 
4.  What is the frequency and nature of interaction with each other member 
of the team?  
 
5.   Discuss specific strategic decision discussed by firm owner/ceo. 
 
6.  How do you feel this decision was made?  Who or what was involved in 
this decision?  Do you think it was a good/right decision/direction taken 
considering your understanding of the organisations goals?  What kind of 
resources were needed or allocated to make this happen? Why?  Social, 
Economic, Network, Technological? 
 
7. What was the outcome of this decision/direction?  Was the outcome 
better than, worse or what you expected?  Are you still anticipating a 
specific outcome?  Why? 
 
8. How has this decision impacted the workplace environment?   
 
9. How much of your success in the industry is based upon that decision? 
 
10. Do you feel there is an inherent ‘structure’ or ‘way of doing things’ in this 
business that influences how or what decisions you take?  Past 
experiences, certain expectations?  What do you feel you can control vs. 
what you can’t? 
 
11. Do you feel there are restrictions or limits in the way in which decisions 
are made? Do you wish you could do more? Why? How could or would 
you do that?  
 
12. What role does the company’s financial position or potential financial 
position play in how you make important decisions?  How about the 
company’s ‘level of success’ or position in the industry?  How important is 
the influence upon your social network? 
 
13. Does your competition influence how or what decision you make?  How? 
Why? 
 
14. When a big decision needs to be made that may have a substantial impact 
on your business, are different options or potential outcomes discussed 
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with you or anyone else that works here?  Do you know if any uses 
financial or quantitative analysis tools to help you determine the 
monetary implications?  If they do, do you think that is effective? Whom 
do you consult with, if anyone, before you make a big decision? Why? 
 
15. What do you think is important to keep in mind when considering a new 
strategic direction or making a big direction? Why is this important? 
 
16. Are there any external sources that you consult with or use for analysis 
before you make a decision? Why? 
 
17. Do you below to any professional organisations or clubs? If so which 
ones?  Why?  Has belonging to one of these organisations influenced your 
decision making process in any way – directly or indirectly?  Why?  
 
18. How do you deal with the ‘demand’ uncertainty and rapidly changing 
conditions inherent in this business?  How do you manage the 
uncertainties that come with the temperament of the creative individual 
like an artist? Do you plan for these uncertainties and do they influence 
which direction you decide to go? 
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